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Stakeholder Transportation Scorecard: Reviewing Nevada's Recommendations for Enhancing the Safety and Security of Nuclear Waste Shipments - 13518

As a primary stakeholder in the Yucca Mountain program, the state of Nevada has spent three decades examining and considering national policy regarding spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transportation. During this time, Nevada has identified 10 issues it believes are critical to ensuring the safety and security of any spent nuclear fuel transportation program, and achieving public acceptance. These recommendations are: 1) Ship the oldest fuel first; 2) Ship mostly by rail; 3) Use dual-purpose (transportable storage) casks; 4) Use dedicated trains for rail shipments; 5) Implement a full-scale cask testing program; 6) Utilize a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process for the selection of a new rail spur to the proposed repository site; 7) Implement the Western Interstate Energy Board (WIEB) 'straw man' process for route selection; 8) Implement Section 180C assistance to affected States, Tribes and localities through rulemaking; 9) Adopt safety and security regulatory enhancements proposed states; and 10) Address stakeholder concerns about terrorism and sabotage. This paper describes Nevada's proposals in detail and examines their current status. The paper describes the various forums and methods by which Nevada has presented its arguments and sought to influence national policy. As of 2012, most of Nevada's recommendations have been adopted in one form or another, although not yet implemented. If implemented in a future nuclear waste program, the State of Nevada believes these recommendations would form the basis for a successful national transportation plan for shipments to a geologic repository and/or centralized interim storage facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Post-closure program streamlining at the Nevada national security site - 15290

More than 200 sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), and Tonopah Test Range (TTR) have been closed in place. At these sites, contamination has been left in place, and protection of human health, safety, and the environment is ensured through the establishment of use restrictions (URs). Post-closure requirements were initially established in the Closure Report (CR) for each site and include a variety of inspection, monitoring, maintenance, and reporting commitments. Post-closure requirements and site controls (fences, monuments, soil covers, and postings) may vary depending on site location, accessibility, land use scenario, and the nature of contaminants left in place. Corrective Action Sites (CASs) on the NNSS, NTTR, and TTR have been identified for closure under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), which was signed in 1996. Over 1,900 CASs have been closed under the framework of the FFACO, and more than 200 of those have URs. Many post-closure requirements have been modified over time. In addition, because the scope of the program has spanned almost 20 years, the post-closure requirements have varied due to changing strategies and expectations. Because of the number of sites closed over the course of the program, post-closure requirements are found in hundreds of closure documents, addendums, errata sheets, Records of Technical Change, inspection reports, permit modifications, and correspondence. Furthermore, resources such as personnel and funding necessary to conduct the post-closure program have diminished, while computer capabilities and configuration control principles have improved since closure activities under the FFACO began. Because of these factors, to effectively manage the post-closure program, ensure that all commitments are being met, and improve the ease of identifying the most current post-closure requirements for each UR, the current requirements for every use-restricted site under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office will be consolidated into a single Post-Closure Plan. The Consolidated Post-Closure Plan will also outline a strategy and present possible criteria that may be used for future evaluation of post-closure requirements. Continual assessment of the post-closure program will ensure that the post-closure requirements for URs across the NNSS, NTTR, and TTR are consistently justifiable and sufficient to protect site workers, the public, and the environment while increasing efficiency. Future changes to post-closure requirements and justification for those changes will be recorded in revisions to the Consolidated Post-Closure Plan. This process will provide a comprehensive, consistent, and streamlined method for evaluation of post-closure requirements and implementation of changes. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Improving nuclear criticality safety in maintenance and construction activities at Y-12 national security complex

Maintenance and construction activities inside aging DOE nuclear facilities often impact nuclear criticality safety controls and requirements. Gaps in communication, training, and implementation of criticality safety guidance and controls in maintenance and construction work packages were identified at the Y-12 National Security Complex in 2016 when a maintenance package in the field was discovered to not have been reviewed by criticality safety. This incident resulted in a deficiency because criticality safety review is required any time maintenance or construction is working on equipment containing fissile material or their work impacts fissile material or fissile material activities. This review is required to protect the basis and requirements of criticality safety evaluations. To address these issues, the Y-12 criticality safety group reviewed a large number of maintenance packages, created a new method of communicating criticality safety controls to maintenance and construction, and developed a criticality safety training session designed specifically for maintenance and construction work planners. This paper presents the improvements in communication and implementation made between criticality safety, maintenance, and construction at the Y-12 National Security Complex and possible applications for other DOE sites. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Mercury Cleanup at the Y-12 Nuclear Security Complex - 18304

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) is one of the nation's most important national security assets. The facility played a key role in producing the world's first atomic bomb during the Manhattan Project and since World War II has been a vital contributor to America's nuclear deterrent capability. Historically, mercury was used extensively in operations at Y-12 in connection with production of components for nuclear weapons. During peak usage - from 1950 to 1963 - approximately 11 million kilograms of mercury were used. Over the years, large quantities of mercury - as much as 330,000 kilograms -- were lost within buildings and to soil and surface water. Today, mercury is considered the greatest environmental risk on the Oak Ridge Reservation and mercury cleanup is a high priority for the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM). Remediation of Y-12 and East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC) to mitigate the mercury risk is based on a phased, adaptive management approach. The approach to address surface water includes treatment actions in the short term and research and technology development to evaluate longer-term solutions in the downstream environment. A number of formidable challenges must be addressed in order to assure safe, effective cleanup of mercury contamination at Y-12 and in EFPC. In the long term, understanding how mercury moves in the EFPC system is essential to the development of new technologies and remedial options and strategies for mercury contamination in the creek. OREM has developed and is currently executing a Mercury Technology Development Plan to address these long term needs. As a major component of the short term actions, UCOR has completed the design of the Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility. Outfall 200 is the point at which the west end Y-12 storm drain system discharges to Upper East Fork Poplar Creek (UEFPC). Outfall 200 is consistently the largest single source of mercury to UEFPC. Construction and operation of this facility is critical to reduce mercury in UEFPC, and operation of this facility will be required before demolition of mercury contaminated facilities can begin. Once operational, the Mercury Treatment Facility will have a treatment capacity of 3,000 gallons per minute (gpm), a storm water capture rate of 40,000 gpm, and two million gallons of storm water storage capacity. The headworks with transfer pipeline is designed to capture flow from Outfall 200 and move it to the treatment facility. A contract for construction of the Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility is expected to be awarded in 2018. Early site preparation began in 2017. The early site preparation scope includes utilities relocation, small structure demolition and creek bank secant wall installation. Initial operation of the Mercury Treatment Facility is planned for 2022. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analysis of Exposure during Transportation of Waste to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 20445

Safety is a priority for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program. This commitment to safety is integrated into requirements and work procedures at DOE sites across the U.S. that generate low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste, and classified waste that is transported to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for permanent disposal. Generators of this waste are responsible for ensuring it is packaged and transported in a safe and compliant manner. These generators and their contracted commercial carriers must comply with U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations; the Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC); and other applicable federal, state, and local regulations and requirements. This includes packaging and shipping the waste to meet DOT regulatory radiation dose limits to ensure public safety during transportation. NNSS waste generators have a solid safety record for complying with these stringent regulations as demonstrated by the fact that no shipments exceeding DOT dose rate limits were received at the NNSS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) during FY 2014 through FY 2018. A 2005 study conducted by the Desert Research Institute validated shipments to the NNSS comply with DOT radiation dose limits. In response to recent Nevada stakeholder requests for an updated study, an analysis was conducted to verify and provide evidence that the public continues to be safe from exposure to radioactive waste shipment to the NNSS. Radiation exposure from radioactive waste shipments in transit to the NNSS was evaluated. Three studies were performed: 1. Confirm compliance of waste shipments to the DOT radiation limits using dose rate surveys taken at the generator site and at the disposal site. 2. Estimate the dose to the public from waste shipments using the dosimetry results for disposal site personnel by comparing time of exposure for various individuals/scenarios. 3. Estimate the truck driver dose using the receipt dose rate surveys and time of exposure, and from dosimetry results. Study 1 confirmed compliance with the DOT dose rate limits for a sample of waste shipments (123 of 1,038) received during fiscal year (FY) 2017. Study 2 showed that the average annual radiation equivalent dose for disposal site personnel during FY 2017 was approximately 6.7% [0.415 mSv (41.5 millirem)] of the annual average dose that a person living in the U.S. receives from all sources [6.2 mSv (620 mrem)]. Maximum dose to a member of the public, a person resting/sleeping in an adjacent truck at a rest area to a waste shipment, was 0.0166 mSv (1.66 mrem), which is less than the dose received from a person taking a round trip from the east coast to the west coast of the continental U.S. on an airplane [0.07 mSv (7 mrem) per round trip]. Study 3 showed that the truck driver who made the most shipments of radioactive waste to the NNSS, who drove the most hours (estimated time of exposure 2,520 hours), during FY 2017 had a total dose of 0.15 mSv (15 mrem), which was obtained from their personal dosimeter. The annual dose recorded for disposal site personnel, the dose estimates for the public, and the truck driver dose were all a small percentage of the average radiation dose a person receives from all sources (e.g., background and medical radiation). At these levels, risk should only be described qualitatively. Radiation exposure from radioactive waste shipments to the NNSS were shown to be compliant with the DOT dose rate limits, safe, and very low (i.e., within background levels). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

X-ray Security Imaging on Personal Dosimetry

Federal regulations mandate that personal dosimetry devices — like optically stimulated luminescence (OSLs) — must be worn by all US Department of Energy (DOE) and associated radiation workers to track their occupational dose. Unfortunately, the inadvertent passage of OSLs through x-ray security scanners can compromise their validity. With the advent of high energy, advanced resolution security technology used in airports, this once insignificant issue now requires that Radiological Control (RadCon) be able to accurately discern non-occupational dose to effected OSLs. This presentation will discuss the principles, methods, and, rather surprising, models for establishing the corrective dose estimates at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and its implication across the DOE.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

STEM Professional Development Program for Nuclear Security Science and Technology Consortium

This oral presentation captures the technical and developmental aspect of the program in support of UNLV. The goal of this project is to develop a steady pipeline of STEM educated professionals in area of national and international nuclear security. The goal is to train university students at NNSS laboratories in studies motivated by global nuclear security topics ranging from nuclear emergency response and management to physics experiments for stockpile stewardship program.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

A Managed Tokens Service for Securely Keeping and Distributing Grid Tokens

Fermilab is transitioning authentication and authorization for grid operations to using bearer tokens based on the WLCG Common JWT (JSON Web Token) Profile. One of the functionalities that Fermilab experimenters rely on is the ability to automate batch job submission, which in turn depends on the ability to securely refresh and distribute the necessary credentials to experiment job submit points. Thus, with the transition to using tokens for grid operations, we needed to create a service that would obtain, refresh, and distribute tokens for experimenters' use. This service would avoid the need for experimenters to be experts in obtaining their own tokens and would better protect the most sensitive long-lived credentials. Further, the service needed to be widely scalable, as Fermilab hosts many experiments, each of which would need their own credentials. To address these issues, we created and deployed a Managed Tokens Service. The service is written in Go, taking advantage of that language's native concurrency primitives to easily be able to scale operations as we onboard experiments. The service uses as its first credentials a set of kerberos keytabs, stored on the same secure machine that the Managed Tokens service runs on. These kerberos credentials allow the service to use htgettoken via condor_vault_storer to store vault tokens in the HTCondor credential managers (credds) that run on the batch system scheduler machines (HTCondor schedds); as well as downloading a local, shorter-lived copy of the vault token. The kerberos credentials are then also used to distribute copies of the locally-stored vault tokens to experiment submit points.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Provable Security and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure – Next Steps

With the conclusion of the Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project on Provable Security and Resilience (PSaR) in Critical Infrastructure, we present forward-looking technical concepts and strategies that build on the project’s outcomes and INL’s long-standing expertise in infrastructure protection. The challenge is to protect critical infrastructure and functions much more efficiently at scale than capable adversaries can attack at scale. After summarizing progress and ongoing work we’ll discuss what are the challenges that remain and what are new/emerging technologies, strategies, and processes to meet those challenges. Finally, we’ll layout concepts that integrate with other protection work in the coming year and beyond. For example, building secure function-specific platforms based on the seL4 microkernel, and considering the successes of Cyber-Informed Engineering as a model for engage, collaboration, and adoption. We look forward to your feedback and collaboration as we refine and expand this vision.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Application of JMP and design of experiments to security system technology testing.

JMP and design of experiments (DOE) have been successfully applied to security system technologies from sensors to communication and display systems. In all cases, the technologies have been complex enough to warrant the need for a statistical determination of significant factors and/or the generation of predictive models. For the sensors, it was the task of calibrating a fiber optic intrusion detection sensor (FOIDS) with 32 adjustable settings. In addition to the numerous settings, the FOIDS also had two software processors for detecting different types of alarms. The problem was made more complex when the different types of alarms occurred on the wrong processors, causing nuisance alarms. JMP's ability to optimize several predictive models simultaneously with JMP's Prediction Profiler flash files was an important factor in producing field solutions. For the Communications and Display testbed system, numerous hardware and software network components had been integrated to build a functional system. Although the components of the system had been tested individually, the system's performance could not be piecewise evaluated. Through the application of JMP's design of experiments and data mining capabilities, it was possible to test some of the factors affecting the system's performance and to differentiate between some of the software and hardware contributors. This paper will discuss design of experiments and the JMP tools applied to the solutions for both security systems.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Situational Awareness as a Measure of Performance in Cyber Security Collaborative Work

Cyber defense competitions arising from U.S. service academy exercises, offer a platform for collecting data that can inform research that ranges from characterizing the ideal cyber warrior to describing behaviors during certain challenging cyber defense situations. This knowledge in turn could lead to better preparation of cyber defenders in both military and civilian settings. We conducted proof of concept experimentation to collect data during the Pacific-rim Regional Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (PRCCDC) and analyzed it to study the behavior of cyber defenders. We propose that situational awareness predicts performance of cyber security professionals, and in this paper we focus on our collection and analysis of competition data to determine whether it supports our hypothesis. In addition to normal cyber data, we collected situational awareness and workload data and compared it against the performance of cyber defenders as indicated by their competition score. We conclude that there is a weak correlation between our measure of situational awareness and performance that we hope to exploit in further studies.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Securing The Future: 2026 Manufacturing & Critical Infrastructure Threat Landscape

This report outlines the current state of manufacturing weaknesses introduced by the complexities of modern environments, including cloud services and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, with particular attention paid to the unique vulnerabilities encountered by SMMs. It also highlights CyManII’s strategic initiatives and collaborative solutions to mitigate these risks and strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the manufacturing ecosystem. Utilizing data from 2025 to inform forward-looking mitigation strategies, this report provides manufacturers with a clear understanding of both current and emerging cybersecurity threats, as well as practical opportunities to strengthen their cyber ecosystems. The following sections detail key vulnerabilities and threat vectors, along with actionable mitigation strategies, many of which have been developed or piloted through CyManII-led efforts. A thorough understanding of these risks and mitigation strategies is essential for manufacturers seeking to strengthen the security and resilience of their manufacturing operations.

3D Printing↗

Reducing Software Security Risk Through an Integrated Approach

This paper discusses new joint work by the California Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the University of California at Davis sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to develop a security assessment instrument for the software development and maintenance life cycle.

risk matrix↗

Quantifying Availability in SCADA Environments Using the Cyber Security Metric MFC

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are distributed networks dispersed over large geographic areas that aim to monitor and control industrial processes from remote areas and/or a centralized location. They are used in the management of critical infrastructures such as electric power generation, transmission and distribution, water and sewage, manufacturing/industrial manufacturing as well as oil and gas production. The availability of SCADA systems is tantamount to assuring safety, security and profitability. SCADA systems are the backbone of the national cyber-physical critical infrastructure. Herein, we explore the definition and quantification of an econometric measure of availability, as it applies to SCADA systems; our metric is a specialization of the generic measure of mean failure cost.

Availability↗

Public Safety: Fighting Crime and Terrorism; Border Security

This chapter discusses risks from unintentional or illicit movement of nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through international border crossing points, summarizes international efforts to build capacity and support border security, and discusses how detection equipment can be used to screen for penetrating radiation at traditional border crossing points.

border security↗

Introduction to the special section on learning and security for multi-agent systems

This report features six articles that provide an overview of the emerging research topics at the intersection learning, security, and multi-agent systems. Recent years have witnessed a surge in the number of works at their intersections, and they have appeared in system and control communities as well as many other communities in artificial intelligence, cyber–physical systems, and economics. The articles in this special section give accessible and comprehensive tutorials and surveys for a broad systems and control audience, covering topics including adversarial machine learning, multi-agent reinforcement learning, cyber resilience, resilient control systems, and game design. It is hopeful that this special section will spawn future interest and cross-disciplinary collaborations in this emerging transdisciplinary research area.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Radioactive Cesium Isotope Ratios as a Tool for determining Dispersal and Re-dispersal Mechanisms Downwind from the Nevada Nuclear Security Site

Fractionation of the two longer lived radioactive cesium isotopes (135 and 137) produced by above ground nuclear tests have been measured and used to clarify the dispersal mechanisms of cesium deposited in the area between the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS) and Lake Mead in the southwestern United States. Fractionation of these isotopes is due to the 135 decay chain requiring several days to completely decay to Cs and the 137 decay chain less than one hour. Since the Cs precursors are gases, iodine and xenon, the 135Cs plume was deposited farther downwind than the 137Cs plume. Samples were obtained from the Las Vegas arm of Lake Mead, separated into segments, gamma counted to identify layers of activity and analyzed for 135Cs/137Cs ratios. The layers proved to have nearly identical highly fractionated isotope ratios. This information is consistent with a model where the cesium was initially deposited onto the land area draining into Lake Mead and the composite from all the above ground shots subsequently washed onto the Lake by high intensity rain and windstorms producing a layering of Cs activity where each layer is a portion of the composite.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PERSPECTIVE: Cultivating Strategic Foresight for Energy and Environmental Security

Disastrous social, economic, and political instability can result from limited energy resources or deteriorating environmental conditions. Historically, understanding and preparing for potential turbulent events posed significant challenges for governments, due in part to complex connections and dependencies associated with multiple, inter-related issues. Moving forward, we propose world governments can better mitigate and even avert energy and environmental disasters by cultivating a shared, diverse community of physical and social scientists, engineers, security analysts, and other professionals from related fields to share concerns, discuss ideas, and coalesce key concepts from the vast amount of data available about energy and environmental issues. Bringing relevant parties from multiple disciplines into a dynamic, diverse, and more transparent forum will produce a greater range of discussion, deliberation, and feasible solutions to help address uncertain, global energy and environmental concerns of both the present-day and our future.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗