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A Study on Optimized Management Options for the Wolsong Low- and Intermediate - Level Waste Disposal Center in Korea - 13479

The safe and effective management of radioactive waste is a national task required for sustainable generation of nuclear power and for energy self-reliance in Korea. Currently, for permanent disposal of low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW), the Wolsong LILW Disposal Center (WLDC) is under construction. It will accommodate a total of 800,000 drums at the final stage after stepwise expansion. As an implementing strategy for cost-effective development of the WLDC, various disposal options suitable for waste classification schemes would be considered. It is also needed an optimized management of the WLDC by taking a countermeasure of volume reduction treatment. In this study, various management options to be applied to each waste class are analyzed in terms of its inventory and disposal cost. For the volume reduction and stabilization of waste, the vitrification and plasma melting methods are considered for combustible and incombustible waste, respectively. (authors)

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2016 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs), with the results submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan.The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PAs and CAs for federal fiscal year (FY) 2016. This annual summary report presents results and conclusions of the FY 2016 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs. Important developments in FY 2016 include the following: Development of a new Area 5 RWMS closure inventory estimate based on disposals through FY 2016, Evaluation of new or revised waste streams by special analysis, and Development and acceptance of version 4.200 of the Area 5 RWMS GoldSim PA/CA model. The Area 3 RWMS has been in inactive status since July 1, 2006, with the last shipment received in April 2006. The FY 2016 review of operations, facility design, closure plans, monitoring results, and R&D results for the Area 3 RWMS indicates no changes that would impact PA validity. The conclusion of the annual review is that all performance objectives can be met and the Area 3 RWMS PA remains valid. There is no need to revise the Area 3 RWMS PA. Review of Area 5 RWMS operations, design, closure plans, monitoring results, and R&D activities indicates that no significant changes have occurred. The FY 2016 PA results, generated with the Area 5 RWMS v4.200 GoldSim PA model, indicate that there continues to be a reasonable expectation of meeting all performance objectives. All results remain less than 50% of their performance objectives. The results and conclusions of the Area 5 RWMS PA are judged valid, and there is no need to the revise the PA. A review of changes potentially impacting the CAs indicates that no significant changes occurred in FY 2016. A new Corrective Action Unit (CAU), CAU 576, with corrective action sites near the Area 3 RWMS and Area 5 RWMS was identified in FY 2016. The sites are currently under investigation and not expected to be important sources for the CA. The continuing adequacy of the CAs was evaluated with the new models, and no significant changes that would alter the CAs’ results or conclusions were found. The revision of the Area 3 RWMS CA, which will include the Yucca Flat Underground Test Area (CAU 97) source, is scheduled for FY 2024, following the completion of the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan. Inclusion of the Frenchman Flat Underground Test Area (CAU 98) source in the Area 5 RWMS CA is planned pending the completion of the CAU 98 Closure Report in FY 2017. Near-term R&D efforts will focus on continuing development of the PA, CA, and inventory models for the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs.

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RCRA Part B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU)

This volume of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection focuses on continued operation of the Mixed Waste Storage Unit at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), under the auspices of DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). Low-level mixed waste (LLMW) accepted at the NNSS contains both radioactive and hazardous material components as defined by various laws and regulations. The Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU) is located at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). Existing facilities at the RWMC are used to store LLMW generated at or shipped to the NNSS prior to disposal at the Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU). The document describes the MWSU, its general design, its operation, the materials it stores, and relevant health and safety regulations with which NNSS complies. The currently permitted MWSU has been operated since December 2010. Each of the four designated storage areas is RCRA-compliant for the storage of hazardous waste. This application represents a renewal request by DOE for the permitted MWSU. For security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This version of the application contains most but not all of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

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Verification and Validation of START: A Spent Nuclear Fuel Routing and Decision Support Tool

The Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START) is a web-based geospatial decision-support tool being developed by the US Department of Energy’s Office of Integrated Waste Management (IWM) to support federal interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and associated transportation. START provides many functions for the IWM program including: serving as a communications tool for conveying geospatial data and information, an options analysis tool for exploring potential transport modes and routes for transporting SNF from nuclear power plants to future federal interim storage facilities, an emergency response planning tool for Tribes and States to identify training needs along potential SNF transport corridors, an environmental analysis tool for estimating potential radiation dose exposure from incident-free and incident-case SNF transport conditions, and a systems analysis support tool providing route-related inputs for system throughput analysis. As part of the START development process, a verification and validation (V&V) effort is being undertaken. In the initial V&V phase, several outputs of the START tool were checked such as the total distance, population and population densities within the buffer zone, and incident free dose. The V&V process is fluid as it will be utilized after each version change to ensure that the core functionalities of the tool are maintained and the results are consistent with the previous versions. Efforts have also been put into developing scripts to aid in the process of automating certain sections of the V&V work. As some of the V&V efforts use Environmental Systems Research Institute’s (ESRI) tools upon which the START framework is built, the START data were compared against outputs from tools like Quantum Geographic Information System (QGIS) for buffer zone populations and route lengths to ensure independence of the V&V process. Good agreement was observed between the START results and the independent V&V studies with the majority of the differences falling between 1% and 5% for populations within the buffer zone and route distance. This presentation describes the development and design of the START tool, V&V methods employed for various metrics of interest and their respective results, and future plans.

START, transportation, GIS, V&V↗

Iraq liquid radioactive waste tanks maintenance and monitoring program plan.

The purpose of this report is to develop a project management plan for maintaining and monitoring liquid radioactive waste tanks at Iraq's Al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. Based on information from several sources, the Al-Tuwaitha site has approximately 30 waste tanks that contain varying amounts of liquid or sludge radioactive waste. All of the tanks have been non-operational for over 20 years and most have limited characterization. The program plan embodied in this document provides guidance on conducting radiological surveys, posting radiation control areas and controlling access, performing tank hazard assessments to remove debris and gain access, and conducting routine tank inspections. This program plan provides general advice on how to sample and characterize tank contents, and how to prioritize tanks for soil sampling and borehole monitoring.

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Lessons-Learned from D and D Activities at the Five Gaseous Diffusion Buildings (K-25, K- 27, K-29, K-31 and K-33) East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, TN - 13574

The East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) is the site of five former gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) process buildings that were used to enrich uranium from 1945 to 1985. The process equipment in the original two buildings (K-25 and K-27) was used for the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU), while that in the three later buildings (K-29, K-31 and K-33) produced low enriched uranium (LEU). Equipment was contaminated primarily with uranium and to a lesser extent technetium (Tc). Decommissioning of the GDP process buildings has presented several unique challenges and produced many lessons-learned. Among these is the importance of good, up-front characterization in developing the best demolition approach. Also, chemical cleaning of process gas equipment and piping (PGE) prior to shutdown should be considered to minimize the amount of hold-up material that must be removed by demolition crews. Another lesson learned is to maintain shutdown buildings in a dry state to minimize structural degradation which can significantly complicate characterization, deactivation and demolition efforts. Perhaps the most important lesson learned is that decommissioning GDP process buildings is first and foremost a waste logistics challenge. Innovative solutions are required to effectively manage the sheer volume of waste generated from decontamination and demolition (D and D) of these enormous facilities. Finally, close coordination with Security is mandatory to effectively manage Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and classified equipment issues. (authors)

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Thermal Process Technology for Nuclear Applications - 20379

ANSTO's Synroc technology has been developed to provide a safe, secure matrix for the immobilization and final disposal of radioactive waste. Synroc technology will be used to manage radioactive wastes from the production of the radioisotope Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99). This paper shall outline various stages of the process development with specific reference to the thermal treatment technology of calcination. Calcination is a key step in the Synroc process [1-2].The rotary thermal processing system includes: an advanced heating element design for increased robustness and ease of remote operation and maintenance, an enhanced modular design of components for ease of remote maintenance in a hot cell and in compliance with hot cell radioactive environment requirements for safety, reliability and maintainability. In addition to thermal treatment of waste from nuclear medicine production, this technology provides solutions for a variety of nuclear materials processing applications including sintering UO{sub 2} pellets for reactor fuel rods, oxidation of UO{sub 2} pellets, swarf, and powder to U{sub 3}O{sub 8}, de-nitration of Uranyl nitrate and hydrofluorination of UO{sub 2} pellets. The paper will also discuss thermal processing solutions for a range of nuclear applications. (authors)

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Audit Report on Management Controls over the Use of Service Contracts at the Office of River Protection

The Department of Energy's (Department) Office of River Protection (ORP) is responsible for the storage, treatment, and disposal of over 53 million gallons of highly radioactive waste from over 40 years of plutonium production at the Hanford Site. Because of the diversity, complexity, and large scope of its mission, coupled with its small staff, ORP told us that it has found it necessary to engage in service contracts to obtain consulting services, technical expertise, and support staff. Federal policy generally permits contractors to perform a wide range of support service activities, including, in most situations, the drafting of Government documents subject to the review and approval of Federal employees. Federal policy issued by the Office of Management and Budget, however, prohibits contractors from drafting agency responses to Congressional inquiries and reports issued by the Office of Inspector General and Government Accountability Office (GAO) because they are so closely related to the public interest and provide the appearance of private influence. To provide a majority of its needed services, ORP issued a Blanket Purchase Agreement to Project Assistance Corporation (PAC) in 2003. Through the Blanket Purchase Agreement, ORP acquired services in the areas of project management, risk assessment, program assessment, quality assurance, safety, cost and schedule estimating, budgeting and finance, and engineering. PAC has, in turn, subcontracted with various other firms to obtain some of the services needed by ORP. From 2005 to 2008, the total annual cost for the contract with PAC had grown from $4.7 million to $9.2 million. Because of the extent of the services provided and growing costs of the contract, we conducted this review to determine whether ORP appropriately administered its contract with the Project Assistance Corporation. Our review disclosed that, in some instances, ORP had not appropriately administered all work performed under the PAC contract. Specifically, ORP allowed PAC employees to perform work that was inherently governmental and created situations where a potential conflict of interest occurred. Specifically: (1) ORP assigned PAC employees responsibility for providing information and responses to Congressional inquiries and reports issued by the GAO and the Department of Energy's Office of Inspector General (OIG); and (2) PAC employees were also allowed to perform functions that created potential conflicts of interest. ORP permitted PAC employees, for example, to develop statements of work and approve funding of work to be performed under PAC's own contract. We concluded that these problems occurred, at least in part, because ORP had not established controls necessary to effectively administer the PAC contract. Federal procurement regulations recommended that agencies provide additional management controls over contractors whose work has the potential to influence the action of government officials. ORP, however, had not implemented the controls specifically recommended in Federal policy guidance for administering contracts, including: (1) Performing conflict of interest reviews; and (2) Separating contractor and Department employees either physically or organizationally. By not effectively administering its contract with PAC, ORP increased the risk that decisions based on work performed by the contractor may not have been made in the best interests of the Department. For example, ORP increased the risk that approved work would be unnecessary or too costly. As we also recently noted in our report on 'Management Challenges at the Department of Energy' (DOE/IG-0808, December 2008), contract administration issues such as those discussed in this report remain a significant vulnerability. Continued efforts to improve this area are vitally important since the risk that contractors receive payments for unallowable costs could also increase as the Department expands its contracting activities under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. To its credit, however, ORP has recognized that there are weaknesses in its oversight of the PAC contract and is in the process of taking certain corrective actions. ORP indicated that it had reassigned responsibility to a Federal employee for responding to Congressional requests, GAO reviews, and OIG reports, and, planned to physically separate PAC employees from their government counterparts. While positive, those actions do not sufficiently address the issues identified in our report. Accordingly, we have made several recommendations designed to strengthen internal controls over this area.

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EDF industrial strategy for the management of radioactive waste - 15204

In France, EDF is in charge of electronuclear power operation since the sixties and consequently has to manage radioactive waste. Radioactive waste management is based on the control of each industrial step, taking into account the classification by activity level and radioactive half life. The main steps are to limit waste quantities at the generation stage, sort out non-rad and recoverable items from the waste, recycle, treat and package the radioactive waste as soon as it is generated, limit the use of interim storage, prepare and achieve as soon as reasonably practicable conditioning and disposal. EDF aims to empower operators in charge of NPP operating and of decommissioning and to centralize interfaces with the stakeholders in order to pool management routes and to guarantee the consistency of our industrial policy. The French regulatory framework for the management of radioactive waste and material is set by the French 2006 planning Act, in line with the European Directive. The legal framework structures interactions between EDF and the regulatory bodies (Nuclear Safety Authority, General Directorate for Energy and Climate), the French National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ANDRA) and other waste producer (mainly AREVA Company and CEA). Regarding short lived waste, management routes are in current operation for the large majority of this waste generated both by power plants in service and during decommissioning. EDF is working on new management route for metallic materials knowing the future evolution of deposits is the field of large refit and decommissioning activities. Regarding long lived waste, disposal development represents a major stake for EDF. EDF contributes to design studies of the geological disposal center and collaborates with ANDRA for the acceptance of future national waste disposal. (authors)

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Multi-discipline Waste Acceptance Process at the Nevada National Security Site - 13573

The Nevada National Security Site low-level radioactive waste disposal facility acceptance process requires multiple disciplines to ensure the protection of workers, the public, and the environment. These disciplines, which include waste acceptance, nuclear criticality, safety, permitting, operations, and performance assessment, combine into the overall waste acceptance process to assess low-level radioactive waste streams for disposal at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. Four waste streams recently highlighted the integration of these disciplines: the Oak Ridge Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators and Consolidated Edison Uranium Solidification Project material, West Valley Melter, and classified waste. (authors)

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Transportation Operations Model (TOM) Technical Manual

The Transportation Operations Model (TOM) is a component of the Transportation Storage Logistics (TSL) model, which assists the analyst in planning and evaluating scenarios for the transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). TOM was originally developed for the DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) in 2006. TOM provides detailed modeling of the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and the assets needed to accomplish that. This Transportation Operations Model (TOM) Technical Manual presents the theory and algorithm behind the model. Further information on the Transportation Storage Logistics model is available in the Transportation Storage Logistics Users’ Manual, and in the Transportation Storage Logistics Model Data Management Manual.

Busch, Ingrid Karin↗

Environmental Management

Another key aspect of the NNSS mission is Environmental Management program, which addresses the environmental legacy from historic nuclear weapons related activities while also ensuring the health and safety of present day workers, the public, and the environment as current and future missions are completed. The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management site receives low-level and mixed low-level waste from some 28 different generators from across the DOE complex in support of the legacy clean-up DOE Environmental Management project. Without this capability, the DOE would not be able to complete the clean up and proper disposition of these wastes. The program includes environmental protection, compliance, and monitoring of the air, water, plants, animals, and cultural resources at the NNSS. Investigation and implementation of appropriate corrective actions to address the contaminated ground water facilities and soils resulting from historic nuclear testing activities, the demolition of abandoned nuclear facilities, as well as installation of ground water wells to identify and monitor the extent of ground water contamination.

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One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval And Delivery Of The Hanford Tank Wastes For Vitrification In The Waste Treatment Plant

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction ofWTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration & Controls, Front-End Design & Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety & Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH&QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant Foundation-configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan.

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Life cycle Management of 324 Project High-Activity, Mixed/Low-Level Radioactive Waste - 20506

U.S. DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) manages the 324 Building and is preparing to remotely excavate and disposition the radioactive soil beneath the building to allow further deactivation of the building. The 324 Building is a non-reactor Category 2 Nuclear Facility located in the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. Records indicate that in October 1986, approximately 516 liters of a concentrated liquid waste stream containing cesium-137 ({sup 137}Cs) and strontium-90 ({sup 90}Sr) spilled onto the floor of a hot cell, B-Cell, in the 324 Building. The spill contained an estimated 1.3 million curies (Ci) of radioactivity. A breach in the sump of B-Cell was discovered in November 2009 during characterization of the soil under the building. Exposure rates in excess of 10,000 R/hr were detected through a system of access pipes installed under the hot cell, and an estimated 1.557 E+05 Ci of {sup 137}Cs and 6.842 E+04 Ci of {sup 90}Sr are in the soil beneath B-Cell. The magnitude of the soil contamination below B-Cell represents one of the most challenging remediation activities in the DOE complex. The objective of CHPRC's 324 Project is to remotely excavate and disposition the highly contaminated soil under the hot cell so building deactivation and stabilization activities can resume. Depending on the volume and radioactivity of contaminated soil under B-Cell, the material will be dispositioned either at the Hanford Site's Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) or in grout monoliths that will be created in the hot cells (A, C and D) next to B-Cell during future building demolition activities. The current project scope includes installing structural supports under the walls of B-Cell and using remotely operated equipment to remove debris from the hot cell, remove debris mixed with grout on the floor, saw through and remove the cell floor and liner, and excavate contaminated soil under B-Cell to a depth of up to 3.66 meters (12 feet). Addition or removal of debris in A-Cell may be required to support B-Cell cleanout and excavation activities. The base approach is to disposition debris and soil bins in the Radiochemical Engineering Cell (REC) monoliths, and subsequently disposition the monoliths during building demolition. (authors)

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EPRI Research Results: International Nuclear Power Plant Waste Classification - 17444

Different countries around the globe use varying schemes for the classification of radioactive waste. Many countries develop country specific waste classification schemes based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) waste classification framework. The United States of America use the Class A, B, and C waste classification. Additionally, some countries use concentration limits to classify wastes while others use dose rate limits or a combination of concentration and dose rate limits. General comparisons have been made between the IAEA and the United States classification schemes, but a clear and well researched comparison of the international schemes was not evident in the available research data sets. In 2013 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) initiated the Comparison of Global Low and Intermediate Level Waste Management Methods project. The objective of the project was to understand how six countries managed their low and intermediate level wastes from generation to disposal. A major task of this project was to conduct a comparison of the international waste classification schemes. EPRI developed a set of reference waste volumes that are representative of nuclear power plant low-level radioactive waste in form and radioactivity concentrations (e.g. dry active waste, high activity resin, low activity resin, high activity filters and low activity filters). These waste volumes were then classified using the waste classification systems in place in several countries around the world. In 2016, EPRI presented a paper providing a status update on this research. This 2017 paper provides the final results of that research, show where comparisons and correlations can be made, and provide a discussion on how this information might inform international radioactive research and development and benchmarking of radioactive waste management strategies, operational experiences, best practices, and technology implementation. (authors)

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Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) is for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” which is located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). CAU 577 includes five low-level waste cells at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. To resolve issues related to this alleged violation of hazardous waste regulations, a Settlement Agreement was executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office on April 25, 2019, which identified agreed-upon mitigation measures. The Settlement Agreement required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Operational Stewardship Program Development and Execution Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory - 16353

As LLNL carries out its national security missions, the Laboratory strives to ensure its facilities portfolio meets the latest technologies and enables infrastructure needs. Among the identified Science, Technology and Engineering (ST and E) areas that constitute strategic priorities, state-of-the-art facilities are needed to allow LLNL to draw collaborative partners required to advance capabilities and provide the requisite world-class forensics support in nuclear threat countermeasures. Efficient utilization of existing facilities presents a unique challenge given the advanced age and unique mission design of many of LLNL's facilities. A strategy developed in 2007 sought to focus key reinvestments into enduring facilities while strategically migrating personnel and operations out of past mission facilities with the intent of closure and final Transition and Disposition (T and D). At the time, LLNL lacked processes or procedures that met the continually changing facility mission and objectives needs. A comprehensive approach was needed to provide the framework to guide decisions along the entire life cycle of a project and/or facility. The development of an Operational Stewardship Program began in 2012 which outlines the process, and roles and responsibilities, in changing facility status to ensure good stewardship, accountability, and management and utilization of facilities. Further emphasizing LLNL forward actions, the 2015 NNSA sponsored Excess Contaminated Facilities Working Group charted the development of a common, Department-wide methodology for determining costs and risks. In December 2015, the complete Operational Stewardship Program was approved for implementation by LLNL senior management. (authors)

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A perspective on the interaction between the NCSD and ANSI/ANS-8 standards

The intent of this paper is to illuminate the reasons behind the culture of standards involvement by the criticality safety community in the NCSD (Nuclear Criticality Safety Division), and specifically highlight those NCSD activities that build/support this culture. Many NCSD members are currently active in ANSI/ANS-8 and other standards and have been for the last half century. This paper was inspired by a request from ANS's Professional Divisions Committee concerning how the professional divisions could 'increase support to Standards development as Subject Matter Experts'. The healthy level of involvement (i.e., culture) by the NCSD membership in standards was noted. A history of the ANSI/ANS-8 series standards is provided, with roots going back to 1955. The need became apparent during a cluster of nuclear criticality accidents that occurred between 1958-1962. The first NCS related standard was the American Standard N6.1-1964, the parent of ANSI/ANS-8.1, which was prepared in 1958 and adopted in 1964. Thus, the involvement in standards by the NCS community goes back more than 50 years. The NCSD continues to help foster a culture of standards use and development. However, the support provided by the NCSD is frequently not recognized, and standards activities are often viewed as separate from the NCSD. This paper highlights the interaction between the NCSD and the ANSI/ANS-8 standards activities as well as the benefit of this support. (authors)

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