Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Plutonium”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,423 records · Page 79

BNFL 3013 Containers for Radioactive material Transportation

The DOE Standard, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials, DOE-STD-3013-1994 — i.e., the 3013 Standard — was issued in December 1994, by the DOE weapons complex for the stabilization, packaging and safe storage of excess plutonium-bearing metal and oxides. Based on the 3013 Standard, the BNFL container was designed and developed to remove excess plutonium material from the Hanford and Rocky Flats Sites. The BNFL 3013 containers were put into certified transportation packages and sent to the Savannah River Site for storage and later disposition.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis of Differential Die Away Instrument Simulated Performance Using Boiling Water Reactor Spent Fuel Assemblies

As part of evaluating the performance of various Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) instruments measuring the plutonium content and other information about spent nuclear fuel, the Next Generation of Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Spent Fuel (SF) Project generated spent fuel libraries containing the composition of spent fuel assemblies originating from various reactors, initial enrichments (IE), burnups (BU), and cooling times (CT). Spent Fuel Library (SFL) number 5 (SFL5), representing Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) assemblies, was created as part of a “Gentleman’s Agreement” with Sweden to examine if the Differential Die Away (DDA) instrument performs similarly for BWR assemblies as for the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) ones. The difference between PWRs and BWRs is that BWRs have a large axial variation in moderator density because it is in the form of water at the bottom of the reactor but turns into steam as it gets warmer at the top of the reactor; thus, more plutonium builds up at the bottom of each assembly than at the top. In a PWR, the moderator density varies slightly from the bottom to the top, but since it is pressurized, the changes are not as significant with respect to the burnup and plutonium distributions. BWR assemblies are also typically smaller than PWR ones, which could affect detector performance. Since Sweden has both PWR and BWR assemblies, it is anticipated that we will be deploying the DDA instrument to measure both spent fuel assembly (SFA) types.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

LANL's Role in the U.S. Fissile Material Disposition Program

The process of Fissile Material Disposition is in part a result of the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES), which is an agreement between the U.S. and Russia to dispose of excess plutonium used to make weapons. LANL is one sight that aides in the process of dismantling, storage and repurposing of the plutonium gathered from dismantled weapons. Some uses for the repurposed plutonium is fuel for commercial nuclear reactors which will provide energy for citizens.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory Overview of the SAVY-4000 Design: Abstract Meeting the Challenge for Worker Safety

Incidents involving release of nuclear materials stored in containers of convenience such as food pack cans, slip lid taped cans, paint cans, etc. has resulted in defense board concerns over the lack of prescriptive performance requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shared in these incidents and in response proactively moved into developing a performance based storage container design, the SAVY-4000. The SAVY-4000 is the first vented general use nuclear material container demonstrated to meet the requirements of DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY-4000 is an innovative and creative design demonstrated by the fact that it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without torque wrenches or other tools; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas, yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates, and prevents release of material even in a 12 foot drop. Finally, it has been tested to 500C for 2 hours, and will reduce the risk to the public in the event of an earthquake/fire scenario. This will allow major nuclear facilities to credit the container towards source term Material at Risk (MAR) reduction. The container was approved for nuclear material storage in theTA-55 Plutonium Facility on March 15, 2011, and the first order of 79 containers was received at LANL on March 21, 2011. The first four SAVY-4000 containers were packaged with plutonium on August 2, 2011. Key aspects of the SAVY-4000 vented storage container design will be discussed which include design qualification and testing, implementation plan development and status, risk ranking methodology for re-packaging, in use implementation with interface to LANMAS, surveillance strategy, the design life extension program as enhanced by surveillance activities and production status with the intent to extend well beyond the current five year design life.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Lens of Eye Dosimetry

An analysis of LANL occupational dose measurements was made with respect to lens of eye dose (LOE), in particular, for plutonium workers. Table 1 shows the reported LOE as a ratio of the “deep” (photon only) and “deep+neutron” dose for routine monitored workers at LANL for the past ten years. The data compares the mean and range of these values for plutonium workers* and non-routine plutonium workers. All doses were reported based on measurements with the LANL Model 8823 TLD.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Radiological Dose Calculations And Supplemental Dose Assessment Data For Neshap Compliance For SNL Nevada Facilities 1996.

Operations of Sandia National Laboratories, Nevada (SNL/NV) at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) resulted in no planned point radiological releases during 1996. Other releases from SNL/NV included diffuse transuranic sources consisting of the three Clean Slate sites. Air emissions from these sources result from wind resuspension of near-surface transuranic contaminated soil particulates. The total area of contamination has been estimated to exceed 20 million square meters. Soil contamination was documented in an aerial survey program in 1977 (EG&G 1979). Surface contamination levels were generally found to be below 400 pCi/g of combined plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-240, and americium-241 (i.e., transuranic) activity. Hot spot areas contain up to 43,000 pCi/g of transuranic activity. Recent measurements confirm the presence of significant levels of transuranic activity in the surface soil. An annual diffuse source term of 0.39 Ci of transuranic material was calculated for the cumulative release from all three Clean Slate sites. A maximally exposed individual dose of 1.1 mrem/yr at the TTR airport area was estimated based on the 1996 diffuse source release amounts and site-specific meteorological data. A population dose of 0.86 person-rem/yr was calculated for the local residents. Both dose values were attributable to inhalation of transuranic contaminated dust.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2016

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a non-nuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) by posting signs 200 to 400 ft (60 to 120 m) outside of the original fence.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NCSP IER 422 CED-3b Documentation

A Subcritical Copper-Reflected α-phase Plutonium (SCRαP) integral benchmark experiment has been designed and measured. In this experiment, multiplication is approximated using correlated neutron data from a detector system consisting of 3He tubes inside high density polyethylene (HDPE). Measurements were performed on various subcritical experimental configurations consisting of a weapons-grade plutonium sphere surrounded by different Cu thicknesses. In addition to the proposed base experimental configurations with Cu, additional configurations were performed with the plutonium ball nested in various thicknesses of interleaved HDPE spherical shells mixed in with the Cu shells. The HDPE is intended to provide fast neutron moderation and reflection, resulting in additional measurements with differing multiplication, spectra, and nuclear data sensitivity.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Literature Review: Crud Formation at the Liquid/Liquid Interface of TBP-Based Solvent-Extraction Processes

This report summarizes the literature reviewed on crud formation at the liquid:liquid interface of solvent extraction processes. The review is focused both on classic PUREX extraction for industrial reprocessing, especially as practiced at the Hanford Site, and for those steps specific to plutonium purification that were used at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) within the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) at the Hanford Site.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ARIES Blend Lot Book Data Analysis

The Advanced Recovery Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program being executed at Los Alamos TA-55 produces unpolished plutonium oxide powder from pit disassembly in batches of material referred to as a blend lot. Each blend lot is sampled and analyzed by Los Alamos group C-AAC (Chemistry Division, Actinide Analytical Chemistry Group) for radioactive and nonradioactive constituents contained in the material. A blend lot, which nominally consists of 12 kg(Pu), is then packaged into three DOE-STD-3013 containers that are analyzed by nondestructive analysis (NDA) to determine the fraction and total amount of plutonium mass relative to impure plutonium oxide. The analytical and NDA data are presented in a Blend Lot Book (BLB). The data are used to confirm that a blend lot grouping of three cans meets the requirements for off-site shipment specified in the formal interface control document (ICD). The analytical and NDA data from 49 blend lots were reviewed to provide summary-level information on the constituents present in the blend lots. The results provide an overall perspective in historical amounts for constituent averages over all blend lots and similar information in the variation between constituent levels. Note that to properly compare the can contents, it would be most appropriate to decay all of cans’ constituents to a particular date. Previously, this analysis only examined statistical data as determined at the time of blend lot chemical analysis. The chemical analysis dates span the period from June 2011 to May 2015 (4 years), which is 28% of one Pu-241 half-life. Therefore, the approximate nature of the aggregate information must be properly understood in this light. However, to address this issue, a new table is included in this revision that decays the 48 blend lots to a single date.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

MIS High-Purity Plutonium/Uranium Oxide Hydride Product 5501407 (SSR129): Final Report

A high-purity uranium/plutonium mixed oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample 5501579 represents process plutonium oxides from high purity mixed oxides and mixed oxides from alloy oxidation at Hanford, hydride oxide from Rocky Flats, and mixed oxides from alloy oxidation and scrap mixed oxides at Savannah River that are currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure of two samples of this material with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. The first experiment studied a mixture of 60% as-received material (AR) and 40% material that had been calcined at 950 °C. The mixture contained 66% weapons grade plutonium and 11% uranium, with approximately 7.3% impurities and the remainder principally oxygen. A second experiment studied material calcined at 950 °C which contained approximately 4.3% impurities and similar uranium and plutonium content. Gas compositions were measured periodically over approximately 3.5 years in the first container and 20 months for the second container, which was terminated early due to an inadvertent container pumpdown. The maximum observed gas pressures were 152 kPa and 161 kPa, respectively. The increase over the initial pressures of 82 kPa and 88 kPa, respectively, was primarily due to generation of carbon dioxide and nitrogen gases. In the container with the AR/calcined mixture, a small amount of hydrogen and oxygen was generated and was consumed. In the container with calcined material only, hydrogen partial pressure of 18.9 kPa was measured. A small amount of oxygen was generated and was consumed. At the completion of the study, the internal components of both sealed containers showed signs of corrosion

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Large Area Airborne Contamination Monitoring

Current D&D operations at Hanford have demonstrated a flaw in the current state of the art capability of defining airborne contamination boundaries. Airborne particulate emissions of Pu-239 from CM2H operations on the Hanford Pu Finishing Plant were detected well beyond areas controlled for airborne plutonium, putting numerous workers at risk for radiological assimilations. Forty-two Hanford workers had positive bioassay results for plutonium uptake. Work areas determined to be free of airborne contamination as measured by state-of-the-art continuous alpha monitoring (CAM) systems were later discovered not to be. Airborne contamination was scattered to a such degree that CAM systems were surveying insufficient volumes of air to accurately predict where respiratory protection was required. A $\$ 19,000$ state of the art portable CAM system used at both Hanford and at SRS screens air for alpha activity at the rate of 1 CFM. This research project will explore the feasibility of using commercially available air purifying systems to screen significantly larger volumes of air for airborne actinide contamination. Commercial household HEPA based air purifying units screen large volumes of air, a simple $\$ 300$ unit being looked at for this study could screen a volume of air that would require over 300 of the $\$ 19,000$ CAMs. The goal of the project was to determine the feasibility of building a detection system capable of screening the air purifiers pre-filters and HEPA filters for any actinide bearing hot particles that have been captured. The simplest technologies available to Field-Radiological-Protection personnel are hand-held alpha field survey meters. With the size and the corrugated structure of these HEPA filters, hand screening is not practical. This project researched alternatives capable of automating this function. Two potential technologies were examined. One technology evaluated was the measurement of xray emissions from the actinides, taking advantage of the higher emission rates of the L x-rays compared to the gamma emissions of isotopes such as Pu-238 or Pu-239. High resolution to low resolution systems were evaluated. Branching ratio data on the actinides in the literature is incomplete, and a study was initiated to measure branching ratios of the various L emissions of a number of the plutonium isotopes. A Monte Carlo simulation was also run to calculate the effect the attenuating HEPA media would have on x-ray measurements on spectrometers centered in each quadrant above the surface of the HEPA. The second technology evaluated was measuring the light from a scintillating media applied to the surface of the HEPA filter using a ThorLabs Scientific-Grade Digital Camera Model 8051M. A light tight enclosure capable of holding the 2’x2’x1” HEPA filter was fabricated. Numerous scintillation media were evaluated for both the sensitivity and for resolution of measuring alpha activity. Figure 1 shows images of a 4”x4” section of HEPA filter with a 3 x 3 grid of Pu-238 contamination loaded inside the crevices of the HEPA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Cold Testing for Characterization of Oxide Feed Impurities in Support of the ARIES Program

The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program converts surplus plutonium metal components into an oxide powder form and packages the material for final disposition. In support of the ARIES program, over a metric ton (MT) of plutonium has been removed from surplus nuclear weapons since 1998 and packaged for long-term storage in 3013 cans. The oxide production rate is anticipated to increase substantially over the next decade in support of dilute and dispose goals. Analytical chemistry data from destructive analysis of the resulting 70+ blend lots to date has been reported for contaminants in the product oxide. Changes in the Pu product specification for Pu oxide product, induced by a different pit mix, the LANL swap program and processing Alternate (non-Pit Pu) Feed Stock (AFS) metals, will affect the level and the mix of these contaminants in the upcoming years. With these changes in feed material, it will be important to provide fast and efficient measurement of elemental impurities in the oxide to be certain that the process is under control and to monitor the anticipated changes from the historical blend lot data. Non-destructive methods need to be evaluated for the characterization of the plutonium oxide product and the quantification of the impurities at the current and anticipated levels. A feasibility study has begun to investigate the applicability of new spectroscopic methods for oxide impurity characterization. To this end, here we describe the preparation of surrogate materials to support these investigations, and the results of a feasibility study investigating the use of LIBS (Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy) to characterize the surrogate materials as calibration standards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Data and Cross Section Testing Using ENDF/B-VIII.0

With the release of the Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF)/B-VIII.0 library, nuclear criticality safety practitioners and engineers have access to the latest cross section sets available for their analyses. However, these cross sections must be rigorously tested and validated to ensure that the nuclear data are responsive to the needs of the individuals responsible for developing, implementing, and maintaining computational tools for criticality safety applications. Thus, the ENDF/B-VIII.0 library is tested and validated with a large collection of experiments that were vetted by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project and made available in the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments. A selection of benchmark experiments for use within the criticality safety community were prepared and reviewed within the Verified, Archived Library of Inputs and Data (VALID), which is maintained by the Nuclear Energy and Fuel Cycle Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The performance of the ENDF/B-VIII.0 library is assessed by using VALID models of benchmark experiments with the beta 12 version of SCALE 6.3 KENO V.a and KENO-VI Monte Carlo codes. The performance is compared with the results obtained from with the ENDF/B-VII.1 library. This report considers multigroup (MG) and continuous energy (CE) formats of the ENDF/B-VIII.0 and -VII.1 libraries. The benchmark experiments within VALID that validate the ENDF/B-VIII.0 library cover 15 broad system categories by using a range of fissile materials, uranium enrichments, plutonium isotopic vectors, and mixed uranium/plutonium systems. These forms are represented as metals, solutions, or various arrays of rods or plates that cover a variety of neutron energy spectra: thermal, fast, mixed, and intermediate. Over 600 cases were considered for use with the KENO V.a and KENO-VI codes with the ENDF/B-VIII.0 library. The results of the Monte Carlo comparison of ENDF/B-VIII.0 to ENDF/B-VII.1 with both KENO V.a and KENO-VI indicate that there is a less than 0.53% Δk difference between the bias of calculated k eff from the expected values. The CE ENDF/B-VIII.0 library results in smaller magnitude biases than the ENDF/B-VII.1 data for HEU-MET-FAST, HEU-SOL-THERM, IEU-MET-FAST, LEU-SOL-THERM, PU-SOL-THERM, and U233-MET-FAST systems, while the MG results yielded smaller magnitude biases for HEU-MET-FAST, HEU-SOL-THERM, IEU-MET-FAST, LEU-COMP-THERM, LEU-SOL THERM, MIX-COMP-FAST, and U233-MET-FAST systems. Most notable are the adjustments to the plutonium and 233 U cross section data, which has resulted in noticeably lower biases in the ENDF/B VIII.0 results for the mixed, plutonium, and 233 U systems. Results of the sensitivity data file comparison generated from TSUNAMI-3D for selected VALID cases for the ENDF/B-VIII.0 library indicate a very high level of agreement with correlation coefficients of the effect of nuclear data uncertainty on k eff (the c k integral parameter) all above 0.99. This indicates that cases with the ENDF/B-VIII.0 library would see very similar responses to any nuclear data errors or change as those with the ENDF/B-VII.1 library.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Evaluation of the Volatile Species Associated with the K-Area Complex Blend Cans (D5043)

In the K-Area Complex (KAC), blend cans are used to down blend plutonium oxide for future disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The blend can is a thin walled screw lid container that is used to down blend a measured amount of plutonium oxide with adulterant to reduce the attractiveness of the plutonium. The oxide and adulterant are mixed within the blend can and the blend can is packaged into a thick walled outer container. The blend cans are procured from an offsite vendor that uses a lubricant in the can manufacturing process. A thin coating of the lubricant adheres to the outer surface of the blend can and both inner and outer surfaces of the blend can cap.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2019

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was performed to (1) assess a technique for estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a nonnuclear detonation, (2) develop biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments, (3) evaluate methods of surface decontamination, and (4) evaluate instruments and field procedures for the prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) in 2007 by posting signs 200 ft to 400 ft (60 m to 120 m) outside of the original fence.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Misuse Detection for a Generalized SFR Test Reactor

Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) present unique challenges for international safeguards. SFRs possess neutron physics characteristics that if configured appropriately could produce more fissile material than consumed. An adversary state may choose to build an SFR, justified by a lack of domestic natural uranium and limited access or interest to procuring uranium from international markets. Once constructed, the state may choose to misuse the SFR for the purpose of diverting fissile plutonium from declared operation. This work shows that a demonstration SFR does not need to be configured as a plutonium breeder to create one Significant Quantity (SQ) of plutonium in a short amount of time (e.g., one to few years). However, such an extreme case of misuse would change the core reactivity in such a way as to be easily indicated by deviations of control rod position compared to declared operation. In this work a contrived SFR demonstration reactor was modeled for the purpose of exploring proliferation scenarios and how such misuse could be detected using the SFR's Reactor Data Acquisition System (RDAS). Typically, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have access to the control rod position, power, thermal, pressure sensing and indicating systems of nuclear power plants. However, this work shows that such data streams can be compared against a parallel detailed simulation model (a Digital Twin) to detect possible misuse.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Analysis of Tank 38h (HTF-38-23-19, -20) and Tank 43H (HTF-43-23-21, -22) Samples for Support of the Enrichment Control and Corrosion Control Programs

SRNL analyzed samples from Tank 38H and Tank 43H to support ECP and CCP. The results indicate the concentrations of most soluble species in the Tank 38H surface sample decreased significantly from the previous surface sample. The Tank 38H sub-surface sample shows changes in concentration for soluble species in the solution with some increasing and some decreasing. The current Thank 38H sub-surface sample contains visible sludge solids similar to the previous sample, i.e., less than 1%, based on visual appearance. The significant differences in the concentrations of major components between the Tank 38H surface and sub-surface samples indicate significant stratification of solution species between these two locations within the tank. Savannah River Mission Completion personnel indicate that ~ 150,000 gallons of Tank 22 supernate were received in Tank 38H since its last analysis during which time the 2H evaporator was not operated, so the observed stratification is expected. The Tank 43H surface and sub-surface samples are similar in composition to the previous samples. The similar solution compositions measured in the Tank 43H surface and sub-surface samples indicate a minimal stratification within the tank. The total uranium and plutonium in the current Tank 38H surface sample remains similar to the previous analysis. The Tank 38H sub-surface sample shows an increase in uranium and plutonium concentrations compared to the previous sample likely because of an increase in sludge solids in the current sample. The total uranium concentration in the Tank 43H surface sample is similar to the previous sample results while the plutonium in the Tank 43H sub-surface sample increased relative to the previous analysis. The sum of the major cations versus the sum of the major anions shows a difference of <10% for both samples from Tank 38H sub-surface sample (174 mg/L) increased compared with the previous sample. The Tank 38H surface sample silicon concentrations (27.5 mg/L) is one-half of the previous sample results. The Tank 43H surface sample silicon concentrations compared to the previous sample results indicate Si in the concentration range of 60 to 83 mg/L. Thus, these current samples analyzed from Tanks 38H and 43H show overall silicon concentrations ranging from 27.5 to 174 mg/L.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗