The Role of Borders in Radioactive and Nuclear Materials Counterproliferation.
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Solidification of radioactive waste resins using cement mixed with organic material i.e. biochar is described in this paper. Different percentage of biochar (0%, 5%, 8%, 11%, 14% and 18%) was investigated in this study. The characteristics such as compressive strength and leaching behavior were examined in order to evaluate the performance of solidified radioactive waste resins. The results showed that the amount of biochar affect the compressive strength of the solidified resins. Based on the data obtained for the leaching experiments performed, only one formulation showed the leached of Cs-134 from the solidified radioactive waste resins.
Detailed activation analyses are performed for the different materials under consideration for use in the target capsules and hohlraums used during the ignition campaign on the National Ignition Facility. Results of the target material activation were additionally used to estimate the levels of contamination within the NIF target chamber and the workplace controls necessary for safe operation. The analysis examined the impact of using Be-Cu and Ge-doped CH capsules on the external dose received by workers during maintenance activities. Five days following a 20 MJ shot, dose rates inside the Target Chamber (TC) due to the two proposed capsule materials are small ({approx} 1 {micro}rem/h). Gold and depleted-uranium (DU) are considered as potential hohlraum materials. Following a shot, gold will most probably get deposited on the TC first wall. On the other hand, while noble-gas precursors from the DU are expected to stay in the TC, most of the noble gases are pumped out of the chamber and end up on the cryopumps. The dose rates inside the TC due to activated gold or DU, at 5 days following a 20 MJ shot, are about 1 mrem/h. Dose rates in the vicinity of the cryo-pumps (containing noble 'fission' gases) drop-off to about 1 mrem/h during the first 12 hours following the shot. Contamination from activation of NIF targets will result in the NIF target chamber exceeding DOE surface contamination limits. Objects removed from the TC will need to be managed as radioactive material. However, the results suggest that airborne contamination from resuspension of surface contamination will not be significant and is at levels that can be managed by negative ventilation when accessing the TC attachments.
In March 2016, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued Information Notice 2016-04: 'ANSI N14.5-2014 Revision and leakage rate testing considerations'. American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.5, 'American National Standard for Radioactive Materials-Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment', applies to leakage rate testing of Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) Type B packages operated under 10CFR71. In their information notice NRC is encouraging Type B cask license holders and licensees (cask users) to adapt a new version of ANSI N 14.5 standard. Typically, leakage rate testing for Type B packages (or casks) is performed at different stages of cask development (design and fabrication leak tests) and operations (periodic/maintenance and pre-shipment leak tests) with the purpose to reasonably assure that the packaging will contain radioactive material under both normal and hypothetical accident conditions of transport described in 10CFR71. The standard was updated to provide a modern, robust and standardized approach for performance of leak rate testing on Type B casks by the industry stakeholders. Although implementation of new version of the leak testing standard may not be problematic for a modern Type B package designs, it may be extremely challenging to apply its principles to the existing legacy Type B casks which were designed/fabricated more then 20-30 years ago based on older requirements. Majority of such casks are not 'leak test' friendly. Some of legacy Type B packages may not readily available to meet newer ANSI N 14.5 standard requirements and will require implementation of alternative compensatory measures in lieu of the standard's requirements. In addition, the new standard mandates implementation of additional requirements for leak rate testing performance and personnel qualifications during routine maintenance of Type B casks by owner and during operations of casks by users. The focus of the paper will be to discuss ANSI N 14.5-2014 requirements and provide specific examples on how these requirements will impact the current leak rate test practices. This will be illustrated based on several Type B cask models operated within EnergySolutions fleet (both newer and legacy cask designs). Finally, the paper will cover considerations of the cask closure design features that have to be considered by Type B cask designers in order to ensure robustness of leak testing during design, fabrication and, most importantly, operation of a package. This information shall benefit both owners and users of Type B casks with respect to improvement of the cask designs and Type B cask operational experience. (author)
Smart drum technology is the result of a coupling between a robust drum-type package containing radioactive and other hazardous materials and the ARG-US radio frequency identification (RFID) system that enables 'unattended' remote monitoring of the State of Health of the package and contents - in real time, 24/7, with automatic alert/alarm capabilities. Recent educational demos of the system are highlighted. (authors)
Materials and methods of making low-sintering-temperature glass waste forms that sequester radioactive iodine in a strong and durable structure. First, the iodine is captured by an adsorbant, which forms an iodine-loaded material, e.g., AgI, AgI-zeolite, AgI-mordenite, Ag-silica aerogel, ZnI.sub.2, CuI, or Bi.sub.5O.sub.7I. Next, particles of the iodine-loaded material are mixed with powdered frits of low-sintering-temperature glasses (comprising various oxides of Si, B, Bi, Pb, and Zn), and then sintered at a relatively low temperature, ranging from 425.degree. C. to 550.degree. C. The sintering converts the mixed powders into a solid block of a glassy waste form, having low iodine leaching rates. The vitrified glassy waste form can contain as much as 60 wt % AgI. A preferred glass, having a sintering temperature of 500.degree. C. (below the silver iodide sublimation temperature of 500.degree. C.) was identified that contains oxides of boron, bismuth, and zinc, while containing essentially no lead or silicon.
Nuclear weapons proliferation is an existing and growing worldwide problem. To help with devising strategies and supporting decisions to interdict the transport of nuclear material, we developed the Pathway Analysis, Threat Response and Interdiction Options Tool (PATRIOT) that provides an analytical approach for evaluating the probability that an adversary smuggling radioactive or special nuclear material will be detected during transit. We incorporate a global, multi-modal transportation network, explicit representation of designed and serendipitous detection opportunities, and multiple threat devices, material types, and shielding levels. This paper presents the general structure of PATRIOT, all focuses on the theoretical framework used to model the reliabilities of all network components that are used to predict the most likely pathways to the target.
The H-3, Ar-37, and Ar-39 radioactivities were measured at several depths in the large documented lunar rocks 14321 and 15555. The comparison of the Ar-37 activities from similar locations in rocks 12002, 14321, and 15555 gives direct measures of the amount of Ar-37 produced by the 2 November 1969 and 24 January 1971 solar flares. The tritium contents in the documented rocks decreased with increasing depths. The solar flare intensity averaged over 30 years obtained from the tritium depth dependence was approximately the same as the flare intensity averaged over 1000 years obtained from the Ar-37 measurements. Radioactivities in two Apollo 15 soil samples, H-3 in several Surveyor 3 samples, and tritium and radon weepage were also measured.
This document details Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) criteria and processes for determining if potentially volumetrically contaminated or potentially surface contaminated wastes are to be managed as material containing residual radioactivity or as non-radioactive. This document updates and replaces UCRL-AR-109662, Criteria and Procedures for the Certification of Nonradioactive Hazardous Waste (Reference 1), also known as 'The Moratorium', and follows the guidance found in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) document, Performance Objective for Certification of Non-Radioactive Hazardous Waste (Reference 2). The 1992 Moratorium document (UCRL-AR-109662) is three volumes and 703 pages. The first volume provides an overview of the certification process and lists the key radioanalytical methods and their associated Limits of Sensitivities. Volumes Two and Three contain supporting documents and include over 30 operating procedures, QA plans, training documents and organizational charts that describe the hazardous and radioactive waste management system in place in 1992. This current document is intended to update the previous Moratorium documents and to serve as the top-tier LLNL institutional Moratorium document. The 1992 Moratorium document was restricted to certification of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), State and Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) hazardous waste from Radioactive Material Management Areas (RMMA). This still remains the primary focus of the Moratorium; however, this document increases the scope to allow use of this methodology to certify other LLNL wastes and materials destined for off-site disposal, transfer, and re-use including non-hazardous wastes and wastes generated outside of RMMAs with the potential for DOE added radioactivity. The LLNL organization that authorizes off-site transfer/disposal of a material or waste stream is responsible for implementing the requirements of this document. The LLNL Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) organization is responsible for the review and maintenance of this document. It should be noted that the DOE metal recycling moratorium is still in effect and is implemented as outlined in reference 17 when metals are being dispositioned for disposal/re-use/recycling off-site. This document follows the same methodology as described in the previously approved 1992 Moratorium document. Generator knowledge and certification are the primary means of characterization. Sampling and analysis are used when there is insufficient knowledge of a waste to determine if it contains added radioactivity. Table 1 (page 12) presents a list of LLNL's analytical methods for evaluating volumetrically contaminated waste and updates the reasonably achievable analytical-method-specific Minimum Detectable Concentrations (MDCs) for various matrices. Results from sampling and analysis are compared against the maximum MDCs for the given analytical method and the sample specific MDC to determine if the sample contains DOE added volumetric radioactivity. The evaluation of an item that has a physical form, and history of use, such that accessible surfaces may be potentially contaminated, is based on DOE Order 5400.5 (Reference 3), and its associated implementation guidance document DOE G 441.1-XX, Control and Release of Property with Residual Radioactive Material (Reference 4). The guidance document was made available for use via DOE Memorandum (Reference 5). Waste and materials containing residual radioactivity transferred off-site must meet the receiving facilities Waste Acceptance Criteria (if applicable) and be in compliance with other applicable federal or state requirements.
One of the approaches to safe management of highlevel nuclear wastes (HLW)calls for the disposal of HLW in geological repositories. Though the engineered barrier systems are expected to last a very long time after the repository is closed, they may gradually deteriorate and eventually lose integrity. consequently, water could contact the waste, dissolve it, and carry radionuclides out of the repository. Under the chemical environment in the vicinity of the waste form, 237Np(V) is one of the most soluble radionuclides and is most likely to be carried away from the repository. Because of its long half-life and high mobility, it is projected that, in the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository, the fractional dose attributed to 237Np will increase to 67% of the total dose in 75000 years [1]. As a result, the migration of Np in the postclosure chemical environment of the repository is a great concern to long-term repository performance. Because the temperature of the HLW repository could remain significantly higher than the ambient even thousands of years after the closure of the repository, predictions of the chemical behavior of Np in the repository can not be made without reliable thermodynamic data concerning the interactions of Np with the ligands that exist in the groundwater of the repository (e.g., OH–, F–, SO42– , PO43– and CO32) at elevated temperatures. Unfortunately, thermodynamic data on actinide complexation at elevated temperatures are scarce and highly scattered [2]. Lack of reliable geochemical thermodynamic data could lead to conservative decisions that have too big safety margins and raise the cost of the project. To help with the performance assessment of the HLW repository and fill the gap in thermodynamic data on actinide complexation at elevated temperatures, we have studied the complexation of actinides (Th, U, Np and Pu) with selected organic and inorganic ligands at elevated temperatures. This paper summarizes the results of the complexation of Np(V) with sulfate at 10–70°C.
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Nuclear Science User Facility (NSUF) supports nuclear energy-relevant research into the effects of radiation on nuclear fuels and structural materials. The NSUF provides access, at no cost to the researcher, to the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the High-Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), and other university and national laboratory research and test reactors for radiation effects experiments. Post-irradiation examination of materials poses some difficulties when studying neutron-irradiated materials due to the radioactivity levels of the materials. Inside a test reactor, under high neutron flux, stable materials can activate (capture a neutron) and become unstable or radioactive. These newly created radioactive materials decay, based on their respective half-lives, and emit energetic radiation. Nuclides with short half-lives are able to decay to sufficiently low radiation levels prior to the sample being removed from the reactor. However, nuclides with longer half-lives present a challenge since they must be handled with extreme caution and stored until their radioactivity levels decrease. If immediate examination is required, the examination may take place in a hot cell, which can dramatically increase the cost of the project. The NSUF has access to a variety of hot cells and characterization capabilities at national laboratories, universities, and industrial sites across the United States. In order to estimate the post-irradiation radioactivity levels of materials early in the experiment cycle, we created a radioactivity calculator, hosted on the NSUF web site (nsuf.inl.gov), which will consider three stages of neutron activations and decays for sample materials.
Eight uranyl chromates have been crystallized from aqueous solution and characterized: Mg(H{sub 2}O){sub 6}[(UO{sub 2}){sub 2}(CrO{sub 4}){sub 2}(OH){sub 2}](H{sub 2}O){sub 3} (1), (NH{sub 4}){sub 2}[(UO{sub 2}){sub 2}(CrO{sub 4}){sub 2}(OH){sub 2}](H{sub 2}O){sub 3}, Rb{sub 2}[(UO{sub 2}){sub 2}(CrO{sub 4}){sub 2}(OH){sub 2}](H{sub 2}O){sub 3} (3), Cs[(UO{sub 2})(CrO{sub 4})(OH)]H{sub 2}O (4), Rb[(UO{sub 2})(CrO{sub 4})(OH)]H{sub 2}O (5) Co(H{sub 2}O){sub 4}(Co(H{sub 2}O){sub 6}){sub 2}[(UO{sub 2}){sub 4}(CrO{sub 4}){sub 6}(OH){sub 2}](H{sub 2}O){sub 4} (6), Li{sub 2}[(UO{sub 2}){sub 2}(CrO{sub 4}){sub 3}](H{sub 2}O){sub 7} (7), and Zn(H{sub 2}O){sub 6}[(UO{sub 2}){sub 2}(CrO{sub 4}){sub 3}](H{sub 2}O){sub 3} (8). The structural units of 1 through 8 each consist of a sheet of uranyl pentagonal bipyramids and (Cr(VI)O{sub 4}){sup 2-} tetrahedra. In each case two uranyl pentagonal bipyramids share an equatorial edge, giving a dimer that is linked into the sheet through vertex sharing with (Cr(VI)O{sub 4}){sup 2-} tetrahedra. The sheets are based upon three distinct sheet anion topologies, and the sheets based on a given anion topology can differ in the orientations of the non-bridging O atoms of (CrO{sub 4}){sup 2-} tetrahedra. The interlayers of these compounds contain either monovalent or divalent cations, as well as H{sub 2}O groups that are either bonded to the interlayer cation or are held in place by H bonding only. We explore the relationships between sheet topologies and interlayer configuration in these compounds. - Graphical abstract: Eight uranyl chromate compounds containing sheet structural units built from uranyl pentagonal bipyramids and (CrO{sub 4}){sup 2-} tetrahedra are reported. Relationships between sheet topologies and interstitial constituents is examined. Highlights: Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Eight uranyl Cr(VI) compounds with sheet structural units are reported. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Relationships between the topology of the uranyl chromate sheets and interlayers are examined. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Uranyl and chromate polyhedra form a topologically novel sheet.
Nuclear weapons proliferation is an existing and growing worldwide problem. To help with devising strategies and supporting decisions to interdict the transport of nuclear material, we developed the Pathway Analysis, Threat Response and Interdiction Options Tool (PATRIOT) that provides an analytical approach for evaluating the probability that an adversary smuggling radioactive or special nuclear material will be detected during transit. We incorporate a global, multi-modal transportation network, explicit representation of designed and serendipitous detection opportunities, and multiple threat devices, material types, and shielding levels. This paper presents the general structure of PATRIOT, and focuses on the theoretical framework used to model the reliabilities of all network components that are used to predict the most likely pathways to the target.
FAARM is an acronym for a low background counting facility at the proposed DUSEL laboratory at the Homestake mine in South Dakota. Detailed plans for the 4850' level facility are presented, as well as plans for associated technologies and integration activities.
An energy-dispersive X-ray spectrometer (EDS) is commonly used with a scanning electron microscope (SEM) to analyze the elemental compositions and microstructures of a variety of samples. For example, the microstructures of nuclear fuels are commonly investigated with this technique. However, the radioactivity of some materials introduces additional X-rays that contribute to the EDS background spectrum. These X-rays are generally not accounted for in spectral analysis software, and can cause misleading results. X-rays from internal conversion [1], Bremsstrahlung [2] radiation associated with alpha ionizations and beta particle interactions [3], and gamma rays from radioactive decay can all elevate the background of radioactive materials.
Evidence from comparison with stony meteorites of solar flare proton induced radioactivity in Apollo 11 lunar rocks
A mathematical procedure for analyzing the heat conductivity of the lunar surface is discussed. The solution is based on homogeneous and laminated moon models and considers the effects of radioactive elements conveyed to the lunar surface by melting. The various parameters which introduce uncertainties into the numerical analysis are identified. The application of data obtained from radio astronomy and from analyses of lunar samples returned by the Apollo flights is explained. Tables of data are included to show the types and amounts of radioactive materials which have been identified.