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At least 1,405 records · Page 78

3-D Deep Penetration Neutron Imaging of Thick Absorgin and Diffusive Objects Using Transport Theory

A current area of research interest in national security is to effectively and efficiently determine the contents of the many shipping containers that enter ports in the United States. This interest comes as a result of the 9/11 Commission Act passed by Congress in 2007 that requires 100% of inbound cargo to be scanned by 2012. It appears that this requirement will be achieved by 2012, but as of February of 2009 eighty percent of the 11.5 million inbound cargo containers were being scanned. The systems used today in all major U.S. ports to determine the presence of radioactive material within cargo containers are Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM). These devices generally exist in the form of a gate or series of gates that the containers can be driven through and scanned. The monitors are effective for determining the presence of radiation, but offer little more information about the particular source. This simple pass-fail system leads to many false alarms as many everyday items emit radiation including smoke detectors due to the Americium-241 source contained inside, bananas, milk, cocoa powder and lean beef due to the trace amounts of Potassium-40, and fire brick and kitty litter due to their high clay content which often contains traces of uranium and thorium. In addition, if an illuminating source is imposed on the boundary of the container, the contents of the container may become activated. These materials include steel, aluminum and many agricultural products. Current portal monitors also have not proven to be that effective at identifying natural or highly enriched uranium (HEU). In fact, the best available Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Monitors (ASP) are only capable of identifying bare HEU 70-88% of the time and masked HEU and depleted uranium (DU) only 53 percent of the time. Therefore, a better algorithm that uses more information collected from better detectors about the specific material distribution within the container is desired. The work reported here explores the inverse problem of optical tomography applied to heterogeneous domains. The neutral particle transport equation was used as the forward model for how neutral particles stream through and interact within these heterogeneous domains. A constrained optimization technique that uses Newtons method served as the basis of the inverse problem. Optical tomography aims at reconstructing the material properties using (a) illuminating sources and (b) detector readings. However, accurate simulations for radiation transport require that the particle (gamma and/or neutron) energy be appropriate discretize in the multigroup approximation. This, in turns, yields optical tomography problems where the number of unknowns grows (1) about quadratically with respect to the number of energy groups, G, (notably to reconstruct the scattering matrix) and (2) linearly with respect to the number of unknown material regions. As pointed out, a promising approach could rely on algorithms to appropriately select a material type per material zone rather than G2 values. This approach, though promising, still requires further investigation: (a) when switching from cross-section values unknowns to material type indices (discrete integer unknowns), integer programming techniques are needed since derivative information is no longer available; and (b) the issue of selecting the initial material zoning remains. The work reported here proposes an approach to solve the latter item, whereby a material zoning is proposed using one-group or few-groups transport approximations. The capabilities and limitations of the presented method were explored; they are briefly summarized next and later described in fuller details in the Appendices. The major factors that influenced the ability of the optimization method to reconstruct the cross sections of these domains included the locations of the sources used to illuminate the domains, the number of separate experiments used in the reconstruction, the locations where measurements were collected, the optical thickness of the domain, the amount of signal noise and signal bias applied to the measurements and the initial guess for the cross section distribution. All of these factors were explored for problems with and without scattering. Increasing the number of source and measurement locations and experiments generally was more successful at reconstructing optically thicker domains while producing less error in the image. The maximum optical thickness that could be reconstructed with this method was ten mean free paths for pure absorber and two mean free paths for scattering problems. Applying signal noise and signal bias to the measured fluxes produced more error in the produced image. Generally, Newtons method was more successful at reconstructing domains from an initial guess for the cross sections that was greater in magnitude than their true values than from an initial guess that was lower in magnitude.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Compliance Monitoring of Underwater Blasting for Rock Removal at Warrior Point, Columbia River Channel Improvement Project, 2009/2010

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Portland District (USACE) conducted the 20-year Columbia River Channel Improvement Project (CRCIP) to deepen the navigation channel between Portland, Oregon, and the Pacific Ocean to allow transit of fully loaded Panamax ships (100 ft wide, 600 to 700 ft long, and draft 45 to 50 ft). In the vicinity of Warrior Point, between river miles (RM) 87 and 88 near St. Helens, Oregon, the USACE conducted underwater blasting and dredging to remove 300,000 yd3 of a basalt rock formation to reach a depth of 44 ft in the Columbia River navigation channel. The purpose of this report is to document methods and results of the compliance monitoring study for the blasting project at Warrior Point in the Columbia River.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Mitigation of Hydrogen Gas Generation from the Reaction of Uranium Metal with Water in K Basin Sludge and Sludge Waste Forms

Prior laboratory testing identified sodium nitrate and nitrite to be the most promising agents to minimize hydrogen generation from uranium metal aqueous corrosion in Hanford Site K Basin sludge. Of the two, nitrate was determined to be better because of higher chemical capacity, lower toxicity, more reliable efficacy, and fewer side reactions than nitrite. The present lab tests were run to determine if nitrate’s beneficial effects to lower H2 generation in simulated and genuine sludge continued for simulated sludge mixed with agents to immobilize water to help meet the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance drainable liquid criterion. Tests were run at ~60°C, 80°C, and 95°C using near spherical high-purity uranium metal beads and simulated sludge to emulate uranium-rich KW containerized sludge currently residing in engineered containers KW-210 and KW-220. Immobilization agents tested were Portland cement (PC), a commercial blend of PC with sepiolite clay (Aquaset II H), granulated sepiolite clay (Aquaset II G), and sepiolite clay powder (Aquaset II). In all cases except tests with Aquaset II G, the simulated sludge was mixed intimately with the immobilization agent before testing commenced. For the granulated Aquaset II G clay was added to the top of the settled sludge/solution mixture according to manufacturer application directions. The gas volumes and compositions, uranium metal corrosion mass losses, and nitrite, ammonia, and hydroxide concentrations in the interstitial solutions were measured. Uranium metal corrosion rates were compared with rates forecast from the known uranium metal anoxic water corrosion rate law. The ratios of the forecast to the observed rates were calculated to find the corrosion rate attenuation factors. Hydrogen quantities also were measured and compared with quantities expected based on non-attenuated H2 generation at the full forecast anoxic corrosion rate to arrive at H2 attenuation factors. The uranium metal corrosion rates in water alone and in simulated sludge were near or slightly below the metal-in-water rate while nitrate-free sludge/Aquaset II decreased rates by about a factor of 3. Addition of 1 M nitrate to simulated sludge decreased the corrosion rate by a factor of ~5 while 1 M nitrate in sludge/Aquaset II mixtures decreased the corrosion rate by ~2.5 compared with the nitrate-free analogues. Mixtures of simulated sludge with Aquaset II treated with 1 M nitrate had uranium corrosion rates about a factor of 8 to 10 lower than the water-only rate law. Nitrate was found to provide substantial hydrogen mitigation for immobilized simulant sludge waste forms containing Aquaset II or Aquaset II G clay. Hydrogen attenuation factors of 1000 or greater were determined at 60°C for sludge-clay mixtures at 1 M nitrate. Hydrogen mitigation for tests with PC and Aquaset II H (which contains PC) were inconclusive because of suspected failure to overcome induction times and fully enter into anoxic corrosion. Lessening of hydrogen attenuation at ~80°C and ~95°C for simulated sludge and Aquaset II was observed with attenuation factors around 100 to 200 at 1 M nitrate. Valuable additional information has been obtained on the ability of nitrate to attenuate hydrogen gas generation from solution, simulant K Basin sludge, and simulant sludge with immobilization agents. Details on characteristics of the associated reactions were also obtained. The present testing confirms prior work which indicates that nitrate is an effective agent to attenuate hydrogen from uranium metal corrosion in water and simulated K Basin sludge to show that it is also effective in potential candidate solidified K Basin waste forms for WIPP disposal. The hydrogen mitigation afforded by nitrate appears to be sufficient to meet the hydrogen generation limits for shipping various sludge waste streams based on uranium metal concentrations and assumed waste form loadings.

08 HYDROGEN↗

SALTSTONE 2QCY11 TCLP RESULTS

The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) receives waste from Tank 50H for treatment. In the second quarter of the 2011 calendar year (2QCY11), Tank 50H accepted transfers of approximately 15 kgal from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), approximately 2 kgal from Tank 710 - the H-Canyon General Purpose Evaporator, approximately 63 kgal from the HCanyon Super Kukla campaign, approximately 370 kgal from the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (ARP/MCU) Decontaminated Salt Solution Hold Tank (DSS-HT), and approximately 10 kgal from other sources. The Saltstone Grout Sampling plan provides the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution which is to be disposed of in the Z-Area Solid Waste Landfill (SWLF). During operation, samples were collected from Tank 50H and grout samples prepared to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24(b) and R.61-79.268.48(a). Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was asked to prepare saltstone from samples of Tank 50H obtained April 5, 2011 during 2QCY11 to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout. The samples were cured and shipped to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group-Radioisotope and Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (B&W TSG-RACL) to perform the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) and subsequent extract analysis on saltstone samples for the analytes required for the quarterly analysis saltstone sample. In addition to the eight toxic metals - arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury, lead, selenium and silver - analytes included the underlying hazardous constituents (UHC) antimony, beryllium, nickel, and thallium which could not be eliminated from analysis by process knowledge. B&W TSGRACL provided subsamples to GEL Laboratories, LLC for analysis for the UHCs benzene, phenols and total and amenable cyanide.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT ENGINEERED CONTAINER RETRIEVAL AND TRANSFER SYSTEM PRELIMINARY DESIGN HAZARD ANALYSIS SUPPLEMENT 1

This 'What/If' Hazards Analysis addresses hazards affecting the Sludge Treatment Project Engineered Container Retrieval and Transfer System (ECRTS) NPH and external events at the preliminary design stage. In addition, the hazards of the operation sequence steps for the mechanical handling operations in preparation of Sludge Transport and Storage Container (STSC), disconnect STSC and prepare STSC and Sludge Transport System (STS) for shipping are addressed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SALTSTONE VAULT CLASSIFICATION SAMPLES MODULAR CAUSTIC SIDE SOLVENT EXTRACTION UNIT/ACTINIDE REMOVAL PROCESS WASTE STREAM APRIL 2011

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was asked to prepare saltstone from samples of Tank 50H obtained by SRNL on April 5, 2011 (Tank 50H sampling occurred on April 4, 2011) during 2QCY11 to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout and for additional vault classification analyses. The samples were cured and shipped to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group-Radioisotope and Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (B&W TSG-RACL) to perform the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) and subsequent extract analysis on saltstone samples for the analytes required for the quarterly analysis saltstone sample. In addition to the eight toxic metals - arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury, lead, selenium and silver - analytes included the underlying hazardous constituents (UHC) antimony, beryllium, nickel, and thallium which could not be eliminated from analysis by process knowledge. Additional inorganic species determined by B&W TSG-RACL include aluminum, boron, chloride, cobalt, copper, fluoride, iron, lithium, manganese, molybdenum, nitrate/nitrite as Nitrogen, strontium, sulfate, uranium, and zinc and the following radionuclides: gross alpha, gross beta/gamma, 3H, 60Co, 90Sr, 99Tc, 106Ru, 106Rh, 125Sb, 137Cs, 137mBa, 154Eu, 238Pu, 239/240Pu, 241Pu, 241Am, 242Cm, and 243/244Cm. B&W TSG-RACL provided subsamples to GEL Laboratories, LLC for analysis for the VOCs benzene, toluene, and 1-butanol. GEL also determines phenol (total) and the following radionuclides: 147Pm, 226Ra and 228Ra. Preparation of the 2QCY11 saltstone samples for the quarterly analysis and for vault classification purposes and the subsequent TCLP analyses of these samples showed that: (1) The saltstone waste form disposed of in the Saltstone Disposal Facility in 2QCY11 was not characteristically hazardous for toxicity. (2) The concentrations of the eight RCRA metals and UHCs identified as possible in the saltstone waste form were present at levels below the UTS. (3) Most of the inorganic species measured in the leachate do not exceed the MCL, SMCL or TW limits. (4) The inorganic waste species that exceeded the MCL by more than a factor of 10 were nitrate, nitrite and the sum of nitrate and nitrite. (5) Analyses met all quality assurance specifications of US EPA SW-846. (6) The organic species (benzene, toluene, 1-butanol, phenol) were either not detected or were less than reportable for the vault classification samples. (7) The gross alpha and radium isotopes could not be determined to the MCL because of the elevated background which raised the detection limits. (8) Most of the beta/gamma activity was from 137Cs and its daughter 137mBa. (9) The concentration of 137Cs and 90Sr were present in the leachate at concentrations 1/40th and 1/8th respectively than in the 2003 vault classification samples. The saltstone waste form placed in the Saltstone Disposal Facility in 2QCY11 met the SCHWMR R.61-79.261.24(b) RCRA metals requirements for a nonhazardous waste form. The TCLP leachate concentrations for nitrate, nitrite and the sum of nitrate and nitrite were greater than 10x the MCLs in SCDHEC Regulations R.61-107.19, Part I A, which confirms the Saltstone Disposal Facility classification as a Class 3 Landfill. The saltstone waste form placed in the Saltstone Disposal Facility in 2QCY11 met the R.61-79.268.48(a) non wastewater treatment standards.

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Annual Site Environmental Report: 2010 (ASER)

This report provides information about environmental programs during the calendar year of 2010 at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (SLAC), Menlo Park, California. Activities that overlap the calendar year - i.e., stormwater monitoring covering the winter season of 2010/2011 (October 2010 through May 2011) are also included. SLAC is a federally-funded research and development center with Stanford University as the M&O contractor. Under Executive Order (EO) 13423, Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, EO 13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, and DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program, SLAC effectively implements and integrates the key elements of an Environmental Management System (EMS) to achieve the site's integrated safety and environmental management system goals. For normal daily activities, SLAC managers and supervisors are responsible for ensuring that policies and procedures are understood and followed so that: (1) Worker safety and health are protected; (2) The environment is protected; and (3) Compliance is ensured. Throughout 2010, SLAC continued to improve its management systems. These systems provided a structured framework for SLAC to implement 'greening of the government' initiatives such as EO 13423, EO 13514, and DOE Orders 450.1A and 430.2B. Overall, management systems at SLAC are effective, supporting compliance with all relevant statutory and regulatory requirements. During 2010, there were no reportable releases to the environment from SLAC operations. In addition, many improvements in waste minimization, recycling, stormwater management, groundwater restoration, and SLAC's chemical management system (CMS) were continued. The following are among SLAC's environmental accomplishments for 2010. To facilitate management and identification of future potential greenhouse gases (GHG) reduction opportunities, SLAC voluntarily completed GHG inventories for calendar year (CY) 2008 and CY 2009 and submitted the results to The Climate Registry. A Lead Management Plan was completed to reduce the potential of lead impacting the environment, and two large legacy tube-trailer modules, each containing 38 tubes of compressed ethane, were reused or recycled by an outside contractor, resulting in hazardous waste avoidance and cost savings of approximately $100,000 in transportation and disposal costs. SLAC continues to make progress on achieving the sustainability goals of EOs 13423 and 13514, which include, but are not limited to reductions in the use of water, energy, and fuel, building to green standards and reductions in GHG emissions. Phase I of the SLAC Advanced Metering project for electrical and natural gas systems was completed. Phase I included the design of the metering system and purchase of the enterprise software. The planning, design, and installation of an advanced water metering system for select buildings, landscape, and process systems were completed. In addition, the last major onsite chiller containing a Class I ozone-depleting substance was taken out of service, and SLAC continued to replace conventional vehicles with electric vehicles. In 2010, there were no radiological impacts to the public or the environment from SLAC operations. The potential doses to the public were negligible and far below the regulatory and SLAC administrative limits. No radiological incidents occurred that increased radiation levels to the public or released radioactivity to the environment. In addition to managing its radioactive wastes safely and responsibly, SLAC worked to reduce the amount of waste generated. SLAC shipped 2,891 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste, half of which was legacy waste, to appropriate treatment and disposal facilities for low-level radioactive waste. SLAC also continued its efforts to reduce the inventory of materials no longer needed for its mission by permanently removing 125 sealed radioactive sources from the inventory. Ninety-seven of the sealed sources were returned to the manufacturer, and 28 were sent to Energy Solutions for processing before being sent to the Nevada Test Site for burial. In addition, 87 concrete blocks which had been stored in an area known as the Bone Yard were surveyed for potential surface contamination and volumetric activation prior to off-site release. Based on the comprehensive measurements, all 87 blocks were qualified for release and were disposed of as ordinary materials at a landfill. In 2010, the SLAC Environmental Restoration Program personnel continued work on site characterization and evaluation of remedial alternatives at four sites with volatile organic compounds in groundwater and several areas with polychlorinated biphenyls and low concentrations of lead in soil.

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Assessing Vulnerabilities, Risks, and Consequences of Damage to Critical Infrastructure

Since the publication of 'Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructure,' there has been a keen understanding of the complexity, interdependencies, and shared responsibility required to protect the nation's most critical assets that are essential to our way of life. The original 5 sectors defined in 1997 have grown to 18 Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources (CIKR), which are discussed in the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and its supporting sector-specific plans. The NIPP provides the structure for a national program dedicated to enhanced protection and resiliency of the nation's infrastructure. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provides in-depth, multi-disciplinary assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence across all 18 sectors at scales ranging from specific facilities to infrastructures spanning multi-state regions, such as the Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) sector. Like many of the CIKR sectors, the ONG sector is comprised of production, processing, distribution, and storage of highly valuable and potentially dangerous commodities. Furthermore, there are significant interdependencies with other sectors, including transportation, communication, finance, and government. Understanding the potentially devastating consequences and collateral damage resulting from a terrorist attack or natural event is an important element of LLNL's infrastructure security programs. Our work began in the energy sector in the late 1990s and quickly expanded other critical infrastructure sectors. We have performed over 600 physical assessments with a particular emphasis on those sectors that utilize, store, or ship potentially hazardous materials and for whom cyber security is important. The success of our approach is based on building awareness of vulnerabilities and risks and working directly with industry partners to collectively advance infrastructure protection. This approach consists of three phases: The Pre-Assessment Phase brings together infrastructure owners and operators to identify critical assets and help the team create a structured information request. During this phase, we gain information about the critical assets from those who are most familiar with operations and interdependencies, making the time we spend on the ground conducting the assessment much more productive and enabling the team to make actionable recommendations. The Assessment Phase analyzes 10 areas: Threat environment, cyber architecture, cyber penetration, physical security, physical penetration, operations security, policies and procedures, interdependencies, consequence analysis, and risk characterization. Each of these individual tasks uses direct and indirect data collection, site inspections, and structured and facilitated workshops to gather data. Because of the importance of understanding the cyber threat, LLNL has built both fixed and mobile cyber penetration, wireless penetration and supporting tools that can be tailored to fit customer needs. The Post-Assessment Phase brings vulnerability and risk assessments to the customer in a format that facilitates implementation of mitigation options. Often the assessment findings and recommendations are briefed and discussed with several levels of management and, if appropriate, across jurisdictional boundaries. The end result is enhanced awareness and informed protective measures. Over the last 15 years, we have continued to refine our methodology and capture lessons learned and best practices. The resulting risk and decision framework thus takes into consideration real-world constraints, including regulatory, operational, and economic realities. In addition to 'on the ground' assessments focused on mitigating vulnerabilities, we have integrated our computational and atmospheric dispersion capability with easy-to-use geo-referenced visualization tools to support emergency planning and response operations. LLNL is home to the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) and the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC). NARAC/IMAAC has capabilities to respond to toxic industrial chemical spills, nuclear-power plant accidents, fires, chemical/biological agents, radiological/nuclear devices (RDDs, INDs), and other airborne hazards. Our web-based systems provide hazards assessments of critical infrastructure for defensive planning and can provide infrastructure operators and emergency responders with a baseline for planning and exercises. LLNL's infrastructure security web mapping services facilitate dissemination of technical information for all phases of disaster management. Examples of some of these products are shown in the Figure 1.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Monitoring plan for Everest, Kansas.

This transmittal is a response to your request of January 22, 2009, for a letter work plan outlining a program of annual groundwater and surface water monitoring at Everest, Kansas. Once yearly, they propose to conduct surface water sampling at the 5 locations shown in Figure 1 and groundwater sampling in the 16 wells identified in Figure 2. The wells will be sampled according to the low-flow procedure. The next sampling event is planned for April 2009. The surface water and groundwater samples collected will be preserved, shipped, and analyzed for volatile organic compounds as in previous work at Everest. Results will be reported to the KDHE. This monitoring program will continue until identified plume conditions at the site indicate a technical justification to change the monitoring program.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

AGC-1 Post Irradiation Examination Status

The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Graphite R&D program is currently measuring irradiated material property changes in several grades of nuclear graphite for predicting their behavior and operating performance within the core of new Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) designs. The Advanced Graphite Creep (AGC) experiment consisting of six irradiation capsules will generate this irradiated graphite performance data for NGNP reactor operating conditions. All six AGC capsules in the experiment will be irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), disassembled in the Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF), and examined at the INL Research Center (IRC) or Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This is the first in a series of status reports on the progress of the AGC experiment. As the first capsule, AGC1 was irradiated from September 2009 to January 2011 to a maximum dose level of 6-7 dpa. The capsule was removed from ATR and transferred to the HFEF in April 2011 where the capsule was disassembled and test specimens extracted from the capsules. The first irradiated samples from AGC1 were shipped to the IRC in July 2011and initial post irradiation examination (PIE) activities were begun on the first 37 samples received. PIE activities continue for the remainder of the AGC1 specimen as they are received at the IRC.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Calcined Waste Storage at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center

This comprehensive report provides definitive volume, mass, and composition (chemical and radioactivity) of calcined waste stored at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center. Calcine composition data are required for regulatory compliance (such as permitting and waste disposal), future treatment of the caline, and shipping the calcine to an off-Site-facility (such as a geologic repository). This report also contains a description of the calcine storage bins. The Calcined Solids Storage Facilities (CSSFs) were designed by different architectural engineering firms and built at different times. Each CSSF has a unique design, reflecting varying design criteria and lessons learned from historical CSSF operation. The varying CSSF design will affect future calcine retrieval processes and equipment. Revision 4 of this report presents refinements and enhancements of calculations concerning the composition, volume, mass, chemical content, and radioactivity of calcined waste produced and stored within the CSSFs. The historical calcine samples are insufficient in number and scope of analysis to fully characterize the entire inventory of calcine in the CSSFs. Sample data exist for all the liquid wastes that were calcined. This report provides calcine composition data based on liquid waste sample analyses, volume of liquid waste calcined, calciner operating data, and CSSF operating data using several large Microsoft Excel (Microsoft 2003) databases and spreadsheets that are collectively called the Historical Processing Model. The calcine composition determined by this method compares favorably with historical calcine sample data.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Saltstone 3QCY11 TCLP Results

A Saltstone waste form was prepared in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) from a Tank 50H sample and Z-Area premix material for the third quarter of calendar year 2011 (3QCY11). After the prescribed 32 day cure, samples of the saltstone were collected, and the waste form was shown to meet the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24 and R.61-79.268.48(a) requirements for a nonhazardous waste form with respect to RCRA metals and underlying hazardous constituents. These analyses met all quality assurance specifications of USEPA SW-846. The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) receives waste from Tank 50H for treatment. In the third quarter of the 2011 calendar year (3QCY11), Tank 50H accepted transfers of approximately 20 kgal from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), approximately 236 kgal from the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (ARP/MCU) Decontaminated Salt Solution Hold Tank (DSS-HT), and approximately 25 kgal from other sources. The Saltstone Grout Sampling plan provides the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution which is to be disposed of in the Z-Area Solid Waste Landfill (SWLF). During operation, samples were collected from Tank 50H and grout samples prepared to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24(b) and R.61-79.268.48(a). Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was asked to prepare saltstone from samples of Tank 50H obtained July 7, 2011 during 3QCY11 to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout. The samples were cured and shipped to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group-Radioisotope and Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (B&W TSG-RACL) to perform the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) and subsequent extract analysis on saltstone samples for the analytes required for the quarterly analysis saltstone sample. In addition to the eight toxic metals - arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury, lead, selenium and silver - analytes included the underlying hazardous constituents (UHC) antimony, beryllium, nickel, and thallium which could not be eliminated from analysis by process knowledge. B&W TSG-RACL provided subsamples to GEL Laboratories, LLC for analysis for the UHCs benzene, phenols and total and amenable cyanide.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Saltstone 4QCY11 TCLP Results

The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) receives waste from Tank 50H for treatment. In the fourth quarter of the 2011 calendar year (4QCY11), Tank 50H accepted transfers of approximately 10 kgal from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), approximately 4 kgal from 211H, approximately 573 kgal from the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (ARP/MCU) Decontaminated Salt Solution Hold Tank (DSS-HT), and approximately 5 kgal from other sources. The Saltstone Grout Sampling plan provides the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution which is to be disposed of in the Z-Area Solid Waste Landfill (SWLF). During operation, samples were collected from Tank 50H and grout samples prepared to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24(b) and R.61-79.268.48(a). Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was asked to prepare saltstone from samples of Tank 50H obtained Oct. 12, 2011 during 4QCY11 to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout. The samples were cured and shipped to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group-Radioisotope and Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (B&W TSG-RACL) to perform the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) and subsequent extract analysis on saltstone samples for the analytes required for the quarterly analysis saltstone sample. In addition to the eight toxic metals - arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury, lead, selenium and silver - analytes included the underlying hazardous constituents (UHC) antimony, beryllium, nickel, and thallium which could not be eliminated from analysis by process knowledge. B&W TSG-RACL provided subsamples to GEL Laboratories, LLC for analysis for the UHCs benzene, phenols and total and amenable cyanide.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Reflector Technology Development and System Design for Concentrating Solar Power Technologies

Alcoa began this program in March of 2008 with the goal of developing and validating an advanced CSP trough design to lower the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) as compared to existing glass based, space-frame trough technology. In addition to showing a pathway to a significant LCOE reduction, Alcoa also desired to create US jobs to support the emerging CSP industry. Alcoa's objective during Phase I: Concept Feasibility was to provide the DOE with a design approach that demonstrates significant overall system cost savings without sacrificing performance. Phase I consisted of two major tasks; reflector surface development and system concept development. Two specific reflective surface technologies were investigated, silver metallized lamination, and thin film deposition both applied on an aluminum substrate. Alcoa prepared samples; performed test validation internally; and provided samples to the NREL for full-spectrum reflectivity measurements. The final objective was to report reflectivity at t = 0 and the latest durability results as of the completion of Phase 1. The target criteria for reflectance and durability were as follows: (1) initial (t = 0), hemispherical reflectance >93%, (2) initial spectral reflectance >90% for 25-mrad reading and >87% for 7-mrad reading, and (3) predicted 20 year durability of less than 5% optical performance drop. While the results of the reflective development activities were promising, Alcoa was unable to down-select on a reflective technology that met the target criteria. Given the progress and potential of both silver film and thin film technologies, Alcoa continued reflector surface development activities in Phase II. The Phase I concept development activities began with acquiring baseline CSP system information from both CSP Services and the DOE. This information was used as the basis to develop conceptual designs through ideation sessions. The concepts were evaluated based on estimated cost and high-level structural performance. The target criteria for the concept development was to achieve a solar field cost savings of 25%-50% thereby meeting or exceeding the DOE solar field cost savings target of $\$$350/m 2 . After evaluating various structural design approaches, Alcoa down-selected to a monocoque, dubbed Wing Box, design that utilizes the reflective surface as a structural, load carrying member. The cost and performance potential of the Wing Box concept was developed via initial finite element analysis (FEA) and cost modeling. The structural members were sized through material utilization modeling when subjected to representative loading conditions including wind loading. Cost modeling was utilized to refine potential manufacturing techniques that could be employed to manufacture the structural members. Alcoa concluded that an aluminum intensive collector design can achieve significant cost savings without sacrificing performance. Based on the cost saving potential of this Concept Feasibility study, Alcoa recommended further validation of this CSP approach through the execution of Phase II: Design and Prototype Development. Alcoa Phase II objective was to provide the DOE with a validated CSP trough design that demonstrates significant overall system cost savings without sacrificing performance. Phase II consisted of three major tasks; Detail System Design, Prototype Build, and System Validation. Additionally, the reflector surface development that began in Phase I was continued in Phase II. After further development work, Alcoa was unable to develop a reflective technology that demonstrated significant performance or cost benefits compared to commercially available CSP reflective products. After considering other commercially available reflective surfaces, Alcoa selected Alano's MIRO-SUN product for use on the full scale prototype. Although MIRO-SUN has a lower specular reflectivity compared to other options, its durability in terms of handling, cleaning, and long-term reflectivity was deemed the most important attribute to successfully validate Alcoa's advanced trough architecture. To validate the performance of the Wing Box trough, a 6 meter aperture by 14 meter long prototype trough was built. For ease of shipping to and assembly at NREL's test facility, the prototype was fabricated in two half modules and joined along the centerline to create the Wing Box trough. The trough components were designed to achieve high precision of the reflective surface while leveraging high volume manufacturing and assembly techniques.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Effects of Gain Changes on RPM Performance

The mission of the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's (DOE/NNSA's) Office of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) is to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system. The goal of this mission is to reduce the probability of these materials being fashioned into a weapon of mass destruction or radiological dispersal device that could be used against the United States or its international partners. This goal is achieved primarily through the installation and operation of radiation detection equipment at border crossings, airports, seaports, and other strategic locations around the world. In order to effectively detect the movement of radioactive material, the response of these radiation detectors to various materials in various configurations must be well characterized. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) investigated two aspects of Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) settings, based on a preliminary investigation done by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL): source-to-detector distance effect on amplifier gain and optimized discriminator settings. This report discusses this investigation. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the ORNL testing. First, for increased distance between the source and the detector, thus illuminating the entire detector rather than just the center of the detector (as is done during detector alignments), an increase in gain may provide a 5-15% increase in sensitivity (Fig. 4). However, increasing the gain without adjusting the discriminator settings is not recommended as this makes the monitor more sensitive to electronic noise and temperature-induced fluctuations. Furthermore, if the discriminators are adjusted in relation to the increase in gain, thus appropriately discriminating against electronic noise, the sensitivity gains are less than 5% (Fig. 6). ORNL does not consider this slight increase in sensitivity to be a worthwhile pursuit. Second, increasing the ULD will increase sensitivity a few percent (Fig. 7); however, it is not clear that the slight increase in sensitivity is worth the effort required to make the change (e.g., reliability, cost, etc.). Additionally, while the monitor would be more sensitive to HEU, it would also be more sensitive to NORM. Third, the sensitivity of the system remains approximately the same whether it is calibrated to a small source on contact or a large source far away (Fig. 6). This affirms that no changes to the existing calibration procedure are necessary.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Radiochemistry Results from the IER-163 COMET Irradiation

The COMET assembly at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) was used to irradiate twelve foils in September 2011. The intention of this irradiation was to measure 'peak yield' fission product activities, activation products, and so-called 'endpoint R values' for different foil materials in a non-thermal neutron spectrum. After irradiation, several of the foils were shipped to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for radiochemical analysis. The results from the non-destructive and radiochemical analyses of six of these foils are presented.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Plutonium Equivalent Inventory for Belowground Radioactive Waste at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Technical Area 54, Area G Disposal Facility - Fiscal Year 2011

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) generates radioactive waste as a result of various activities. Many aspects of the management of this waste are conducted at Technical Area 54 (TA-54); Area G plays a key role in these management activities as the Laboratory's only disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste (LLW). Furthermore, Area G serves as a staging area for transuranic (TRU) waste that will be shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for disposal. A portion of this TRU waste is retrievably stored in pits, trenches, and shafts. The radioactive waste disposed of or stored at Area G poses potential short- and long-term risks to workers at the disposal facility and to members of the public. These risks are directly proportional to the radionuclide inventories in the waste. The Area G performance assessment and composite analysis (LANL, 2008a) project long-term risks to members of the public; short-term risks to workers and members of the public, such as those posed by accidents, are addressed by the Area G Documented Safety Analysis (LANL, 2011a). The Documented Safety Analysis uses an inventory expressed in terms of plutonium-equivalent curies, referred to as the PE-Ci inventory, to estimate these risks. The Technical Safety Requirements for Technical Area 54, Area G (LANL, 2011b) establishes a belowground radioactive material limit that ensures the cumulative projected inventory authorized for the Area G site is not exceeded. The total belowground radioactive waste inventory limit established for Area G is 110,000 PE-Ci. The PE-Ci inventory is updated annually; this report presents the inventory prepared for 2011. The approach used to estimate the inventory is described in Section 2. The results of the analysis are presented in Section 3.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Report for Los Alamos National Laboratory Technical Area 54, Area G Disposal Facility – Fiscal Year 2011

As a condition to the Disposal Authorization Statement issued to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) on March 17, 2010, a comprehensive performance assessment and composite analysis maintenance program must be implemented for the Technical Area 54, Area G disposal facility. Annual determinations of the adequacy of the performance assessment and composite analysis are to be conducted under the maintenance program to ensure that the conclusions reached by those analyses continue to be valid. This report summarizes the results of the fiscal year 2011 annual review for Area G. Revision 4 of the Area G performance assessment and composite analysis was issued in 2008 and formally approved in 2009. These analyses are expected to provide reasonable estimates of the long-term performance of Area G and, hence, the disposal facility's ability to comply with Department of Energy (DOE) performance objectives. Annual disposal receipt reviews indicate that smaller volumes of waste will require disposal in the pits and shafts at Area G relative to what was projected for the performance assessment and composite analysis. The future inventories are projected to decrease modestly for the pits but increase substantially for the shafts due to an increase in the amount of tritium that is projected to require disposal. Overall, however, changes in the projected future inventories of waste are not expected to compromise the ability of Area G to satisfy DOE performance objectives. The Area G composite analysis addresses potential impacts from all waste disposed of at the facility, as well as other sources of radioactive material that may interact with releases from Area G. The level of knowledge about the other sources included in the composite analysis has not changed sufficiently to call into question the validity of that analysis. Ongoing environmental surveillance activities are conducted at, and in the vicinity of, Area G. However, the information generated by many of these activities cannot be used to evaluate the validity of the performance assessment and composite analysis models because the monitoring data collected are specific to operational releases or address receptors that are outside the domain of the performance assessment and composite analysis. In general, applicable monitoring data are supportive of some aspects of the performance assessment and composite analysis. Several research and development (R and D) efforts have been initiated under the performance assessment and composite analysis maintenance program. These investigations are designed to improve the current understanding of the disposal facility and site, thereby reducing the uncertainty associated with the projections of the long-term performance of Area G. The status and results of R and D activities that were undertaken in fiscal year 2011 are discussed in this report. Special analyses have been conducted to determine the feasibility of disposing of specific waste streams, to address proposed changes in disposal operations, and to consider the impacts of changes to the models used to conduct the performance assessment and composite analysis. These analyses are described and the results of the evaluations are summarized in this report. The Area G disposal facility consists of Material Disposal Area (MDA) G and the Zone 4 expansion area. To date, all disposal operations at Area G have been confined to MDA G. Material Disposal Area G is scheduled to undergo final closure in 2015; disposal of waste in the pits and shafts is scheduled to end in 2013. In anticipation of the closure of MDA G, plans are being made to ship the majority of the waste generated at LANL to off-site locations for disposal. It is not clear at this time if waste that will be disposed of at LANL will be placed in Zone 4 or if disposal operations will move to a new location at the Laboratory. Separately, efforts to optimize the final cover used in the closure of MDA G are underway; a final cover design different than that adopted for the performance assessment and composite analysis will likely emerge from that investigation. All of these changes will require re-examination of the assumptions upon which the performance assessment and composite analysis are based and, in all likelihood, revision of those analyses.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗