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At least 1,405 records · Page 78

Siting Study for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project

The U.S. Department of Energy has identified a mission need for continued disposal capacity for remote-handled low-level waste (LLW) generated at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). An alternatives analysis that was conducted to evaluate strategies to achieve this mission need identified two broad options for disposal of INL generated remote-handled LLW: (1) offsite disposal and (2) onsite disposal. The purpose of this study is to identify candidate sites or locations within INL boundaries for the alternative of an onsite remote handled LLW disposal facility and recommend the highest-ranked locations for consideration in the National Environmental Policy Act process. The study implements an evaluation based on consideration of five key elements: (1) regulations, (2) key assumptions, (3) conceptual design, (4) facility performance, and (5) previous INL siting study criteria, and uses a five-step process to identify, screen, evaluate, score, and rank 34 separate sites located across INL. The result of the evaluation is identification of two recommended alternative locations for siting an onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility. The two alternative locations that best meet the evaluation criteria are (1) near the Advanced Test Reactor Complex and (2) west of the Idaho Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act Disposal Facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Quantitative analysis of beam delivery parameters and treatment process time for proton beam therapy

Purpose: To evaluate patient census, equipment clinical availability, maximum daily treatment capacity, use factor for major beam delivery parameters, and treatment process time for actual treatments delivered by proton therapy systems. Methods: The authors have been recording all beam delivery parameters, including delivered dose, energy, range, spread-out Bragg peak widths, gantry angles, and couch angles for every treatment field in an electronic medical record system. We analyzed delivery system downtimes that had been recorded for every equipment failure and associated incidents. These data were used to evaluate the use factor of beam delivery parameters, the size of the patient census, and the equipment clinical availability of the facility. The duration of each treatment session from patient walk-in and to patient walk-out of the treatment room was measured for 82 patients with cancers at various sites. Results: The yearly average equipment clinical availability in the last 3 yrs (June 2007-August 2010) was 97%, which exceeded the target of 95%. Approximately 2200 patients had been treated as of August 2010. The major disease sites were genitourinary (49%), thoracic (25%), central nervous system (22%), and gastrointestinal (2%). Beams have been delivered in approximately 8300 treatment fields. The use factor for six beam delivery parameters was also evaluated. Analysis of the treatment process times indicated that approximately 80% of this time was spent for patient and equipment setup. The other 20% was spent waiting for beam delivery and beam on. The total treatment process time can be expressed by a quadratic polynomial of the number of fields per session. The maximum daily treatment capacity of our facility using the current treatment processes was estimated to be 133 {+-} 35 patients. Conclusions: This analysis shows that the facility has operated at a high performance level and has treated a large number of patients with a variety of diseases. The use factor of beam delivery parameters varies by disease site. Further improvements in efficiency may be realized in the equipment- and patient-related processes of treatment.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Modern Nuclear Data Evaluation with the TALYS Code System

This paper presents a general overview of nuclear data evaluation and its applications as developed at NRG, Petten. Based on concepts such as robustness, reproducibility and automation, modern calculation tools are exploited to produce original nuclear data libraries that meet the current demands on quality and completeness. This requires a system which comprises differential measurements, theory development, nuclear model codes, resonance analysis, evaluation, ENDF formatting, data processing and integral validation in one integrated approach. Software, built around the TALYS code, will be presented in which all these essential nuclear data components are seamlessly integrated. Besides the quality of the basic data and its extensive format testing, a second goal lies in the diversity of processing for different type of users. The implications of this scheme are unprecedented. The most important are: 1. Complete ENDF-6 nuclear data files, in the form of the TENDL library, including covariance matrices, for many isotopes, particles, energies, reaction channels and derived quantities. All isotopic data files are mutually consistent and are supposed to rival those of the major world libraries. 2. More exact uncertainty propagation from basic nuclear physics to applied (reactor) calculations based on a Monte Carlo approach: 'Total' Monte Carlo (TMC), using random nuclear data libraries. 3. Automatic optimization in the form of systematic feedback from integral measurements back to the basic data. This method of work also opens a new way of approaching the analysis of nuclear applications, with consequences in both applied nuclear physics and safety of nuclear installations, and several examples are given here. This applied experience and feedback is integrated in a final step to improve the quality of the nuclear data, to change the users vision and finally to orchestrate their integration into simulation codes.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Integrating the human element into the systems engineering process and MBSE methodology

In response to the challenges related to the increasing size and complexity of systems, organizations have recognized the need to integrate human considerations in the beginning stages of systems development. Human Systems Integration (HSI) seeks to accomplish this objective by incorporating human factors within systems engineering (SE) processes and methodologies, which is the focus of this paper. A representative set of HSI methods from multiple sources are organized, analyzed, and mapped to the systems engineering Vee-model. These methods are then consolidated and evaluated against the SE process and Models-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) methodology to determine where and how they could integrate within systems development activities in the form of specific enhancements. Overall conclusions based on these evaluations are presented and future research areas are proposed.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of DED and LPBF Fe-based Alloys Process Application Envelopes based on Performance, Process Economics, Supply Chain Risks, and Reactor-specific Targeted Components

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) program aims to develop extreme-environment materials solutions for use in the deployment of advanced nuclear reactors and the sustainment of the current fleet. To achieve this objective, a combination of experiment, a computational tool, and machine learning (ML) for the design of materials is adopted for the maturation of materials for nuclear technology. Through advanced manufacturing techniques such as laser powder bed fusion (LPBF) and laser powder direct energy deposition (LP-DED), components with complex geometries can be fabricated with reduced time and effort. Such advanced manufacturing methods can also provide the opportunity to improve materials performance through optimized microstructures and mechanical properties. However, existing engineering alloys are not always well suited for fabrication with additive manufacturing (AM), as their compositions have been tuned to optimize fabrication via conventional methods. Thus, similar alloys with modified compositions that are better suited for AM can be studied for improved performance. Over the past three years, the AMMT teams from Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) studied various known Fe-based alloys by evaluating their initial printability using LPBF, and an AMMT-developed down-selection and decision matrix reduced the number of alloys to be studied from six to three in fiscal year (FY) 2024. Additionally, in FY 2024, for parallel evaluation, these three alloys were studied using LPDED. While LPBF is better for small- to medium-sized components with high detail and internal features, LP-DED combines a material feed system to place the powder onto the exact spot where the laser will melt the material. This AM method can be easily scaled to extremely large components and provides high build rate speeds compared to those of conventional LPBF systems. Additionally, DED is a better choice for complex geometries and compositional gradients.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Parametric Evaluation of Large-Scale High-Temperature Electrolysis Hydrogen Production Using Different Advanced Nuclear Reactor Heat Sources

High Temperature Electrolysis (HTE), when coupled to an advanced nuclear reactor capable of operating at reactor outlet temperatures of 800 °C to 950 °C, has the potential to efficiently produce the large quantities of hydrogen needed to meet future energy and transportation needs. To evaluate the potential benefits of nuclear-driven hydrogen production, the UniSim process analysis software was used to evaluate different reactor concepts coupled to a reference HTE process design concept. The reference HTE concept included an Intermediate Heat Exchanger and intermediate helium loop to separate the reactor primary system from the HTE process loops and additional heat exchangers to transfer reactor heat from the intermediate loop to the HTE process loops. The two process loops consisted of the water/steam loop feeding the cathode side of a HTE electrolysis stack, and the sweep gas loop used to remove oxygen from the anode side. The UniSim model of the process loops included pumps to circulate the working fluids and heat exchangers to recover heat from the oxygen and hydrogen product streams to improve the overall hydrogen production efficiencies. The reference HTE process loop model was coupled to separate UniSim models developed for three different advanced reactor concepts (a high-temperature helium cooled reactor concept and two different supercritical CO2 reactor concepts). Sensitivity studies were then performed to evaluate the affect of reactor outlet temperature on the power cycle efficiency and overall hydrogen production efficiency for each of the reactor power cycles. The results of these sensitivity studies showed that overall power cycle and hydrogen production efficiencies increased with reactor outlet temperature, but the power cycles producing the highest efficiencies varied depending on the temperature range considered.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

SMART Deliverable 6.1.2a: Application of the ORION tool to the IBDP Carbon Storage Site

Forecasting and managing potential induced seismic activity is one of the challenges facing commercialscale geologic carbon sequestration (GCS), as well as other geologic energy extraction and byproduct disposal technologies. Historically, the process to develop robust, science-based forecasts of induced seismicity has required an integrated effort from experts in seismology, geomechanics, and reservoir engineering to manage data, develop and evaluate models of subsurface processes, and to calibrate and interpret the results from a range of models to understand site behavior relative to prescribed standards and in the context of uncertainty in geologic characterization data, forecasting models, and operational scenario uncertainty. The Operational Forecasting of Induced Seismicity (ORION) toolkit is an open-source, observation-based forecasting toolkit that is being co-developed by two U.S. DOE-funded initiatives: the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) and the Scienceinformed Machine Learning for Accelerating Real Time Decisions in Subsurface Applications (SMART) Initiative. ORION is designed to provide functionality to support decision making about seismic hazard analysis and risk management for GCS stakeholders ranging from the public to site operators to expert seismologists. The tool, which is written as open-source code in the Python programming language, is composed of a desktop graphical user interface (GUI) and an underlying forecasting engine. The forecasting engine uses available reservoir properties, well and fluid injection scenario details, and observed seismic catalog data as inputs to produce a set of temporal and spatio-temporal seismic forecasts.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

F-Tank Farm Performance Assessment Updates through the Special Analysis Process at Savannah River Site - 12169

The F-Area Tank Farm (FTF) is owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and operated by Savannah River Remediation, LLC (SRR), Liquid Waste Operations contractor at DOE's Savannah River Site (SRS). The FTF is in the north-central portion of the SRS and occupies approximately 22 acres within F-Area. The FTF is an active radioactive waste storage facility consisting of 22 carbon steel waste tanks and ancillary equipment such as transfer lines, evaporators and pump tanks. An FTF Performance Assessment (PA) was prepared to support the eventual closure of the FTF underground radioactive waste tanks and ancillary equipment. The PA provides the technical basis and results to be used in subsequent documents to demonstrate compliance with the pertinent requirements identified below for final closure of FTF. The FTank Farm is subject to a state industrial waste water permit and Federal Facility Agreement. Closure documentation will include an F-Tank Farm Closure Plan and tank-specific closure modules utilizing information from the performance assessment. For this reason, the State of South Carolina and the Environmental Protection Agency must be involved in the performance assessment review process. The residual material remaining after tank cleaning is also subject to reclassification prior to closure via a waste determination pursuant to Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005. The projected waste tank inventories in the FTF PA provide reasonably bounding FTF inventory projections while taking into account uncertainties in the effectiveness of future tank cleaning technologies. As waste is removed from the FTF waste tanks, the residual contaminants will be sampled and the remaining residual inventory is characterized. In this manner, tank specific data for the tank inventories at closure will be available to supplement the waste tank inventory projections currently used in the FTF PA. For FTF, the new tank specific data will be evaluated through the Special Analysis process. The FTF Special Analyses process will be utilized to evaluate information regarding the final residual waste that will be grouted in place in the FTF Tanks and assess the potential impact the new inventory information has on the FTF PA assumptions and results. The Special Analysis can then be used to inform decisions regarding FTF tank closure documents. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the Special Analysis process and share insights gained while implementing this process. An example of an area of interest in the revision process is balancing continuous improvement versus configuration control of agreed upon methodologies. Other subjects to be covered include: 1) defining the scope of the revisions included in the Special Analysis, 2) determining which PA results should be addressed in the Special Analysis, and 3) deciding whether the Special Analysis should utilize more qualitative or quantitative assessments. For the SRS FTF, an FTF PA has been prepared to provide the technical basis and results to be used in subsequent documents to demonstrate compliance with the pertinent requirements for final closure of FTF. The FTF Special Analyses process will be utilized to evaluate the impact new information has on the FTF PA assumptions and results. The Special Analysis can then be used to inform decisions regarding FTF tank closure documents. In preparing SAs, it is crucial that the scope of the SA be well defined within the SA, since the specific scope will vary from SA to SA. Since the SAs are essentially addendums to the PA, the SA scope should utilize the PA as the baseline from which the SA scope is defined. The SA needs to focus on evaluating the change associated with the scope, and not let other changes interfere with the ability to perform that evaluation by masking the impact of the change. In preparing the SA, it is also important to let the scope determine whether the Special Analysis should utilize more qualitative or quantitative assessments and also which results from the PA should be addressed in the Special Analysis. These decisions can vary from SA and should not be predetermined. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of a Turbidity Meter for Use at the Defense Waste Processing Facility

Savannah River Remediation’s (SRR’s) Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Laboratory currently tests for sludge carry-over into the Recycle Collection Tank (RCT) by evaluating the iron concentration in the Slurry Mix Evaporator Condensate Tank (SMECT) and relating this iron concentration to the amount of sludge solids present. A new method was proposed for detecting the amount of sludge in the SMECT that involves the use of an Optek turbidity sensor. Waste Services Laboratory (WSL) personnel conducted testing on two of these units following a test plan developed by Waste Solidification Engineering (WSE). Both Optek units (SN64217 and SN65164) use sensor model AF16-N and signal converter model series C4000. The sensor body of each unit was modified to hold a standard DWPF 12 cc sample vial, also known as a “peanut” vial. The purpose of this testing was to evaluate the use of this model of turbidity sensor, or meter, to provide a measurement of the sludge solids present in the SMECT based upon samples from that tank. During discussions of the results from this study by WSE, WSL, and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) personnel, an upper limit on the acceptable level of solids in SMECT samples was set at 0.14 weight percent (wt%). A “go/no-go” decision criterion was to be developed for the critical turbidity response, which is expressed in concentration units (CUs), for each Optek unit based upon the 0.14 wt% solids value. An acceptable or a “go” decision for the SMECT should reflect the situation that there is an identified risk (e.g. 5%) for a CU response from the Optek unit to be less than the critical CU value when the solids content of the SMECT is actually 0.14 wt% or greater, while a “no-go” determination (i.e., an Optek CU response above the critical CU value, a conservative decision relative to risk) would lead to additional evaluations of the SMECT to better quantify the possible solids content of the tank. Subsequent to the issuance of the initial version of this report but under the scope of the original request for technical assistance, WSE asked for this report to be revised to include the “go/no-go” CU value corresponding to 0.28 wt% solids. It was this request that led to the preparation of Revision 1 of the report. The results for the 0.28 wt% solids value were developed following the same approach as that utilized for the 0.14 wt% solids value. A sludge simulant was used to develop standards for testing both Optek units and to determine the viability of a “go/no-go” CU response for each of the units. Statistical methods were used by SRNL to develop the critical CU value for the “go/no-go” decision for these standards for each Optek unit. Since only one sludge simulant was available for this testing, the sensitivity of these results to other simulants and to actual sludge material is not known. However, limited testing with samples from the actual DWPF process (both SRAT product samples and SMECT samples) demonstrated that the use of the “go/no-go” criteria developed from the sludge simulant testing was conservative for these samples taken from the sludge batch, Sludge Batch 7b, being processed at the time of this testing. While both of the Optek units performed very reliably during this testing, there were statistically significant differences (although small on a practical scale) between the two units. Thus, testing should be conducted on any new unit of this Optek model to qualify it before it is used to support the DWPF operation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Magnetic Processing of Structural Components for Transportation Vehicles

The specific goal of this project was to develop and evaluate the effect of magnetic processing as a viable and new technology to manufacture side‐rails for heavy trucks; and to demonstrate the applicability of this technology for an industrial truck/automotive process. The targeted performance enhancements for this project were to increase the hardness or strength of two families of alloys (comparable carbon contents but one alloy system incorporating hardenability improving additions of titanium and boron) by 15 to 20%. Thermomagnetic processing has been shown to make significant and unprecedented, simultaneous improvements in yield strength and ultimate tensile strength with no loss of ductility for the truck rail application investigated in this project. Improvements in the ultimate tensile strength and yield strength in the range 20 to 30% have been measured even for the lower hardenability alloy samples that only received a very low magnetic field tempering treatment at a tempering temperature that was 67% lower than the current non-magnetic field enhanced commercial process and for a brief tempering time of 20% of the time required in their current process at the higher temperature. These significant developments, that require further demonstration and investigation on current commercial and other alloy systems, promise the evolution of a much more energy efficient and lower-carbon footprint process to be used in the future to produce stronger, tougher, and lighter weight truck rails. The property increases in the truck rails themselves will enable lighter weight truck side-rails to be produced which will reduce the overall weight of heavy duty trucks which will reduce fuel consumption and be an enabler of the goals of the DOE EERE SuperTruck Program where fuel consumption reductions of 50% are targeted for the future generation of trucks.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Plan Position Indicator Hydrometeor Field Statistics (PPIHYD) Evaluation Data Product Version 1.0

The PPIHYD evaluation data product provides distinct hydrometeor field statistics calculated from U.S. Department of Energy Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) user facility scanning radar plan position indicator (PPI) scans. These statistics include the equivalent reflectivity factor and Doppler spectral width percentiles, min/max values, and first four moments (mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) of distinct hydrometeor features (clustered hydrometeor fields). Statistics also include morphological properties, water content and precipitation rate parameterization-based estimates, and thermodynamic properties interpolated using the Interpolated Sonde value-added product (INTERPSONDE VAP). The data set is organized in tabular form and is accompanied by mask arrays with corresponding indices. This straightforward file structure simplifies scanning radar data processing and renders this data set useful for process understanding and model evaluation studies. This report describes the data set and its processing algorithm and provides some examples.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DWPF COAL CARBON WASTE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA LIMIT EVALUATION

A paper study was completed to assess the impact on the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF)'s Chemical Processing Cell (CPC) acid addition and melter off-gas flammability control strategy in processing Sludge Batch 10 (SB10) to SB13 with an added Fluidized Bed Steam Reformer (FBSR) stream and two Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) products (Strip Effluent and Actinide Removal Stream). In all of the cases that were modeled, an acid mix using formic acid and nitric acid could be achieved that would produce a predicted Reducing/Oxidizing (REDOX) Ratio of 0.20 Fe{sup +2}/{Sigma}Fe. There was sufficient formic acid in these combinations to reduce both the manganese and mercury present. Reduction of manganese and mercury are both necessary during Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) processing, however, other reducing agents such as coal and oxalate are not effective in this reduction. The next phase in this study will be experimental testing with SB10, FBSR, and both SWPF simulants to validate the assumptions in this paper study and determine whether there are any issues in processing these streams simultaneously. The paper study also evaluated a series of abnormal processing conditions to determine whether potential abnormal conditions in FBSR, SWPF or DWPF would produce melter feed that was too oxidizing or too reducing. In most of the cases that were modeled with one parameter at its extreme, an acid mix using formic acid and nitric acid could be achieved that would produce a predicted REDOX of 0.09-0.30 (target 0.20). However, when a run was completed with both high coal and oxalate, with minimum formic acid to reduce mercury and manganese, the final REDOX was predicted to be 0.49 with sludge and FBSR product and 0.47 with sludge, FBSR product and both SWPF products which exceeds the upper REDOX limit.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Addendum to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 321: Area 22 Weather Station Fuel Storage Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the August 2001, Corrective Action Decision Document / Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 321: Area 22 Weather Station Fuel Storage as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 22-99-05, Fuel Storage Area. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove the UR because contamination is not present at the site above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 335: Area 6 Injection Well and Drain Pit Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revison 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the June 2003, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 335: Area 6 Injection Well and Drain Pit as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 06-20-02, 20-inch Cased Hole • CAS 06-23-03, Drain Pit These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 355: Area 2 Cellars/Mud Pits Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the November 2003, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 355: Area 2 Cellars/Mud Pits as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 02-37-01, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-03, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-04, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-05, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-06, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-07, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-10, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-11, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-12, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-13, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-14, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-15, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-16, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-17, Cellar • CAS 02-37-18, Cellar & Tanks These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 358: Areas 18, 19, 20 Cellars/Mud Pits Nevada Test Site, Nevada

This document constitutes an addendum to the January 2004, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 358: Areas 18, 19, 20 Cellars/Mud Pits as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 20-23-02, Postshot Cellar • CAS 20-23-03, Cellar • CAS 20-23-04, Postshot Cellar • CAS 20-23-05, Postshot Cellar • CAS 20-23-06, Cellar • CAS 20-37-01, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 20-37-05, Cellar These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 398: Area 25 Spill Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the April 2003, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 398: Area 25 Spill Sites as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 25-25-17, Subsurface Hydraulic Oil Spill. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove the UR because contamination is not present at the site above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2, 6, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the April 1999, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2, 6, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 03-05-002-SW02, Septic Waste System • CAS 03-05-002-SW06, Septic Waste System These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗