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Life cycle Management of 324 Project High-Activity, Mixed/Low-Level Radioactive Waste - 20506

U.S. DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) manages the 324 Building and is preparing to remotely excavate and disposition the radioactive soil beneath the building to allow further deactivation of the building. The 324 Building is a non-reactor Category 2 Nuclear Facility located in the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. Records indicate that in October 1986, approximately 516 liters of a concentrated liquid waste stream containing cesium-137 ({sup 137}Cs) and strontium-90 ({sup 90}Sr) spilled onto the floor of a hot cell, B-Cell, in the 324 Building. The spill contained an estimated 1.3 million curies (Ci) of radioactivity. A breach in the sump of B-Cell was discovered in November 2009 during characterization of the soil under the building. Exposure rates in excess of 10,000 R/hr were detected through a system of access pipes installed under the hot cell, and an estimated 1.557 E+05 Ci of {sup 137}Cs and 6.842 E+04 Ci of {sup 90}Sr are in the soil beneath B-Cell. The magnitude of the soil contamination below B-Cell represents one of the most challenging remediation activities in the DOE complex. The objective of CHPRC's 324 Project is to remotely excavate and disposition the highly contaminated soil under the hot cell so building deactivation and stabilization activities can resume. Depending on the volume and radioactivity of contaminated soil under B-Cell, the material will be dispositioned either at the Hanford Site's Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) or in grout monoliths that will be created in the hot cells (A, C and D) next to B-Cell during future building demolition activities. The current project scope includes installing structural supports under the walls of B-Cell and using remotely operated equipment to remove debris from the hot cell, remove debris mixed with grout on the floor, saw through and remove the cell floor and liner, and excavate contaminated soil under B-Cell to a depth of up to 3.66 meters (12 feet). Addition or removal of debris in A-Cell may be required to support B-Cell cleanout and excavation activities. The base approach is to disposition debris and soil bins in the Radiochemical Engineering Cell (REC) monoliths, and subsequently disposition the monoliths during building demolition. (authors)

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EPRI Research Results: International Nuclear Power Plant Waste Classification - 17444

Different countries around the globe use varying schemes for the classification of radioactive waste. Many countries develop country specific waste classification schemes based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) waste classification framework. The United States of America use the Class A, B, and C waste classification. Additionally, some countries use concentration limits to classify wastes while others use dose rate limits or a combination of concentration and dose rate limits. General comparisons have been made between the IAEA and the United States classification schemes, but a clear and well researched comparison of the international schemes was not evident in the available research data sets. In 2013 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) initiated the Comparison of Global Low and Intermediate Level Waste Management Methods project. The objective of the project was to understand how six countries managed their low and intermediate level wastes from generation to disposal. A major task of this project was to conduct a comparison of the international waste classification schemes. EPRI developed a set of reference waste volumes that are representative of nuclear power plant low-level radioactive waste in form and radioactivity concentrations (e.g. dry active waste, high activity resin, low activity resin, high activity filters and low activity filters). These waste volumes were then classified using the waste classification systems in place in several countries around the world. In 2016, EPRI presented a paper providing a status update on this research. This 2017 paper provides the final results of that research, show where comparisons and correlations can be made, and provide a discussion on how this information might inform international radioactive research and development and benchmarking of radioactive waste management strategies, operational experiences, best practices, and technology implementation. (authors)

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Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) is for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” which is located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). CAU 577 includes five low-level waste cells at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. To resolve issues related to this alleged violation of hazardous waste regulations, a Settlement Agreement was executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office on April 25, 2019, which identified agreed-upon mitigation measures. The Settlement Agreement required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO).

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Operational Stewardship Program Development and Execution Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory - 16353

As LLNL carries out its national security missions, the Laboratory strives to ensure its facilities portfolio meets the latest technologies and enables infrastructure needs. Among the identified Science, Technology and Engineering (ST and E) areas that constitute strategic priorities, state-of-the-art facilities are needed to allow LLNL to draw collaborative partners required to advance capabilities and provide the requisite world-class forensics support in nuclear threat countermeasures. Efficient utilization of existing facilities presents a unique challenge given the advanced age and unique mission design of many of LLNL's facilities. A strategy developed in 2007 sought to focus key reinvestments into enduring facilities while strategically migrating personnel and operations out of past mission facilities with the intent of closure and final Transition and Disposition (T and D). At the time, LLNL lacked processes or procedures that met the continually changing facility mission and objectives needs. A comprehensive approach was needed to provide the framework to guide decisions along the entire life cycle of a project and/or facility. The development of an Operational Stewardship Program began in 2012 which outlines the process, and roles and responsibilities, in changing facility status to ensure good stewardship, accountability, and management and utilization of facilities. Further emphasizing LLNL forward actions, the 2015 NNSA sponsored Excess Contaminated Facilities Working Group charted the development of a common, Department-wide methodology for determining costs and risks. In December 2015, the complete Operational Stewardship Program was approved for implementation by LLNL senior management. (authors)

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A perspective on the interaction between the NCSD and ANSI/ANS-8 standards

The intent of this paper is to illuminate the reasons behind the culture of standards involvement by the criticality safety community in the NCSD (Nuclear Criticality Safety Division), and specifically highlight those NCSD activities that build/support this culture. Many NCSD members are currently active in ANSI/ANS-8 and other standards and have been for the last half century. This paper was inspired by a request from ANS's Professional Divisions Committee concerning how the professional divisions could 'increase support to Standards development as Subject Matter Experts'. The healthy level of involvement (i.e., culture) by the NCSD membership in standards was noted. A history of the ANSI/ANS-8 series standards is provided, with roots going back to 1955. The need became apparent during a cluster of nuclear criticality accidents that occurred between 1958-1962. The first NCS related standard was the American Standard N6.1-1964, the parent of ANSI/ANS-8.1, which was prepared in 1958 and adopted in 1964. Thus, the involvement in standards by the NCS community goes back more than 50 years. The NCSD continues to help foster a culture of standards use and development. However, the support provided by the NCSD is frequently not recognized, and standards activities are often viewed as separate from the NCSD. This paper highlights the interaction between the NCSD and the ANSI/ANS-8 standards activities as well as the benefit of this support. (authors)

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PREDICTING WATER ACTIVITY IN ELECTROLYTE SOLUTIONS WITH THE CISTERNAS-LAM MODEL

Water activity is an important parameter needed to predict the solubility of hydrated salts in Hanford nuclear waste supernatants. A number of models available in the scientific literature predict water activity from electrolyte solution composition. The Cisternas-Lam model is one of those models and has several advantages for nuclear waste application. One advantage is that it has a single electrolyte specific parameter that is temperature independent. Thus, this parameter can be determined from very limited data and extrapolated widely. The Cisternas-Lam model has five coefficients that are used for all aqueous electrolytes. The present study aims to determine if there is a substantial improvement in making all six coefficients electrolyte specific. The Cisternas-Lam model was fit to data for six major electrolytes in Hanford nuclear waste supernatants. The model was first fit to all data to determine the five global coefficients, when they were held constant for all electrolytes it yielded a substantially better fit. Subsequently, the model was fit to each electrolyte dataset separately, where all six coefficients were allowed to be electrolyte specific. Treating all six coefficients as electrolyte specific did not make sufficient difference, given the complexity of applying the electrolyte specific parameters to multi-solute systems. Revised water specific parameters, optimized to the electrolytes relevant to Hanford waste, are also reported.

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Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

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Natural and Engineered Features Supporting Environmental Performance of Idaho National Laboratory's Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility - 19436

The Idaho National Laboratory's (INL's) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been designed and constructed to receive waste generated at the INL site in support of the US DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and Naval Reactors (NR) missions. The facility has been designed to receive legacy RH LLW currently in storage at INL facilities and new waste generated by nuclear research programs. RH LLW to be received at the facility is solid waste consisting of surface contaminated materials; ion exchange resins used to purify cooling and canal water; and activated metal components generated during reactor core change outs and Naval spent fuel management; and nuclear R and D. Disposal of INL's RH LLW poses unique disposal challenges due to high radiation levels (contact rates up to 600 Sv/hr [60,000 Rem/hr]) that require remote handling and adequate shielding for transportation and disposal. The facility has been designed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, including the all-pathways dose, air pathway dose, inadvertent intruder doses, and radon emissions limits. This paper presents an overview of natural and engineered design features that support the safety case and enhance the environmental performance of the facility. These features include location selection, use of reinforced pre-cast concrete vaults; a robust hydraulic drainage system; use of steel waste canisters for waste disposal; the facility monitoring system; facility layout; and crediting waste forms. The facility performance assessment (PA) developed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, credits each of these protective features. Releases from waste forms disposed of at this facility are limited by corrosion of the steel waste canisters which will ultimately allow contact with infiltrating water followed by transport of radionuclides from the vault system. The steel waste canisters were credited for their ability to limit water contact with the waste based on the demonstrated ability of the reinforced pre-caste concrete vaults to provide long-term structural protection of the steel waste canisters. Verification of hydraulic and concrete performance was conducted through laboratory data, field infiltration tests supported by a robust monitoring system, and numerical modeling. Releases into the vault system from activated metals are based on site-specific corrosion data. Radionuclide transport from the vault system from all waste forms is based on site-specific climatological, hydrologic, and stratigraphic data. At INL, the groundwater pathway historically and appropriately has received the most attention. By crediting aspects of the natural system, the engineered vault system, and the waste, estimated radiologic doses via the groundwater pathway are minimal. Air pathway doses were reduced by differentially crediting corrosion of aluminum and stainless steel activated metals resulting in the pathway being screened out of the PA. Groundwater and inadvertent intruder doses were reduced through selective facility layout. This paper provides an overview of the system-wide protective features incorporated into the facility design along with an extensive reference list to supporting technical papers and analyses that provide data and interpretation. (authors)

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Long-Term Stewardship Challenges at the Piqua, Ohio, Decommissioned Reactor Site - 19578

This paper describes the site history following the decommissioning of the Piqua, Ohio, Nuclear Power Facility to include key features of the 1968 contract and 1969 lease agreement with the City of Piqua still in effect today. Long-term stewardship challenges facing the US Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) and the path to find long-term solutions that are in the best interest of all parties are described. Lastly, the applications of lessons learned to other LM legacy sites are also presented. (authors)

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Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.4.

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One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval and Delivery of Hanford Tank Wastes for Vitrification in the Waste Treatment Plant - 13234

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety-conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction of WTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration and Controls, Front-End Design and Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety and Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH and QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant{sup R} Foundation-Configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan. (authors)

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Comparison of measurement techniques and sorption of radium-226 in low and high salinity aqueous samples

Human activities have the potential to redistribute radium (Ra) in the marine environment in a manner that may necessitate monitoring or management of subsequent human or environmental exposures. There is therefore a need to identify accurate and accessible techniques for Ra measurement in high salinity samples and to describe the distribution of Ra in estuarine and marine environments, but most efforts in these areas have focused on low salinity matrices. In addition, rapid and reliable measurements are crucial for time-sensitive samples such as short-lived isotopes or emergency situations. The objective of this study is to describe the limits of detection, cost, and relative ease for measurement of Ra in both low and high salinity aqueous samples via three analytical methods: liquid scintillation counting (LSC), high purity germanium (HPGe) gamma spectrometry, and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS). To contextualize these measurements for real-world scenarios, the partitioning of 226 Ra to substrates relevant to the marine environment was also characterized. Although HPGe detection with solid phase extraction had the lowest limit of detection for low salinity samples (0.27 Bq L −1 ), poor 226 Ra recovery for high salinity samples and high materials costs make this method prohibitive for many users. Limits of detection for high salinity samples were lower for LSC (1.28 Bq L −1 ) than for ICP-MS without dilution (11.4 Bq L −1 ), but significant and unexpected degradation of the high salinity LSC standards was observed after six months. Furthermore, our preferred measurement method for high salinity Ra samples is ICP-MS with sample dilution as necessary to reduce matrix effects.

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Strategic Planning as a Competitive Advantage by Using the BSC as a Management Tool: a Case Study in Application of Radioisotope Technology at IPEN - 16400

Strategic planning is one of the most important management tools for organizational decision making. The nuclear area represents a segment of energy production used by many countries in America, Europe and Asia. It is known that in the future nuclear energy can be a major exit to the global energy crisis. The aim of this research was to use the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) as a strategic tool for decision making in a teaching and research institution of the nuclear area - Nuclear and Energy Research Institute (IPEN), located in the city of Sao Paulo, which belongs to the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) in Brazil. The methodology used in this academic doctoral study was a case study, which considered the period of research from December 2012 to December 2015. The main results expected from this case study are: the improvement of information flow, the view, the increased visibility of an organization providing education and especially research in relation to published works, increased interaction among IPEN and the main global research institutes and centers, increasing academic production of technical articles, indicator improvement, improving the monitoring of management actions, among others. Given the expected results one can conclude that this study will be of great value to the IPEN and also for the Brazilian energy sector, as it will allow and contribute to the dissemination and demystification of nuclear power as an energy source of mankind, its peaceful applications and for the management activity of knowledge and innovation production in the nuclear area of IPEN. (authors)

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Lessons Learned in the Development of Industry Guidance - 20279

The availability of industry guidance on different aspects of waste management forms a valuable reference for waste practitioners. The guidance typically details the principles, processes and practices that should be consulted during each stage of the relevant activities. It also includes relevant regulatory and international requirements, appropriate case studies and examples of best practices to illustrate technical concepts and make the information available to the reader in an accessible manner. Over recent years Wood have developed (or are developing) a number of industry guidance documents on a range of topics including Solid Waste Characterization, Routine Water Quality Monitoring on Nuclear Sites: Pipeline Characterization: Determining Background Radioactivity for Land Quality Assessment: Interim Storage and Aqueous Waste Management. This talk provides an overview of lessons learned along the way including: - the importance of stakeholder engagement through the process: - how to identify 'good practice'; - the importance of iterative development; and - the selection of illustrative and informative case studies. (authors)

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 30, No. 1, January-March 1989]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 International Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety: NUCSAFE 88 by A. P. Malinauskas and J. G. Pruett; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 18 Chernobyl Today: State of Research by A. Yu. Gagarinskii; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 23 Problems Associated with Routine In-Plant Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Systems at U.S. Light-Water Reactors by Barry G. Wahlig, David M. Walker, Mahmoud R. Ghavi, and John M. Palms; DESIGN FEATURES: 34 Twentieth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning Conference by R. R. Bellamy, D. W. Moeller, and M. W. First, 46 Design Options for the Core Support Structure for Liquid-Metal-Cooled Reactor Plants by J. P. Burelbach, W. J. Kann, J. G. Saiveau, and R. W. Seidensticker; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 53 The Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident by L. V. Konstantinov and A. J. González; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 70 Activities Related to Waste Management Compiled by E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 80 Fuel Performance Annual Report for 1986 by W. J. Bailey, 103 Safety Considerations Related to 12-Hour Shift Schedules by S. Gould, 105 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 108 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 130 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 140 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 145 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 153 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 69 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 79 International Seminar on Fission Product Transport Processes in Reactor Accidents, 129 Harvard School of Public Health Offers Short Courses, 152 MIT Offers Summer Short Courses on Reactor Safety and Nodal Analysis, 152 Seminar on Use of PCs in Probabilistic Safety Analysis, 157 The Authors, 160 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 29.

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Sixth National Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

The United States of America (U.S.) ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention) on April 9, 2003. The Joint Convention establishes an international peer review process among Contracting Parties and provides incentives for nations to take appropriate steps to bring their spent fuel and radioactive waste management activities into compliance with general safety standards and practices. An extensive U.S. legal and regulatory structure ensures the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. This report describes radioactive waste management in the U.S. in both the commercial and government sectors, and provides annexes with information on spent fuel and waste management facilities, inventories, and ongoing decommissioning projects. It also provides detailed information on spent fuel and radioactive waste management safety, as well as transboundary movements (imports/exports) and disused sealed sources, as required by the Joint Convention.

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Panel Session 11: Featured Country Canada - Remediation of Contaminated Sites

Canada has several unique sites requiring environmental remediation of radiological contaminants. This panel was designed to outline the remediation of contaminated sites across Canada from several perspectives. Remote legacy uranium mining operations, small scale residential locations, and large impacted soil sites all pose different challenges, however there are some common solutions and keys to success. This panel addressed several of those challenges and provided lessons learned on how to successfully plan and execute large scale environmental remediation in both remote and residential locations. This panel focused on the cleaning up several contaminated sites in Canada and monitoring the long-term performance of sites that have already been remediated. Panelists addressed the technical and social challenges associated with various cleanup initiatives North of the 49. Parallel and the solutions that have been adopted to enable these projects to move forward. The panel offered the perspectives of owners, contractors and regulators on current projects and how they are leveraging past experience and learning from others to ensure future undertakings are successful. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Regulating Environmental Remediation in Canada (Michael Rinker, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (Canada)); 2 - Integration of Local Knowledge and Engagement/Capacity Building Legacy Uranium Mine Sites (Joe Muldoon, Saskatchewan Research Council (Canada)); 3 - The Path to Institutional Control - Safe, Secure and Stable (R. Liam Mooney, Cameco Corporation (Canada)); 4 - Port Hope Area Initiative: Project Challenges (Scott Parnell, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (Canada))

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2nd Quarter FY18 Transportation Report

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. This report summarizes the 2nd quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2018 low-level radioactive waste (LLW), mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW), which includes classified LLW and MLLW, classified non-radioactive (CNR) and classified non-radioactive hazardous (CNRH) shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment from a NNSS facility and returned to the NNSS this quarter of FY2018.

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