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At least 145 records · Page 8

The Final Demise of East Tennessee Technology Park Building [Slides]

Building K-33 was constructed in 1954 as the final section of the five-stage uranium enrichment cascade at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant (ORGDP). The two original building (K-25 and K-27) were used to produce weapons grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). Building K-29, K-31, and K-33 were added to produce low enriched uranium (LEU) for nuclear power plant fuel. During ORGDP operations K-33 produced a peak enrichment of 2.5%. Thousands of tons of reactor tails fed into gaseous diffusion plants in the 1950s and early 1960s introducing some fission products and transuranics. Building K-33 was a two-story, 25-meters (82-feet) tall structure with approximately 30 hectare (64 acres) of floor space. The Operations (first) Floor contained offices, change houses, feed vaporization rooms, and auxiliary equipment to support enrichment operations. The Cell (second) Floor contained the enrichment process equipment and was divided into eight process units (designated K-902-1 through K-902-8). Each unit contained ten cells, and each cell contained eight process stages (diffusers) for a total of 640 enrichment stages. 1985: LEU buildings were taken off-line after the anticipated demand for uranium enrichment failed to materialize. 1987: LEU buildings were placed in permanent shutdown. Process equipment were maintained in a shutdown state. 1997: DOE signed an Action Memorandum for equipment removal and decontamination of Buildings K-29, K-31, K-33; BNFL awarded contract to reindustrialize the buildings under the Three Buildings D&D and Recycle Project. 2002: Equipment removal complete and effort shifts to vacuuming, chemical cleaning, scabbling, etc. 2005: Decontamination efforts in K-33 cease. Building left with significant 99 Tc contamination on metal structures and PCB contamination in concrete. Uranium, transuranics, and fission products also present on building shell. 2009: DOE targets Building K-33 for demolition. 2010: ORAU contracted to characterize Building K-33 for final disposition at the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) in Oak Ridge. ORAU collected 439 samples from May and June. LATA Sharp started removing transite panels in September. 2011: LATA Sharp began demolition in January and expects the last waste shipment to EMWMF in September. Approximately 237,000 m 3 (310,000 yd 3 , bulked) of waste taken to EMWMF in 23,000 truckloads expected by project completion.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Evaluation of Fire Station 23-425, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to modernize the Mercury town site at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. These plans—including anticipated demolitions, consolidations, and rebuilding at Mercury—are considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District, including the identification of its contributing components. This district was recommended eligible for listing to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP or National Register) under Criteria A and C but was unevaluated under Criteria B and D at that time. The Mercury Historic District contains 153 individual landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, all except one are recommended as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the land now called the NNSS was named the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This report concerns the proposed demolition of the 1966 Fire Station 23-425 in Mercury as a phase of the larger modernization program mentioned above. Further evaluation of this property indicates that it does not meet any of the Secretary of the Interior’s Significance Criteria for eligibility for the NRHP at either the national or local levels. However, it does remain an important contributing element of Mercury Historic District. This is part of a series of reports.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of 1950s-Era Architectural Resources in Blocks 10, 11, and 17, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to modernize the Mercury town site at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. These plans, including anticipated demolitions, consolidations, and rebuilding at Mercury, are considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing components (Reno et al. 2018). This district was recommended eligible to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP or National Register) under Criteria A and C but was unevaluated under Criteria B and D at that time. The Mercury Historic District contains 154 individual landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, DRI recommends all except one as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the land now called the NNSS was formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This report is concerned with evaluating resources dating to the 1950s in Blocks 10, 11, and 17 in Mercury prior to the proposed demolition of 22 resources in Blocks 10 and 11 as a phase of the larger modernization program mentioned above. Although the Mercury Historic District as a whole is eligible to the National Register, further evaluation of these properties as detailed in this report indicates that none are individually eligible under any of the Secretary of Interior’s Significance Criteria, either at the national or local level. This is one report in the report series "Evaluation, Finding of Effect, and Mitigation Documentation for 1950s-Era Architectural Resources, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada".

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Air Dispersion Modeling of Radioactive Releases During Proposed 236Z Rubble Pile Removal Activities

This report is part of the planning process for the removal of the 236Z rubble remaining as of January 1, 2018, at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site. This report documents an analysis considering standard techniques for the removal of demolition rubble. It does not document any decisions about the removal approaches. This document is intended to guide the establishment of a boundary for the application of an air monitoring regime. Atmospheric dispersion modeling using estimated release rates has been conducted to provide information on the location and levels of radioactive contamination that may be expected as the result of rubble removal activities. Hourly meteorological data collected over a 6-year period (2004–2009) were used to examine the effects of wind speed, direction, and stability on projected concentrations of contaminants in air and deposited on nearby surfaces. The source terms modeled in this report were based on the residual transuranic contamination levels that are anticipated to remain in the 236Z rubble following building demolition. The potential airborne concentrations were established using the five-factor formula from DOE-HDBK-3010 (DOE 1994) considering material-at-risk, damage ratio, airborne release fraction, respirable fraction, and leak path factor. Radioactive contamination emissions were calculated by release mechanism and rubble pile area for on-shift and off-shift activities. The emissions from the applicable sources were combined to provide emissions estimates for each day from each cleanup area. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) AERMOD computer code was used to estimate atmospheric dispersion and deposition of the released radioactive materials in the immediate vicinity of the planned rubble removal activities Both airborne and surface concentrations were modeled with AERMOD. Hourly derived air concentrations (DAC) were modeled for an array of receptors covering the rubble pile site and surrounding area. Peak (95th and 99th percentile) values of time-integrated air concentrations at these receptor points are derived from these hourly values, with modeling results reported as total incremental air concentrations in DAC-hours occurring over the selected time period. Total accumulated deposition amounts were also evaluated with AERMOD using the same array of receptors, with results reported as disintegrations per minute (dpm) per 100 cm2. Each rubble pile was considered in terms of its size, location, and estimated contamination levels. The modeling was based on the assumed sequence of the rubble removal activities. The results in this report are based on cleanup schedules and methods proposed by CHPRC. As of January 1, 2018, there are broadly three large rubble piles (west, footprint, and east) remaining of the 236Z Building process cell. It is assumed that the overall cleanup will require either 1) 30 days over a 6-week period, or 2) 60 days over a 12-week period. Work was assumed to be performed during 10-hour day shifts. The analysis shows that some releases of radioactive material are to be anticipated during the cleanup of the 236Z rubble piles. The modeling results presented here are closely tied to the details of how the rubble removal is to be conducted. The results indicate that for the rubble removal, the radiological exposures from the planned activities are predicted to be well below the designated limits for air and soil exposures. The cleanup of the 236Z main process cell rubble is expected to release some alpha-emitting radionuclides. However, results based on 6 years of hourly climatological data, two representative cleanup periods, realistic mitigating actions, and a bounding source term indicate that concentrations at the fence line of the PFP facilities should remain well below 12 DAC-hours/week. The results presented in this report are a reevaluation of a subset of the results presented in PNNL-20173 Rev. 4.

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The Architecture of Area 12 Camp - Nevada's Atomic Ghost Town. An Architectural Survey of Area 12 Camp, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish 10 buildings and one structure in Area 12 Camp at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Program, and Environmental Management mission requirements and to reduce dangers to site workers from some of these resources. These demolitions constitute an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. These resources were recorded and evaluated as individually ineligible for the National Register of Historic Places (National Register or NRHP) by Menocal and Shaw (2019). Upon review by the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) and internal review by Desert Research Institute (DRI) and NNSA/NFO staff, it was determined that these resources needed to be rerecorded and evaluated in relation to what appeared to be a National Register-eligible Historic District made up of the entirety of Area 12 Camp. Based on preliminary information, it appeared that all 11 resources would likely be contributing elements of that historic district. With that assumption in mind, recording of the entire proposed Area 12 Camp Historic District was done for three purposes. First, it would result in a definitive significance evaluation of the 11 resources in question. Second, recording of the entire camp would be offered as an appropriate mitigation measure for the demolition of these resources. Third, it would present an essential background for future management of resources within the district boundaries. Prior to the present survey, Area 12 Camp had not yet been systematically recorded; therefore, DRI surveyed an area of approximately 229 acres for architectural resources. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Area 12 Camp Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D372), including the identification of its contributing components. This district is recommended eligible for the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A and C. It is unevaluated under Criteria B and D. The Area 12 Historic District contains 71 Principal Resources, which include landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, 69 (including 10 of the 11 resources to be removed) are recommended as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1960 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the government reservation now called the NNSS was named the Nevada Test Site (NTS).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

300 Area D4 Project Fiscal Year 2009 Building Completion Report

This report summarizes the deactivation, decontamination, decommissioning, and demolition activities of seven facilities in the 300 Area of the Hanford Site in fiscal year 2009. The D4 of these facilities included characterization; engineering; removal of hazardous and radiologically contaminated materials; equipment removal; utility disconnection; deactivation, decontamination, demolition of the structure; and stabilization or removal of slabs and foundations. This report also summarizes the nine below-grade slabs/foundations removed in FY09 of buildings demolished in previous fiscal years.

300 Area↗

Application for a Permit to Operate a Class III Solid Waste Disposal Site at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Asbestiform Low-Level Solid Waste Disposal Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is located approximately 105 km (65 mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) is the federal lands management authority for the NNSS and National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec) is the Management and Operations contractor. Access on and off the NNSS is tightly controlled, restricted, and guarded on a 24-hour basis. The NNSS is posted with signs along its entire perimeter. NSTec is the operator of all solid waste disposal sites on the NNSS. The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) is the location of the permitted facility for the Solid Waste Disposal Site (SWDS). The Area 5 RWMS is located near the eastern edge of the NNSS (Figure 1), approximately 26 km (16 mi) north of Mercury, Nevada. The Area 5 RWMS is used for the disposal of low-level waste (LLW) and mixed low-level waste. Many areas surrounding the RWMS have been used in conducting nuclear tests. The site will be used for the disposal of regulated Asbestiform Low-Level Waste (ALLW), small quantities of low-level radioactive hydrocarbon-burdened (LLHB) media and debris, LLW, LLW that contains Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water, and small quantities of LLHB demolition and construction waste (hereafter called permissible waste). Waste containing free liquids, or waste that is regulated as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) or state-of-generation hazardous waste regulations, will not be accepted for disposal at the site. Waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that will be accepted at the disposal site is regulated asbestos-containing materials (RACM) and PCB Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water. The term asbestiform is used throughout this document to describe RACM. The disposal site will be used as a depository of permissible waste generated both on site and off site. All generators designated by NNSA/NSO will be eligible to dispose regulated ALLW at the Asbestiform Low-Level Waste Disposal Site in accordance with the DOE/NV-325, Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC, current revision). Approval will be given by NNSA/NSO to generators that have successfully demonstrated through process knowledge (PK) and/or sampling and analysis that the waste is low-level, contains asbestiform material, or contains PCB Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water, or small quantities of LLHB demolition and construction waste and does not contain prohibited waste materials. Each waste stream will be approved through the Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program (RWAP), which ensures that the waste meets acceptance requirements outlined in the NNSSWAC.

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A framework for understanding waste management studies in construction

During the past decades, construction and demolition (C and D) waste issues have received increasing attention from both practitioners and researchers around the world. A plethora of research relating to C and D waste management (WM) has been published in scholarly journals. However, a comprehensive understanding of the C and D WM research is somehow absent in spite of its proliferation. The aim of this paper is to develop a framework that helps readers understand the C and D WM research as archived in selected journals. Papers under the topic of C and D WM are retrieved based on a set of rigorous procedures. The information of these papers is then analyzed with the assistance of the Qualitative Social Research (QSR) software package NVivo. A framework for understanding C and D WM research is created based on the analytic results. By following the framework, a bibliometric analysis of research in C and D WM is presented, followed by an in-depth literature analysis. It is found that C and D generation, reduction, and recycling are the three major topics in the discipline of C and D WM. Future research is recommended to (a) investigate C and D waste issues in wider scopes including design, maintenance and demolition, (b) develop a unified measurement for waste generation so that WM performance can be compared across various economies, and (c) enhance effectiveness of WM approaches (e.g. waste charging scheme) based on new WM concepts (e.g. Extended Producer Responsibility). In addition to the above research findings, the approach for producing the research framework can be useful references for other studies which attempt to understand the research of a given discipline.

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In Situ Decommissioning (ISD) Concepts and Approaches for Excess Nuclear Facilities Decommissioning End State - 13367

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) currently has numerous radiologically contaminated excess nuclear facilities waiting decommissioning throughout the Complex. The traditional decommissioning end state is complete removal. This commonly involves demolishing the facility, often segregating various components and building materials and disposing of the highly contaminated, massive structures containing tons of highly contaminated equipment and piping in a (controlled and approved) landfill, at times hundreds of miles from the facility location. Traditional demolition is costly, and results in significant risks to workers, as well as risks and costs associated with transporting the materials to a disposal site. In situ decommissioning (ISD or entombment) is a viable alternative to demolition, offering comparable and potentially more protective protection of human health and the environment, but at a significantly reduced cost and worker risk. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has completed the initial ISD deployment for radiologically contaminated facilities. Two reactor (P and R Reactors) facilities were decommissioned in 2011 using the ISD approach through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The SRS ISD approach resolved programmatic, regulatory and technical/engineering issues associated with avoiding the potential hazards and cost associated with generating and disposing of an estimated 124,300 metric tons (153,000 m{sup 3}) of contaminated debris per reactor. The DOE Environmental Management Office of Deactivation and Decommissioning and Facility Engineering, through the Savannah River National Laboratory, is currently investigating potential monitoring techniques and strategies to assess ISD effectiveness. As part of SRS's strategic planning, the site is seeking to leverage in situ decommissioning concepts, approaches and facilities to conduct research, design end states, and assist in regulatory interactions in broad national and international government and private industry decommissioning applications. SRS offers critical services based upon the SRS experience in decommissioning and reactor entombment technology (e.g., grout formulations for varying conditions, structural and material sciences). The SRS ISD approach follows a systems engineering framework to achieve a regulatory acceptable end state based on established protocols, attains the final end state with minimal long stewardship requirements, protects industrial workers, and protects groundwater and the environment. The ISD systems engineering framework addresses key areas of the remedial process planning, technology development and deployment, and assessment to attain the ultimate goal of natural resource stewardship and protecting the public. The development and deployment of the SRS ISD approach has established a path for ISD of other large nuclear facilities in the United States and around the globe as an acceptable remedial alternative for decommissioning nuclear facilities. (authors)

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Concepts and Tests for the Remote-Controlled Dismantling of the Biological Shield and Form work of the KNK Reactor - 13425

The compact sodium-cooled nuclear reactor facility Karlsruhe (KNK), a prototype Fast Breeder, is currently in an advanced stage of dismantling. Complete dismantling is based on 10 partial licensing steps. In the frame of the 9. decommissioning permit, which is currently ongoing, the dismantling of the biological shield is foreseen. The biological shield consists of heavy reinforced concrete with built-in steel fitments, such as form-work of the reactor tank, pipe sleeves, ventilation channels, and measuring devices. Due to the activation of the inner part of the biological shield, dismantling has to be done remote-controlled. During a comprehensive basic design phase a practical dismantling strategy was developed. Necessary equipment and tools were defined. Preliminary tests revealed that hot wire plasma cutting is the most favorable cutting technology due to the geometrical boundary conditions, the varying distance between cutter and material, and the heavy concrete behind the steel form-work. The cutting devices will be operated remotely via a carrier system with an industrial manipulator. The carrier system has expandable claws to adjust to the varying diameter of the reactor shaft during dismantling progress. For design approval of this prototype development, interaction between manipulator and hot wire plasma cutting was tested in a real configuration. For the demolition of the concrete structure, an excavator with appropriate tools, such as a hydraulic hammer, was selected. Other mechanical cutting devices, such as a grinder or rope saw, were eliminated because of concrete containing steel spheres added to increase the shielding factor of the heavy concrete. Dismantling of the biological shield will be done in a ring-wise manner due to static reasons. During the demolition process, the excavator is positioned on its tripod in three concrete recesses made prior to the dismantling of the separate concrete rings. The excavator and the manipulator carrier system will be operated alternately. Main boundary condition for all the newly designed equipment is the decommissioning housing of limited space within the reactor building containment. To allow for a continuous removal of the concrete rubble, an additional opening on the lowest level of the reactor shaft will be made. All equipment and the interaction of the tools have to be tested before use in the controlled area. Therefore a full-scale model of the biological shield will be provided in a mock-up. The tests will be performed in early 2014. The dismantling of the biological shield is scheduled for 2015. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Oak Ridge Cleanup Vision: Moving to the Future by Cleaning Up the Past - 13291

The Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (EM) strives to be the leader in the Department of Energy's (DOE's) EM Complex regarding successful and safe project execution and stakeholder interactions that yield positive results. EM's goal has been to become 'Investment Worthy' and, in order to accomplish that important objective, has also had to improve communications both within and outside of the Department. One of our most important missions is to assist the Department in achieving the sustainability goals set forth in Executive Order 13514. In this regard, EM's primary role is to return land to beneficial use and reduce energy impacts and maintenance costs by demolishing unneeded and deteriorating structures and remediating environmental contamination. Recent accomplishments toward meeting these goals include significant progress in the decontamination and demolition of the country's largest facility, the former K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Building, constructed in 1942 to enrich uranium to help end World War II; the disposition of the first phase of Uranium-233 material from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) which involved the transfer of Zero Power Reactor Plates to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); and a host of other project successes associated with transuranic (TRU) waste processing, hot cell decontamination and demolition, remediation of highly contaminated soils and burial grounds, and removal of mercury from storm sewers and surface waters. With regard to successful stakeholder interactions, recent accomplishments include a new method for collaboration that has renewed EM's working relationship with the regulators, and success in completing an extensive consultation process with over a dozen parties on the historic preservation of the former Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, which is now called the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP). Regarding improved communications, EM has successfully revised Program priorities and has received buy-in from the leadership in Headquarters, the regulators, and the community. Issues EM was facing in 2009 are presented. Resulting lessons learned and subsequent changes that the Office has gone through in the past several years in order to improve performance in the safe execution of work, relationships with external stakeholders, and communications both internally and externally are discussed. Results of these efforts are provided as a summary of Program accomplishments, including a strong focus on the future. EM's motto, Moving to the Future by Cleaning up the Past, will be demonstrated through the Program's mission, which includes protecting the region's health and environment; ensuring the continuation of ongoing vital missions being conducted by DOE on the Oak Ridge Reservation; and making clean land available for future use at all three sites, with a near-term focus on Re-industrialization of ETTP. (authors)

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Lessons Learned from the Application of Bulk Characterization to Individual Containers on the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor Decommissioning Project at Brookhaven National Laboratory - 12056

When conducting environmental cleanup or decommissioning projects, characterization of the material to be removed is often performed when the material is in-situ. The actual demolition or excavation and removal of the material can result in individual containers that vary significantly from the original bulk characterization profile. This variance, if not detected, can result in individual containers exceeding Department of Transportation regulations or waste disposal site acceptance criteria. Bulk waste characterization processes were performed to initially characterize the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor (BGRR) graphite pile and this information was utilized to characterize all of the containers of graphite. When the last waste container was generated containing graphite dust from the bottom of the pile, but no solid graphite blocks, the material contents were significantly different in composition from the bulk waste characterization. This error resulted in exceedance of the disposal site waste acceptance criteria. Brookhaven Science Associates initiated an in-depth investigation to identify the root causes of this failure and to develop appropriate corrective actions. The lessons learned at BNL have applicability to other cleanup and demolition projects which characterize their wastes in bulk or in-situ and then extend that characterization to individual containers. (authors)

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Progress on Footprint Reduction at the Hanford Site - 12406

The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) continues to reduce the footprint of legacy sites throughout the EM complex. Footprint reduction is being accomplished by focusing cleanup activities on decontamination and demolition of excess contaminated facilities, soil and groundwater remediation, and solid waste disposition. All of these initiatives are being accomplished with established technologies in proven regulatory frameworks. Ultimately, completion of these environmental cleanup activities will reduce the monitoring and maintenance costs associated with managing large federal facilities, allowing EM to place more focus on other high priority cleanup efforts and facilitate a successful transition to land-term stewardship of these sites. Through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) investment, the Department's cleanup footprint has been reduced by 45 percent to date, from 2411 km{sup 2} (931 mi{sup 2}) to 1336 km{sup 2} (516 mi{sup 2}s). With this significant progress on footprint reduction, the Department is on track towards their goal to reduce its overall footprint by approximately 90 percent by 2015. In addition, some areas cleaned up may become available for alternate uses (i.e. recreation, conservation, preservation, industrialization or development). Much of the work to reduce the complex's footprint occurred at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Hanford Site in Washington, but cleanup continues across the complex. Footprint reduction is progressing well at the Hanford Site, supported predominantly through ARRA investment. To date, 994 km{sup 2} (384 mi{sup 2}) (65%) of footprint reduction have been achieved at Hanford, with a goal to achieve a 90% reduction by Fiscal Year 2015. The DOE EM and DOE Richland Operations Office, continue to make great progress to reduce the legacy footprint of the Hanford Site. Footprint reduction is being accomplished by focusing cleanup activities on decontamination and demolition of excess facilities, both contaminated and uncontaminated, waste site cleanup activities, and debris pile removal. All of these activities can be accomplished with proven technologies and within established regulatory frameworks. Footprint reduction goals for Fiscal Year 2011 were exceeded, largely with the help of ARRA funding. As cleanup projects are completed and the total area requiring cleanup shrinks, overall costs for surveillance and maintenance operations and infrastructure services decrease. This work completion and decrease in funding requirements to maintain waste sites and antiquated facilities allows more focus on high priority site missions (i.e. groundwater remediation, tank waste disposition, etc.) and moves Site areas closer to transition from EM to the Legacy Management program. The progress in the Hanford footprint reduction effort will help achieve success in these other important mission areas. (authors)

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Humboldt Bay Power Plant Decommissioning Progress Update - 16358

Decommissioning of the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG and E) Company Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) Unit 3 nuclear facility achieved several significant milestones in the summer and fall of 2015 when the RPV Segmentation Project completed, the Caisson Removal project began and the Unit 3 Refueling building (RFB) and Main Plant Ventilation system were released for Open Air Demolition (OAD). At the end of 2014 the Civil Works prime contractor Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB and I) was also awarded the contract to complete the RPV Segmentation. This work scope continued to use the First of a Kind (FOAK) segmentation equipment that was designed and fabricated for the HBPP Reactor Project. The preparation for RFB OAD was part of the original Civil Works contract scope. It was important that this work and the segmentation of the reactor shell be finished to allow a portion of the Refueling building to be demolished to continue the installation of the perimeter water cutoff wall and the caisson Support of Excavation (SOE) shoring system. The CB and I Civil Works contract endorsed the October 2012 HBPP Caisson Removal Feasibility Study approach to install a perimeter cutoff wall intended to stop movement of groundwater by installation of cement-bentonite (CB) backfill in a slurry wall trench excavated to a depth of 53 meters and tied into the Unit F clay layer. The CB and I on-site project manager and principal engineer from their home office re-evaluated the design approach outlined in their proposal and awarded contract. As CB and I further developed design plans, an option to complete the perimeter wall with Cutter Soil Mixing (CSM) technology was developed. CB and I described the CSM process as a modified trench cutter technique, to be used for both perimeter groundwater cutoff, and for caisson demolition SOE. CSM technology blends slurry while mixing soil on the down stroke, and injects cement into the blended soil cuttings on the upstroke to create a cemented 'cutoff wall'. CB and I proposed several variations for three key support elements: the perimeter cutoff wall; the dewatering well system; and the caisson SOE shoring system. The proposed alternatives brought many enhancements in the design and integration of the work to be executed. CB and I personnel were persistent in seeing their vision through that resulted in a significant benefit in worker safety and schedule enhancement (early finish by 5 months). (authors)

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Major Achievements of the Springfields Decommissioning Program - 16512

Since the 1940's, Springfields has manufactured fuel products for the UK's nuclear power stations and for international customers. The early operations were in support of the atomic weapons program, closely followed by fuel manufacture for electricity generation via the Magnox power stations commencing in the late 1950's. In 2005, responsibility for the assets and liabilities of Springfields was transferred to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). A new company, Springfields Fuels Limited, was created to run the site, which was managed and operated by Westinghouse Electric UK Ltd on the NDA's behalf. On April 1, 2010, Westinghouse entered into an agreement with the NDA for a long-term lease of the Springfields site, which transferred responsibility for the commercial fuel manufacturing business and Springfields Fuels Limited to Westinghouse. Today, the main Springfields activities include: - Oxide fuels for Advanced Gas-cooled and Light Water Reactors, as well as intermediate fuel products, such as powders, granules and pellets, - Manufacture of Uranium Hexafluoride (now in Care and Maintenance), - Processing and recovery of Uranium residues, - Decommissioning and demolition of redundant plants and buildings. Some 120 plant buildings and support facilities have been successfully decommissioned and demolished in the period 1996 to date. These range from 1940's buildings, subsequently converted for nuclear fuel manufacture, together with some of the formerly sealed chemical agent manufacture and storage facilities. Decommissioning of the now redundant Magnox manufacturing facilities is ongoing at Springfields without compromising the other site operations. Westinghouse is managing all activities related to the whole lifecycle, planning, design, safety case, radiation protection, Post Operational Clean Out (POCO), service diversions, characterization, decommissioning all phases through to ground remediation, waste disposal and agreed end states. Decommissioning of process plants starts with the removal of the majority of radiological activity or hazard contained within the plant. This is known as Post Operational Clean Out. Once this is complete, the plant may be dismantled. Work is scoped and defined within packages (at plant or cell level) to aid control and commercial monitoring as the decommissioning is progressed. This package approach also enables clean or lightly contaminated items to be removed separately to aid potential re-cycling and minimize decontamination and waste disposal costs. Westinghouse is further optimising work package delivery by planning parallel POCO and Decommissioning work phases within plant at a cell level to systematically remove redundant plant and reduce hazard earlier, whilst optimising use of both internal and external resources to reduce total project cost. Waste and Residues from all phases are disposed of via authorized disposal routes and in accordance with our environmental authorizations. On completion of decommissioning and removal of plant and equipment the building is re-assessed radiologically, categorized and appropriate remediation work progressed to render it safe for conventional demolition. The major elements of the success achieved to date can be attributed to the following elements: - Overall programme management with extensive experience of planning, cost, and risk management. Integration of the programme within a major commercial site without compromising safety or operations. - Complete site EHS management working within a complex regulatory framework including the Nuclear Site Licenses, Environmental Authorisations and Security requirements. - Avoiding safety complacency by use of rigorous and systematic process to emphasise safety over competing goals. Including structured use of Human Performance and Corrective Action and Learning processes. - Unique safety experiences attained through complex hazard reduction across a broad range of uranium manufacturing and chemical hazard/agent facilities. - Project leadership and excellence utilizing a core site team to deploy repeatable processes and safe practices to deliver complex scope within budget and schedule. - Optimised use of internal and external resources, with extensive use of Operating Experience to drive continuous improvement and problem resolution. - Management of Contractors from initial selection, pre-qualification, tender assessment and Performance using varied contract forms across delivery phases. - Use of Westinghouse expertise for safety case, waste management, uranium recovery, health physics and design. - Implementation of a work package to ensure gated discreet manageable packages. Underpinned by package specific method statements, with appropriate hold points to maintain management and control of the works. - Continuous local safety focus via safety planning, induction, plant specific training, proactive risk assessment, and a defined approach to decoupling operating plant safety cases enabling focussed and usable documentation. This paper will provide an overview of the latest decommissioning activities achieved on the Springfields site and will focus on best practices that allowed Westinghouse to maintain the program on time and on budget. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Challenges, Successes, and Lessons Learned on Two Active DOE Facility D and D Projects - 18379

'Surgical removal', although having a number of technical and safety challenges, is an effective alternative to traditional Demolition and Decommissioning (D and D) methods. When carefully planned and managed, surgical removal of equipment can be safely performed to achieve cost savings and accelerated schedule. At Fernald, a large groundwater extraction system that treats radionuclides was downsized during continued operations. Challenges included demolition of remedial components in tight spaces adjacent to active components, in-situ management and removal of slurry multimedia and resins, and complex hoisting/rigging of whole vessels from very tight areas. The approach realized a significant reduction in waste volumes and slurry transfer to reduce radionuclide exposure while allowing use of existing vessels as IP-1 shipping containers while providing an opportunity to implement out of the box design for hoisting/rigging/moving large vessels. Several lessons were learned as Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc. (LATA) faced the project challenges and progressed through the D and D process. The slurry removal required thorough understanding of equipment selection and circulation techniques to maintain a slurry while avoiding plugging of extraction equipment. The physical condition of each individual tank was different and required development of alternate removal techniques, such as draining the vessel and removal of the hard material with an air vacuum truck, for each one. Lessons learned regarding large tank removal focused on recertification of an overhead crane, determination of pick points from a partially filled vessel, reanalyzing the lifting lugs for a partially full tank, and requirements to fill all void space in the vessels to meet off-site disposal specifications. At Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), LATA performed the surgical removal of all biomass process equipment inside ORNL's Building 2719. Among the challenges was a requirement that the removal action had to be conducted during continued operations. Live steam lines, fire protection, water process and boiler feed water systems were operational during LATA's D and D effort and were in close proximity to removal operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Dounreay (UK) Shaft and Silo Decommissioning - Remote Handling in an Extreme and Uncertain Environment - 18420

DSRL is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Cavendish Dounreay Partnership Ltd, a consortium of Cavendish Nuclear, CH2M and AECOM. It is funded by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) to deliver the site closure programme. Today, Dounreay is a site of construction, demolition and waste management, all of it designed to return the site to an interim end state. Dounreay is recognised as the most complex nuclear site closure project in Europe. The experimental nature of many of the sites redundant facilities means the clean-up and demolition requires innovation as well as great care. It is driving innovation in the approach to remote handling and robotics in the highly complex, hazardous and uncertain environment, all within tight financial constraints by UK Government. Veolia Nuclear Solutions (VNS) is instrumental in delivery of the overall solutions for the shaft and silo decommissioning project working with other members of industry and directly for DSRL to deliver the overall concept design for waste treatment as well as specialised equipment to recover highly hazardous and uncertain materials in this unique project. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

C-400 and C-409 Criticality Incredible Road Map

Many guides and standards describe a process for evaluating process operations with known quantities of fissile material. The accepted industry guides and standards for performing criticality evaluations for fissile material operations are not well suited for operating systems that may contain residual fissile material. The Paducah Site deactivation activities includes large process components that have unfavorable geometries for the {sup 235}U enrichment levels present. The fissile material holdup in these components can range from negligible residual quantities to significant deposits weighing several hundred pounds. The purpose of this white paper is to outline a methodology that can be used to declare a facility as criticality incredible (CI). For the purpose of this paper, criticality incredible means that the inventory and its form and distribution within the facility does not need Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) type (e.g., administrative or engineered) controls. This assumes of course that certain project assumptions are maintained. For example in the facilities that will be discussed within this paper, wet decontamination is not part of the planned demolition and disposal operations. The proposed methodology for deactivation of a facility to the point that criticality incredible can be declared will be applied to the C-400 Chemical Cleaning Building and to the C-409 Decontamination Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP). The purpose and intent of the CI declaration is to release a facility from Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) requirements and simplify the demolition of the facility. In practical terms, this means the facility can be re-categorized as < a Hazard Category 3 facility per DOE-STD-1027-92 Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, NCS controls are not needed, and the Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (CAAS) can be removed from service. The only involvement from the site NCS program following the declaration would be to ensure that the underlying assumptions are not violated through discovered conditions or project changes. This includes the institutional control of preventing new fissile material from being introduced into the facility. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗