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At least 1,423 records · Page 79

Data-Intensive Visual Analysis for Cyber Security

Protecting communications networks against attacks where the aim is to steal information, disrupt order, or harm critical infrastructure can require the collection and analysis of staggering amounts of data. The ability to detect and respond to threats quickly is a paramount concern across sectors, and especially for critical government, utility and financial networks. Yet detecting emerging or incipient threats in immense volumes of network traffic requires new computational and analytic approaches. Network security increasingly requires cooperation between human analysts able to spot suspicious events through means such as data visualization and automated systems that process streaming network data in near real-time to triage events so that human analysts are best able to focus their work.

Pike, William A.↗

REMOVAL OF LEGACY PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FROM SWEDEN

U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) recently removed legacy plutonium materials from Sweden in collaboration with AB SVAFO, Sweden. This paper details the activities undertaken through the U.S. receiving site (Savannah River Site (SRS)) to support the characterization, stabilization, packaging and removal of legacy plutonium materials from Sweden in 2012. This effort was undertaken as part of GTRI’s Gap Materials Program and culminated with the successful removal of plutonium from Sweden as announced at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. The removal and shipment of plutonium materials to the United States was the first of its kind under NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The Environmental Assessment for the U.S. receipt of gap plutonium material was approved in May 2010. Since then, the multi-year process yielded many first time accomplishments associated with plutonium packaging and transport activities including the application of the of DOE-STD-3013 stabilization requirements to treat plutonium materials outside the U.S., the development of an acceptance criteria for receipt of plutonium from a foreign country, the development and application of a versatile process flow sheet for the packaging of legacy plutonium materials, the identification of a plutonium container configuration, the first international certificate validation of the 9975 shipping package and the first intercontinental shipment using the 9975 shipping package. This paper will detail the technical considerations in developing the packaging process flow sheet, defining the key elements of the flow sheet and its implementation, determining the criteria used in the selection of the transport package, developing the technical basis for the package certificate amendment and the reviews with multiple licensing authorities and most importantly integrating the technical activities with the Swedish partners.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Case for the Application of Worldwide Marine Radioactivity Studies In the Search for Undeclared Facilities and Activities

Undeclared nuclear facilities unequivocally remain the most difficult safeguards challenge facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent cases of undeclared facilities revealed in Iran and Syria, which are NPT signatory States, show both the difficulty and the seriousness of this threat to nonproliferation. In the case of undeclared nuclear facilities, the most effective deterrent against proliferation is the application of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES); however, WAES is currently cost-prohibitive. As with any threat, the most effective countering strategy is a multifaceted approach. Some of the approaches applied by the IAEA include: open source analysis, satellite imagery, on-site environmental sampling, complementary access under the Additional Protocol (where in force), traditional safeguards inspections, and information provided by member States. These approaches, naturally, are focused on specific States. Are there other opportunities not currently within the IAEA purview to assess States that may provide another opportunity to detect clandestine facilities? In this paper, the author will make the case that the IAEA Department of Safeguards should explore the area of worldwide marine radioactivity studies as one possible opportunity. One such study was released by the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory in January 2005. This technical document focused on 90Sr, 137Cs, and 239/240Pu. It is clearly a challenging area because of the many sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the world’s oceans and seas including: nuclear weapons testing, reprocessing, accidents, waste dumping, and industrial and medical radioisotopes, whose distributions change based on oceanographic, geochemical, and biological processes, and their sources. It is additionally challenging where multiple States share oceans, seas, and rivers. But with the application of modern science, historical sampling to establish baselines, and a focus on the most relevant radionuclides, the potential is there to support this challenging IAEA safeguards mission.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

U.S. Patent Pending, Cyberspace Security System for Complex Systems, U.S. Patent Application No.: 14/134,949

A computer implemented method monetizes the security of a cyber-system in terms of losses each stakeholder may expect to lose if a security break down occurs. A non-transitory media stores instructions for generating a stake structure that includes costs that each stakeholder of a system would lose if the system failed to meet security requirements and generating a requirement structure that includes probabilities of failing requirements when computer components fails. The system generates a vulnerability model that includes probabilities of a component failing given threats materializing and generates a perpetrator model that includes probabilities of threats materializing. The system generates a dot product of the stakes structure, the requirement structure, the vulnerability model and the perpetrator model. The system can further be used to compare, contrast and evaluate alternative courses of actions best suited for the stakeholders and their requirements.

Availablity↗

Cyberspace security system

A system evaluates reliability, performance and/or safety by automatically assessing the targeted system's requirements. A cost metric quantifies the impact of failures as a function of failure cost per unit of time. The metrics or measurements may render real-time (or near real-time) outcomes by initiating active response against one or more high ranked threats. The system may support or may be executed in many domains including physical domains, cyber security domains, cyber-physical domains, infrastructure domains, etc. or any other domains that are subject to a threat or a loss.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

FY 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan - Biennial Plan Summary

This year’s summary report updates the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2016 SSMP), the 25-year strategic program of record that captures the plans developed across numerous NNSA programs and organizations to maintain and modernize the scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure necessary to ensure the success of NNSA’s nuclear weapons mission. The SSMP is a companion to the Prevent, Counter, and Respond: A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2017-2021) report, the planning document for NNSA’s nuclear threat reduction mission. New versions of both reports are published each year in response to new requirements and challenges. Much was accomplished in FY 2015 as part of the program of record described in this year’s SSMP. The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify for the twentieth time that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without the need for underground nuclear explosive testing. The talented scientists, engineers, and technicians at the three national security laboratories, the four nuclear weapons production plants, and the national security site are primarily responsible for this continued success. Research, development, test, and evaluation programs have advanced NNSA’s understanding of weapons physics, component aging, and material properties through first-of-a-kind shock physics experiments, along with numerous other critical experiments conducted throughout the nuclear security enterprise. The multiple life extension programs (LEPs) that are under way made progress toward their first production unit dates. The W76-1 LEP is past the halfway point in total production, and the B61-12 completed three development flight tests. Critical to this success is the budget. The Administration’s budget request for NNSA’s Weapons Activities has increased for all but one of the past seven years, resulting in a total increase of approximately 45 percent since 2010. If adopted by Congress, the FY 2017 budget request will increase funding by $396 million (about 4.5 percent) from the enacted FY 2016 level. A significant portion of the increase would fund the research for multiple life extension programs, support the programs in Directed Stockpile Work, and modernize the physical infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise.

Source record↗

Transforming Agricultural Systems on Public Lands in the EAA to Support Everglades Restoration

The success of Everglades restoration is threatened by both regional and global scale pressures. The overarching global threat to the Everglades is long-term sea level rise due to climate change driven by greenhouse gas emissions. The State of Florida is purchasing EAA lands with the plan of replacing them with water storage and treatment areas. But displaced farms simply reappear elsewhere in the world, given that removing farms does not reduce the demand for food products. Substitute farms typically reappear in developing nations on lands cleared from native habitat. And since land clearing for agriculture and other development is a major source of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, it can be argued that agriculture displaced from Florida contributes to greater greenhouse gas emissions and thus simply fuels global-scale threats to the Everglades. To achieve meaningful and lasting benefits, Everglades restoration programs must address the global need to produce food in a manner compatible with ecosystem protection. EAA farms on public lands can be redesigned to balance food production with environmental needs such as water storage, nutrient management, soil subsidence reduction, energy efficiency, and habitat protection in ways that are potentially more profitable to farmers and less costly to tax payers.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Transforming Agricultural Water Management in Support of Ecosystem Restoration

Threats to ecosystems are not local; they have to be handled with the global view in mind. Eliminating Florida farms, in order to meet its environmental goals, would simply move the needed agricultural production overseas, where environmentally less sensitive approaches are often used, thus yielding no net ecological benefit. South Florida is uniquely positioned to lead in the creation of sustainable agricultural systems, given its population, technology, and environmental restoration imperative. Florida should therefore aggressively focus on developing sustainable systems that deliver both agricultural production and environmental services. This presentation introduces a new farming concept of dealing with Florida’s agricultural land issues. The state purchases large land areas in order to manage the land easily and with ecosystem services in mind. The proposed new farming concept is an alternative to the current “two sides of the ditch” model, in which on one side are yield-maximizing, input-intensive, commodity price-dependent farms, while on the other side are publicly-financed, nutrient-removing treatment areas and water reservoirs trying to mitigate the externalized costs of food production systems and other human-induced problems. The proposed approach is rental of the land back to agriculture during the restoration transition period in order to increase water storage (allowing for greater water flow-through and/or water storage on farms), preventing issues such as nutrients removal, using flood-tolerant crops and reducing soil subsidence. Since the proposed approach is still being developed, there exist various unknown variables and considerations. However, working towards a long-term sustainable scenario needs to be the way ahead, as the threats are global and balancing the environment and agriculture is a serious global challenge.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Employing the radiological and nuclear risk assessment methods (RNRAM) for assessing radiological and nuclear detection architectures

The United States Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is charged with implementing domestic nuclear detection efforts to protect the U.S. from radiological and nuclear threats. DNDO is also responsible for coordinating the development of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). DNDO utilizes a unique risk analysis tool to conduct a holistic risk assessment of the GNDA known as the Radiological and Nuclear Risk Assessment Methods (RNRAM). The capabilities of this tool will be used to support internal DNDO analyses and has also been used for other entities such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The model uses a probabilistic risk assessment methodology and includes the ability to conduct a risk assessment of the effectiveness of layered architectures in the GNDA against an attack by an intelligent, adaptive adversary. This paper overviews the basic structure, capabilities, and use of RNRAM as used to assess different architectures and how various risk components are calculated through a series of interconnected modules. Also highlighted is flexible structure of RNRAM which can accommodate new modules in order to examine a variety of threat detection architectures and concepts.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗

Towards a Cyber Defense Framework for SCADA Systems Based on Power Consumption Monitoring

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is an industrial automation system that remotely monitor, and control critical infrastructures. SCADA systems are major targets for espionage and sabotage attackers. According to the 2015 Dell security annual threat report, the number of cyber-attacks against SCADA systems has doubled in the past year. Cyber-attacks (i.e., buffer overflow, rootkits and code injection) could cause serious financial losses and physical infrastructure damages. Moreover, some specific cyber-attacks against SCADA systems could become a threat to human life. Current commercial off-the-shelf security solutions are insufficient in protecting SCADA systems against sophisticated cyber-attacks. In 2014 a report by Mandiant stated that only 69% of organizations learned about their breaches from third entities, meaning that these companies lack of their own detection system. Furthermore, these breaches are not detected in real-time or fast enough to prevent further damages. The average time between compromise and detection (for those intrusions that were detected) was 205 days. To address this challenge, we propose an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that detects SCADA-specific cyber-attacks by analyzing the power consumption of a SCADA device. Specifically, to validate the proposed approach, we chose to monitor in real-time the power usage of a a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). To this end, we configured the hardware of the tetsbed by installing the required sensors to monitor and collect its power consumption. After that two SCADA-specific cyber-attacks were simulated and TracerDAQ Pro was used to collect the power consumption of the PLC under normal and anomalous scenarios. Results showed that is possible to distinguish between the regular power usage of the PLC and when the PLC was under specific cyber-attacks.

Hernandez Jimenez, Jarilyn M↗

Impacts of Vehicle (In)Security

Nuclear and radioactive material is routinely transported worldwide every day. Since 2010, the complexity of the transport vehicle to support such activities has grown exponentially. Many core functions of a vehicle are now handled by small embedded computer modules with more being added each year to enhance the owner’s experience and convenience. With a system as complex as today’s automobile, the potential for cyber security issues is certain. Hackers have begun exploring this new domain with public information increasingly disseminated. Because vehicles are allowed into and around secure nuclear facilities, the potential for using a vehicle as a new cyber entry point or vector into the facility is now plausible and must be mitigated. In addition, compromising such a vehicle could aide in illicit removal of nuclear material, putting sensitive cargo at risk. Because cyber attacks can now be introduced using vehicles, cyber security, needs to be integrated into an organization’s design basis threat document. Essentially, a vehicle now extends the perimeter for which security professionals are responsible.Electronic Control Units (ECU) responsible for handling all core and ancillary vehicle functions are interconnected using the controller area network (CAN) bus. A typical CAN network in a modern automobile contains 50 or more ECUs. The CAN protocol now supports a wide variety of areas, including automotive, road transportation, rail transportation, industrial automation, power generation, maritime, military vehicles, aviation, and medical devices. In many ways, the nuclear industry is employing the CAN bus protocol or other similar broadcast serial networks. This paper will provide an overview of the current state of automobile and CAN Bus security, as well as an overview of what has been publicly disclosed by many research organizations. It will then present several hypotheses of how vehicle security issues may impact nuclear activities. An initial discussion of how a vehicle can be used as a new threat vector to penetrate secure facilities will be presented. This includes how a modern automobile can be used as the exploitation mechanism for nearby devices such as laptops, cell phones, and wireless access points. Additional discussion will highlight how vehicle security might impact transportation of nuclear material through remote exploitation of a moving vehicle. The final discussion will include what possible implications might be relative to the physical protection systems at nuclear facilities. The audience will also be given details regarding the complexity of attack, thus implying the likelihood of successful exploitation, and information on how such attacks may be mitigated. Emerging security products for automobiles will be discussed and other mitigation methods will be detailed (e.g. disabling vehicle cellular modems). As a result, the audience will have a greater understanding of how to add vehicle security as a part of a comprehensive nuclear security policy.Finally, this paper will highlight the similarities between CAN Bus and other broadcast serial bus networks such as Profibus or DeviceNet, helping educate the reader on how susceptible this type of networking is to nefarious attacks and how it might affect components connected to many different nuclear systems, including control systems, safety systems, emergency systems, and support systems.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

On Bipartite Graphs Trees and Their Partial Vertex Covers.

Graphs can be used to model risk management in various systems. Particularly, Caskurlu et al. in [7] have considered a system, which has threats, vulnerabilities and assets, and which essentially represents a tripartite graph. The goal in this model is to reduce the risk in the system below a predefined risk threshold level. One can either restricting the permissions of the users, or encapsulating the system assets. The pointed out two strategies correspond to deleting minimum number of elements corresponding to vulnerabilities and assets, such that the flow between threats and assets is reduced below the predefined threshold level. It can be shown that the main goal in this risk management system can be formulated as a Partial Vertex Cover problem on bipartite graphs. It is well-known that the Vertex Cover problem is in P on bipartite graphs, however; the computational complexity of the Partial Vertex Cover problem on bipartite graphs has remained open. In this paper, we establish that the Partial Vertex Cover problem is NP-hard on bipartite graphs, which was also recently independently demonstrated [N. Apollonio and B. Simeone, Discrete Appl. Math., 165 (2014), pp. 37–48; G. Joret and A. Vetta, preprint, arXiv:1211.4853v1 [cs.DS], 2012]. We then identify interesting special cases of bipartite graphs, for which the Partial Vertex Cover problem, the closely related Budgeted Maximum Coverage problem, and their weighted extensions can be solved in polynomial time. We also present an 8/9-approximation algorithm for the Budgeted Maximum Coverage problem in the class of bipartite graphs. We show that this matches and resolves the integrality gap of the natural LP relaxation of the problem and improves upon a recent 4/5-approximation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Modeling Attacks and Defenses of Smart Grids at Three Levels

As optimization, user capabilities, and data-taking abilities are incorporated into next-generation power grids, or smart grids, they face cyber threats. The traditional electrical grid could only be damaged by physical attacks; however thesmart grid can suffer remote/cyber attacks, which have not been studied extensively in the literature. The electrical grid forms the backbone of the modern society and its security has significant implications in military settings. This paper applies game theory to model three-levels (power plants, transmission, and distribution networks) of defenses and attacks in smart grid network security. We characterize both the attacker and the defender (who interact at three network levels: distribution, transmission, and power plants) best responses and equilibrium strategies. We find that the defender's best response is not only a function of direct attacks but also of the spread from connected networks. Sensitivity analyses of the equilibrium strategies show that when success probability of an attack against power plantsreaches a threshold, the defender increases defending efforts for power plants. In contrast, the attack eort at all levels is not affected by this probability. This paper provides some novel insights to modeling and analyzing the emerging threats to the growing smart grid networks.

Rao, Nageswara S.↗

Creating Cybersecurity Professionals of the Future

Cybersecurity is a growing public concern with more threats and vulnerabilities being discovered and exploited by adversaries each day. In particular, industrial control systems (ICS) are at a higher risk because their components were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increased risk to ICS, it is vital that the employees who work on the system are trained in cybersecurity best practices and the latest threats. Research has shown that there are currently no curriculum standards for an ICS cybersecurity professional, which may contribute to the issues faced during the hiring process. In fact, most individuals require extensive post-hire training before they can begin normal operations. The goal in cybersecurity is to become operationally resilient, which means in part that employees of an organization are trained to prevent and handle a cybersecurity incident. Therefore, the authors present a project that offers a solution to the education gap by creating a workforce pipeline for ICS cybersecurity professionals. The project is a virtual ecosystem for collaboration and transforming operational resilience (VECTOR). VECTOR incorporates many different efforts to increase operational resilience including the development of ICS cybersecurity curriculum and apprenticeships.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Mathematical Framework for Representing Cyber-Physical System Interdependencies and Resilience

U.S. critical infrastructure is increasingly composed of integrated cyber-physical systems (CPS) whose components are operationally interdependent. These interdependencies can create additional vulnerabilities beyond those that are typically evaluated through independent physical and cyber risk assessments. These additional vulnerabilities, previously undetected at the sub-system and/or component level, could cause cascading effects across both the physical and cyber domains that could lead to infrastructure disruption or failure. This paper will review an initial mathematical framework developed to help understand the dynamics of these interfacing physical and cyber components at a holistic system level. The resulting framework also provides a method for modeling and assessing the resilience of CPS in complex and adaptive systems. It frames the system in terms of mission performance and the potential effects to performance caused by attacks that are cyber, physical, or blended in nature. The framework utilizes a systems-based, state-space modeling approach to reason about risk, resilience, and interdependencies in CPS. Probabilities are applied to each CPS component regarding a threat (both man-made and natural) and the likelihood of that particular component being impacted, along with indirect impact to other interdependent components. These component-level impacts from threats then translate into mission-level impact and systemic state change.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗

Thermal protection barrier for delaying access

A thermal protection barrier including a base layer having a plurality of baffles with perforated walls and a high melting temperature granular media disposed within the plurality of baffles. When the base layer is breached by a thermal threat, the granular media is operable to flow through the perforated walls of the plurality of baffles to provide a controlled flow of granular media to an area proximate the breach for thwarting the thermal threat.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Los Alamos Scientists Support Planetary Defense Efforts Worldwide

Every two years the International Academy of Astronautics brings scientists, engineers, spacecraft developers, disaster specialists, and government officials together to share research and ideas, and to consider how to find, and ultimately deflect or destroy, an asteroid that might be threatening Earth. Attending these Planetary Defense Conferences are scientists from Los Alamos National Laboratory who contribute considerable expertise in the areas of computer modeling and asteroid mitigation technologies. Los Alamos scientists work with NASA's Planetary Defense Coordination Office to assist in the location and tracking near-Earth objects, characterization of those objects to determine their orbit trajectory, size, shape, mass, composition, rotational dynamics and other parameters, and planning and implementation of measures to deflect or disrupt an object on an impact course, along with measures that can be taken on Earth to protect lives and property include evacuation of the impact area and movement of critical infrastructure. At the Planetary Defense Conferences scientists share research findings, collaborate on planetary defense strategies, and work on hypothetical scenarios that consider the many timelines and options that might occur during an asteroid threat. To be sure, that threat is rare, but these emergency exercises provide officials with valuable information that may one day protect us all during the real thing.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 1 of 2 – Using a Cloud Solution to Compress the Timely Detection Model

The design and implementation of new security technologies must account for numerous and complex operational challenges. For example, traditionally isolated systems must now survive amid the proliferation of network connectivity and endure the dynamic environments created by organizations tolerating bring-your-own-device policies. When evaluating the cyber, physical, or cyber-physical security of an asset, a common practice in the security industry is to apply the Timely Detection Model (TDM)—a versatile concept that relates the security functions of detection, delay, and response to the progression of an oppositional force’s attack timeline. If implemented correctly, security enhancements can compress the TDM to offer efficiencies to the stakeholders responsible for adjudicating threat scenarios. The efficiencies gained by the response force allow for more effective protection strategies to be realized. One such enhancement, deployed within the radiological security domain—the Sentry-Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS)—is a stand-alone security system that detects, assesses, and communicates priority alarms as a means of thwarting internal and external threats. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform—an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS—is being developed to facilitate more efficient alarm adjudication by site stakeholders and, if necessary, a faster response by law enforcement. This Cloud-hosted platform receives protected information from deployed Sentry-RMS units and relays it to stakeholders that have vested interests in maintaining an elevated level of situational awareness. Operationally, this enables real-time delivery of high-priority alarm and video imagery directly to an identified response stakeholder, such as local law enforcement or site management, via natively developed mobile applications or full platform integration. The Sentry-SECURE platform, as implemented by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Radiological Security, is an example of an innovative security technology that compresses the TDM by (1) enabling a more efficient time to target and (2) better informing a response force’s predetermined tactics, techniques, and procedures. This paper explores the platform’s operational roles, highlights its principal functions, and presents a use case that demonstrates how the platform provides enhanced situational awareness when adjudicating priority alarms.

Sentry-RMS, Timely Detection Model, Sentry-SECURE↗