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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

MFANS 2024 - Formally Proving Characteristics of Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are engineered systems that rely on the smooth integration of computational algorithms and physical elements. This integration presents new challenges for verifying that systems will behave as expected. The goal of this presentation is to present current challenges and potential solutions for the formal verification of cyber-physical systems. For cyber systems, formal methods refer to systematically rigorous mathematical techniques employed in the specification, development, analysis, and verification of both software and hardware systems. Recent advancements in computer science have yielded sophisticated tools specifically designed to address challenges associated with formal methods in complex systems. These tools leverage various foundational concepts such as logic, formal languages, program semantics, type systems, type theory, and automata theory. A notable achievement in the application of formal methods is the seL4 microkernel, claimed to be the first general-purpose operating-system kernel to be verified. Its proof implies the absence of bugs and guarantees that the kernel meets specifications. For physical systems, dynamic and control theory has a history of using rigorous analytic techniques to prove functional correctness. Lyapunov, optimal, classical, modern, and robust control theories all provide rigorous mathematical methods both to analyze system performance and to design controller that can be guaranteed to meet certain objectives. Recent computational techniques like level set theory and reachability analysis provide assertions that a system's state will avoid unsafe regions. Even though success has been independently achieved for cyber systems and physical systems, the integration of such systems creates new challenges. In particular, there is an obvious discrepancy between finite-state machines and infinite-state systems, resulting in different approaches for modeling and analyzing these system. While it is possible to simulate hybrid systems, this provides only a demonstration of a performance and not proof. For hybrid systems, current formal methods and system analysis approaches typically require a workarounds to work on hybrid systems like CPS. This paper will outline the state of the art and limits of current practice for formally verifying CPS and will identify possible research directions that require attention.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Implementation Aspects of Smart Grids Cyber-Security Cross-Layered Framework for Critical Infrastructure Operation

Communication networks in power systems are a major part of the smart grid paradigm. It enables and facilitates the automation of power grid operation as well as self-healing in contingencies. Such dependencies on communication networks, though, create a roam for cyber-threats. An adversary can launch an attack on the communication network, which in turn reflects on power grid operation. Attacks could be in the form of false data injection into system measurements, flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data, or intercepting messages. Using machine learning-based processing on data gathered from communication networks and the power grid is a promising solution for detecting cyber threats. In this paper, a co-simulation of cyber-security for cross-layer strategy is presented. The advantage of such a framework is the augmentation of valuable data that enhances the detection as well as identification of anomalies in the operation of the power grid. The framework is implemented on the IEEE 118-bus system. The system is constructed in Mininet to simulate a communication network and obtain data for analysis. A distributed three controller software-defined networking (SDN) framework is proposed that utilizes the Open Network Operating System (ONOS) cluster. According to the findings of our suggested architecture, it outperforms a single SDN controller framework by a factor of more than ten times the throughput. This provides for a higher flow of data throughout the network while decreasing congestion caused by a single controller’s processing restrictions. Furthermore, our CECD-AS approach outperforms state-of-the-art physics and machine learning-based techniques in terms of attack classification. The performance of the framework is investigated under various types of communication attacks.

cross-layered↗
DOE OSTI2023

A dataset of cyber-induced mechanical faults on buildings with network and buildings data

We have collected data of cyber-induced mechanical faults on buildings using a simulation platform. A DOE reference building model was used for running the simulation under a Rogue device attack and collected the network data as well as the physical buildings data to better understand the impacts of cyber attacks on the building and help identify the source of the mechanical fault with the network data. Alfalfa is the tool used for simulating the DOE reference buildings and acts as an interface to the model for querying the status and providing input externally. The Building Automation System (BAS) is the centralized controller providing control commands to other BACnet devices on the network based on the building status received from Alfalfa. The BACnet devices like damper will listen for the control commands from BAS on the BACnet network and implement it. The attacker is the malicious actor on the network creating disruptions by placing cyber-attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Survey of Cyber Threats and Security Controls Analysis for Urban Air Mobility Environments

Since the cyber threat landscape changes daily, cybersecurity needs to be an ongoing activity for every organization within the UAM environments. This paper will provide information on identified cyber threats and controls associated with an instance of the Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environment. The MITRE ATT&CK model and framework and the selection of cyber threats and the National Institute of Standards and Technology publications for security control identification and cybersecurity risk identification will be leveraged for analysis.

Cyber Threats↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Risk Considerations for Nuclear Digital I&C Systems

Many engineers and scientists researching modeling and analysis methods for nuclear energy advancement are focused on proof-of-concept and early-stage development for new reactor designs. Since instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are traditionally developed later in the systems engineering lifecycle, researchers may be unfamiliar with modern digital technology used in these I&C systems. It is even more likely that they are unfamiliar with the cyber risks associated with them. This paper provides a brief overview of nuclear digital I&C systems before examining the importance of cyber risk management at nuclear reactors and the benefits of including Cyber-Informed Engineering throughout the systems engineering lifecycle. The primary goal is for engineers and scientists to develop a mindset that incorporates cybersecurity as another discipline alongside safety when designing and developing new technologies, regardless of technology readiness level.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber‐Resilient Distributed Energy Resource Control Algorithms for Smart Distribution Grids

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on the development of cyber‐resilient gradient‐based optimisation algorithms and theoretical proof for grid‐interactive distributed energy resource (DER) control to enable two grid services of virtual power plants (VPPs) dispatch and grid voltage regulation, considering the communication and security impacts. Firstly, the combined DER dispatch and voltage regulation as a real‐time gradient‐based optimisation problem is recapped. Thereafter, we consider a probabilistic traffic model to characterise packet delays and loss in a communication network, and study how the delays enter the process of information exchange among the grid measurement units, local DER controllers and the grid control centre that execute this control algorithm in a coordinated manner. Then, a strategy combining delay thresholds and message update rules is proposed to immunity the asynchrony resulting from the communications traffic and it avoids possible numerical instabilities and sensitivities of the power tracking and voltage regulation capabilities, resulting as cyber‐resilient DER control algorithms. Additionally, their convergence is theoretically proved. Effectiveness of proposed cyber‐resilient algorithms has been validated on the IEEE 37‐bus system in terms of convergence, VPP tracking and voltage regulation performance for smart distribution systems with high penetration of DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Enhancement in Digital Substations: Hidden Markov Model-Based Smart Cyber Switching and Threat Response

The rising incidence of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and power grids poses significant threats to the stability and reliability of electrical substations, with potentially devastating consequences such as extended blackouts. This paper introduces an advanced cybersecurity framework aimed at safeguarding IEC 61850-based substations through the integration of software-defined networking (SDN) and digital twin (DT) technologies. The proposed DT-based framework employs smart cyber switching (SCS) for proactive threat mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for swift system restoration, thereby maintaining continuous operational integrity and robust cybersecurity defenses. Central to this framework is the adaptive port controller (APC), which enables dynamic port management to adapt to evolving threats, and an intrusion detection system (IDS) designed to detect and neutralize malicious attacks on IEC 61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented substation event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. Further, novel predictive intrusion detection and response (PIDR) algorithm is implemented on a digital substation (DS) to predict the best route to be taken by the attacker. The efficacy of these comprehensive cybersecurity frameworks is validated through rigorous simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, showcasing the system’s ability to sustain substation operations amidst cyber-attacks.

Digital substation↗
DOE OSTI2023

Deep Reinforcement Learning for Distribution System Cyber Attack Defense with DERs

The use of smart inverter capabilities of distributed energy resources (DERs) enhances the grid reliability but in the meanwhile exhibits more vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks. This paper proposes a deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based defense approach. The defense problem is reformulated as a Markov decision making process to control DERs and minimizing load shedding to address the voltage violations caused by cyber-attacks. The original soft actor-critic (SAC) method for continuous actions has been extended to handle discrete and continuous actions for controlling DERs' setpoints and loadshedding scenarios. Numerical comparison results with other control approaches, such as Volt-VAR and Volt-Watt on the modified IEEE 33-node, show that the proposed method can achieve better voltage regulation and have less power losses in the presence of cyber-attacks.

active distribution systems↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber Physical Grid-Interactive Distributed Energy Resources Control for VPP Dispatch and Regulation

This paper presents a cyber-physical algorithm for grid-interactive Distributed Energy Resource (DER) control to enable two features of Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) dispatch and grid voltage regulation, considering the communication and security impacts. We first formulate the DER dispatch problem as a real-time, iterative, and grid-interactive DER control problem. Thereafter, we consider a probabilistic traffic model to characterize packet delays and loss in a communication network, and study how the delays enter the process of information exchange among the grid measurement units, local DER controllers and the grid control center that coordinately execute this dispatch algorithm. Finally, a strategy combining delay threshold and modified message update rules is proposed to immune the asynchrony resulting from the communications network traffic and it avoids possible numerical instabilities and sensitivities of the tracking and regulation capabilities of this DER control algorithm. By implementing the proposed cyber-physical algorithm on the modified IEEE 37-node system, our preliminary results exhibit that the uncertainties of the underlying communications infrastructure must be considered for the VPP tracking and regulation capabilities of any DER in a generic Cyber-Physical System (CPS), because the delayed voltage measurements in the uplink/bi-link cases result in the off-track in VPP dispatch and jittery in voltage regulation.

cyber-physical algorithm↗
DOE OSTI2023

Adaptive Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm for Distribution System Cyber Attack Defense With High Penetration of DERs

With grid modernization, smart inverters are increasingly used to execute advanced controls for distribution network reliability. However, this also increases the cyber-attack space. Here this paper focuses on the defense approaches to restore the system to normal operation circumstances in the presence of cyber-attacks. A unique deep reinforcement learning (DRL) method is developed to minimize voltage violations and reduce power losses for impacted feeders. The defense problem is reformulated as a Markov decision-making process to dynamically control DERs while minimizing load shedding. This is achieved via an improved soft actor-critic (SAC)-based DRL algorithm, which can govern DER set points and load-shedding scenarios in discrete and continuous modes via the auto-tune entropy and Gaussian policy features. Numerical comparison results on the modified IEEE 123-node system with other control approaches, such as Volt-VAR (VV), Volt-Watt (VW), and model predictive control (MPC) show that the proposed method can eliminate voltage violations and provide feasible control actions that perform complete mitigation of cyber-threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Demonstrating the Transient System Impact of Cyber-Physical Events Through Scalable Transmission and Distribution (T&D) Co-Simulation

Modern power systems become more vulnerable to cyber threats due to their growing interconnectivity, interdependence, and complexity. Widespread deployment of distributed energy resources (DERs) further expands the threat landscape to the grid edge, where fewer cybersecurity protections exist. In this article, a systematic cyber-physical events demonstration, enabled by an integrated transmission, distribution, and communication co-simulation framework, is performed. It analyzes cyber risks to power grid under DER-enabled automatic generation control from different angles. Unlike existing works, the simulation captures millisecond-to-minutes frequency and voltage transient dynamics at a cross-region system scale.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Resilient Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (XFACTS)

This report summarizes the activities conducted under the DOE-OE funded project DEOE0000897, Cyber Attack Resilient Flexible AC Systems – XFACTS. Hitachi Energy (HE), in collaboration with ABB Inc. (ABB), Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), Iowa State University (ISU), and University of Idaho (UI) pursued the development of a system of defense for Flexible Alternating current Transmission Systems against cyber-attacks (XFACTS). A FACTS substation enhanced with XFACTS defense mechanisms will be capable of mitigating cyberattacks especially those that seek to control electrical parameters like voltage or current and interrupt the power flow in AC lines. It empowers existing FACTS controllers and associated intelligent electronic devices to detect and mitigate malicious intents to depress system voltages, destabilize power flows, trip AC circuit breakers, corrupt currents, and voltages, even if the malicious commands and the measurements have correct syntax. The XFACTS functions utilize the physics of active power electronic systems, control and protection, electric power engineering principles, and state estimation to bring more in-depth cyber defense closer to the protected FACTS substation devices.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Benefits Quantification: Recommendations for Consideration

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) integrates engineering principles into the design, development, and operation of cyber-physical systems (CPS) to mitigate or eliminate the impact of cyber-enabled attacks. In July 2024, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) engaged MITRE researchers to investigate methods for systematically measuring the benefits of CIE implementation. This included evaluating the success and outcomes of CIE, identifying and quantifying the value of early adoption, and determining the business justification for its implementation, especially in existing infrastructure. MITRE reviewed existing methods in engineering and cybersecurity to understand how organizations prioritize security investments, considering their strengths, weaknesses, and relevance to CIE stakeholders. Based on this analysis, MITRE proposed potential approaches for quantifying CIE benefits and provided recommendations for INL's consideration.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Requirements Framework for Cyber-Informed Engineering

The existing requirements frameworks or models cater to the existing practices. However, they fall short in directly using them for Cyber informed engineering. Therefore, this paper develops and presents a comprehensive framework that can be used for Cyber informed Engineering during the requirements phase. We describe the existing requirements process and models, then develop a requirements framework for cyber informed engineering.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) – Engineered Controls Database and Use

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber-attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-physical cascading failure and resilience of power grid: A comprehensive review

Smart grid technologies are based on the integration of the cyber network and the power grid into a cyber-physical power system (CPPS). The increasing cyber-physical interdependencies bring about tremendous opportunities for the modeling, monitoring, control, and protection of power grids, but also create new types of vulnerabilities and failure mechanisms threatening the reliability and resiliency of system operation. A major concern regarding the interdependent networks is the cascading failure (CF), where a small initial disturbance/failure in the network results in a seemingly unexpected large-scale failure. Although there has been a significant volume of recent work in the CF research of CPPS, a comprehensive review remains unavailable. This article aims to fill the gap by providing a systematic literature survey regarding the modeling, analysis, and mitigation of CF in CPPS. The open research questions for further research are also discussed. This article allows researchers to easily understand the state of the art of CF research in CPPS and fosters future work required towards full resolutions to the remaining questions and challenges.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Bayesian Estimation of Oscillator Parameters: Toward Anomaly Detection and Cyber-Physical System Security

Cyber-physical system security presents unique challenges to conventional measurement science and technology. Anomaly detection in software-assisted physical systems, such as those employed in additive manufacturing or in DNA synthesis, is often hampered by the limited available parameter space of the underlying mechanism that is transducing the anomaly. As a result, the formulation of anomaly detection for such systems often leads to inverse or ill-posed problems, requiring statistical treatments. Here, we present Bayesian inference of unknown parameters associated with a generic actuator considered as a representative vital element of a cyber-physical system. Via a series of experimental input-output measurements, a transfer function for the actuator is obtained numerically, which serves as our model for the proposed method. Linear, nonlinear, and delayed dynamics may be assumed for the actuator response. By devising a code-based malicious signal, we study the efficacy of Bayesian inference for its potential to produce a detection, including uncertainty quantification, with a remarkably small number of input data points. Our approach should be adaptable to a variety of real-time cyber-physical anomaly detection scenarios.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Transforming Cyber Education thru Open to All Accessible Pathways

Boise State University’s (BSU) Cyber Operations and Resilience CORe program was intentionally designed so that any student, especially non-traditional and non-technical students, with an interest in cybersecurity could have an education and training pathway to enter the cyber workforce. The CORe curriculum focuses on teaching students how to design, apply, and improve cybersecurity through the interaction of people, processes, and technology. CORe is a stackable curriculum with elective credit hours and options for various academic and industry certificates and certifications that enable students to customize their unique career pathway. The CORe program guides students to think about the system being managed, the risks presented, and the dynamic intersection of system elements when considering how to incorporate resilience frameworks in achieving a resilient system. By developing systems thinking, the students gain an understanding of the interdependencies interacting with the operational system. Further, the CORe program encourages students to integrate cybersecurity knowledge with models and frameworks found in other academic disciplines through a unifying systems approach. CORe is designed around the realities of today’s broad cyber landscape: that breaches will occur in any system over time and proactive design of resilience into systems to detect, respond, and recover in a timely and orderly manner is critical. Students are taught to think holistically about cybersecurity focusing on all system elements. CORe is not a traditional cybersecurity degree. CORe is distinguished by the non-traditional engineering, computer science approach to cybersecurity education with the singular focus on infusing resilience operations and transdisciplinary systems thinking principles throughout the curriculum.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗