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Target mass corrections in lepton–nucleus DIS: Theory and applications to nuclear PDFs

Motivated by the wide range of kinematics covered by current and planned deep-inelastic scattering (DIS) facilities, we revisit the formalism, practical implementation, and numerical impact of target mass corrections (TMCs) for DIS on unpolarized nuclear targets. An important aspect is that we only use nuclear and later partonic degrees of freedom, carefully avoiding a picture of the nucleus in terms of nucleons. After establishing that formulae used for individual nucleon targets (p,n), derived in the Operator Product Expansion (OPE) formalism, are indeed applicable to nuclear targets, here we rewrite expressions for nuclear TMCs in terms of re-scaled (or averaged) kinematic variables. As a consequence, we find a representation for nuclear TMCs that is approximately independent of the nuclear target. We go on to construct a single-parameter fit for all nuclear targets that is in good numerical agreement with full computations of TMCs. We discuss in detail qualitative and quantitative differences between nuclear TMCs built in the OPE and the parton model formalisms, as well as give numerical predictions for current and future facilities.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Nuclear weapons modernizations

This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Using isotope shift for testing nuclear theory: The case of nobelium isotopes

We calculate field isotope shifts for nobelium atoms using nuclear charge distributions which come from different nuclear models.We demonstrate that comparing calculated isotope shifts with experiment can serve as a testing ground for nuclear theories. It also provides a way of extracting parameters of nuclear charge distribution beyond nuclear root mean square (rms) radius, e.g., parameter of quadrupole deformation β. The measurements of at least two atomic transitions is needed to disentangle the contributions of the changes in deformation and nuclear rms radius into field isotopic shift. We argue that a previous interpretation of the isotope measurements in terms of δ < r 2 > between 252,254 No isotopes should be amended when nuclear deformation is taken into account. As a result, we calculate isotope shifts for other known isotopes and for hypothetically metastable isotope 286 No for which the predictions of nuclear models differ substantially.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Activities ONDRAF/NIRAS related to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities

Since 1980, the Agency is responsible by law for the safe management of all radioactive waste produced in Belgium, including decommissioning wastes. By the law of 11 January 1991 and the implementing Royal Decree of 16/10/1991, ONDRAF/NIRAS has been entrusted with a mission concerning the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. This mission involves the collection and assessment of data concerning decommissioning forecasts for nuclear facilities, the approval of facilities' decommissioning programmes, the establishment - in consultation with operators - of financing conditions for decommissioning, as well as the implementation of these programmes on request by the operator, or in the case of its failure to do so. This is the case for the company Best Medical Belgium SA located at Fleurus (MDS Nordion SA, till April 2011), which produced radioisotopes for medical applications and went bankrupt in 2012. These installations have been entrusted to ONDRAF/NIRAS. A plan of action was developed for taking over the operations in the framework of remediation and decommissioning. Steps have been taken to integrate his new role as a nuclear operator. The installations of Best Medical Belgium SA are now referred to as the 'O/N - Site Fleurus.' Nuclear facility operators, or any person requesting to operate a nuclear facility, are obliged to provide ONDRAF/NIRAS, under their responsibility and in due time, with all the necessary information concerning these facilities' decommissioning forecasts, the nature, quantities and dates of transfer of the resulting waste, and the financing conditions for these facilities' decommissioning. In order to make the necessary funds available for decommissioning a nuclear facility when it will be shut down, operators are obliged to establish provisions during the facility's active life. These provisions are calculated in such a way that the total amount established at the time of the final shutdown covers all costs resulting from the facility's final phase, namely the preparation of decommissioning, decontamination, more or less long-term maintenance, dismantling, treatment, conditioning and disposal of waste produced during this phase. In order to face to multiple and repeated evaluation processes, the Agency, already in the early 90's, started with the implementation of its own integrated data processing system, recording the physical and radiological inventories of nuclear facilities, and allowing the evaluation of the quantities of decommissioning materials and wastes as well as of the decommissioning costs of these facilities. The cost evaluations cover all decommissioning activities from final shutdown of the facility until final release from nuclear control, as well as conventional demolition and site restoration if required. Beside the information related to the inventories, the database involves so called auxiliary tables integrating unit prices of the various decontamination and dismantling techniques, unit rates for radioactive waste processing, interim storage and final disposal. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Extension of PENELOPE to protons: Simulation of nuclear reactions and benchmark with Geant4

Purpose: Describing the implementation of nuclear reactions in the extension of the Monte Carlo code (MC) PENELOPE to protons (PENH) and benchmarking with Geant4.Methods: PENH is based on mixed-simulation mechanics for both elastic and inelastic electromagnetic collisions (EM). The adopted differential cross sections for EM elastic collisions are calculated using the eikonal approximation with the Dirac–Hartree–Fock–Slater atomic potential. Cross sections for EM inelastic collisions are computed within the relativistic Born approximation, using the Sternheimer–Liljequist model of the generalized oscillator strength. Nuclear elastic and inelastic collisions were simulated using explicitly the scattering analysis interactive dialin database for {sup 1}H and ICRU 63 data for {sup 12}C, {sup 14}N, {sup 16}O, {sup 31}P, and {sup 40}Ca. Secondary protons, alphas, and deuterons were all simulated as protons, with the energy adapted to ensure consistent range. Prompt gamma emission can also be simulated upon user request. Simulations were performed in a water phantom with nuclear interactions switched off or on and integral depth–dose distributions were compared. Binary-cascade and precompound models were used for Geant4. Initial energies of 100 and 250 MeV were considered. For cases with no nuclear interactions simulated, additional simulations in a water phantom with tight resolution (1 mm in all directions) were performed with FLUKA. Finally, integral depth–dose distributions for a 250 MeV energy were computed with Geant4 and PENH in a homogeneous phantom with, first, ICRU striated muscle and, second, ICRU compact bone.Results: For simulations with EM collisions only, integral depth–dose distributions were within 1%/1 mm for doses higher than 10% of the Bragg-peak dose. For central-axis depth–dose and lateral profiles in a phantom with tight resolution, there are significant deviations between Geant4 and PENH (up to 60%/1 cm for depth–dose distributions). The agreement is much better with FLUKA, with deviations within 3%/3 mm. When nuclear interactions were turned on, agreement (within 6% before the Bragg-peak) between PENH and Geant4 was consistent with uncertainties on nuclear models and cross sections, whatever the material simulated (water, muscle, or bone).Conclusions: A detailed and flexible description of nuclear reactions has been implemented in the PENH extension of PENELOPE to protons, which utilizes a mixed-simulation scheme for both elastic and inelastic EM collisions, analogous to the well-established algorithm for electrons/positrons. PENH is compatible with all current main programs that use PENELOPE as the MC engine. The nuclear model of PENH is realistic enough to give dose distributions in fair agreement with those computed by Geant4.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S&S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Required Assets for a Nuclear Energy Applied R&D Program

This report is one of a set of three documents that have collectively identified and recommended research and development capabilities that will be required to advance nuclear energy in the next 20 to 50 years. The first report, Nuclear Energy for the Future: Required Research and Development Capabilities—An Industry Perspective, was produced by Battelle Memorial Institute at the request of the Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy. That report, drawn from input by industry, academia, and Department of Energy laboratories, can be found in Appendix 5.1. This Idaho National Laboratory report maps the nuclear-specific capabilities from the Battelle report onto facility requirements, identifying options from the set of national laboratory, university, industry, and international facilities. It also identifies significant gaps in the required facility capabilities. The third document, Executive Recommendations for Nuclear R&D Capabilities, is a letter report containing a set of recommendations made by a team of senior executives representing nuclear vendors, utilities, academia, and the national laboratories (at Battelle’s request). That third report can be found in Appendix 5.2. The three reports should be considered as set in order to have a more complete picture. The basis of this report was drawn from three sources: previous Department of Energy reports, workshops and committee meetings, and expert opinion. The facilities discussed were winnowed from several hundred facilities that had previously been catalogued and several additional facilities that had been overlooked in past exercises. The scope of this report is limited to commercial nuclear energy and those things the federal government, or more specifically the Office of Nuclear Energy, should do to support its expanded deployment in order to increase energy security and reduce carbon emissions. In the context of this report, capabilities mean innovative, well-structured research and development programs, a viable work force, and well-equipped specialized facilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Keeping the Momentum and Nuclear Forensics at Los Alamos National Laboratory

LANL has 70 years of experience in nuclear forensics and supports the community through a wide variety of efforts and leveraged capabilities: Expanding the understanding of nuclear forensics, providing training on nuclear forensics methods, and developing bilateral relationships to expand our understanding of nuclear forensic science. LANL remains highly supportive of several key organizations tasked with carrying forth the Nuclear Security Summit messages: IAEA, GICNT, and INTERPOL. Analytical chemistry measurements on plutonium and uranium matrices are critical to numerous programs including safeguards accountancy verification measurements. Los Alamos National Laboratory operates capable actinide analytical chemistry and material science laboratories suitable for nuclear material and environmental forensic characterization. Los Alamos National Laboratory uses numerous means to validate and independently verify that measurement data quality objectives are met. Numerous LANL nuclear facilities support the nuclear material handling, preparation, and analysis capabilities necessary to evaluate samples containing nearly any mass of an actinide (attogram to kilogram levels).

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

International Approaches for Nuclear Waste Disposal in Geological Formations: Report on Fifth Worldwide Review

An important issue for present and future generations is the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Over the past over forty years, the development of technologies to isolate both spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and other high-level nuclear waste (HLW) generated at nuclear power plants and from production of defense materials, and low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste (LILW) in underground rock and sediments has been found to be a challenging undertaking. Finding an appropriate solution for the disposal of nuclear waste is an important issue for protection of the environment and public health, and it is a prerequisite for the future of nuclear power. The purpose of a deep geological repository for nuclear waste is to provide to future generations, protection against any harmful release of radioactive material, even after the memory of the repository may have been lost, and regardless of the technical knowledge of future generations. The results of a wide variety of investigations on the development of technology for radioactive waste isolation from 19 countries were published in the First Worldwide Review in 1991 (Witherspoon, 1991). The results of investigations from 26 countries were published in the Second Worldwide Review in 1996 (Witherspoon, 1996). The results from 32 countries were summarized in the Third Worldwide Review in 2001 (Witherspoon and Bodvarsson, 2001). The last compilation had results from 24 countries assembled in the Fourth Worldwide Review (WWR) on radioactive waste isolation (Witherspoon and Bodvarsson, 2006). Since publication of the last report in 2006, radioactive waste disposal approaches have continued to evolve, and there have been major developments in a number of national geological disposal programs. Significant experience has been obtained both in preparing and reviewing cases for the operational and long-term safety of proposed and operating repositories. Disposal of radioactive waste is a complex issue, not only because of the nature of the waste, but also because of the detailed regulatory structure for dealing with radioactive waste, the variety of stakeholders involved, and (in some cases) the number of regulatory entities involved.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste Inventory Report

This report provides information on the inventory of commercial spent fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in the United States, as well as non-commercial SNF and HLW in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. Actual or estimated quantitative values for current inventories are provided along with inventory forecasts derived from examining different future commercial nuclear power generation scenarios. The report also includes select information on the characteristics associated with the wastes examined (e.g., type, packaging, heat generation rate, decay curves). This report was produced for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to support various analyses on options for storage and transport of SNF and HLW and sponsored by DOE’s Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD). The report draws from and complements a previously issued report, Fuel Cycle Potential Waste Inventory for Disposition, developed for DOE’s Used Nuclear Fuel Research & Development Campaign. The current report is not intended as a revision to either Fuel Cycle Potential Waste Inventory for Disposition or Evaluation of Options for Permanent Geologic Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in Support of a Comprehensive National Nuclear Fuel Cycle Strategy from which some underlying data is used as referenced in the current report. Rather, this report is intended as a stand-alone report providing estimates of current and projected SNF and HLW inventory and has been generated for SFWD planning purposes. This is a technical report that does not take into account contractual limitations or obligations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). For example, under the provisions of the Standard Contract, spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters is not an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this report conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract governs the obligations of the parties, and this report in no manner supersedes, overrides, or amends the Standard Contract. This report reflects technical work which could support future decision making by DOE. No inferences should be drawn from this report regarding future actions by DOE, which are limited both by the terms of the Standard Contract and a lack of Congressional appropriations for the Department to fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act including licensing and construction of a spent nuclear fuel repository.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Data Assessment for Advanced Reactors

Advanced reactor concepts being developed throughout the industry are significantly different from light-water reactor (LWR) designs with respect to geometry, materials, and operating conditions, and consequently, with respect to their reactor physics behavior. Given the limited operating experience with non-LWRs, the accurate simulation of reactor physics and the quantification of associated uncertainties are important for ensuring that the nuclear design for advanced reactor concepts include appropriate margins. Nuclear data are a major source of input uncertainties in reactor physics analysis. As part of a project sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), key nuclear data relevant to reactor safety analysis in selected advanced reactor technologies were identified, and their impacts on important key figures of merit were assessed based on (1) a review of available advanced reactor specifications, (2) analysis of previous studies performed at ORNL and other research institutions, and (3) sensitivity and uncertainty analyses performed for six selected benchmarks—three experimental and three computational—to quantify the impacts of the identified key nuclear data on several key metrics. This report summarizes the key nuclear data—nominal data and nuclear data uncertainties— considering the most important nuclear reactions in the fuel and in various materials for the moderator, coolant, and structure of the considered advanced reactors.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Exploring Advanced Computational Tools and Techniques with Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Operating Nuclear Plants

This report presents the project Idaho National Laboratory conducted for Nuclear Regulatory Commission to explore the advanced computational tools and techniques, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), for operating nuclear plants. The report reviews the nuclear data sources, with the focus on the operating experience data, that could be applied by advanced computational tools and techniques. Plant-specific and generic (national and international) data from different sources are described. The report describes the relationships between statistics and AI/ML and then introduces the most widely used AI/ML algorithms in both supervised and unsupervised learning. The report reviews the recent applications of advanced computational tools and techniques in various fields of nuclear industry, such as reactor system design and analysis, plant operation and maintenance, and nuclear safety and risk analysis. Finally, the report presents the insights from the project on the potential applicability of AI/ML techniques in improving advanced computational capabilities, how the advanced tools and techniques could contribute to the understanding of safety and risk, and what information would be needed to provide meaningful insights to decision makers. The report also documents an NRC survey on the current state of commercial nuclear power operations relative to the use of AI and ML tools as well as the role of AI/ML tools in nuclear power operations was published by the NRC as in FRN NRC-2021-0048 in April 2021. A summary of the survey including the survey questions, survey participants, survey responses, and the conclusions and insights derived from the survey is provided in the report. Finally, the report investigates potential applications of using AI/ML in operating NPPs and advanced reactors (both advanced LWRs and advanced NLWRs) to improve nuclear plant safety and efficiency. Three main application fields are defined and discussed: (1) plant safety and security assessments; (2) plant degradation modeling, fault and accident diagnosis and prognosis; and (3) plant operation and maintenance efficiency improvement.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the “human factor.” Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former “Assistant Secretary for Safeguards and Security” at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear-weapons complex and a former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has observed that “good security is 20% equipment and 80% people.”1 Although eliminating the “human factor” is not possible, accounting for and mitigating the risk of the insider threat is an essential element in establishing an effective nuclear security culture. This paper will consider the organizational role in mitigating the risk associated with the malicious insider through monitoring and enhancing human reliability and motivation as well as enhancing the nuclear security culture.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuclear Materials Management Program at the NNSS

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, was established in 1951 mainly for weapons testing; because special nuclear materials (SNM) were expended during the tests, a nuclear material management program was not required. That changed in December 2004 with the receipt of Category I SNM for purposes other than weapons testing. At that time, Material Control and Accountability and Nuclear Material Management were a joint laboratory (Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore) effort with nuclear material management being performed at the laboratories. That changed in March 2006 when the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office appointed sole responsibility to the Management and Operations (M&O) contractor, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). Since 2006 the basic nuclear material management work was completed by a combination of M&O employees and subcontractors, but a true Nuclear Material Management (NMM) Program was not determined to be necessary until recently. With expanding missions and more nuclear material (NM) coming to the NNSS, it became imperative to have an organization to manage these materials; therefore, an NMM Manager was officially appointed by NSTec in 2012. In June 2011 a Gap Analysis and white paper was completed by a subcontractor; this presentation will include highlights from those documents along with our plans to resolve the “gaps” and stand up a functional and compliant NMM Program at the NNSS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of Platforms for Nuclear Science Experiments at the National Ignition Facility

When neutrons are produced in nuclear processes such as fission or fusion, they can interact with any surrounding materials, inducing radioactivity through neutron capture reactions. Neutron reactions are fundamental to many areas of nuclear science, including studies of nuclear reactors, determining the formation of matter in stars, nuclear forensics, medical radiotherapy, and assessing the safety of our nuclear stockpile. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) offers a unique opportunity to use the inertial confinement fusion platform to measure neutron reactions essential to national security or fundamental and applied science applications. A typical fusion experiment at NIF currently produces approximately 10 16 neutrons through the fusion of deuterium and tritium in a target capsule. Materials introduced into the NIF target chamber in close proximity to the capsule will undergo neutron reactions such as capture or fission, and the resultant reaction rates can be evaluated. While neutron reactions can be measured at other facilities, NIF offers unique advantages. The flux of neutrons produced (number of neutrons per square centimeter per second) is much higher than any other available neutron source due to both the small size of the NIF capsule (2-mm diameter before implosion) and the short time (roughly 100 ps) over which the neutrons are produced. This results in less target material required to perform a reaction-rate study (less than or equal to 10 16 atoms) as compared to traditional particle accelerators, which require targets that are approximately 1 mg or roughly 10 20 atoms. Also, the NIF neutron spectrum is peaked at thermonuclear (14 MeV) neutron energy, which means that nuclear reactions with nonthermal energy thresholds can be studied at NIF, whereas neutron energies at a nuclear reactor are generally insufficient for studying higher-energy neutron reactions. Several experimental configurations have been developed that enable the use of NIF fusion capsules as powerful neutron sources for nuclear reaction measurements.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

The Creation of a French Basic Nuclear Installation - Description of the Regulatory Process - 13293

CEA is a French government-funded technological research organization. It has to build a medium-level waste interim storage facility because the geological repository will not be available until 2025. This interim storage facility, called DIADEM, has to be available in 2017. These wastes are coming from the research facilities for spent fuel reprocessing and the dismantling of the most radioactive parts of nuclear facilities. The CEA handles the waste management by inventorying the needs and updating them regularly. The conception of the facility is mainly based on this inventory. It provides quantity and characteristics of wastes and it gives the production schedule until 2035. Beyond mass and volume, main characteristics of these radioactive wastes are chemical nature, radioisotopes, radioactivity, radiation dose, the heat emitted, corrosive or explosive gas production, etc. These characteristics provide information to study the repository safety. DIADEM mainly consists of a concrete cell, isolated from the outside, wherein stainless steel welded containers are stored, stacked in a vertical position in the racks. DIADEM is scheduled to store three types of 8 mm-thick, stainless steel cylindrical containers with an outside diameter 498 mm and height from 620 to 2120 mm. DIADEM will be a basic nuclear installation (INB in French) because of overall activity of radioactive substances stored. The creation of a French basic nuclear installation is subject to authorization according to the French law No. 2006-686 of 13 June 2006 on Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Field. The authorization takes into account the technical and financial capacities of the licensee which must allow him to conduct his project in compliance with these interests, especially to cover the costs of decommissioning the installation and conduct remediation work, and to monitor and maintain its location site or, for radioactive waste disposal installations, to cover the definitive shut-down, maintenance and surveillance expenditure. The authorization is issued by a decree adopted upon advice of the French Nuclear Safety Authority and after a public enquiry. In accordance with Decree No. 2007-1557 of November 2, 2007, the application is filed with the ministries responsible for nuclear safety and the Nuclear Safety Authority. It consists of twelve files and four records information. The favorable opinion of the Nuclear Safety Authority on the folder is required to start the public inquiry. Once the public inquiry is completed, the building permit is issued by the prefect. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Choosing Your Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Life Cycle Assessment Perspective - 16425

Nuclear waste management has always been a much debated topic and a key driver for decisions within the nuclear industry. A standardised global approach has not yet been developed and at present many countries are re-considering their position. In the UK the reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel is projected to stop, but no clear indication about the future approach has been given. This contribution sets out the early stages of an approach to compare the possible alternatives based on Life Cycle Assessment (LCA), which is widely used in other sectors to assess the overall environmental burdens of a product or a service across the whole life cycle - i.e. from cradle to grave. The LCA may serve to support decision-making processes within the nuclear industry and, provided that it is used in an open and transparent way, to improve public attitudes towards nuclear energy. To date few LCA studies within the nuclear industry have been carried out, the main issue being the lack of a standardised methodology to evaluate the impacts of radionuclides. The present study proposes a new framework for this purpose, and demonstrates its application in an LCA study of the current UK approach to the management of spent nuclear fuel based on specific data from plants at Sellafield. The final results of the study will show the overall environmental footprint of the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, in terms of both radiological and non-radiological impacts. A 'hot spot' analysis will also be performed to highlight the critical processing steps. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Collaborative Research Programme in Decommissioning, Immobilisation and Storage Solutions for Nuclear Waste Inventories (DISTINCTIVE) - 16466

The UK government remains committed to nuclear power as an important part of the energy generation capacity over the next 30-50 years and possibly beyond, with aspirations for both new-build power stations and lifetime extension of the existing fleet. A central component of public acceptance for any new-build programme is the need to demonstrate our ability to safely manage and dispose of high- and intermediate-level wastes from legacy nuclear operations. Clear milestones associated with the needs of waste management and decommissioning have been provided by the UK government, and most rely on further research and technical developments being delivered over the next 10-20 years. The DISTINCTIVE (Decommissioning, Immobilisation and Storage Solutions for Nuclear Waste Inventories) consortium is carrying out research that addresses the broad area of nuclear waste and decommissioning, bringing together key industry partners and leading academic researchers from 10 of the UK's leading research intensive universities. The research being carried out is multi-disciplinary and covers both fundamental and applied topics, with research projects clustered in four major themes: AGR, Magnox and exotic spent fuels; PuO{sub 2} and fuel residues; legacy ponds and silo wastes; and structural integrity. The consortium builds upon and consolidates the work of previous Research Councils' UK Energy Programme-funded projects in the same field although, importantly, this new project draws in researchers from a larger group of universities and increases the multi-disciplinary nature of the group. All participating research groups have a strong track-record of supporting the nuclear industry through basic and applied research as well as consultancy activities. Key aims of the consortium are to extend and develop a relevant academic skill base in the UK associated with the needs of the nuclear waste management industry, to train the next generation of UK researchers, equipping them with skills and experiences relevant to nuclear waste management and decommissioning issues, and to carry out cutting-edge research that has the potential to provide new and innovative pathways to better management of both legacy and future nuclear wastes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗