Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Control Account”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 145 records · Page 8

Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S&S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

US-Russian Cooperation in Upgrading MC&A System at Rosatom Facilities: Measurement of Nuclear Materials

Improve protection of weapons-usable nuclear material from theft or diversion through the development and support of a nationwide sustainable and effective Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) program based on material measurement. The material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) cooperation has yielded significant results in implementing MC&A measurements at Russian nuclear facilities: (1) Establishment of MEM WG and MEMS SP; (2) Infrastructure for development, certification, and distribution of RMs; and (3) Coordination on development and implementation of MMs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Tritium accountancy in fusion systems

The US Department of Energy (DOE) has clearly defined requirements for nuclear material control and accountability (MCA) of tritium whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not since tritium is not a fissile material. MCA requirements are expected for tritium fusion machines and will be dictated by the host country or regulatory body where the machine is operated. Material Balance Areas (MBA) are defined to aid in the tracking and reporting of nuclear material movements and inventories. Material sub-accounts (MSA) are established along with key measurement points (KMP) to further subdivide a MBA to localize and minimize uncertainties in the inventory difference (ID) calculations for tritium accountancy. Fusion systems try to minimize tritium inventory which may require continuous movement of material through the MSA. The ability of making meaningful measurements of these material transfers is described in terms of establishing the MSA structure to perform and reconcile ID calculations. For fusion machines, changes to the traditional ID equation will be discussed which includes breeding, burn-up, and retention of tritium in the fusion device. The concept of 'net' tritium quantities consumed or lost in fusion devices is described in terms of inventory taking strategies and how it is used to track the accumulation of tritium in components or fusion machines. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Programmatic Value Determination and Termination of Safeguards Process for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nuclear Material Management & Storage (MNN&S) and the Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) programs at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) have the responsibility to ensure accountable nuclear material (NM) no longer need by programs/projects is managed, coordinated, and dispositioned in accordance with DOE Orders 410.2, “Management of Nuclear Materials, and 474.2, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability”. CD-NMM.007, “Programmatic Value Determination of Nuclear Material and Termination of Safeguards” is the document which lays out the process to fulfill these requirements. This paper defines the roles and responsibilities for all the organizations involved, the programmatic value determination (PVD), disposition planning, and termination of safeguards (ToS)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Overview of the Cooperative Effort between the United States Department of Energy and the China Atomic Energy Authority to Enhance MPC&A Inspections for Civil Nuclear Facilities in China

The United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) are cooperating to enhance the domestic regulatory inspections capacity for special nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) requirements for civil nuclear facilities in China. This cooperation is conducted under the auspices of the Agreement between the Department of Energy of the United States of America and the State Development and Planning Commission of the People s Republic of China on Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology. This initial successful effort was conducted in three phases. Phase I focused on introducing CAEA personnel to DOE and U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspection methods for U. S. facilities. This phase was completed in January 2008 during meetings in Beijing. Phase II focused on developing physical protection and material control and accounting inspection exercises that enforced U. S. inspection methods identified during Phase 1. Hands on inspection activities were conducted in the United States over a two week period in July 2009. Simulated deficiencies were integrated into the inspection exercises. The U. S. and Chinese participants actively identified and discussed deficiencies noted during the two week training course. The material control and accounting inspection exercises were conducted at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in Paducah, KY. The physical protection inspection exercises were conducted at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Oak Ridge, TN. Phase III leveraged information provided under Phase I and experience gained under Phase II to develop a formal inspection guide that incorporates a systematic approach to training for Chinese MPC&A field inspectors. Additional hands on exercises that are applicable to Chinese regulations were incorporated into the Phase III training material. Phase III was completed in May 2010 at the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) in Beijing. This paper provides details of the successful cooperation between DOE/NNSA and CAEA for all phases of the cooperative effort to enhance civil domestic MPC&A inspections in China.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives included: Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacture, etc.), and assessment video feeds. All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). Automated creation of reports and data visualization. Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” For personnel safety needs: Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual. For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Measurement control workshop instructional materials

An essential element in an effective nuclear materials control and accountability (MC&A) program is the measurement of the nuclear material as it is received, moved, processed and shipped. Quality measurement systems and methodologies determine the accuracy of the accountability values. Implementation of a measurement control program is essential to ensure that the measurement systems and methodologies perform as expected. A measurement control program also allows for a determination of the level of confidence in the accounting values.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Implementation of the MPC and A Operations Monitorying (MOM) System at JSC PO Sevmas

The Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program has been working since 1994 with nuclear sites in Russia to upgrade the physical protection (PP) and material control and accounting (MC&A) functions at facilities containing weapons usable nuclear material. In early 2001, the MPC&A program initiated the MPC&A Operations Monitoring (MOM) Project to monitor facilities where MPC&A upgrades have been installed to provide increased confidence that personnel are present and vigilant, provide confidence that security procedures are being properly performed and provide additional assurance that nuclear materials have not been stolen. The MOM project began as a pilot project at the Moscow State Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and a MOM system was successfully installed in October 2001. Following the success of the MEPhI pilot project, the MPC&A Program expanded the installation of MOM systems to several other Russian facilities, including the JSC 'PO' Sevmash', Severodvinsk, Russia. The MOM system was made operational at Sevmash in September, 2008. This paper will discuss the objectives of the MOM system installed at Sevmash and indicate how the objectives influenced the development of the conceptual design. The paper will also describe activities related to installation of the infrastructure and the MOM system at Sevmash. Experience gained from operation of the system and how the objectives are being met will also be discussed. The paper will describe how the MOM system is used at Sevmash and, in particular, how the data is analyzed. Finally, future activities including potential expansion of the MOM system, operator training, data sharing and analysis, procedure development, repair and maintenance will be included in the paper.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Taxonomy for Evaluation of Distributed Control Strategies for Distributed Energy Resources

Distributed control strategies applied to power distribution control problems are meant to offer robust and scalable integration of distributed energy resources (DERs). However, the term 'distributed control' is often loosely applied to a variety of very different control strategies. In particular there is a lack of discrimination between aspects related to communication topology, physical distribution of components, and associated control objectives. This has lead to a lack of objective criteria for performance comparison and general quality assessment of state of the art distributed control solutions. For such comparison, a classification is required that is consistent across the different aspects mentioned above. This paper develops systematic categories of control strategies that accounts for communication, control and physical distribution aspects of the problem, and provides a set of criteria that can be assessed for these categories. The proposed taxonomy is applied to the state of the art as part of a review of existing work on distributed control of DER. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of the proposed classification to researchers and system designers.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Measurement control workshop instructional materials

An essential element in an effective nuclear materials control and accountability (MC&A) program is the measurement of the nuclear material as it is received, moved, processed and shipped. Quality measurement systems and methodologies determine the accuracy of the accountability values. Implementation of a measurement control program is essential to ensure that the measurement systems and methodologies perform as expected. A measurement control program also allows for a determination of the level of confidence in the ac counting values.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Support for Advanced Fuel Fabrication MC&A Approaches

This report summarizes the key activities of the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program’s safeguards training work package for FY25. The work focused on two main areas: domestic safeguards training and the development of new technologies for nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC). A key development during this FY was the delivery of NMAC statistics for US Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements refresher course. The course objective was to assist industry in meeting the MC&A program requirements for fuel cycle facilities; this training focused on front-end bulk fuel cycle processes. At the same time, a report was prepared on the research output of an effort that focused on the benefits of commercial fuel debundling for NMAC and waste management. The MPACT team evaluated various technologies and proposed a fuel debundling detector that integrates gamma spectroscopy and neutron detection as the most practical solution. The scope of activities under this work package for FY26 focuses on developing a fundamental nuclear material control plan, also known as MC&A plan, for tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel fabrication facilities. This plan will address the various NMAC requirements for facilities that handle Category II.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safeguards Modeling for Advanced Nuclear Facility Design.

Future nuclear fuel cycle facilities will see a significant benefit from considering materials accountancy requirements early in the design process. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group is demonstrating Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for a notional electrochemical reprocessing facility as part of a 2020 Milestone. The idea behind SSBD is to consider regulatory requirements early in the design process to provide more optimized systems and avoid costly retrofits later in the design process. Safeguards modeling, using single analyst tools, allows the designer to efficiently consider materials accountancy approaches that meet regulatory requirements. However, safeguards modeling also allows the facility designer to go beyond current regulations and work toward accountancy designs with rapid response and lower thresholds for detection of anomalies. This type of modeling enables new safeguards approaches and may inform future regulatory changes. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) has been used for materials accountancy system design and analysis. This paper steps through the process of designing a Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) system, presents the baseline system design for an electrochemical reprocessing facility, and provides performance metrics from the modeling analysis. The most critical measurements in the electrochemical facility are the spent fuel input, electrorefiner salt, and U/TRU product output measurements. Finally, material loss scenario analysis found that measurement uncertainties (relative standard deviations) for Pu would need to be at 1% (random and systematic error components) or better in order to meet domestic detection goals or as high as 3% in order to meet international detection goals, based on a 100 metric ton per year plant size.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives include: • Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. • Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacturer, etc.), and assessment video feeds. • All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. • Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. • Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). • Automated creation of reports and data visualization. • Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: • For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” • For personnel safety needs: o Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. o Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual (Ref TBD). • For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Summary

An effective risk assessment system is needed to address the threat posed by an active or passive insider who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt diversion or theft of nuclear material. The material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system. The MSET process is divided into four distinct and separate parts: (1) Completion of the questionnaire that assembles information about the operations of every aspect of the MPC&A system; (2) Conversion of questionnaire data into numeric values associated with risk; (3) Analysis of the numeric data utilizing the MPC&A fault tree and the SAPHIRE computer software; and (4) Self-assessment using the MSET reports to perform the effectiveness evaluation of the facility's MPC&A system. The process should lead to confirmation that mitigating features of the system effectively minimize the threat, or it could lead to the conclusion that system improvements or upgrades are necessary to achieve acceptable protection against the threat. If the need for system improvements or upgrades is indicated when the system is analyzed, MSET provides the capability to evaluate potential or actual system improvements or upgrades. A facility's MC&A system can be evaluated at a point in time. The system can be reevaluated after upgrades are implemented or after other system changes occur. The total system or specific subareas within the system can be evaluated. Areas of potential system improvement can be assessed to determine where the most beneficial and cost-effective improvements should be made. Analyses of risk importance factors show that sustainability is essential for optimal performance and reveals where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. The risk importance factors show the amount of risk reduction achievable with potential upgrades and the amount of risk reduction achieved after upgrades are completed. Applying the risk assessment tool gives support to budget prioritization by showing where budget support levels must be sustained for MC&A functions most important to risk. Results of the risk assessment are also useful in supporting funding justifications for system improvements that significantly reduce system risk. The functional model, the system risk assessment tool, and the facility evaluation questionnaire are valuable educational tools for MPC&A personnel. These educational tools provide a framework for ongoing dialogue between organizations regarding the design, development, implementation, operation, assessment, and sustainability of MPC&A systems. An organization considering the use of MSET as an analytical tool for evaluating the effectiveness of its MPC&A system will benefit from conducting a complete MSET exercise at an existing nuclear facility.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Advanced Insider Threat Mitigation Workshop Instructional Materials

Insiders represent a formidable threat to nuclear facilities. This set of workshop materials covers methodologies to analyze and approaches to mitigate the threat of an insider attempting abrupt and protracted theft of nuclear materials. This particular set of materials is an update of a January 2008 version to add increased emphasis on Material Control and Accounting and its role with respect to protracted insider nuclear material theft scenarios. This report is a compilation of workshop materials consisting of lectures on technical and administrative measures used in Physical Protection (PP) and Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) and methods for analyzing their effectiveness against a postulated insider threat. The postulated threat includes both abrupt and protracted theft scenarios. Presentation is envisioned to be through classroom instruction and discussion. Several practical and group exercises are included for demonstration and application of the analysis approach contained in the lecture/discussion sessions as applied to a hypothetical nuclear facility.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Global Survey of the Concepts and Understanding of the Interfaces Between Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards

There is increasing global discourse on how the elements of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards can be most effectively implemented in nuclear power programs. While each element is separate and unique, they must nevertheless all be addressed in a country’s laws and implemented via regulations and in facility operations. This topic is of particular interest to countries that are currently developing the infrastructure to support nuclear power programs. These countries want to better understand what is required by these elements and how they can manage the interfaces between them and take advantages of any synergies that may exist. They need practical examples and guidance in this area in order to develop better organizational strategies and technical capacities. This could simplify their legal, regulatory, and management structures and avoid inefficient approaches and costly mistakes that may not be apparent to them at this early stage of development. From the perspective of IAEA International Safeguards, supporting Member States in exploring such interfaces and synergies provides a benefit to them because it acknowledges that domestic safeguards in a country do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it relies on a strong State System of Accounting and Control that is in turn dependent on a capable and independent regulatory body as well as a competent operator and technical staff. These organizations must account for and control nuclear material, communicate effectively, and manage and transmit complete and correct information to the IAEA in a timely manner. This, while in most cases also being responsible for the safety and security of their facilities. Seeking efficiencies in this process benefits international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will present the results of a global survey of current and anticipated approaches and practices by countries and organizations with current or future nuclear power programs on how they are implementing, or planning to implement, safety, security, and safeguards in their programs. The idea is to capture current knowledge and thinking on this topic and to identify common themes in organizations and management. It will also document the most commonly held ideas and perception (and misperceptions) of what it means to manage interfaces and take advantage of synergies for operating nuclear facilities and those that are building their infrastructures. It is desired that the results of this paper will inform the current discourse on this topic with some quantitative data and identify any general trends in understanding.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Development of an MC&A toolbox for liquid-fueled molten salt reactors with online reprocessing (Final Report)

A critical barrier to the deployment of MSRs is the absence of a well-defined nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) approach, a vital prerequisite to meet NRC licensing requirements as well as facilitating future international exports. Liquid-fueled MSR variants (especially those incorporating online refueling or reprocessing) present a unique set of challenges to traditional nuclear material control and accountancy. Unlike solid-fueled light-water reactors, traditional item-counting methods cannot be applied as an accountancy strategy. Rather, MC&A approaches to MSR variants (including both uranium and thorium fueled designs) are more analogous to bulk material handling facilities (e.g., enrichment and reprocessing); yet further complicating matters is the fact that fuel medium is also highly radioactive. Meanwhile, the space of MSRs covers a broad range of design parameters, including thermal and fast spectra designs; operation in actinide breeder or burner modes, choice of actinide fuel used (e.g., 235 U, 232 Th / 233 U, denatured 233 U, etc.), pool or loop-type configuration, and even different salt chemistry. Each of these design choices introduce significant challenges to MC&A approaches within MSR facilities. We propose to bridge this gap for liquid-fueled MSRs by developing a modular, component-based test framework for evaluating viable process monitoring and MC&A techniques specifically suited to liquid-fueled MSR system variants employing online refueling or reprocessing. This test platform will consist of a toolbox of independent process modules representing discrete physical units (such as the reactor core, off-gas processing, decay tanks, and actinide separation units), each with its own self-contained physics responsive to the input mass flow, along with appropriate measurement models that can be coupled to key flow points. These dynamic physical signatures thus afford the ability to test the viability and efficacy of potential accountancy techniques under the full range of reactor operating conditions. As process modules are connected via mass flows, the result is a reconfigurable, generic MSR mass flow model capable of serving as an MC&A test platform for a broad spectrum of possible MSR configurations. The resulting MSR MC&A toolbox will enable robust assessment of accountancy strategies for this unique facility type, including analysis of physical feedbacks arising both from depletion of the fuel over time as well as from potential off-normal events, including those introduced by equipment failures (e.g., a pump failure) as well as by malicious action (i.e., attempts to divert material). The proposed toolbox both addresses a critical needs area for the MPACT analysis toolkit while leveraging existing MPACT-sponsored tools, especially with respect to simulation of measurement and accountancy techniques for advanced fuel cycle facilities. Beyond enabling new analysis capabilities for MSR systems, the design of this toolbox will be to such to maximize compatibility with existing MPACT tools, such to enhance existing facility MC&A analysis capabilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Data Analysis

Analysis of the material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system is necessary to understand the limits and vulnerabilities of the system to internal threats. A self-appraisal helps the facility be prepared to respond to internal threats and reduce the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear material. The material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) fault tree was developed to depict the failure of the MPC&A system as a result of poor practices and random failures in the MC&A system. It can also be employed as a basis for assessing deliberate threats against a facility. MSET uses fault tree analysis, which is a top-down approach to examining system failure. The analysis starts with identifying a potential undesirable event called a 'top event' and then determining the ways it can occur (e.g., 'Fail To Maintain Nuclear Materials Under The Purview Of The MC&A System'). The analysis proceeds by determining how the top event can be caused by individual or combined lower level faults or failures. These faults, which are the causes of the top event, are 'connected' through logic gates. The MSET model uses AND-gates and OR-gates and propagates the effect of event failure using Boolean algebra. To enable the fault tree analysis calculations, the basic events in the fault tree are populated with probability risk values derived by conversion of questionnaire data to numeric values. The basic events are treated as independent variables. This assumption affects the Boolean algebraic calculations used to calculate results. All the necessary calculations are built into the fault tree codes, but it is often useful to estimate the probabilities manually as a check on code functioning. The probability of failure of a given basic event is the probability that the basic event primary question fails to meet the performance metric for that question. The failure probability is related to how well the facility performs the task identified in that basic event over time (not just one performance or exercise). Fault tree calculations provide a failure probability for the top event in the fault tree. The basic fault tree calculations establish a baseline relative risk value for the system. This probability depicts relative risk, not absolute risk. Subsequent calculations are made to evaluate the change in relative risk that would occur if system performance is improved or degraded. During the development effort of MSET, the fault tree analysis program used was SAPHIRE. SAPHIRE is an acronym for 'Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations.' Version 1 of the SAPHIRE code was sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1987 as an innovative way to draw, edit, and analyze graphical fault trees primarily for safe operation of nuclear power reactors. When the fault tree calculations are performed, the fault tree analysis program will produce several reports that can be used to analyze the MPC&A system. SAPHIRE produces reports showing risk importance factors for all basic events in the operational MC&A system. The risk importance information is used to examine the potential impacts when performance of certain basic events increases or decreases. The initial results produced by the SAPHIRE program are considered relative risk values. None of the results can be interpreted as absolute risk values since the basic event probability values represent estimates of risk associated with the performance of MPC&A tasks throughout the material balance area (MBA). The RRR for a basic event represents the decrease in total system risk that would result from improvement of that one event to a perfect performance level. Improvement of the basic event with the greatest RRR value produces a greater decrease in total system risk than improvement of any other basic event. Basic events with the greatest potential for system risk reduction are assigned performance improvement values, and new fault tree calculations show the improvement in total system risk. The operational impact or cost-effectiveness from implementing the performance improvements can then be evaluated. The improvements being evaluated can be system performance improvements, or they can be potential, or actual, upgrades to the system. The RIR for a basic event represents the increase in total system risk that would result from failure of that one event. Failure of the basic event with the greatest RIR value produces a greater increase in total system risk than failure of any other basic event. Basic events with the greatest potential for system risk increase are assigned failure performance values, and new fault tree calculations show the increase in total system risk. This evaluation shows the importance of preventing performance degradation of the basic events. SAPHIRE identifies combinations of basic events where concurrent failure of the events results in failure of the top event.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗