Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “CLOSURES”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,405 records · Page 78
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

The AAA+ ATPase TRIP13 remodels HORMA domains through N-terminal engagement and unfolding

Proteins of the conserved HORMA domain family, including the spindle assembly checkpoint protein MAD2 and the meiotic HORMADs, assemble into signaling complexes by binding short peptides termed “closure motifs”. The AAA+ ATPase TRIP13 regulates both MAD2 and meiotic HORMADs by disassembling these HORMA domain–closure motif complexes, but its mechanisms of substrate recognition and remodeling are unknown. Here, we combine X-ray crystallography and crosslinking mass spectrometry to outline how TRIP13 recognizes MAD2 with the help of the adapter protein p31comet. We show that p31comet binding to the TRIP13 N-terminal domain positions the disordered MAD2 N-terminus for engagement by the TRIP13 “pore loops”, which then unfold MAD2 in the presence of ATP. N-terminal truncation of MAD2 renders it refractory to TRIP13 action in vitro, and in cells causes spindle assembly checkpoint defects consistent with loss of TRIP13 function. Similar truncation of HORMAD1 in mouse spermatocytes compromises its TRIP13-mediated removal from meiotic chromosomes, highlighting a conserved mechanism for recognition and disassembly of HORMA domain–closure motif complexes by TRIP13.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Simulations of Taylor Bubbles in Vertical and Inclined Pipes with Upward and Downward Liquid Flow

Summary Two-phase flow is a common occurrence in pipes of oil and gas developments. Current predictive tools are based on the mechanistic two-fluid model, which requires the use of closure relations to predict integral flow parameters such as liquid holdup (or void fraction) and pressure gradient. However, these closure relations carry the highest uncertainties in the model. In particular, significant discrepancies have been found between experimental data and closure relations for the Taylor bubble velocity in slug flow, which has been determined to strongly affect the mechanistic model predictions (Lizarraga-García 2016). In this work, we study the behavior of Taylor bubbles in vertical and inclined pipes with upward and downward flow using a validated 3D computational fluid dynamics (CFD) approach with level set method implemented in a commercial code. A total of 56 cases are simulated, covering a wide range of fluid properties, pipe diameters, and inclination angles: Eo ∈ [10, 700]; Mo ∈ [1×10–6, 5×103]; ReSL ∈ [–40, 10]; θ ∈ [5°, 90°]. For bubbles in vertical upward flows, the simulated distribution parameter, C0, is successfully compared with an existing model. However, the C0 values of downward and inclined slug flows where the bubble becomes asymmetric are shown to be significantly different from their respective vertical upward flow values, and no current model exists for the fluids simulated here. The main contributions of this work are (1) the relatively large 3D numerical database generated for this type of flow, (2) the study of the asymmetric nature of inclined and some vertical downward slug flows, and (3) the analysis of its impact on the distribution parameter, C0.

Engineering↗
DOE OSTI2012

Form and Aging of Plutonium in Savannah River Site Waste Tank 18

Process modeling; injection molding; long-fiber thermoplastic; fiber orientation; fiber lengt This report provides a summary of the effects of aging on and the expected forms of plutonium in Tank 18 waste residues. The findings are based on available information on the operational history of Tank 18, reported analytical results for samples taken from Tank 18, and the available scientific literature for plutonium under alkaline conditions. These findings should apply in general to residues in other waste tanks. However, the operational history of other waste tanks should be evaluated for specific conditions and unique operations (e.g., acid cleaning with oxalic acid) that could alter the form of plutonium in heel residues. Based on the operational history of other tanks, characterization of samples from the heel residues in those tanks would be appropriate to confirm the form of plutonium. During the operational period and continuing with the residual heel removal periods, Pu(IV) is the dominant oxidation state of the plutonium. Small fractions of Pu(V) and Pu(VI) could be present as the result of the presence of water and the result of reactions with oxygen in air and products from the radiolysis of water. However, the presence of Pu(V) would be transitory as it is not stable at the dilute alkaline conditions that currently exists in Tank 18. Most of the plutonium that enters Savannah River Site (SRS) high-level waste (HLW) tanks is freshly precipitated as amorphous plutonium hydroxide, Pu(OH) 4(am) or hydrous plutonium oxide, PuO 2(am,hyd) and coprecipitated within a mixture of hydrous metal oxide phases containing metals such as iron, aluminum, manganese and uranium. The coprecipitated plutonium would include Pu 4+ that has been substituted for other metal ions in crystal lattice sites, Pu 4+ occluded within hydrous metal oxide particles and Pu 4+ adsorbed onto the surface of hydrous metal oxide particles. The adsorbed plutonium could include both inner sphere coordination and outer sphere coordination of the plutonium. PuO 2(am,hyd) is also likely to be present in deposits and scales that have formed on the steel surfaces of the tank. Over the operational period and after closure of Tank 18, Ostwald ripening has and will continue to transform PuO 2(am,hyd) to a more crystalline form of plutonium dioxide, PuO 2(c) . After bulk waste removal and heel retrieval operations, the free hydroxide concentration decreased and the carbonate concentration in the free liquid and solids increased. Consequently, a portion of the PuO 2(am,hyd) has likely been converted to a hydroxy-carbonate complex such as Pu(OH) 2 (CO 3 ) (s) . or PuO(CO 3 ) · xH 2 O (am) . Like PuO 2(am,hyd) , Ostwald ripening of Pu(OH) 2 (CO 3 ) (s) or PuO(CO 3 ) · xH 2 O (am) would be expected to occur to produce a more crystalline form of the plutonium carbonate complex. Due to the high alkalinity and low carbonate concentration in the grout formulation, it is expected that upon interaction with the grout, the plutonium carbonate complexes will transform back into plutonium hydroxide. Although crystalline plutonium dioxide is the more stable thermodynamic state of Pu(IV), the low temperature and high water content of the waste during the operating and heel removal periods in Tank 18 have limited the transformation of the plutonium into crystalline plutonium dioxide. During the tank closure period of thousands of years, transformation of the plutonium into a more crystalline plutonium dioxide form would be expected. However, the continuing presence of water, reaction with water radiolysis products, and low temperatures will limit the transformation, and will likely maintain an amorphous Pu(OH) 4 or PuO 2(am,hyd) form on the surface of any crystalline plutonium dioxide produced after tank closure. X-ray Absorption Spectroscopic (XAS) measurements of Tank 18 residues are recommended to confirm coordination environments of the plutonium. If the presence of PuO(CO 3 ) (am,hyd) is confirmed by XAS, it is recommended that experiments be conducted to determine if plutonium carbonates are transformed back into PuO 2(am,hyd) upon contact with grout.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

RH Packaging Maintenance Manual (Rev. 4)

This part of the manual provides instructions for performing inner containment vessel (IV) and outer containment vessel (OC)maintenance leakage rate tests on the following packaging seals and corresponding seal surfaces using a non-destructive helium(He) leak test: IV middle main O-ring seal, IV gas sampling port closure bolt O-ring seal, IV backfill port closure bolt O-ring seal, OC lower main O-ring seal, OC gas sampling port closure bolt O-ring seal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Temperature-package power correlations for open-mode geologic disposal concepts.

Logistical simulation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management in the U.S. combines storage, transportation and disposal elements to evaluate schedule, cost and other resources needed for all major operations leading to final geologic disposal. Geologic repository reference options are associated with limits on waste package thermal power output at emplacement, in order to meet limits on peak temperature for certain key engineered and natural barriers. These package power limits are used in logistical simulation software such as CALVIN, as threshold requirements that must be met by means of decay storage or SNF blending in waste packages, before emplacement in a repository. Geologic repository reference options include enclosed modes developed for crystalline rock, clay or shale, and salt. In addition, a further need has been addressed for open modes in which SNF can be emplaced in a repository, then ventilated for decades or longer to remove heat, prior to permanent repository closure. For each open mode disposal concept there are specified durations for surface decay storage (prior to emplacement), repository ventilation, and repository closure operations. This study simulates those steps for several timing cases, and for SNF with three fuel-burnup characteristics, to develop package power limits at which waste packages can be emplaced without exceeding specified temperature limits many years later after permanent closure. The results are presented in the form of correlations that span a range of package power and peak postclosure temperature, for each open-mode disposal concept, and for each timing case. Given a particular temperature limit value, the corresponding package power limit for each case can be selected for use in CALVIN and similar tools.

Hardin, Ernest.↗
DOE OSTI2014

Project 57 Air Monitoring Annual Report - Fiscal Year 2013 (October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2013)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) is currently working to achieve regulatory closure of radionuclide-contaminated Soils sites under its auspices. Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 415, Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion Site is located in Emigrant Valley, Nevada, on Range 4808A of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), and consists of one Corrective Action Site (CAS): NAFR-23-02, Pu Contaminated Soil. Closure plans being developed for the CAUs both on and off of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) may include postclosure monitoring for the possible release of radioactive contaminants. Determining the potential for transport of radionuclide-contaminated soils under ambient climatic conditions will facilitate an appropriate closure design and postclosure monitoring program. The DOE has authorized the Desert Research Institute (DRI) to conduct field assessments of potential transport of radionuclide-contaminated soil from the Project 57 site during ambient wind events. The assessment is intended to provide site-specific information on meteorological conditions that result in airborne soil particle redistribution, as well as determine which, if any, radiological contaminants may be entrained with the soil particles and estimate their concentrations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2014

SRNL SHELF LIFE STUDIES - SCC STUDIES AT ROOM TEMPERTURE [stress corrosion cracking ]

Phase II, Series 2 corrosion testing performed by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for the Department of Energy 3013 container has been completed. The corrosion tests are part of an integrated plan conducted jointly by Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Savannah River Site. SRNL was responsible for conducting corrosion studies in small-scale vessels to address the influence of salt composition, water loading, and type of oxide/salt contact on the relative humidity inside a 3013 container and on the resulting corrosion of Type 304L and 316L stainless steel (304L and 316L). This testing was conducted in two phases: Phase I evaluated a broad spectrum of salt compositions and initial water loadings on the salt mixtures exposed to 304L and 316L and the resulting corrosion; Phase II evaluated the corrosion of 304L at specific water loadings and a single salt composition. During Phase I testing at high initial moisture levels (0.35 to 1.24 wt%)a, the roomtemperature corrosion of 304L exposed to a series of plutonium oxide/chloride salt mixtures ranged from superficial staining to pitting and stress corrosion cracking (SCC). 304L teardrop coupons that exhibited SCC were directly exposed to a mixture composed of 98 wt % PuO2, 0.9 wt % NaCl, 0.9 wt % KCl, and 0.2 wt % CaCl2. Cracking was not observed in a 316L teardrop coupon. Pitting was also observed in this environment for both 304L and 316L with depths ranging from 20 to 100 μm. Neither pitting nor SCC was observed in mixtures with a greater chloride salt concentration (5 and 28 wt%). These results demonstrated that for a corrosive solution to form a balance existed between the water loading and the salt chloride concentration. This chloride solution results from the interaction of loaded water with the hydrating CaCl2 salt. In Phase II, Series 1 tests, the SCC results were shown to be reproducible with cracking occurring in as little as 85 days. The approximate 0.5 wt% moisture level was found to result in an initial relative humidity of ~55% within the small-scale vessels. Pits were found to be associated with cracks and appeared to act as initiators for the cracking. In a vapor-space only exposure, the weld oxide, which results from the TIG closure weld used to fabricate the teardrop coupon, was also shown to be more susceptible to pitting corrosion than a surface free from weld oxide. This result has important implications for the closure weld of the 3013 inner can since the weld oxide on the can internal surface cannot be removed. The results from the Phase II, Series 2 tests further demonstrated the significance of forming a solution with a critical chloride concentration for corrosion to proceed. 304L teardrop coupons were found to corrode only by pitting with a similar oxide/salt mixture as used in Series 1 testing but with a lower water loading of 0.2 wt%, which resulted in an initial relative humidity of 35-38%. These tests ran twice as long as those for Series 1 testing. The exposure condition was also found to impact the corrosion with salt-exposed surfaces showing lower corrosion resistance. Additional analyses of the Series 2 coupons are recommended especially for determining if cracks emanate from the bottom of pits. Data generated under the 2009 3013 corrosion test plan, as was presented here, increased the understanding of the corrosion process within a sealed 3013 container. Along with the corrosion data from destructive evaluations of 3013 containers, the inner can closure weld region (ICCWR) has been identified as the most vulnerable area of the inner can where corrosion may lead to corrosive species leaking to the interior surface of the outer container, thereby jeopardizing the integrity of the 3013 container. A new corrosion plan has been designed that will characterize the corrosion at the ICCWR of 3013 DEs as well as parameters affecting this corrosion.

3013 plutonium storage, stress corrosion cracking,↗
DOE OSTI2014

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 575: Area 15 Miscellaneous Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 575, Area 15 Miscellaneous Sites, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 575 comprises the following four corrective action sites (CASs) located in Area 15 of the Nevada National Security Site: 15-19-02, Waste Burial Pit, 15-30-01, Surface Features at Borehole Sites, 15-64-01, Decontamination Area, 15-99-03, Aggregate Plant This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing each CAS. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 575 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation to document and verify the adequacy of existing information, to affirm the predicted corrective action decisions, and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective actions. This will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2014

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 567: Miscellaneous Soil Sites - Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 567: Miscellaneous Soil Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 567 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. The corrective actions implemented at CAU 567 were developed based on an evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, the assumed presence of COCs at specific locations, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the CAAs. The CAAs were selected on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. The implemented corrective actions meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated. The CAAs meet all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site. Based on the implementation of these corrective actions, the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 567. • The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection issue a Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office for closure of CAU 567. • CAU 567 be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

NNSS Soils Monitoring: Plutonium Valley (CAU 366) FY2013 and FY2014

The Desert Research Institute (DRI) is conducting a field assessment of the potential for contaminated soil transport from the Plutonium Valley Contamination Area (CA) as a result of wind transport and storm runoff in support of Nevada Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) efforts to complete regulatory closure of the contamination areas. The DRI work is intended to confirm the likely mechanism(s) of transport and determine the meteorological conditions that might cause movement of contaminated soils. Emphasis is given to collecting sediment transported by channelized storm runoff at the Plutonium Valley investigation sites. These data will inform closure plans that are being developed, which will facilitate appropriate closure design and postclosure monitoring. Desert Research Institute installed two meteorological monitoring stations south (station number 1) and north (station number 2) of the Plutonium Valley CA and a runoff sediment sampling station within the CA in 2011. Temperature, wind speed, wind direction, relative humidity, precipitation, solar radiation, barometric pressure, soil temperature, and airborne particulate concentration are collected at both meteorological stations. The maximum, minimum, and average or total (as appropriate) for each of these parameters is recorded for each 10-minute interval. The sediment sampling station includes an automatically activated ISCO sampling pump with collection bottles for suspended sediment, which is activated when sufficient flow is present in the channel, and passive traps for bedload material that is transported down the channel during runoff events. This report presents data collected from these stations during FY2013 and FY2014.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 568: Area 3 Plutonium Dispersion Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

The purpose of this CAP is to provide the plan for implementation of the recommended corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for CAU 568. Site characterization activities were performed in 2014, and the results are presented in Appendix A of the CAU 568 CADD. The CAAs were recommended in the CADD. The scope of work required to implement the recommended CAAs of closure in place and clean closure at 11 of the 14 CASs includes the following: The installation of physical barriers over the nine safety experiment ground zeroes to cover contamination at CASs 03-23-20 (Otero), 03-23-23 (San Juan and Pascal-C), 03-23-31 (Pascal-B, Luna, Colfax), 03-23-32 (Pascal-A), 03-23-33 (Valencia), and 03-23-34 (Chipmunk); the characterization and removal of three soil and debris piles at CAS 03-08-04, and one HCA soil pile at CAS 03-23-30; the removal of three steel well head covers (PSM) from CASs 03-23-20 (Otero), 03-23-31 (Luna), and 03-23-33 (Valencia); the removal of soil and lead PSM from two locations at CAS 03-26-04; Implementation of FFACO use restrictions at nine safety experiment ground zeroes at CASs 03-23-20, 03-23-23, 03-23-31, 03-23-32, 03-23-33, and 03-23-34; the steel well head cover at CAS 03-23-23; the areas meeting HCA conditions at CASs 03-23-19 and 03-23-31; and the Boomer crater area at CAS 03-45-01. The FFACO use restriction boundaries will be presented in the CAU 568 closure report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

Associate Directorate Environmental Management Infrastructure Plan for Area G and Area L Domes

Technical Area 54, at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is situated in the east-central portion of the Laboratory on the Mesita del Buey between Pajarito Canyon to the south and Cañada del Buey to the north. TA-54 includes four MDAs designated as G, H, J, and L; a waste characterization, container storage, and transfer facility; active TRU waste and MLLW waste storage and low-level waste (LLW) disposal operations at Area G; active hazardous and mixed low-level (MLLW) waste storage operations at Area L; and administrative and support areas. MDA J has previously under-gone closure. Area G is a waste management and disposal area, used for the disposal and storage of radioactive wastes since 1957. Since August 2015, Area G has been in warm standby and provides minimal operations to support safety, compliance, and nitrate salt remediation. Located within Area G, MDA G covers 63-acres. MDA G contains 334 active and inactive waste management units, which include 36 pits, 294 shafts, and 4 trenches. In 1971, Area G began use for the retrievable storage of TRU waste. There are two pits, four trenches and 60 shafts that contain retrievable TRU waste. Thirty-three of the shafts contain TRU waste that may present unique problems for retrieval. In 1986, segregation of MLLW was initiated at Area G for treatment and temporary storage or for off-site disposal. Area G is the only active LLW disposal facility at the Laboratory. Current operations at Area G include storage and characterization of TRU and mixed TRU waste destined for off-site disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico and the storage of MLLW destined for off-site treatment and/or disposal. Several above-ground container storage units (CSUs) are currently used for storage of containerized MLLW and/or mixed TRU wastes. These consist of asphalt pads and associated fabric domes or other structures. As defined by the Consent Order, MDA G contains 229 of the 334 subsurface waste management units at Area G. These MDA G disposal units include 32 pits, 193 shafts, and 4 trenches and contain LLW, MLLW and TRU waste. The remaining 105 solid waste management units (SWMUs) include RCRA-regulated landfill and storage units and DOE-regulated LLW disposal units. The TA-54 closure project must ensure that continuing waste operations at Area G and their transition to an interim or enduring facility are coordinated with closure activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

CRADA FINAL REPORT FOR CRADA NO. CR-08-001 CEMENTITIOUS BARRIERS PARTNERSHIPS

The Cementitious Barriers Partnership (CBP), led by the Savannah River National Laboratory, has achieved its ultimate purpose to support progress in final treatment and disposal of legacy waste and closure of High-Level Waste (HLW) tanks in the DOE complex. The CBP achieved its goal by developing experimental programs with results that supported the development of a reasonable and credible set of software tools to improve understanding and prediction of the structural, hydraulic and chemical performance of cementitious barriers and waste forms used in nuclear applications. These experimental data and software tools are and will continue to reduce the uncertainties in the current methodologies for assessing cementitious barrier performance and increase the consistency and transparency of the assessment process. The CBP has made a significant impact in reducing risk and uncertainties in the performance assessments that directly impact U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) environmental cleanup and closure programs. The CBP has developed an experimentally-based, integrated modeling tool that serves as a screening tool known as the CBP Software Toolbox, Version 3.0. The CBP products reduce the uncertainties of current methodologies for assessing cementitious barrier performance and increasing the consistency and transparency of the DOE assessment process. This CBP Software Toolbox predicts the hydraulic properties and chemical stability of cement matrix phases and release fluxes of constituents, in response to variable boundary conditions. Therefore, the CBP tools are reducing the uncertainty by coupling multiscale and multi-physics processes, including physical-chemical evolution and transport phenomena applied to heterogeneous materials with changing boundary conditions. In addition, the CBP Experimental and Characterization Program has provided test data to support chemical and physical degradation mechanisms for cementitious barriers. These tools have application to low activity waste forms, high level waste tank closure, D&D and entombment of major nuclear facilities, landfill waste acceptance criteria, and in-situ grouting and immobilization of vadose zone contamination. The CBP also provided: 1) a forum for DOE-NRC technical exchange, 2) material characterization to support performance assessment (PA) predictions, 3) uncertainty reduction in PA predictions, 4) base case performance to improve PA predictions, and 5) improvement in understanding and quantification of moisture and contaminant transport used in PAs. Additional CBP accomplishments include: sponsorship of a national test bed workshop to obtain collaboration in establishing the path forward to obtain actual data supporting future predictions of cementitious barrier performance, and participation in an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Cooperative Research Project on the use of cementitious barriers for low-level radioactive waste treatment and disposal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Annual Report, Fall 2016: Identifying Cost Effective Tank Waste Characterization Approaches

This report documents the activities that were performed during the second year of a project undertaken to improve the cost effectiveness and timeliness of SRNL’s tank closure characterization practices. The activities performed during the first year of the project were previously reported in SRNL-STI-2015-00144. The scope of the second year activities was divided into the following three primary tasks: 1) develop a technical basis and strategy for improving the cost effectiveness and schedule of SRNL’s tank closure characterization program; 2) initiate the design and assembly of a new waste removal system for improving the throughput and reducing the personnel dose associated with extraction chromatography radiochemical separations; and 3) develop and perform feasibility testing of three alternative radiochemical separation protocols holding promise for improving high resource demand/time consuming tank closure sample analysis methods.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Monitoring Potential Transport of Radioactive Contaminants in Shallow Ephemeral Channels: FY2013 and FY2014 (revised)

The Desert Research Institute (DRI) is conducting a field assessment of the potential for contaminated soil to be transported from the Smoky Contamination Area (CA) as a result of storm runoff, which supports National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) efforts to complete regulatory closure of the Soils Corrective Action Unit (CAU) contamination areas. The work is intended to confirm the likely mechanism of transport and determine the meteorological conditions that might cause movement of contaminated soils, as well as determine the particle size fraction that is most closely associated with transported radionuclide-contaminated soils. These data will facilitate the appropriate closure design and post-closure monitoring program.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

High Fidelity BWR Fuel Simulations

This report describes the Consortium for Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors (CASL) work conducted for completion of the Thermal Hydraulics Methods (THM) Level 3 milestone THM.CFD.P13.03: High Fidelity BWR Fuel Simulation. High fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulation for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) was conducted to investigate the applicability and robustness performance of BWR closures. As a preliminary study, a CFD model with simplified Ferrule spacer grid geometry of NUPEC BWR Full-size Fine-mesh Bundle Test (BFBT) benchmark has been implemented. Performance of multiphase segregated solver with baseline boiling closures has been evaluated. Although the mean values of void fraction and exit quality of CFD result for BFBT case 4101-61 agreed with experimental data, the local void distribution was not predicted accurately. The mesh quality was one of the critical factors to obtain converged result. The stability and robustness of the simulation was mainly affected by the mesh quality, combination of BWR closure models. In addition, the CFD modeling of fully-detailed spacer grid geometry with mixing vane is necessary for improving the accuracy of CFD simulation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 413: Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. Revision 0

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan provides the rationale and supporting information for the selection and implementation of corrective actions at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413, Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR). CAU 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range and includes one corrective action site, TA-23-02CS. CAU 413 consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. The CSII test was a non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. To facilitate site investigation and the evaluation of data quality objectives decisions, the releases at CAU 413 were divided into seven study groups: 1 Undisturbed Areas 2 Disturbed Areas 3 Sedimentation Areas 4 Former Staging Area 5 Buried Debris 6 Potential Source Material 7 Soil Mounds Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities, as set forth in the CAU 413 Corrective Action Investigation Plan, were performed from June 2015 through May 2016. Radionuclides detected in samples collected during the CAI were used to estimate total effective dose using the Construction Worker exposure scenario. Corrective action was required for areas where total effective dose exceeded, or was assumed to exceed, the radiological final action level (FAL) of 25 millirem per year. The results of the CAI and the assumptions made in the data quality objectives resulted in the following conclusions: The FAL is exceeded in surface soil in SG1, Undisturbed Areas; The FAL is assumed to be exceeded in SG5, Buried Debris, where contaminated debris and soil were buried after the CSII test; The FAL is not exceeded at SG2, SG3, SG4, SG6, or SG7. Because the FAL is exceeded at CAU 413, corrective action is required and corrective action alternatives (CAAs) must be evaluated. For CAU 413, three CAAs were evaluated: no further action, clean closure, and closure in place. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at CAU 413, and the detailed and comparative analysis of CAAs, clean closure was selected as the preferred CAA for CAU 413 by the U.S. Air Force, Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, and U.S. Department of Energy at the CAA meeting held on August 24, 2016.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

Monitoring Potential Transport of Radioactive Contaminants in Shallow Ephemeral Channels: FY2015 and FY2016

The Desert Research Institute (DRI) is conducting a field assessment of the potential for contaminated soil to be transported from the Smoky Contamination Area (CA) as a result of storm runoff. This activity supports Nevada Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) efforts to complete regulatory closure of the Soils Corrective Action Unit (CAU) contamination areas. The work is intended to confirm the likely mechanism of transport and determine the meteorological conditions that might cause movement of contaminated soils, as well as determine the particle size fraction that is most closely associated with transported radionuclide-contaminated soils. These data will facilitate the appropriate closure design and post-closure monitoring program.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗