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Mission safety evaluation report for STS-33: Postflight edition

Space Transportation System 33 (STS-33) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights, factors from previous flights that have an impact on this flight, and the factors that are not unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late to include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.

Hill, William C.↗

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-35: Postflight edition

Space Transportation System 35 (STS-35) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and factors that were unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late too include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.

Hill, William C.↗

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors, Volume 1

This is Volume 1 of a two-volume document that collects the verification and validation (V&V) works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. Volume 1 describes the V&V of sixteen capabilities of the PLTEMP/ANL code that were identified by research reactor analysts as frequently used in their thermal-hydraulic analysis. Volume 2 describes the V&V of developments and improvements since the release of PLTEMP/ANL Version 4.3. Each chapter of the document focuses on verifying or validating a specific part of the software that calculates a specific phenomenon, e.g., channel flow calculation, coolant property calculation, heat transfer calculation, and flow instability calculation. Software verification is performed by comparing the code with hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, Mathematica calculation, or MATLAB calculation. The software validation is done by comparing the code with experimental data or a widely tested code like the RELAP5 code. In addition, some PLTEMP/ANL V&V works that are available in the open literature are simply cited in Volume 1 of the document. PLTEMP/ANL has been used in the safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors licensed and converted from highly enriched uranium fuel to low-enriched uranium fuel. A list of such reactors is given in Volume 1 of the document.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environmental Monitoring Plan (Rev. 4)

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program, requires each DOE site to conduct environmental monitoring. Environmental monitoring at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is conducted in order to: (1) verify and support compliance with applicable federal, state, and local environmental laws, regulations, permits, and orders; (2) establish baselines and characterize trends in the physical, chemical, and biological condition of effluent and environmental media; (3) identify potential environmental problems and evaluate the need for remedial actions or measures to mitigate the problems; (4) detect, characterize, and report unplanned releases; (5) evaluate the effectiveness of effluent treatment and control, and pollution abatement programs; and (6)determine compliance with commitments made in environmental impact statements, environmental assessments, safety analysis reports, or other official DOE documents. This Environmental Monitoring Plan (EMP) explains the rationale and design criteria for the environmental monitoring program, extent and frequency of monitoring and measurements, procedures for laboratory analyses, quality assurance (QA) requirements, program implementation procedures, and direction for the preparation and disposition of reports. Changes to the environmental monitoring program may be necessary to allow the use of advanced technology and new data collection techniques. This EMP will document changes in the environmental monitoring program. Guidance for preparation of EMPs is contained in DOE/EH-0173T, Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Technical Review Report for the Model 9978-96 Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (S-SARP-G-00002, Revision 1, March 2009)

This Technical Review Report (TRR) documents the review, performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Staff, at the request of the Department of Energy (DOE), on the 'Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), Model 9978 B(M)F-96', Revision 1, March 2009 (S-SARP-G-00002). The Model 9978 Package complies with 10 CFR 71, and with 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material-1996 Edition (As Amended, 2000)-Safety Requirements', International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1. The Model 9978 Packaging is designed, analyzed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME B&PVC). The review presented in this TRR was performed using the methods outlined in Revision 3 of the DOE's 'Packaging Review Guide (PRG) for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages'. The format of the SARP follows that specified in Revision 2 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regulatory Guide 7.9, i.e., 'Standard Format and Content of Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packages for Radioactive Material'. Although the two documents are similar in their content, they are not identical. Formatting differences have been noted in this TRR, where appropriate. The Model 9978 Packaging is a single containment package, using a 5-inch containment vessel (5CV). It uses a nominal 35-gallon drum package design. In comparison, the Model 9977 Packaging uses a 6-inch containment vessel (6CV). The Model 9977 and Model 9978 Packagings were developed concurrently, and they were referred to as the General Purpose Fissile Material Package, Version 1 (GPFP). Both packagings use General Plastics FR-3716 polyurethane foam as insulation and as impact limiters. The 5CV is used as the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the Model 9975-96 Packaging. The Model 9975-96 Packaging also has the 6CV as its Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV). In comparison, the Model 9975 Packagings use Celotex{trademark} for insulation and as impact limiters. To provide a historical perspective, it is noted that the Model 9975-96 Packaging is a 35-gallon drum package design that has evolved from a family of packages designed by DOE contractors at the Savannah River Site. Earlier package designs, i.e., the Model 9965, the Model 9966, the Model 9967, and the Model 9968 Packagings, were originally designed and certified in the early 1980s. In the 1990s, updated package designs that incorporated design features consistent with the then-newer safety requirements were proposed. The updated package designs at the time were the Model 9972, the Model 9973, the Model 9974, and the Model 9975 Packagings, respectively. The Model 9975 Package was certified by the Packaging Certification Program, under the Office of Safety Management and Operations. The Model 9978 Package has six Content Envelopes: C.1 ({sup 238}Pu Heat Sources), C.2 ( Pu/U Metals), C.3 (Pu/U Oxides, Reserved), C.4 (U Metal or Alloy), C.5 (U Compounds), and C.6 (Samples and Sources). Per 10 CFR 71.59 (Code of Federal Regulations), the value of N is 50 for the Model 9978 Package leading to a Criticality Safety Index (CSI) of 1.0. The Transport Index (TI), based on dose rate, is calculated to be a maximum of 4.1.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Space Station Furnace Facility Management Information System (SSFF-MIS) Development

This report summarizes the chronology, results, and lessons learned from the development of the SSFF-MIS. This system has been nearly two years in development and has yielded some valuable insights into specialized MIS development. General: In December of 1994, the Camber Corporation and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) were contracted to design, develop, and implement a MIS for Marshall Space Flight Center's Space Station Furnace Facility Project. The system was to be accessible from both EBM-Compatible PC and Macintosh platforms. The system was required to contain data manually entered into the MIS as well as data imported from other MSFC sources. Electronic interfaces were established for each data source and retrieval was to be performed at prescribed time intervals. The SOW requirement that predominantly drove the development software selection was the dual-platform (IBM-PC and Macintosh) requirement. The requirement that the system would be maintained by Government personnel influenced the selection of Commercial Off-the-shelf software because of its inherent stability and readily available documentation and support. Microsoft FoxPro Professional 2.6 for Windows and Macintosh was selected as the development tool. This is a software development tool that has been in use for many years. It is stable and powerful. Microsoft has since released the replacement for this product, Microsoft Visual FoxPro, but at the time of this development, it was only available on the Windows platform. The initial contract included included the requirement for capabilities relating to the Work- and Organizational Breakdown Structures, cost (plan and actuals), workforce (plan and actuals), critical path scheduling, trend analysis, procurements and contracts, interface to manufacturing, Safety and Mission Assurance, risk analysis, and technical performance indicators. It also required full documentation of the system and training of users. During the course of the contract, the requirements for Safety and Mission Assurance interface, risk analysis, and technical performance indicators were deleted. Additional capabilities were added as reflected in the Contract Chronology below. Modification 4 added the requirement for Support Contractor manpower data, the ability to manually input data not imported from non-nal sources, a general 'health' indicator screen, and remote usage. Mod 6 included the ability to change the level of planning of Civil Service Manpower at any time and the ability to manually enter Op Codes in the manufacturing data where such codes were not provided by the EMPACS database. Modification 9 included a number of changes to report contents and formats. Modification 11 required the preparation of a detailed System Design Document.

Meade, Robert M.↗

ECAR-7517 Rev 1 MARVEL I&C Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

The purpose of this document is to perform a single-failure analysis through the use of a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the Safety Related components of the MARVEL Instrumentation and Control (I&C) System. The intent is that this document will meet the requirements for a single-failure analysis described in IEEE-379, “IEEE Standard for Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems”, to verify that this design does indeed meet the single failure criterion. Principles of IEEE-352, “IEEE Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems” are followed to ensure the analysis is consistent with industry standards.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Possible safety hazards associated with the operation of the 0.3-m transonic cryogenic tunnel at the NASA Langley Research Center

The 0.3 m Transonic Cryogenic Tunnel (TCT) at the NASA Langley Research Center was built in 1973 as a facility intended to be used for no more than 60 hours in order to verify the validity of the cryogenic wind tunnel concept at transonic speeds. The role of the 0.3 m TCT has gradually changed until now, after over 3000 hours of operation, it is classified as a major NASA research facility and, under the administration of the Experimental Techniques Branch, it is used extensively for the testing of airfoils at high Reynolds numbers and for the development of various technologies related to the efficient operation and use of cryogenic wind tunnels. The purpose of this report is to document the results of a recent safety analysis of the 0.3 m TCT facility. This analysis was made as part of an on going program with the Experimental Techniques Branch designed to ensure that the existing equipment and current operating procedures of the 0.3 m TCT facility are acceptable in terms of today's standards of safety for cryogenic systems.

Webster, T. J.↗

Sense and Avoid Safety Analysis for Remotely Operated Unmanned Aircraft in the National Airspace System. Version 5

This document describes a method to demonstrate that a UAS, operating in the NAS, can avoid collisions with an equivalent level of safety compared to a manned aircraft. The method is based on the calculation of a collision probability for a UAS , the calculation of a collision probability for a base line manned aircraft, and the calculation of a risk ratio given by: Risk Ratio = P(collision_UAS)/P(collision_manned). A UAS will achieve an equivalent level of safety for collision risk if the Risk Ratio is less than or equal to one. Calculation of the probability of collision for UAS and manned aircraft is accomplished through event/fault trees.

Carreno, Victor↗

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors

The document compiles in a single volume the verification and validation works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. The verification of sixteen capabilities of the PLTEMP/ANL Version 4.3 code that were identified by research reactor analysts as frequently used in their thermal-hydraulic analysis are described and documented. Each chapter of the document deals with the verification or validation of a specific model. The model verification is usually done by comparing the code with hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, or Mathematica calculation. The model validation is done by comparing the code with experimental data or a widely tested code like the RELAP5 code. In addition, some PLTEMP/ANL verification works that are available in the open literature are simply referenced and not included in the document. PLTEMP/ANL has been used in conversion safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors that have been licensed and converted. A list of such reactors is given.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors (Code Version 4.3)

The document compiles in a single volume the verification and validation works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. The verification of sixteen capabilities of the PLTEMP/ANL Version 4.3 code that were identified by research reactor analysts as frequently used in their thermal-hydraulic analysis are described and documented. Each chapter of the document deals with the verification or validation of a specific part of the software that calculates a specific phenomenon, e.g., channel flow calculation, coolant property calculation, heat transfer calculation, and flow instability calculation. The software verification work is usually done by comparing the code with hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, or Mathematica calculation. The software validation is done by comparing the code with experimental data or a widely tested code like the RELAP5 code. In addition, some PLTEMP/ANL verification works that are available in the open literature are simply referenced and not included in the document. PLTEMP/ANL has been used in conversion safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors that have been licensed and converted. A list of such reactors is given.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

HyRAM V1.1 User Guide

Hydrogen Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM) is a software toolkit that provides a basis for quantitative risk assessment and consequence modeling for hydrogen infrastructure and transportation systems. HyRAM integrates validated, analytical models of hydrogen behavior, statistics, and a standardized QRA approach to generate useful, repeatable data for the safety analysis of various hydrogen systems. HyRAM is a software developed by Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Department of Energy. This document demonstrates how to use HyRAM to recreate a hydrogen system and obtain relevant data regarding potential risk. Specific examples are utilized throughout this document, providing detailed tutorials of HyRAM features with respect to hydrogen system safety analysis and risk assessment.

08 HYDROGEN↗

HyRAM V2.0 User Guide

Hydrogen Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM) is a software toolkit that provides a basis for quantitative risk assessment and consequence modeling for hydrogen infrastructure and transportation systems. HyRAM integrates validated, analytical models of hydrogen behavior, statistics, and a standardized QRA approach to generate useful, repeatable data for the safety analysis of various hydrogen systems. HyRAM is a software developed by Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Department of Energy. This document demonstrates how to use HyRAM to recreate a hydrogen system and obtain relevant data regarding potential risk. Specific examples are utilized throughout this document, providing detailed tutorials of HyRAM features with respect to hydrogen system safety analysis and risk assessment.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Defining and Reasoning about Model-based Safety Analysis: A Review

Model-based safety analysis (MBSA) has been around for over two decades. The benefits of MBSA have been well-documented in the literature, such as tackling complexity, introducing Formal Methods to eliminate the ambiguity in the traditional safety analysis, using automation to replace the error-prone manual safety modeling process, and ensuring consistency between the design model and the safety model. However, there is still a lack of consensus on what MBSA even is. This paper provides an approach towards developing such a consensus

model-based↗

Managing Aging Effects on Dry Cask Storage Systems for Extended Long-Term Storage and Transportation of Used Fuel

The cancellation of the Yucca Mountain repository program in the United States raises the prospect of extended long-term storage (i.e., >120 years) and deferred transportation of used fuel at operating and decommissioned nuclear power plant sites. Under U.S. federal regulations contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 72.42, the initial license term for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) must not exceed 40 years from the date of issuance. Licenses may be renewed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the expiration of the license term upon application by the licensee for a period not to exceed 40 years. Application for ISFSI license renewals must include the following: (1) Time-limited aging analyses (TLAAs) that demonstrate that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety will continue to perform their intended function for the requested period of extended operation; and (2) a description of the aging management program (AMP) for management of issues associated with aging that could adversely affect SSCs important to safety. In addition, the application must also include design bases information as documented in the most recent updated final safety analysis report as required by 10 CFR 72.70. Information contained in previous applications, statements, or reports filed with the Commission under the license may be incorporated by reference provided that those references are clear and specific. The NRC has recently issued the Standard Review Plan (SRP) for renewal of used-fuel dry cask storage system (DCSS) licenses and Certificates of Compliance (CoCs), NUREG-1927, under which NRC may renew a specific license or a CoC for a term not to exceed 40 years. Both the license and the CoC renewal applications must contain revised technical requirements and operating conditions (fuel storage, surveillance and maintenance, and other requirements) for the ISFSI and DCSS that address aging effects that could affect the safe storage of the used fuel. The information contained in the license and CoC renewal applications will require NRC review to verify that the aging effects on the SSCs in DCSSs/ ISFSIs are adequately managed for the period of extended operation. To date, all of the ISFSIs located across the United States with more than 1,500 dry casks loaded with used fuel have initial license terms of 20 years; three ISFSIs (Surry, H.B. Robinson and Oconee) have received their renewed licenses for 20 years, and two other ISFSIs (Calvert Cliffs and Prairie Island) have applied for license renewal for 40 years. This report examines issues related to managing aging effects on the SSCs in DCSSs/ISFSIs for extended long-term storage and transportation of used fuels, following an approach similar to that of the Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) report, NUREG-1801, for the aging management and license renewal of nuclear power plants. The report contains five chapters and an appendix on quality assurance for aging management programs for used-fuel dry storage systems. Chapter I of the report provides an overview of the ISFSI license renewal process based on 10 CFR 72 and the guidance provided in NUREG-1927. Chapter II contains definitions and terms for structures and components in DCSSs, materials, environments, aging effects, and aging mechanisms. Chapter III and Chapter IV contain generic TLAAs and AMPs, respectively, that have been developed for managing aging effects on the SSCs important to safety in the dry cask storage system designs described in Chapter V. The summary descriptions and tabulations of evaluations of AMPs and TLAAs for the SSCs that are important to safety in Chapter V include DCSS designs (i.e., NUHOMS{reg_sign}, HI-STORM 100, Transnuclear (TN) metal cask, NAC International S/T storage cask, ventilated storage cask (VSC-24), and the Westinghouse MC-10 metal dry storage cask) that have been and continue to be used by utilities across the country for dry storage of used fuel to date. The goal of this report is to help establish the technical basis for extended long-term storage and transportation of used fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Managing Aging Effects on Dry Cask Storage Systems for Extended Long-Term Storage and Transportation of Used Fuel – Revision 1

Because there is currently no designated disposal site for used nuclear fuel in the United States, the nation faces the prospect of extended long-term storage (i.e., >120 years) and deferred transportation of used fuel at operating and decommissioned nuclear power plant sites. Under U.S. federal regulations contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 72.42, the initial license term for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) must not exceed 40 years from the date of issuance. Licenses may be renewed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the expiration of the license term upon application by the licensee for a period not to exceed 40 years. Applications for ISFSI license renewals must include the following: 1. Time-limited aging analyses (TLAAs) that demonstrate that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety will continue to perform their intended function for the requested period of extended operation, and 2. A description of the aging management program (AMP) for management of issues associated with aging that could adversely affect SSCs important to safety. In addition, the application must include design basis information as documented in the most recently updated final safety analysis report, as required by 10 CFR 72.70. Information contained in previous applications, statements, or reports filed with the Commission under the license may be incorporated by reference, provided that these references are clear and specific.

Chopra, O. K.↗

Managing Aging Effects on Dry Cask Storage Systems for Extended Long-Term Storage and Transportation of Used Fuel (Rev. 2)

At present, the United States does not have a designated disposal site for used nuclear fuel — the nation therefore faces the prospect of extended long‐term storage (i.e., >60 years) and deferred transportation of used fuel at operating and decommissioned nuclear power plant sites. Under current U.S. federal regulations contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 72.42, the initial license term for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) must not exceed 40 years from the date of issuance (20 years before the rule change in 2010 that became effective in 2011). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) may renew licenses at the expiration of the license term upon application by the licensee for a period not to exceed 40 years. Applications for ISFSI license renewals must include the following: 1. Time‐limited aging analyses (TLAAs) that demonstrate that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety will continue to perform their intended function for the requested period of extended operation and 2. A description of the aging management program (AMP) for the management of issues associated with aging that could adversely affect SSCs important to safety. In addition, the application must include design basis information as documented in the most recently updated final safety analysis report, as required by 10 CFR 72.70. Information contained in previous applications, statements, or reports filed with the Commission under the license may be incorporated by reference, provided that these references are clear and specific. The NRC has issued the “Standard Review Plan for Renewal of Spent Fuel Dry Cask Storage System Licenses and Certificates of Compliance,” NUREG‐1927, under which NRC may renew a specific license or a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) for a term not to exceed 40 years. Both the license and the CoC renewal applications must contain revised technical requirements and operating conditions (fuel storage, surveillance and maintenance, and other requirements) for the ISFSI and dry cask storage system (DCSS) that address aging effects that could affect the safe storage of the used fuel. The information contained in the license and CoC renewal applications will require NRC review to verify that the aging effects on the SSCs in DCSSs/ISFSIs are adequately managed for the requested period of extended operation. To date, all of the ISFSIs across the United States with more than 1,500 dry casks loaded with used fuel have initial license terms of 20 years — three ISFSIs (Surry, H.B. Robinson, and Oconee) have received their renewed licenses for 40 years, and two other ISFSIs (Calvert Cliffs and Prairie Island) have applied for license renewal for 40 years. In addition, renewal of the CoC for the VSC‐24 system is pending approval from NRC.

Chopra, O. K.↗