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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2009

Hubble Space Telescope Crew Rescue Analysis

In the aftermath of the 2003 Columbia accident NASA removed the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission 4 (SM4) from the Space Shuttle manifest. Reasons cited included concerns that the risk of flying the mission would be too high. There was at the time no viable technique to repair the orbiter s thermal protection system if it were to be damaged by debris during ascent. Furthermore in the event of damage, since the mission was not to the International Space Station, there was no safe haven for the crew to wait for an extended period of time for a rescue. The HST servicing mission was reconsidered because of improvements in the ascent debris environment, the development of techniques for the astronauts to perform on orbit repairs to damage thermal protection, and the development of a strategy to provide a crew rescue capability. However, leading up to the launch of servicing mission, the HST crew rescue capability was a recurring topic. For HST there was a limited amount of time available to perform a crew rescue because of the limited consumables available on the Orbiter. The success of crew rescue depends upon several factors including when a problem is identified, when and to what extent power down procedures are begun, and where the rescue vehicle is in its ground processing cycle. Severe power downs maximize crew rescue success but would eliminate the option for the orbiter servicing the HST to attempt a landing. Therefore, crew rescue success needed to be weighed against preserving the ability of the orbiter to have landing option in case there was a problem with the rescue vehicle. This paper focuses on quantification of the HST mission loss of crew rescue capability using Shuttle historical data and various power down capabilities. That work supported NASA s decision to proceed with the HST service mission, which was successfully completed on May 24th 2009.

Hamlin, Teri L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Hubble Space Telescope Crew Rescue Analysis

In the aftermath of the 2003 Columbia accident, NASA removed the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission 4 (SM4) from the Space Shuttle manifest. Reasons cited included concerns that the risk of flying the mission would be too high. The HST SM4 was subsequently reinstated and flown as Space Transportation System (STS)-125 because of improvements in the ascent debris environment, the development of techniques for astronauts to perform on orbit repairs to damaged thermal protection, and the development of a strategy to provide a viable crew rescue capability. However, leading up to the launch of STS-125, the viability of the HST crew rescue capability was a recurring topic. For STS-125, there was a limited amount of time available to perform a crew rescue due to limited consumables (power, oxygen, etc.) available on the Orbiter. The success of crew rescue depended upon several factors, including when a problem was identified; when and what actions, such as powering down, were begun to conserve consumables; and where the Launch on Need (LON) vehicle was in its ground processing cycle. Crew rescue success also needed to be weighed against preserving the Orbiter s ability to have a landing option in case there was a problem with the LON vehicle. This paper focuses on quantifying the HST mission loss of crew rescue capability using Shuttle historical data and various power down strategies. Results from this effort supported NASA s decision to proceed with STS-125, which was successfully completed on May 24th 2009.

Hamlin, Teri L.↗
NASA NTRS2000

U.S. Civil Rotorcraft Accidents, 1963 Through 1997

Narrative summary data produced by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has been obtained and analyzed for all 8,436 U.S. civil registered rotorcraft accidents which occurred from mid-1963 through 1997. This analysis was based on the NTSB's assignment of each mishap into one of 21 "first event" categories. The number of U.S. civil registered rotorcraft as recorded by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the same period has also been obtained. Taken together, these data indicate the civil rotorcraft accident rate (on a per 1,000 registered rotorcraft basis) has decreased by almost a factor of 10 (i.e., from 130 accidents per 1,000 rotorcraft in 1964 to 13.4 per 1,000 in 1997). Analysis of the mishap data indicates over 70% of the rotorcraft accidents were associated with one of the following four NTSB "first event" categories: 2408 Loss of engine power (28.5%); 1,322 In-flight collisions with objects (15.7%); 1,114 Loss of control (13.2%); 1,083 Airframe/component/system failure or malfunction (12.8%).

Harris, Franklin D.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Study of the application of ERTS-A imagery to fracture-related mine safety hazards in the coal mining industry

The author has identified the following significant results. Various data compilation and analysis activities in support of ERTS-1 imagery interpretation are in progress or are completed. These include the compilation of mine accident data, areas of mine roof instability and the analysis of high altitude color infrared photography and low altitude color and color infrared photography which was acquired by NASA in support of the project. The photography reveals that many fracture lineaments are detectable through a varied thickness of glacial till. These data will be compiled on a series of 1:250,000 scale base maps and evaluated for a correlation between fracture zones and mine accidents and rooffalls. Due to high occurrence of cloud cover in the project area and to the delay in imagery shipments, little progress has been made in the analysis of ERTS-1 imagery.

Wier, C. E.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Loss of Situation Awareness in Pilots: Analysis of Incident Reports

Approximately 75% of all aviation accidents and incidents are attributable to human failures in monitoring, managing, and operating system. Tactical decision errors were found to be a factor in 25 of 37 major US air transport accidents between 1978 and 1990. These two facts demonstrate the inability of some pilots to maintain situation awareness. Situation awareness (SA) is defined as 'the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future". Thus, when a pilot loses SA, he or she is unable to ether perceive, comprehend, or project the status of the aircraft. In pilots terms, he or she has 'fallen behind the airplane'. Our study this summer involved an analysis of 190 NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports.

Eric B. Villeda↗
NASA NTRS2016

Differences in Characteristics of Aviation Accidents during 1993-2012 Based on Flight Purpose

Usually aviation accidents are categorized and analyzed within flight conduct rules (Part 121, Part 135, Part 91) because differences in accident rates within flight rules have been demonstrated. Even within a particular flight rule the flights have different purposes. For many, Part 121 flights are synonymous with scheduled passenger transport, and indeed this is the largest group of Part 121 accidents. But there are also non-scheduled (charter) passenger transport and cargo flights. The primary purpose of the analysis reported here is to examine the differences in aviation accidents based on the purpose of the flight. Some of the factors examined are the accident severity, aircraft characteristics and accident occurrence categories. Twenty consecutive years of data were available and utilized to complete this analysis.

Evans, Joni K.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Analysis of the nature and cause of turbulence upset using airline flight records

The development and application of methods for determining aircraft motions and related winds, using data normally recorded during airline flight operations, are described. The methods are being developed, in cooperation with the National Transportation Safety Board, to aid in the analysis and understanding of circumstances associated with aircraft accidents or incidents. Data from a recent DC-10 encounter with severe, high-altitude turbulence are used to illustrate the methods. The analysis of this encounter shows the turbulence to be a series of equally spaced horizontal swirls known as 'cat's eyes' vortices. The use of flight-data analysis methods to identify this type of turbulence phenomenon is presented for the first time.

Parks, E. K.↗
NASA NTRS2009

STS-107 Debris Characterization Using Re-entry Imaging

Analysis of amateur video of the early reentry phases of the Columbia accident is discussed. With poor video quality and little theoretical guidance, the analysis team estimated mass and acceleration ranges for the debris shedding events observed in the video. Camera calibration and optical performance issues are also described.

Raiche, George A.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Reliability, Safety and Error Recovery for Advanced Control Software

For long-duration automated operation of regenerative life support systems in space environments, there is a need for advanced integration and control systems that are significantly more reliable and safe, and that support error recovery and minimization of operational failures. This presentation outlines some challenges of hazardous space environments and complex system interactions that can lead to system accidents. It discusses approaches to hazard analysis and error recovery for control software and challenges of supporting effective intervention by safety software and the crew.

Malin, Jane T.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Image Analysis via Fuzzy-Reasoning Approach: Prototype Applications at NASA

A set of imaging techniques based on Fuzzy Reasoning (FR) approach was built for NASA at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) to perform complex real-time visual-related safety prototype tasks, such as detection and tracking of moving Foreign Objects Debris (FOD) during the NASA Space Shuttle liftoff and visual anomaly detection on slidewires used in the emergency egress system for Space Shuttle at the launch pad. The system has also proved its prospective in enhancing X-ray images used to screen hard-covered items leading to a better visualization. The system capability was used as well during the imaging analysis of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. These FR-based imaging techniques include novel proprietary adaptive image segmentation, image edge extraction, and image enhancement. Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) scheme available from NeuroShell(TM) Classifier and optimized via Genetic Algorithm (GA) was also used along with this set of novel imaging techniques to add powerful learning and image classification capabilities. Prototype applications built using these techniques have received NASA Space Awards, including a Board Action Award, and are currently being filed for patents by NASA; they are being offered for commercialization through the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), an internationally recognized corporation in scientific research and technology development. Companies from different fields, including security, medical, text digitalization, and aerospace, are currently in the process of licensing these technologies from NASA.

Dominguez, Jesus A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Test-Analysis Correlation for Space Shuttle External Tank Foam Impacting RCC Wing Leading Edge Component Panels

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that NASA develop, validate, and maintain a modeling tool capable of predicting the damage threshold for debris impacts on the Space Shuttle Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) wing leading edge and nosecap assembly. The results presented in this paper are one part of a multi-level approach that supported the development of the predictive tool used to recertify the shuttle for flight following the Columbia Accident. The assessment of predictive capability was largely based on test analysis comparisons for simpler component structures. This paper provides comparisons of finite element simulations with test data for external tank foam debris impacts onto 6-in. square RCC flat panels. Both quantitative displacement and qualitative damage assessment correlations are provided. The comparisons show good agreement and provided the Space Shuttle Program with confidence in the predictive tool.

Lyle, Karen H.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Structural analysis of a thermal insulation retainer assembly

In January 1989 an accident occurred in the National Transonic Facility wind tunnel at NASA Langley Research Center that was believed to be caused by the failure of a thermal insulation retainer. A structural analysis of this retainer assembly was performed in order to understand the possible failure mechanisms. Two loading conditions are important and were considered in the analysis. The first is the centrifugal force due to the fact that this retainer is located on the fan drive shaft. The second loading is a differential temperature between the retainer assembly and the underlying shaft. Geometrically nonlinear analysis is required to predict the stiffness of this component and to account for varying contact regions between various components in the assembly. High, local stresses develop in the band part of the assembly near discontinuities under both the centrifugal and thermal loadings. The presence of an aluminum ring during a portion of the part's operating life was found to increase the stresses in other regions of the band. Under the centrifugal load, high bending stresses develop near the intersection of the band with joints in the assembly. These high bending stresses are believed to be the most likely cause for failure of the assembly.

Greene, William H.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Tailoring a Human Reliability Analysis to Your Industry Needs

Companies at risk of accidents caused by human error that result in catastrophic consequences include: airline industry mishaps, medical malpractice, medication mistakes, aerospace failures, major oil spills, transportation mishaps, power production failures and manufacturing facility incidents. Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) is used to analyze the inherent risk of human behavior or actions introducing errors into the operation of a system or process. These assessments can be used to identify where errors are most likely to arise and the potential risks involved if they do occur. Using the basic concepts of HRA, an evolving group of methodologies are used to meet various industry needs. Determining which methodology or combination of techniques will provide a quality human reliability assessment is a key element to developing effective strategies for understanding and dealing with risks caused by human errors. There are a number of concerns and difficulties in "tailoring" a Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) for different industries. Although a variety of HRA methodologies are available to analyze human error events, determining the most appropriate tools to provide the most useful results can depend on industry specific cultures and requirements. Methodology selection may be based on a variety of factors that include: 1) how people act and react in different industries, 2) expectations based on industry standards, 3) factors that influence how the human errors could occur such as tasks, tools, environment, workplace, support, training and procedure, 4) type and availability of data, 5) how the industry views risk & reliability, and 6) types of emergencies, contingencies and routine tasks. Other considerations for methodology selection should be based on what information is needed from the assessment. If the principal concern is determination of the primary risk factors contributing to the potential human error, a more detailed analysis method may be employed versus a requirement to provide a numerical value as part of a probabilistic risk assessment. Industries involved with humans operating large equipment or transport systems (ex. railroads or airlines) would have more need to address the man machine interface than medical workers administering medications. Human error occurs in every industry; in most cases the consequences are relatively benign and occasionally beneficial. In cases where the results can have disastrous consequences, the use of Human Reliability techniques to identify and classify the risk of human errors allows a company more opportunities to mitigate or eliminate these types of risks and prevent costly tragedies.

DeMott, D. L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger Tradgedy was Caused by an Apollo Mistake, Terminating Risk Analysis

NASA’s attitude toward risk changed drastically between the Apollo and Space Shuttle design. [1]Apollo engineers were seriously alarmed about riskbecause of the fatal Apollo 1 fire and the fact that the estimated probability of another fatal accident was extremely high. The predictions were so appalling thatmanagement terminated risk analysis to avoid public apprehension. Because risk analysis was not done, the Space Shuttle design accepted excessively high andunknown risk. The immediate cause of the Challengertragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in coldweather that impaired the O-ring seals, but the fundamental cause was the high risk of the shuttle design. Before Challenger, management asserted that the probability of a fatal accident was 1 in 100,000.Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a shuttle failure.

Harry W Jones↗
NASA NTRS1998

A Method for Evaluating the Safety Impacts of Air Traffic Automation

This report describes a methodology for analyzing the safety and operational impacts of emerging air traffic technologies. The approach integrates traditional reliability models of the system infrastructure with models that analyze the environment within which the system operates, and models of how the system responds to different scenarios. Products of the analysis include safety measures such as predicted incident rates, predicted accident statistics, and false alarm rates; and operational availability data. The report demonstrates the methodology with an analysis of the operation of the Center-TRACON Automation System at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport.

Kostiuk, Peter↗
NASA NTRS2007

The Columbia Accident Investigation and The NASA Glenn Ballistic Impact Laboratory Contributions Supporting NASA's Return to Flight

On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart during reentry, resulting in loss of the vehicle and its seven crewmembers. For the next several months, an extensive investigation of the accident ensued involving a nationwide team of experts from NASA, industry, and academia, spanning dozens of technical disciplines. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), a group of experts assembled to conduct an investigation independent of NASA, concluded in August, 2003 that the most likely cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the left wing leading edge Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) thermal protection system initiated by the impact of thermal insulating foam that had separated from the orbiters external fuel tank 81 seconds into the mission's launch. During reentry, this breach allowed superheated air to penetrate behind the leading edge and erode the aluminum structure of left wing, which ultimately led to the breakup of the orbiter. The findings of the CAIB were supported by ballistic impact tests, which simulated the physics of External Tank Foam impact on the RCC wing leading edge material. These tests ranged from fundamental material characterization tests to full-scale Orbiter Wing Leading Edge tests. Following the accident investigation, NASA spent the next 18 months focused on returning the shuttle safely to flight. In order to fully evaluate all potential impact threats from the many debris sources on the Space Shuttle during ascent, NASA instituted a significant impact testing program. The results from these tests led to the validation of high-fidelity computer models, capable of predicting actual or potential Shuttle impact events, were used in the certification of STS-114, NASA s Return to Flight Mission, as safe to fly. This presentation will provide a look into the inner workings of the Space Shuttle and a behind the scenes perspective on the impact analysis and testing done for the Columbia Accident Investigation and NASA's Return to Flight programs. In addition, highlights from recent Shuttle missions are presented.

Melis, Matthew E.↗
NASA NTRS2009

The Reconstruction and Failure Analysis of the Space Shuttle Columbia

Several days following the Columbia accident a team formed and began planning for the reconstruction of Columbia. A hangar at the Kennedy Space Center was selected for this effort due to it's size, available technical workforce and materials science laboratories and access to the vehicle ground processing infrastructure. The Reconstruction team established processes for receiving, handling, decontamination, tracking, identifying, cleaning and assessment of the debris. Initially, a 2-dimensional reconstruction of the Orbiter outer mold line was developed. As the investigation progressed fixtures which allowed a 3-dimensional reconstruction of the forward portions of the left wing's leading edge was developed. To support the reconstructions and forensic analyses a Materials and Processes (M&P) 'team was formed. This M&P team established processes for recording factual observations, debris cleaning, and engineering analysis. Fracture surfaces and thermal effects of selected airframe debris were assessed, and process flows for both nondestructive and destructive sampling and evaluation of debris were developed. The Team also assessed left hand airframe components that were believed to be associated with a structural breach of Columbia. A major portion of this analysis was evaluation of metallic deposits were prevalent on left wing leading edge components. Extensive evaluation of the visual, metallurgical and chemical nature of the deposits provided conclusions that were consistent with the visual assessments and interpretations of the NASA lead teams and the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Analytical data collected by the M&P Team showed that a significant thermal event occurred at the left wing leading edge in the proximity of LH RCC Panels 8-9, and a correlation was formed between the deposits and overheating in these areas to the wing leading edge components. The analysis of deposits also showed exposure to temperatures in excess of 1649 C (3200 F), which would severely degrade support structure, tiles, and RCC panel materials. The integrated failure analysis of wing leading edge debris and deposits strongly supported the hypothesis that a breach occurred at LH RCC Panel 8.

Russell, Richard↗
NASA NTRS1986

Aircraft accident report: NASA 712, Convair 990, N712NA, March Air Force Base, California, July 17, 1985, facts and analysis

On July 17, l985, at 1810 P.d.t., NASA 712, a Convair 990 aircraft, was destroyed by fire at March Air Force Base, California. The fire started during the rollout after the pilot rejected the takeoff on runway 32. The rejected takeoff was initiated during the takeoff roll because of blown tires on the right landing gear. During the rollout, fragments of either the blown tires or the wheel/brake assemblies penetrated a right-wing fuel tank forward of the right main landing gear. Leaking fuel ignited while the aircraft was rolling, and fire engulfed the right wing and the fuselage after the aircraft was stopped on the runway. The 4-man flightcrew and the 15 scientists and technicians seated in the cabin evacuated the aircraft without serious injury. The fire was not extinguished by crash/rescue efforts and the aircraft was destroyed.

Batthauer, Byron E.↗