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A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375

Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storage sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded emissions), long term care, reduced access to 'dirty' bomb materials, the social and political costs of siting new facilities and the psychological impact of no solution to the nuclear waste problem, were taken into account, the costs would be far lower than those of the present fuel cycle. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

River Corridor Closure at DOE's Hanford Site - 12503

The discussion of Hanford's River Corridor will cover work that has already been completed plus the work remaining to be done. This includes the buildings, waste sites, and groundwater plumes in the 300 Area; large-scale burial ground remediation in the 600 Area; plutonium production reactor dismantling and 'cocooning' along the river; preservation of the world's first full-scale plutonium production reactor; removal of more than 14 million tons of contaminated soil and debris along the Columbia River shoreline and throughout the River Corridor; and the excavation of buried waste sites in the river shore area. It also includes operating an EPA-permitted low-level waste disposal facility in the central portion of the site. At the completions of cleanup in 2015, Hanford's River Corridor will be the largest closure project ever completed by the Department of Energy. Cleanup of the River Corridor has been one of Hanford's top priorities since the early 1990's. This urgency has been due to the proximity of hundreds of waste sites to the Columbia River. In addition, removal of the sludge from K West Basin, near the river, remains a high priority. This 220-square-mile area of the Hanford Site sits on the edge of the last free-flowing stretch of the Columbia River. The River Corridor portion of the Hanford Site includes the 100 and 300 Areas along the south shore of the Columbia River. The 100 Areas contain nine retired plutonium production reactors. These areas are also the location of numerous support facilities and solid and liquid waste disposal sites that have contaminated groundwater and soil. The 300 Area, located just north of the city of Richland, contains fuel fabrication facilities, nuclear research and development facilities, and their associated solid and liquid waste disposal sites that have contaminated groundwater and soil. In order to ensure that cleanup actions address all threats to human health and the environment, the River Corridor includes the adjacent areas that extend from the 100 Area and 300 Area to the Central Plateau. For sites in the River Corridor, remedial actions are expected to restore groundwater to drinking water standards and ensure that aquatic life in the Columbia River is protected by achieving ambient water quality standards. It is intended that these objectives be achieved, unless technically impracticable, within a reasonable timeframe. In those instances where remedial action objectives are not achievable in a reasonable time frame, or are determined to be technically impracticable, programs are being implemented to contain the plume, prevent exposure to contaminated groundwater, and evaluate further risk reduction opportunities as new technologies become available. River Corridor cleanup work also removes potential sources of contamination, which are close to the Columbia River, and places them on the Central Plateau for final disposal. The intent is to shrink the footprint of active cleanup to within the 75-square- mile area of the Central Plateau by removing excess facilities and remediating waste sites. Cleanup actions are supporting anticipated future land uses consistent with the Hanford Reach National Monument, where applicable, and the Hanford Comprehensive Land- Use Plan (DOE 1999). The River Corridor has been divided into six geographic decision areas to achieve source and groundwater remedy decisions. These decisions will provide comprehensive coverage for all areas within the River Corridor and will incorporate ongoing interim action cleanup activities. Cleanup levels will be achieved in order to support anticipated future land uses of conservation and preservation for most of this area and industrial use for the 300 Area. At the conclusion of cleanup actions, the federal government will implement long-term stewardship activities to ensure protection of human health and the environment. (authors)

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Tank Farms and Waste Feed Delivery - 12507

The mission of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (ORP) is to safely retrieve and treat the 56 million gallons of Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. Our discussion of the Tank Farms and Waste Feed Delivery will cover progress made to date with Base and Recovery Act funding in reducing the risk posed by tank waste and in preparing for the initiation of waste treatment at Hanford. The millions of gallons of waste are a by-product of decades of plutonium production. After irradiated fuel rods were taken from the nuclear reactors to the processing facilities at Hanford they were exposed to a series of chemicals designed to dissolve away the rod, which enabled workers to retrieve the plutonium. Once those chemicals were exposed to the fuel rods they became radioactive and extremely hot. They also couldn't be used in this process more than once. Because the chemicals are caustic and extremely hazardous to humans and the environment, underground storage tanks were built to hold these chemicals until a more permanent solution could be found. The underground storage tanks range in capacity from 55,000 gallons to more than 1 million gallons. The tanks were constructed with carbon steel and reinforced concrete. There are eighteen groups of tanks, called 'tank farms', some having as few as two tanks and others up to sixteen tanks. Between 1943 and 1964, 149 single-shell tanks were built at Hanford in the 200 West and East Areas. Heat generated by the waste and the composition of the waste caused an estimated 67 of these single-shell tanks to leak into the ground. Washington River Protection Solutions is the prime contractor responsible for the safe management of this waste. WRPS' mission is to reduce the risk to the environment that is posed by the waste. All of the pumpable liquids have been removed from the single-shell tanks and transferred to the double-shell tanks. What remains in the single-shell tanks are solid and semi-solid wastes. Known as salt-cakes, they have the consistency of wet beach sand. Some of the waste resembles small broken ice, or whitish crystals. Because the original pumps inside the tanks were designed to remove only liquid waste, other methods have been developed to reach the remaining waste. Access to the tank waste is through long, typically skinny pipes, called risers, extending out of the tanks. It is through these pipes that crews are forced to send machines and devices into the tanks that are used to break up the waste or push it toward a pump. These pipes range in size from just a few inches to just over a foot in diameter because they were never intended to be used in this manner. As part of the agreement regulating Hanford cleanup, crews must remove at least 99% of the material in every tank on the site, or at least as much waste that can be removed based on available technology. To date, seven single-shell tanks have been emptied, and work is underway in another 10 tanks in preparation for additional retrieval activities. Two barriers have been installed over single-shell tanks to prevent the intrusion of surface water down to the tanks, with additional barriers planned for the future. Single and double-shell tank integrity analyses are ongoing. Because the volume of the waste generated through plutonium production exceeded the capacity of the single-shell tanks, between 1968 and 1986 Hanford engineers built 28 double-shell tanks. These tanks were studied and made with a second shell to surround the carbon steel and reinforced concrete. The double-shell tanks have not leaked any of their waste. (authors)

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Hanford Technology Development (Tank Farms) - 12509

The mission of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (ORP) is to safely retrieve and treat the 56 million gallons of Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. The millions of gallons of tank waste are a byproduct of decades of plutonium production. After irradiated fuel rods were taken from the nuclear reactors to the processing facilities at Hanford they were exposed to a series of chemicals designed to dissolve away the rod, which enabled workers to retrieve the plutonium. Once those chemicals were exposed to the fuel rods they became radioactive and extremely hot. They also couldn't be used in this process more than once. Because the chemicals are caustic and extremely hazardous to humans and the environment, underground storage tanks were built to hold these chemicals until a more permanent solution could be found. One key part of the ongoing work at Hanford is retrieving waste from the single-shell tanks, some of which have leaked in the past, and transferring that waste to the double-shell tanks - none of which have ever leaked. The 56 million gallons of radioactive tank waste is stored in 177 underground tanks, 149 of which are single-shell tanks built between 1943 and 1964. The tanks sit approximately 250 feet above the water table. Hanford's single-shell tanks are decades past their 20-year design life. In the past, up to 67 of the single-shell tanks are known or suspected to have leaked as much as one million gallons of waste to the surrounding soil. Starting in the late 1950's, waste leaks from dozens of the single-shell tanks were detected or suspected. Most of the waste is in the soil around the tanks, but some of this waste is thought to have reached groundwater. The Vadose Zone Project was established to understand the radioactive and chemical contamination in the soil beneath the tanks as the result of leaks and discharges from past plutonium-production operations. The vadose zone is the area of soil between the ground surface and the water table 200-to-300 feet below. The project tracks and monitors contamination in the soil. Technologies are being developed and deployed to detect and monitor contaminants. Interim surface barriers, which are barriers put over the single-shell tanks, prevent rain and snow from soaking into the ground and spreading contamination. The impermeable barrier placed over T Farm, which was the site of the largest tank waste leak in Hanford's history, is 60,000 square feet and sloped to drain moisture outside the tank farm. The barrier over TY Farm is constructed of asphalt and drains moisture to a nearby evaporation basin. Our discussion of technology will address the incredible challenge of removing waste from Hanford's single-shell tanks. Under the terms of the Tri-Party Agreement, ORP is required to remove 99 percent of the tank waste, or until the limits of technology have been reached. All pumpable liquids have been removed from the single-shell tanks, and work now focuses on removing the non-pumpable liquids. Waste retrieval was completed from the first single-shell tank in late 2003. Since then, another six single-shell tanks have been retrieved to regulatory standards. (authors)

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The SAVY 4000 Container Storage Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17313

Incidents involving release of nuclear materials stored in containers of convenience such as food pack cans, slip lid taped cans, paint cans, etc. has resulted in the U.S. Defense Nuclear Safety Board concerns over the lack of prescriptive performance requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shared in these incidents and in response proactively moved into developing a performance based storage container design, the SAVY-4000{sup R}. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is the first vented general use nuclear material container demonstrated to meet the requirements of DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is an innovative and creative design demonstrated by the fact that it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without torque wrenches or other tools; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas, yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates, and prevents release of material even in a 12 foot drop. Finally, it has been fire then drop tested and will reduce the risk to the public in the event of an earthquake/fire scenario. This will allow major nuclear facilities to credit the container towards source term Material at Risk (MAR) reduction. The container was approved for nuclear material storage in the TA-55 Plutonium Facility on March 15, 2011, and there are currently over 2000 SAVY-4000{sup R} containers available for use within the facility. A Safety Analysis Report was developed to demonstrate Manual 441.1-1 compliance and was approved April, 2014. The first four SAVY-4000{sup R} containers were packaged with plutonium on August 2, 2011. Key aspects of the SAVY-4000{sup R} vented storage container design will be discussed which include design description, qualification and testing, surveillance strategy, and the design life extension program as enhanced by surveillance activities with the intent to extend well beyond the current five year design life. (authors)

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Design and testing of a sensitive heat-flow calorimeter for measuring radioactive waste in 55-gallon (US) drums - 15334

A sensitive large volume calorimeter for measuring the thermal power generated by the radioactive decay of heat producing materials in 55-gallon drums has been developed and tested. The technology is applicable to the measurement of all radionuclides that decay by alpha or beta decay such as waste or product material containing plutonium, tritium and americium. It is also relevant to the measurement of drums where gamma rays from radioactive decay are captured locally in attenuating materials and the resulting rate of thermal energy deposition (sample thermal power) is of sufficient magnitude for a calorimetry measurement. The initial application of the drum calorimeter is for measuring and characterizing plutonium-bearing waste drums. The calorimeter design has optimised the two characteristics of high thermal sensitivity and reduced measurement times. In order to achieve these characteristics for large volume drums, the heat-flow method of operation was chosen in a single measurement chamber configuration. Using a drum-lifting device, the waste drum is positioned on a sliding platform and subsequently moved by the operator inside an octagonal inner chamber, which acts as the heat sink. The heat-sink chamber has significant thermal inertia and remains effectively at a constant temperature throughout the duration of a drum measurement. The octagonal inner measurement chamber is constructed inside a multi-layer external thermal enclosure, which provides both thermal insulation and significant thermal inertia. The external thermal enclosure isolates the measurement process from the effects of changes in the external ambient temperature. During a measurement, heat flows from the drum being measured to the heat sink. This heat-flow is measured by a series of thermopile sensor assemblies, which are positioned between the waste drum and the heat sink. A high sensitivity of greater than 200 μV/mW (microvolts per milliwatt) has been achieved using multiple close-coupled thermopile sensors in each assembly. Reduced measurement times are achieved by positioning the thermopile sensor assemblies close to the drum surface in order to reduce the thermal transport delay. The instrument incorporates a calibrated precision power supply, which requires annual recalibration and is traceable to national standards. It is used to power a calibration heater that has been built into a calibration and test drum. The calibration and test drum is used both to calibrate the instrument and provide periodic confirmation of correct operation. Measurements of calorimeter performance are reported for a range of drum thermal powers. Long-term temperature drift measurements are used to provide estimates of the minimum detectable drum thermal power and hence the minimum detectable activity for both plutonium and tritium. (authors)

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Behaviour of Alpha Emitters in Cement - 16139

Alpha emitting radioelements can interact with cements in a number of ways. Alpha-radiolysis of water produces hydrogen that may pressurise and damage the structure, and it is postulated that the intense alpha radiation field around waste particles containing high alpha activity can cause mineralogical changes in the hydration products. In addition, their solubility in cement pore fluid can be increased by complexation with organic materials such as the degradation products of cellulose, which itself may be promoted by alpha irradiation. Analysis of pore fluid expressed from cements containing plutonium and a range of organic materials has demonstrated their effect on plutonium solubility. Calculations of hydrogen pressurisation as a result of alpha radiolysis suggest that radiolytic hydrogen will not exceed tensile strength of the cement. Further work is described in which cements containing high loadings of plutonium will be examined in the NNL Central Laboratory to investigate mineralogical changes during and after hydration. (authors)

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Characterization of Low Level and Intermediate Nuclear Waste: improvements in calorimetric measurement combined radiological modelling - 16144

Since 40 years, calorimetry allows to determine precisely amounts of nuclear material within a container. Combined with gamma spectrometry, calorimetric measurements give plutonium contents with a low level of uncertainty for each isotope. Calorimetry is used in a lot of nuclear facilities all around the world for plutonium or tritium inventories. It is one of the best solutions to estimate the overall quantity of nuclear material on a wide range of mass, from a few milligrams up to kilograms of radionuclides. In the case of drums containing nuclear waste, characterization was very challenging due to complex matrix, volume and low level activities. The measurement time was a real problem with large volume container and organic matrix with high air content. New designs of SETARAM calorimeters allow to measure nuclear material contents in very large container (up to 385 liters) and/or with a very low detection limit (10 μWatt). These new concepts are based on single measurement cell and vacuum chamber for low level uncertainties. The acquisition system and electronic temperature regulation are highly improved to increase the detection limit, accuracy and precision of the measurement. These modern technological developments within the calorimetry field give the promise of faster measurement times and precise measurements. These devices can be used in waste management of nuclear facilities with a better accuracy and lower uncertainties than others techniques. It is a non-destructive and non-intrusive method. There is no matrix effect which can bias the results. Waste can also be in solid, liquid or gas phase. The new calorimeters are able to give amounts of plutonium, tritium or others alpha or beta emitter radionuclides and allow determining the classification of waste (low level or intermediate). A measurement approach combining very large volume calorimeter, gamma spectrometry and radiological modelling will be presented as an integrated automatic waste characterization system. This system with a calculation step is taking into account the gamma emitters contribution on the total thermal power measured within the calorimeter. The aim of the system is to give a precise quantification of the radionuclides in the waste container with a precise value of the total uncertainties. (authors)

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Spent Fuel Reprocessing Development and Usage of Fission Products as Starting Precursor for Ceramic Waste-Forms - 16498

The principal purpose of spent fuel reprocessing consists in the recovery of the uranium and plutonium and the separation of fission products so as to allow re-use of fissile isotopes and waste preparing for disposal. Reprocessing is a series of chemical operations that separates plutonium and uranium from other constituents in nuclear waste. Indeed, the plutonium separated can be used to fuel reactors, but also to make nuclear weapons. Since reprocessing operations are far more expensive than using uranium fuel and disposing of the spent fuel directly, this process is not readily considered. Without doubts the reprocessing price of $1000 per kilogram of heavy metal (kgHM), like uranium must be less by at least 2-3 times compared to directly deposing the spent fuel. And some more simple technology (in comparison with PUREX process) must be developed, for example, technology based on precipitation processes. One of the options to change reprocessing technology is the idea to use certain fission products occurring in spent fuel in considerable amount and capable to form insoluble substances as suitable materials for long-term storage or final disposal of radioactive wastes. The development of new materials for HLW immobilization are intended to reduce disposal cost. The present work was aimed at the search for the simple engineering decisions that would provide opportunity of fission products usage as starting precursor for ceramic waste-forms. The results of experiments on synthesis of Pd-based metallo-ceramic compositions are presented in this paper. (authors)

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The DISTINCTIVE University Consortium: Transforming High Activity Materials Research in the UK - 18212

The DISTINCTIVE consortium (Decommissioning, Immobilisation and Storage Solutions for Nuclear Waste Inventories) is a partnership of 11 research universities, working to decommission and clean up the legacy of civil nuclear energy generation, sponsored by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). An important component of the research programme is to develop the skills and facilities to address key research questions, requiring the use of highly radioactive materials. Here we highlight the outcomes of four research projects in which access to state of the art research facilities for working with radioactive materials, supported by international partnerships, has advanced research in plutonium storage and immobilisation, and the disposal of spent nuclear fuels. First, we have developed a viable formulation and process for immobilisation of the UK plutonium stockpile, including commissioning of a radiological hot isostatic press and validation studies using plutonium-239. Second, we have further underpinned the interim storage of PuO{sub 2}, through understanding of water and chlorine sorption / desorption, pertinent to the historic practice of containment within, and degradation of PVC bags. Third, we have developed a novel methodology to investigate the in situ radiolysis induced dissolution of actinide oxide thin films, using synchrotron radiation, to underpin the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Fourth we monitored in situ the oxidation and self-ignition mechanism of uranium carbide, a legacy fuel from the Dounreay Prototype Fast Reactor that is waiting for oxidation treatment prior to permanent storage and/or disposal. Through this programme of research, the DISTINCTIVE consortium is rebuilding the UK capability for research with transuranic materials, which, hitherto, was eroded over decades of disinvestment. (authors)

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MPF X-Ray Module Setup for 2018

The Mobile Plutonium Facility (MPF) is a portable module design facility that can be deployed anywhere in the world for the safe recovery, packaging, and shipment of a nations legacy, or excess plutonium stockpile. All of the modules of MPF have specific purposes for operating in a mission if one were to ever come up. For my past four internships here at SRNL I have been working on the support of the X-Ray module for MPF. This year I installed new equipment I had purchased last year for the X-Ray Module and made sure the module was mission ready for the chance that the team deploys in the future for plutonium recovery. Using digital radiography (DR) and computed tomography (CT) provides the MPF team the ability to verify the contents of containers that would be holding material. This also ensures the safety of the team members in the glovebox facilities by verifying that there are no sharps, liquids, or other items that may harm the workers or glovebox operations when working with radioactive material. X-Ray imaging can also pick up low density objects like plastic bags and tape. Note how the DR image hides the puncture in the inner can while the CT image shows the damage. New DR and CT computers with upgraded software, New imaging panel, NOVO Portable X-Ray System. Because of the new upgrades to the X-Ray module system containers can be scanned and evaluated quicker than before. With the last system the 3D model reconstruction alone would take anywhere from 10-12 minutes, now with the new system that time has been brought down to just shy of 1 minute 30 seconds. The new portable system also can 1,2 or 4 images of an object and stitch them together into a mosaic for scanning of larger containers.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

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Liquid-Liquid Extraction Equipment

Solvent extraction processing has demonstrated the ability to achieve high decontamination factors for uranium and plutonium while operating at high throughputs. Historical application of solvent extraction contacting equipment implies that for the HA cycle (primary separation of uranium and plutonium from fission products) the equipment of choice is pulse columns. This is likely due to relatively short residence times (as compared to mixer-settlers) and the ability of the columns to tolerate solids in the feed. Savannah River successfully operated the F-Canyon with centrifugal contactors in the HA cycle (which have shorter residence times than columns). All three contactors have been successfully deployed in uranium and plutonium purification cycles. Over the past 20 years, there has been significant development of centrifugal contactor designs and they have become very common for research and development applications. New reprocessing plants are being planned in Russia and China and the United States has done preliminary design studies on future reprocessing plants. The choice of contactors for all of these facilities is yet to be determined.

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A Monte Carlo based spent fuel analysis safeguards strategy assessment

Safeguarding nuclear material involves the detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials, and the deterrence of such diversions by the risk of early detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguards nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from spent fuel; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium and other actinides of interest in spent fuel. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of cost effective techniques for quantifying plutonium mass in spent fuel for nuclear safeguards. A standardized assessment process was developed to compare the effective merits and faults of 12 different detection techniques in order to integrate a few techniques and to down-select among the techniques in preparation for experiments. The process involves generating a basis burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library, creating diversion scenarios, developing detector models and quantifying the capability of each NDA technique. Because hundreds of input and output files must be managed in the couplings of data transitions for the different facets of the assessment process, a graphical user interface (GUI) was development that automates the process. This GUI allows users to visually create diversion scenarios with varied replacement materials, and generate a MCNPX fixed source detector assessment input file. The end result of the assembly library assessment is to select a set of common source terms and diversion scenarios for quantifying the capability of each of the 12 NDA techniques. We present here the generalized assessment process, the techniques employed to automate the coupled facets of the assessment process, and the standard burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library. We also clearly define the diversion scenarios that will be analyzed during the standardized assessments. Though this study is currently limited to generic PWR assemblies, it is expected that the results of the assessment will yield an adequate spent fuel analysis strategy knowledge that will help the down-select process for other reactor types.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

SAFETY AT FLUOR HANFORD (A) CASE STUDY - PREPARED BY THUNDERBIRD SCHOOL OF GLOBAL MANAGEMENT

By November of 1997, Fluor Hanford (Fluor) had been the site manager of the Hanford nuclear reservation for a year. The Hanford site had been established as part of the Manhattan Project in the 1940s that gave birth to the atomic bomb. Hanford produced two thirds of U.S. plutonium during the Cold War period. The Hanford site was half the size of Rhode Island and occupied 586 square miles in southeastern Washington State. The production of plutonium for more than 40 years left a huge legacy of chemical and radiological contamination: 80 square miles of contaminated groundwater; 2,300 tons of spent nuclear fuel stored in underwater basins; 20 tons of plutonium-laced contaminated materials; and 500 contaminated facilities. The cleanup involved a challenging combination of radioactive material handling within an infrastructure constructed in the 1940s and 1950s. The cleanup that began in 1988 was expected to take 30 years or more. Improving safety at Hanford had already proven to be a significant challenge. As the new site manager at Hanford, Fluor Hanford inherited lower- and mid-level managers and thousands of unionized employees, many of whom were second or third generation Hanford employees. These employees had seen many contractors come and go over the years. Some of the managers who had worked with the previous contractor saw Fluor's emphasis on safety as getting in the way of operations. Union-management relations were fractious. Hanford's culture was described as 'production driven-management told everyone what to do, and, if you didn't do it, there were consequences'. Worker involvement in designing and implementing safety programs was negligible. Fluor Hanford also was having trouble satisfying its client, the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE did not see a clear path forward for performance improvements at Hanford. Clearly, major change was necessary, but how and where should it be implemented?

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SLIGHTLY IRRADIATED FUEL (SIF) INTERIM DISPOSITION PROJECT

CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL PRC) is proud to submit the Slightly Irradiated Fuel (SIF) Interim Disposition Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2010. The SIF Project was a set of six interrelated sub-projects that delivered unique stand-alone outcomes, which, when integrated, provided a comprehensive and compliant system for storing high risk special nuclear materials. The scope of the six sub-projects included the design, construction, testing, and turnover of the facilities and equipment, which would provide safe, secure, and compliant Special Nuclear Material (SNM) storage capabilities for the SIF material. The project encompassed a broad range of activities, including the following: Five buildings/structures removed, relocated, or built; Two buildings renovated; Structural barriers, fencing, and heavy gates installed; New roadways and parking lots built; Multiple detection and assessment systems installed; New and expanded communication systems developed; Multimedia recording devices added; and A new control room to monitor all materials and systems built. Project challenges were numerous and included the following: An aggressive 17-month schedule to support the high-profile Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) decommissioning; Company/contractor changeovers that affected each and every project team member; Project requirements that continually evolved during design and construction due to the performance- and outcome-based nature ofthe security objectives; and Restrictions imposed on all communications due to the sensitive nature of the projects In spite of the significant challenges, the project was delivered on schedule and $2 million under budget, which became a special source of pride that bonded the team. For years, the SIF had been stored at the central Hanford PFP. Because of the weapons-grade piutonium produced and stored there, the PFP had some of the tightest security on the Hanford nuclear reservation. Workers had to pass through metal detectors when they arrived at the plant and materials leaving the plant had to be scanned for security reasons. Whereas other high-security nuclear materials were shipped from the PFP to Savannah River, S.C. as part ofa Department of Energy (DOE) program to consolidate weapons-grade plutonium, it was determined that the SIF should remain onsite pending disposition to a national repository. Nevertheless, the SIF still requires a high level of security that the PFP complex has always provided. With the 60-year PFP mission of producing and storing plutonium concluded, the environmental cleanup plans for Hanford call for the demolition of the 63-building PFP complex. Consequently, if the SIF remained at PFP it not only would have interfered with the environmental cleanup plans, but would have required $100 million in facility upgrades to meet increased national security requirements imposed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A new smaller and more cost-effective area was needed to store this material, which led to the SIF Project. Once the SIF project was successfully completed and the SIF was safely removed from PFP, the existing Protected Area at PFP could be removed, and demolition could proceed more quickly without being encumbered by restrictive security requirements that an active Protected Area requires. The lightened PFP security level brought by safely removing and storing the SIF would also yield lowered costs for deactivation and demolition, as well as reduce overall life-cycle costs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Effect of 1-hydroxyethane-1,1-diphosphonic acid (HEDPA) on Partitioning of Np and Pu to Synthetic Boehmite

The effect of 1-hydroxyethane-1,1-diphosphonic acid (HEDPA) on sorption of Np(V) and Pu(V) to synthetic boehmite ({gamma}-AlOOH) was examined a function of time and pH (between 4 to 11). Sorption of both elements in boehmite suspensions (1 M NaCl, 600 mg L{sup -1} boehmite) increased with increasing pH. Sorption edges for neptunium and plutonium occurred at approximately pH 8.0 and 6.6, respectively. After steady state partitioning was reached, HEDPA was added to the neptunium-boehmite and plutonium-boehmite suspensions. Neptunium and plutonium partitioning appears to be primarily affected by the formation of soluble Np:HEDPA and Pu:HEDPA complexes, the dissolution of boehmite promoted by HEDPA, and the precipitation of Np:HEDPA and Pu:HEDPA colloids. The results are discussed in terms of applicability of HEDPA-promoted dissolution as a waste reduction method in the treatment of sludge phases contained within high-level nuclear waste storage tanks.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Analysis on fuel breeding capability of FBR core region based on minor actinide recycling doping

Nuclear fuel breeding based on the capability of fuel conversion capability can be achieved by conversion ratio of some fertile materials into fissile materials during nuclear reaction processes such as main fissile materials of U-233, U-235, Pu-239 and Pu-241 and for fertile materials of Th-232, U-238, and Pu-240 as well as Pu-238. Minor actinide (MA) loading option which consists of neptunium, americium and curium will gives some additional contribution from converted MA into plutonium such as conversion Np-237 into Pu-238 and it's produced Pu-238 converts to Pu-239 via neutron capture. Increasing composition of Pu-238 can be used to produce fissile material of Pu-239 as additional contribution. Trans-uranium (TRU) fuel (Mixed fuel loading of MOX (U-Pu) and MA composition) and mixed oxide (MOX) fuel compositions are analyzed for comparative analysis in order to show the effect of MA to the plutonium productions in core in term of reactor criticality condition and fuel breeding capability. In the present study, neptunium (Np) nuclide is used as a representative of MAin trans-uranium (TRU) fuel composition as Np-MOX fuel type. It was loaded into the core region gives significant contribution to reduce the excess reactivity in comparing to mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and in the same time it contributes to increase nuclear fuel breeding capability of the reactor. Neptunium fuel loading scheme in FBR core region gives significant production of Pu-238 as fertile material to absorp neutrons for reducing excess reactivity and additional contribution for fuel breeding.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗