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1,419 records · Page 79

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Plant Modernization Technical Program Plan for FY 2021

This report presents the Technical Program Plan for FY 2019 for the Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program – Plant Modernization research pathway. A summary of the vision and strategy is provided to explain how this program addresses key issues and barriers for modernizing instrumentation and control technologies and infrastructure in domestic nuclear power plants. The report describes the pilot projects that have been formulated to develop and validate enabling technologies over the next several years that will result in digital alternatives to the legacy analog II&C systems in place today. This will allow much needed modernization of these systems to address reliability and obsolescence problems, as well as serve as a platform for substantial operational improvement. The report further describes key project resources and cooperative relationships, including the Electric Power Research Institute, the Nuclear Energy Institute )NEI), the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), the IFE Halden Reactor Project, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and industry suppliers, that are instrumental to the success of the program. The report also lists the schedule for all program products, including the titles and report numbers for all published reports under this program.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Understanding Community Microgrids

Increasing need for distribution circuit reliability and resilience prompt a clearer understanding of community microgrid interconnection and operational requirements. While customer-owned, behind-the-meter microgrid implementation is not always simple, increasing demand for reliability has commercialized many installation approaches. This rapid commercialization has broadened industry understanding of single-customer microgrid integration. Moreover, off-grid behaviors of such microgrids are not required to meet utility standard interconnection requirements. However, multi-customer community microgrids (utility- or third-party operated), are less well explored and introduce more complex design and operational challenges. The control of DER along with distribution automation devices, unmanned operation, protection coordination, and other aspects makes community microgrids challenging to implement and operate in both on-grid and off-grid modes. This whitepaper is a technical primer for understanding community microgrids. It provides a foundation for understanding the components, configurations, design, and operational considerations for community microgrids.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Designing Resilience for Advanced Energy Systems

Advancements in energy technologies are making the grid more powerful, more efficient, and cleaner. As these promising innovations flourish across our communities, it is essential that our nation's infrastructure also becomes more resilient. Natural disasters, cyberattacks, user error, and a changing climate all present risks that could have devastating consequences. Individual emergencies are unique, but holistic planning and proactive measures can harden the grid and help anticipate and respond to any number of threats. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is at the forefront of this transition, establishing a vision for resilient energy systems today, and in the future.

energy disruption↗

Experimental and code simulation of a station blackout scenario for APR1400 with test facility ATLAS and MARS code

A SBO (station blackout) experiment named SBO-01 was performed at full-pressure IET (Integral Effect Test) facility ATLAS (Advanced Test Loop for Accident Simulation) which is scaled down from the APR1400 (Advanced Power Reactor 1400 MWe). In this study, the transient of SBO-01 is discussed and is subdivided into three phases: the SG fluid loss phase, the RCS fluid loss phase, and the core coolant depletion and core heatup phase. In addition, the typical phenomena in SBO-01 test - SG dryout, natural circulation, core coolant boiling, the PRZ full, core heat-up - are identified. Furthermore, the SBO-01 test is reproduced by the MARS code calculation with the ATLAS model which represents the ATLAS test facility. The experimental and calculated transients are then compared and discussed. The comparison reveals there was malfunction of equipments: the SG leakage through SG MSSV and the measurement error of loop flow meter. As the ATLAS model is validated against the experimental results, it can be further employed to investigate the other possible SBO scenarios and to study the scaling distortions in the ATLAS. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Investigations on optimization of accident management measures following a station blackout accident in a VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor

The reactor safety issues are of primary importance for preserving the health of the population and ensuring no release of radioactivity and fission products into the environment. A part of the nuclear research focuses on improvement of the safety of existing nuclear power plants. Studies, research and efforts are a continuing process at improving the safety and reliability of existing and newly developed nuclear power plants at prevention of a core melt accident. Station blackout (loss of AC power supply) is one of the dominant accidents taken into consideration at performing accident analysis. In case of multiple failures of safety systems it leads to a severe accident. To prevent an accident to turn into a severe one or to mitigate the consequences, accident management measures must be performed. The present paper outlines possibilities for application and optimization of accident management measures following a station blackout accident. Assessed is the behaviour of the nuclear power plant during a station blackout accident without accident management measures and with application of primary/secondary side oriented accident management measures. Discussed are the possibilities for operators ' intervention and the influence of the performed accident management measures on the course of the accident. Special attention has been paid to the effectiveness of the passive feeding and physical phenomena having an influence on the system behaviour. The performed simulations show that the effectiveness of the secondary side feeding procedure can be limited due to an early evaporation or flashing effects in the feed water system. The analyzed cases show that the effectiveness of the accident management measures strongly depends on the initiation criteria applied for depressurization of the reactor coolant system. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

ESBWR response to an extended station blackout/loss of all AC power

U.S. federal regulations require light water cooled nuclear power plants to cope with Station Blackouts for a predetermined amount of time based on design factors for the plant. U.S. regulations define Station Blackout (SBO) as a loss of the offsite electric power system concurrent with turbine trip and unavailability of the onsite emergency AC power system. According to U.S. regulations, typically the coping period for an SBO is 4 hours and can be as long as 16 hours for currently operating BWR plants. Being able to cope with an SBO and loss of all AC power is required by international regulators as well. The U.S. licensing basis for the ESBWR is a coping period of 72 hours for an SBO based on U.S. NRC requirements for passive safety plants. In the event of an extended SBO (viz., greater than 72 hours), the ESBWR response shows that the design is able to cope with the event for at least 7 days without AC electrical power or operator action. ESBWR is a Generation III+ reactor design with an array of passive safety systems. The ESBWR primary success path for mitigation of an SBO event is the Isolation Condenser System (ICS). The ICS is a passive, closed loop, safety system that initiates automatically on a loss of power. Upon Station Blackout or loss of all AC power, the ICS begins removing decay heat from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) by (i) condensing the steam into water in heat exchangers located in pools of water above the containment, and (ii) transferring the decay heat to the atmosphere. The condensed water is then returned by gravity to cool the reactor again. The ICS alone is capable of maintaining the ESBWR in a safe shutdown condition after an SBO for an extended period. The fuel remains covered throughout the SBO event. The ICS is able to remove decay heat from the RPV for at least 7 days and maintains the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. The water level in the RPV remains well above the top of active fuel for the duration of the SBO event. Beyond 7 days, only a few simple actions are needed to cope with the SBO for an indefinite amount of time. The operation of the ICS as the primary success path for mitigation of an SBO, allows for near immediate plant restart once power is restored. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

The AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant innovative features for extended station blackout mitigation

Station Blackout (SBO) is defined as 'a condition wherein a nuclear power plant sustains a loss of all offsite electric power system concurrent with turbine trip and unavailability of all onsite emergency alternating current (AC) power system. Station blackout does not include the loss of available AC power to buses fed by station batteries through inverters or by alternate AC sources as defined in this section, nor does it assume a concurrent single failure or design basis accident...' in accordance with Reference 1. In this paper, the innovative features of the AP1000 plant design are described with their operation in the scenario of an extended station blackout event. General operation of the passive safety systems are described as well as the unique features which allow the AP1000 plant to cope for at least 7 days during station blackout. Points of emphasis will include: - Passive safety system operation during SBO - 'Fail-safe' nature of key passive safety system valves; automatically places the valve in a conservatively safe alignment even in case of multiple failures in all power supply systems, including normal AC and battery backup - Passive Spent Fuel Pool cooling and makeup water supply during SBO - Robustness of AP1000 plant due to the location of key systems, structures and components required for Safe Shutdown - Diverse means of supplying makeup water to the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) and the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) through use of an engineered, safety-related piping interface and portable equipment, as well as with permanently installed onsite ancillary equipment. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant safety overview for spent fuel cooling

The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe class pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and costs. The AP1000 design uses passive features to mitigate design basis accidents. The passive safety systems are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as AC power, component cooling water, service water or HVAC. Furthermore, these passive features 'fail safe' during a non-LOCA event such that DC power and instrumentation are not required. The AP1000 also has simple, active, defense-in-depth systems to support normal plant operations. These active systems provide the first level of defense against more probable events and they provide investment protection, reduce the demands on the passive features and support the probabilistic risk assessment. The AP1000 passive safety approach allows the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of an accident for 72 hours without operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the U.S. Utility Requirement Document and the European Utility Requirements for passive plants. Limited operator actions are required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool via passive means. In line with the AP1000 approach to safety described above, the AP1000 plant design features multiple, diverse lines of defense to ensure spent fuel cooling can be maintained for design-basis events and beyond design-basis accidents. During normal and abnormal conditions, defense-in-depth and other systems provide highly reliable spent fuel pool cooling. They rely on off-site AC power or the on-site standby diesel generators. For unlikely design basis events with an extended loss of AC power (i.e., station blackout) or loss of heat sink or both, spent fuel cooling can still be provided indefinitely: - Passive systems, requiring minimal or no operator actions, are sufficient for at least 72 hours under all possible pool heat load conditions. - After 3 days, several different means are provided to continue spent fuel cooling using installed plant equipment as well as off-site equipment with built-in connections. Even for beyond design basis accidents with postulated pool damage and multiple failures in the passive safety-related systems and in the defense-in-depth active systems, the AP1000 multiple spent fuel pool spray and fill systems provide additional lines of defense to prevent spent fuel damage. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Evaluation of earthquake and tsunami on JSFR

Evaluation of earthquake and tsunami on JSFR has been analyzed. For seismic design, safety components are confirmed to maintain their functions even against recent strong earthquakes. As for Tsunami, some parts of reactor building might be submerged including component cooling water system whose final heat sink is sea water. However, in the JSFR design, safety grade components are independent from component cooling water system (CCWS). The JSFR emergency power supply adopts a gas turbine system with air cooling, since JSFR does not basically require quick start-up of the emergency power supply thanks to the natural convection DHRS. Even in case of long station blackout, the DHRS could be activated by emergency batteries or manually and be operated continuously by natural convection. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor passive safety system response to postulated events

The Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor (SMR) is an 800 MWt (>225 MWe) integral pressurized water reactor. This paper is part of a series of four describing the design and safety features of the Westinghouse SMR. This paper focuses in particular upon the passive safety features and the safety system response of the Westinghouse SMR. The Westinghouse SMR design incorporates many features to minimize the effects of, and in some cases eliminates the possibility of postulated accidents. The small size of the reactor and the low power density limits the potential consequences of an accident relative to a large plant. The integral design eliminates large loop piping, which significantly reduces the flow area of postulated loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs). The Westinghouse SMR containment is a high-pressure, compact design that normally operates at a partial vacuum. This facilitates heat removal from the containment during LOCA events. The containment is submerged in water which also aides the heat removal and provides an additional radionuclide filter. The Westinghouse SMR safety system design is passive, is based largely on the passive safety systems used in the AP1000{sup R} reactor, and provides mitigation of all design basis accidents without the need for AC electrical power for a period of seven days. Frequent faults, such as reactivity insertion events and loss of power events, are protected by first shutting down the nuclear reaction by inserting control rods, then providing cold, borated water through a passive, buoyancy-driven flow. Decay heat removal is provided using a layered approach that includes the passive removal of heat by the steam drum and independent passive heat removal system that transfers heat from the primary system to the environment. Less frequent faults such as loss of coolant accidents are mitigated by passive injection of a large quantity of water that is readily available inside containment. An automatic depressurization system is used to reduce the reactor pressure in a controlled manner to facilitate the passive injection. Long-term decay heat removal is accomplished using the passive heat removal systems augmented by heat transfer through the containment vessel to the environment. The passive injection systems are designed so that the fuel remains covered and effectively cooled throughout the event. Like during the frequent faults, the passive systems provide effective cooling without the need for ac power for seven days following the accident. Connections are available to add additional water to indefinitely cool the plant. The response of the safety systems of the Westinghouse SMR to various initiating faults has been examined. Among them, two accidents; an extended station blackout event, and a LOCA event have been evaluated to demonstrate how the plant will remain safe in the unlikely event that either should occur. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

AP1000{sup R} severe accident features and post-Fukushima considerations

The AP1000{sup R} passive nuclear power plant is uniquely equipped to withstand an extended station blackout scenario such as the events following the earthquake and tsunami at Fukushima without compromising core and containment integrity. The AP1000 plant shuts down the reactor, cools the core, containment and spent fuel pool for more than 3 days using passive systems that do not require AC or DC power or operator actions. Following this passive coping period, minimal operator actions are needed to extend the operation of the passive features to 7 days using installed equipment. To provide defense-in-depth for design extension conditions, the AP1000 plant has engineered features that mitigate the effects of core damage. Engineered features retain damaged core debris within the reactor vessel as a key feature. Other aspects of the design protect containment integrity during severe accidents, including unique features of the AP1000 design relative to passive containment cooling with water and air, and hydrogen management. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Storm-DEPART (Damage Estimate Prediction and Recovery Tool)

Storm-DEPART (Damage Estimate Prediction and Restoration Tool): Each year hurricanes and tropical storms in the United States damage critical infrastructure assets, disrupt the services they provide, and cause millions to billions of dollars in economic impacts due to extended recovery times. The Storm-DEPART tool and analytical output enable more impactful data-driven decision-making capabilities and strengthen national-level disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. Storm-DEPART, built through multi-month collaboration between Entergy and INL, combines Entergy’s critical infrastructure inventory data with weather forecasts to predict damages to Electric utility’s assets due to natural disasters and the estimated recovery support needed, including time, materials, and resource allocation. In the event of an approaching hurricane, this innovative solution can assess potential damage to power generation capacity, transmission grids, distribution networks, and communications assets from wind bands, storm surge, and flooding. With more effective predictions, Entergy can more efficiently allocate resources to mitigate impacts and optimize recovery for customers. Storm-DEPART also allows Electric utilities the ability to apply a planning scenario and model expected damage to better inform infrastructure restoration needs leading to enhance system resiliency. The technology is fully transferrable to other electric utilities with the same damage estimating challenges. The INL team is working on the evolution of Storm-DEPART to include ice event damage prediction framework.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Proposed SPAR Modeling Method for Quantifying Time Dependent Station Blackout Cut Sets

Abstract: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (USNRC’s) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models and industry risk models take similar approaches to analyzing the risk associated with loss of offsite power and station blackout (LOOP/SBO) events at nuclear reactor plants. In both SPAR models and industry models, core damage risk resulting from a LOOP/SBO event is analyzed using a combination of event trees and fault trees that produce cut sets that are, in turn, quantified to obtain a numerical estimate of the resulting core damage risk. A proposed SPAR method for quantifying the time-dependent cut sets is sometimes referred to as a convolution method. The SPAR method reflects assumptions about the timing of emergency diesel failures, the timing of subsequent attempts at emergency diesel repair, and the timing of core damage that may be different than those often used in industry models. This paper describes the proposed SPAR method.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Impact of Uncertainty on Calculations for Recovery from Loss of Offsite Power

Uncertainty, both aleatory and epistemic, can have a significant impact on estimated probabilities of recovering from loss of offsite power within a specified time window, and such probabilities are an input to risk-informed decisions as to the significance of inspection findings in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Reactor Oversight Process. In particular, the choice of aleatory model for offsite power recovery time can have a significant impact on the estimated nonrecovery probability, especially if epistemic uncertainty regarding parameters in the aleatory model is accounted for properly. In past and current analyses, such uncertainty has largely been ignored. This paper examines the impact of both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty on the results, using modern open-source Bayesian inference software, which implements Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling. It includes examples of time-dependent convolution calculations to show the impact that uncertainty can have on this increasingly frequent type of calculation, also. The results show that the “point estimate” result, which is an input to risk-informed decisions, can easily be uncertain by a factor of 10 if both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties are considered. The paper also illustrates the use of Bayesian model selection criteria to aid in the choice of aleatory model.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗