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Factors Impacting Nuclear Energy Share in U.S. Energy Markets

The purpose of this report is to collate information and findings from recent studies conducted by national and international bodies/institutes to identify approaches for maintaining/enhancing the role of nuclear energy in the current and future energy mix of the United States. This report shows how nuclear generation grew quickly to provide 20% of U.S. electricity, sustaining that level for three decades without the benefit of new construction, but is now projected to decline going forward. Nuclear construction costs in the U.S. spiraled out of control, ending construction for two decades and the recent resumption of construction has continued the pattern of schedule delays and cost overruns. However, nuclear operations exhibited strong learning, achieving and sustaining the highest capacity factor of any electricity generation technology and license extensions and uprates have sustained nuclear market share. The share of nuclear energy in the U.S. electricity market is projected to decline by ~1/3rd over the next 30 years The report provides an overview of how the markets work in theory and in practice. It indicates how market deregulation and clean energy policies have created conditions where nuclear plants are being retired for economic rather than technical reasons. The report also shows how many of the markets do not in practice have free competition but instead have outcomes that are being determined more and more by policy instead of market forces. While electricity costs from existing nuclear plants are low, electricity from new builds is projected to be too expensive to be competitive head-to-head with natural gas, even for nth-of-a-kind costs. Wind and solar energy have enjoyed an extended period of sustained subsidy. This protected environment has resulted in a sustained reduction in plant level costs to the point that some of these Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) technologies are becoming competitive even if their direct subsidies are removed. But plant level costs underestimate total VRE costs which include a number of system-level externalities. The incremental system value of additional VRE capacity was shown to decline as market share increases, with solar value declining more quickly than wind. The report closes with examination of a possible future for nuclear generation as part of deep decarbonization of the electricity sector. This approach avoids direct competition with natural gas. The two options for achieving 100% decarbonization are to use only renewables or to use all zero emissions technologies, and the report shows the second approach is much less expensive than the first.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

White Paper On Nuclear Structure Reactions and Astrophysics

In preparation for the 2023 NSAC Long Range Plan (LRP), the DNP Town Meeting on Nuclear Structure, Reactions, and Astrophysics was held at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) on Nov 14-16, 2022. The town meeting brought together 578 members of the low-energy nuclear science community, including 216 in-person attendees and 362 remote participants coming from US national laboratories, a wide range of US universities and other research institutions and universities abroad. Participants met in five topic-oriented and seven cross-cutting and intersecting working groups to discuss progress since the 2015 LRP and identify compelling science opportunities and the resources needed to realize them. These considerations were used during the Town Meeting to determine a set of resolutions outlining the highest priorities for our subfield. The full text of the resolutions endorsed by unanimous consent by the low-energy nuclear science community at the Town Meeting is presented at the end of this executive summary. The reports from all working groups that met during the Town Meeting are included as Secs. 1 to 11 of this Whitepaper. The intellectual challenges for nuclear structure, reactions and astrophysics can be captured in the following questions: What is the nature of the nuclear force that binds protons and neutrons into stable nuclei and rare isotopes, and how do the rich phenomena of nuclear structure and reactions emerge? How do single-nucleon, cluster, and collective degrees of freedom coexist and evolve with increasing proton-neutron imbalance and excitation energies? What are the limits of nuclear existence, and what features arise near and beyond these limits? What are the astrophysical origins of the elements and how did the associated chemical evolution proceed? How do stars evolve, and what nuclear signatures do they leave behind? What is the nature of neutron stars and dense matter? How can the knowledge and technological progress provided by nuclear science best be used to benefit society?

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

In-Situ Monitoring Assisted Large-Scale Additive Manufacturing of Mild Steel and 316L Alloys for Nuclear Application

The Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) Program is aimed at developing cross-cutting technologies in support of a broad range of nuclear reactor parts, and to maintain U.S. leadership in materials and manufacturing technologies for nuclear energy applications. The overarching vision of the AMMT program is to accelerate the development, qualification, demonstration and deployment of advanced materials and manufacturing technologies to enable reliable and economical nuclear energy. One of its three goals is to target big challenges and game-changing technologies, to realize the mission and vision of AMMT program. Based on this context, this multi-year work package focuses on understanding the current state of large-scale additive manufacturing (AM) technology for the deposition of 316L stainless steel materials for final components and mild steel for use in nuclear manufacturing processes. The targeted AM modality is directed energy deposition (DED), capable of fabricating components on the size scale of meters including valves, pumps, impellers. etc. that are challenging or difficult to source, especially when developing new systems or replacing obsolete components. Accordingly, the current writeup aims at providing a baseline literature survey on structure-property relationships in mild steel and 316L alloys. Also, information on preliminary trials to date involving these two alloys show tremendous potential of printing parts having complex geometry and thin- walled structures, such as nuclear valve and Hot isostatic Press (HIP) can, using wire based (Wire Arc Additive Manufacturing and Hybrid Additive Manufacturing) as well as blown powder DED machines. All of this is aimed towards (i) demonstrating the ability to fabricate large components for pressure boundary applications relevant to the nuclear community and nuclear manufacturing technology, and (ii) understanding the effect of different manufacturing technology on AM can production and post HIPed material for nuclear applications. Another target of this writeup is to compile various in-situ monitoring tools that have been incorporated for different DED AM modalities, in order to understand process variability during the entire fabrication process. This can be correlated with processing-structure-property response surfaces and would add confidence around process quality verification and ultimately component certification for nuclear applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Non-nuclear Component Signatures for Warhead Dismantlement Confirmation

The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Utilizing Time Reversal Ultrasonics to Detect the Removal of Nuclear Materials from Geological Repositories (FY26 Mid-Year)

Detecting unauthorized nuclear material removal from storage environments, such as geological repositories, is a critical safeguards task essential to ensuring the integrity and non-diversion of nuclear materials. However, this process is fraught with significant technical challenges. Storage configurations often involve tightly packed nuclear material containers or obstructed environments, making detection of removal events exceedingly difficult. Optical surveillance cameras, which are commonly used for monitoring, suffer from substantial limitations, including restricted coverage, reliance on line-of-sight measurements, and vulnerability to environmental conditions in certain storage scenarios. As the global inventory of monitored nuclear materials increases and storage configurations become more complex— such as deep geological repositories, inaccessible storage vaults, and tightly packed containers—there is an urgent need for innovative detection technologies that can reliably identify unauthorized diversion events in these challenging environments. The challenge of detecting nuclear material removal in complex storage environments is both significant and urgent. Preventing unauthorized access, diversion, or tampering with nuclear materials is a cornerstone of global nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation efforts. Current detection methods are increasingly inadequate as storage configurations become more intricate and inaccessible. The limitations of existing technologies—such as their inability to detect changes behind obstructions, reliance on costly and labor-intensive processes, and vulnerability to environmental conditions—pose risks to the effectiveness of safeguards systems. Addressing this challenge is critical to maintaining international trust in nuclear safeguards frameworks and ensuring compliance with nonproliferation agreements. Our project builds on the proven concept of TRU technology that can address this unmet need. TRU has demonstrated exceptional spatial sensitivity and change detection capabilities in complex non-line-ofsight environments, making it uniquely suited for detecting unauthorized nuclear material removal in challenging storage configurations. Unlike optical methods, TRU is not limited by line-of-sight constraints or environmental conditions, enabling reliable detection of subtle alterations even behind obstructions. By leveraging TRU’s ability to identify removal or tampering events, we aim to develop a robust detection system that enhances safeguards in geological repositories, storage vaults, and other complex environments.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "Removal of Categories I and II Special Nuclear Material from Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico"

The Department of Energy's (DOE's) Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico (Sandia) develops science-based technologies in support of national security in areas such as nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, military technologies, and homeland security. Sandia's primary mission is ensuring that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable and can fully support the Nation's deterrence policy. Part of this mission includes systems engineering of nuclear weapons; research, design, and development of non-nuclear components; manufacturing of non-nuclear weapons components; the provision of safety, security, and reliability assessments of stockpile weapons; and the conduct of high-explosives research and development and environmental testing. Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, operates Sandia for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). On May 7, 2004, the Secretary announced that the Department would evaluate missions at DOE sites to consolidate Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in the most secure environments possible. The Administrator of the NNSA said that this effort was a key part of an overall plan to transform the nuclear weapons complex into a smaller, safer, more secure, and more efficient national security enterprise. In February 2008, Sandia was the first site to report it had reduced its on-site inventory of nuclear material below 'Categories I and II' levels, which require the highest level of security to protect material such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The Office of Inspector General initiated an inspection to determine if Sandia made appropriate adjustments to its security posture in response to the removal of the Categories I and II SNM. We found that Sandia adjusted its security posture in response to the removal of Categories I and II SNM. For example, security posts were closed; unneeded protective force weapons and equipment were excessed from the site; and, Sandia's Site Safeguards and Security Plan was modified. We also found that some highly enriched uranium in a complex material configuration was not removed from Sandia. This material was designated as Category III material using a methodology for assessing the attractiveness of complex materials that was not specifically addressed in any current DOE directive. Although DOE and NNSA officials believed that this designation was appropriate, the methodology used to support this designation had not, as of the time of our review, been incorporated into the DOE directives system. Historically, the Department has considered the categorization of SNM to be an important national security and public policy issue. Consequently, we believe that expedited action should be taken to formalize this methodology in the DOE directives system and that it be disseminated throughout the Department of Energy complex.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Mapping the Gap: Analysis of Nuclear Cybersecurity Education in U.S. Universities

The U.S. nuclear sector is undergoing rapid transformation, driven by the expansion of advanced reactors, digital modernization of legacy systems, and increasing interest in nuclear energy to meet AI-fueled energy demands. However, the cybersecurity talent pipeline is not keeping pace with this growth. This paper investigates the significant gap in nuclear cybersecurity education and proposes scalable strategies for colleges to address this critical need by promoting it as a viable and essential career path. Through a multi-institutional landscape analysis of 16 cybersecurity and 12 nuclear engineering programs, we found that nuclear cybersecurity is largely absent from university curricula. Most students are unaware of the field’s existence, and few institutions offer hands-on training or interdisciplinary exposure. This lack of awareness leads to a shortage of specialized talent, forcing nuclear facilities to retrain generalist hires or rely on costly external consultants. We present a framework for early pipeline cultivation grounded in Social Cognitive Career Theory and workforce development principles. Proposed solutions include student-led clubs, guest lectures, modular classroom kits, and summer boot camps. By increasing visibility and access to nuclear cyber content, we aim to break the self-reinforcing cycle of low awareness and limited specialization. This work underscores the critical role of education and advocacy in cultivating early interest and guiding students toward this emerging field. We call on academic institutions, national laboratories, and industry stakeholders to collaborate in establishing nuclear cybersecurity as a distinct and accessible career path within the broader cybersecurity and nuclear engineering ecosystems.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NUCLEAR INCIDENT CAPABILITIES, KNOWLEDGE & ENABLER LEVERAGING

The detonation of a 10 Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is a serious scenario that the United States must be prepared to address. The likelihood of a single nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height of the Cold War. Layered defenses against domestic nuclear terrorism indicate that our government continues to view the threat as credible. The risk of such an event is further evidenced by terrorists desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The act of nuclear terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center in the United States, will overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state governments to respond, and will seriously challenge existing federal response capabilities. A 10 Kiloton IND detonation would cause total infrastructure damage in a 3-mile radius and levels of radiation spanning out 3,000 square miles. In a densely populated urban area, the anticipated casualties would be in excess of several hundred thousand. Although there would be enormous loss of life, housing and infrastructure, an IND detonation is a recoverable event. We can reduce the risk of these high-consequence, nontraditional threats by enhancing our nuclear detection architecture and establishing well planned and rehearsed plans for coordinated response. It is also important for us to identify new and improved ways to foster collaboration regarding the response to the IND threat to ensure the demand and density of expertise required for such an event is postured and prepared to mobilize, integrate, and support a myriad of anticipated challenges. We must be prepared to manage the consequences of such an event in a deliberate manner and get beyond notions of total devastation by adopting planning assumptions around survivability and resiliency. Planning for such a scenario needs to be decisive in determining a response based on competencies and desired outcomes. It is time to synthesize known threats and plausible consequences into action. Much work needs to be accomplished to enhance nuclear preparedness and to substantially bolster and clarify the capacity to deploy competent resources. Until detailed plans are scripted, and personnel and other resources are postured, and exercised, IND specific planning remains an urgent need requiring attention and action. Although strategic guidance, policies, concepts of operations, roles, responsibilities, and plans governing the response and consequence management for the IND scenario exist, an ongoing integration challenge prevails regarding how best to get capable and competent surge capacity personnel (disaster reservists) and other resources engaged and readied in an up-front manner with pre-scripted assignments to augment the magnitude of anticipated demands of expertise. With the above in mind, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) puts science to work to create and deploy practical, high-value, cost-effective nuclear solutions. As the Department of Energy's (DOE) applied research and development laboratory, SRNL supports Savannah River Site (SRS) operations, DOE, national initiatives, and other federal agencies, across the country and around the world. SRNL's parent at SRS also employs more than 8,000 personnel. The team is a great asset that seeks to continue their service in the interest of national security and stands ready to accomplish new missions. Overall, an integral part of the vision for SRNL's National and Homeland Security Directorate is the establishment of a National Security Center at SRNL, and development of state of the science capabilities (technologies and trained technical personnel) for responding to emergency events on local, regional, or national scales. This entails leveraging and posturing the skills, knowledge and experience base of SRS personnel to deliver an integrated capability to support local, state, and federal authorities through the development of pre-scripted requests for assistance, agreements, and plans. It also includes developing plans, training, exercises, recruitment strategies, and processes to establish a 1,000 plus person nuclear disaster workforce capable of providing surge capacity support that can be deployed in part or in all.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards: A TEXTBOOK

Nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are among the most pressing challenges to international peace and security that we face today. Iran and Syria remain in non-compliance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea remain unchecked. Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NPT play a critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation.How do they work? Where did they come from? And what is their future? This book answers these questions. Anyone studying the field of nuclear non-proliferation will benefit from reading this book, and for anyone entering the field, the book will enable them to get a running start. Part I describes the foundations of the international safeguards system: its origins in the 1930s - when new discoveries in physics made it clear immediately that nuclear energy held both peril and promise - through the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT, which codified the role of IAEA safeguards as a means to verify states NPT commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Part II describes the NPT safeguards system, which is based on a model safeguards agreement developed specifically for the NPT, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/153. Part III describes events, especially in South Africa, the DPRK, and Iraq in the early 1990s, that triggered a transformation in the way in which safeguards were conceptualized and implemented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

SIGNATURES OF ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY APPROACHES AND RESULTS

The illicit trafficking of strategic nuclear commodities (defined here as the goods needed for a covert nuclear program excluding special nuclear materials) poses a significant challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation community. Export control regulations, both domestically and internationally, seek to inhibit the spread of strategic nuclear commodities by restricting their sale to parties that may use them for nefarious purposes. However, export controls alone are not sufficient for preventing the illicit transfer of strategic nuclear goods. There are two major pitfalls to relying solely on export control regulations for the deterrence of proliferation of strategic goods. First, export control enforcement today relies heavily on the honesty and willingness of participants to adhere to the legal framework already in place. Secondly, current practices focus on the evaluation of single records which allow for the necessary goods to be purchased separately and hidden within the thousands of legitimate commerce transactions that occur each day, disregarding strategic information regarding several purchases. Our research presents two preliminary data-centric approaches for investigating procurement networks of strategic nuclear commodities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been putting significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. In particular, the PNNL Signature Discovery Initiative (SDI) has codified several scientific methodologies for the detection, characterization, and prediction of signatures that are indicative of a phenomenon of interest. The methodologies and tools developed under SDI have already been applied successfully to problems in bio-forensics, cyber security and power grid balancing efforts and they have now made the nonproliferation of strategic goods into a challenge problem for testing their methodology and tools. As a first step towards the detection and characterization of illicit procurement networks, our research examines procurement networks as defined by a system of entities (people or companies) that enter into transactions of specific items with one another. Once we have defined such networks, we are interested in answering questions about the behavior and characterization of such networks. The questions we wish to answer regarding procurement networks are, first, “Can we detect networks within large, noisy datasets?” and second, “To what extent can we compare multiple networks and identify their similarities?” As procurement networks can be naturally viewed as a graph, we have employed several graph analytic tools to aid in these tasks. In particular, Graphscape, an SDI tool, uses a novel method to approximate edit distance, a graph distance measure based on the number of changes needed to transform one graph into another, in order to measure how similar two given graphs are to each other. Given a set of graphs where vertices represent companies and edges represent a shipment from company A to company B, we can calculate an all-for-all comparison of graphs. In this way, we are able to determine which graphs are most similar, and which require more changes to transform one into the other. The set of graphs to be compared can be further specialized to provide more insight, e.g., using different time periods to explore events in a company life cycle.

graph analysis↗

Stable Element Doping of Sol-gel Toward Simulating Environmental Matrix in Surrogate Explosive Nuclear Debris

Training nuclear forensic analysis personnel in post-detonation scenarios is of critical importance to nuclear threat response capabilities. Thus, realistic nuclear debris simulants which resemble the size, color, elemental composition, and radionuclide content of actual nuclear fallout from a recent detonation would be valuable for training nuclear first responders in realistic scenarios. As nuclear fallout types vary significantly in each of these parameters based on detonation environment (rural, urban, maritime etc.) and collection location, the ability to tailor each of these parameters accurately in simulated debris would be of immense benefit to the post-detonation analysis community for training both in-field collections and triage and the validation of laboratory level nuclear forensic techniques. Sol-gel synthesis techniques can provide the tunability of size, shape and composition required for producing surrogate nuclear debris of a wide variety. The sol-gel process consists of forming a metal oxide material, often silica, through polymerization of a metal-alkoxy precursor. In this work, we characterize the ability to load the sol-gel particles with secondary elemental components such as iron, aluminum, and calcium toward approximating the elemental composition of debris from various detonation environments and demonstrate the ability to produce particles with controllable size, shape, and color. We also demonstrate quantitative radionuclide encapsulation toward reproducing the radionuclide content of actual fallout from a recent detonation. Finally, we then employ these techniques in producing simulated aerodynamic debris samples with realistic elemental matrix composition and radionuclide content simulating a recent uranium-fueled detonation taking place in a rural desert environment and compare it to historic fallout from the Nevada Nuclear Security Site.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

License Amendment Request for Storing Exelon Sister Nuclear Stations Class B/C LLRW in the LaSalle Station Interim Radwaste Storage Facility - 13620

Exelon Nuclear (Exelon) designed and constructed an Interim Radwaste Storage Facility (IRSF) in the mid-1980's at LaSalle County Nuclear Station (LaSalle). The facility was designed to store low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) on an interim basis, i.e., up to five years. The primary reason for the IRSF was to offset lack of disposal in case existing disposal facilities, such as the Southeast Compact's Barnwell Disposal Facility in Barnwell, South Carolina, ceased accepting radioactive waste from utilities not in the Southeast Compact. Approximately ninety percent of the Radwaste projected to be stored in the LaSalle IRSF in that period of time was Class A, with the balance being Class B/C waste. On July 1, 2008 the Barnwell Disposal Facility in the Southeast Compact closed its doors to out of- compact Radwaste, which precluded LaSalle from shipping Class B/C Radwaste to an outside disposal facility. Class A waste generated by LaSalle is still able to be disposed at the 'Envirocare of Utah LLRW Disposal Complex' in Clive, Utah. Thus the need for utilizing the LaSalle IRSF for storing Class B/C Radwaste for an extended period, perhaps life-of-plant or more became apparent. Additionally, other Exelon Midwest nuclear stations located in Illinois that did not build an IRSF heretofore also needed extended Radwaste storage. In early 2009, Exelon made a decision to forward Radwaste from the Byron Nuclear Station (Byron), Braidwood Nuclear Station (Braidwood), and Clinton Nuclear Station (Clinton) to LaSalle's IRSF. As only Class B/C Radwaste would need to be forwarded to LaSalle, the original volumetric capacity of the LaSalle IRSF was capable of handling the small number of additional expected shipments annually from the Exelon sister nuclear stations in Illinois. Forwarding Class B/C Radwaste from the Exelon sister nuclear stations in Illinois to LaSalle would require an amendment to the LaSalle Station operating license. Exelon submitted the License Amendment Request (LAR) to NRC on January 6, 2010; NRC approved the LAR on July 21, 2011. A similar decision was made by Exelon in early 2009 to forward Radwaste from Limerick Nuclear Station to its sister station, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; both in Pennsylvania. A LAR submittal to the NRC was also provided and NRC approval was received in 2011. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

LaserSnake2: An Innovative Approach to Nuclear Decommissioning - 17080

Nuclear decommissioning challenges exist the world over and require innovative approaches to ensure safe and cost effective dismantling of high hazard nuclear facilities. LaserSnake technology makes use of the flexibility and dexterity of snake arm robots to deploy high-powered laser cutting, lifting and manipulation tools. This paper describes the development and use of the system to achieve the successful size reduction and removal of a substantial stainless steel vessel within the First Generation Reprocessing Plant (FGRP) at Sellafield in the UK. Due to the environment, nuclear decommissioning is an extremely challenging activity. High ambient radiation levels often preclude entry to the areas involved, and as industry tries to minimise dose uptake, even moderate radiation levels now require remote solutions. 'In-situ' size reduction of process plant, including vessels and pipework, will allow the removal of the nuclear inventory from a building prior to further decontamination and demolition. The term 'in situ' is in this case used to mean work done on plant items within their existing cells as opposed to moving items from their original location to a dedicated size reduction facility. Traditional size reduction cutting methods, such as reciprocating saws or grinders, pose a significant challenge for remote deployment platforms. This includes the loss of haptic feedback and the length of time taken to perform the task, and difficulty dealing with the reaction forces. Although remote engineered solutions for these tools are possible, they are are typically complicated, unreliable and expensive. Robot deployed laser cutting is widely used in non-nuclear industrial sectors, and offers a simpler method for size reduction. LaserSnake2 is a UK collaborative project, co-funded by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, Innovate UK and the Department of Energy and Climate Change. The project combined the skills of robotic experts and laser and optic specialists, to develop a remote handling technology suited for deployment within active nuclear environments. As well as meeting strict safety case requirements, the system provides a safe and cost effective method for decommissioning of complex nuclear spaces. An overview of the system development and deployment is presented in this paper. In July 2016, a successful decommissioning campaign was conducted in the FGRP at Sellafield. The LaserSnake2 system was used to size reduce a double-skinned dissolver vessel within a radiologically active nuclear cell. Planning of the size reduction method and processes, as well as results of the campaign itself are described in this paper. The containment procedures and radiological considerations for the system are presented along with the effects of operations on the cell and ventilation systems. LaserSnake, developed as a modular arm system with up to 4.5 m of articulation, carries an integrated tool comprising a high power, decommissioning specific, laser cutting head, high definition cameras and high powered illumination LEDs. It is designed for precise dismantling work within confined and hazardous environments. The tool can be interchanged, allowing the snake-arm robot also to carry grippers, environmental mapping sensors and other tools which may prove advantageous during a decommissioning campaign. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analysis of travel logistics for transportation of used nuclear fuel in the continental United States - 15179

The US DOE Office of Nuclear Energy is conducting planning activities within the Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project (NFST) to lay the groundwork for implementing interim storage, including associated transportation, per the Administration's Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, and to develop a foundation for a new nuclear waste management organization. Integrated waste management system architecture analyses are being conducted to support the future deployment of a comprehensive system for managing nuclear waste that consider all aspects of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle (transportation, storage, and disposal). One aspect of a potential future nuclear waste management strategy is the transportation of spent nuclear fuel to an away from reactor interim storage facility. Transportation routes from commercial nuclear reactor sites to various locations in the continental U.S. chosen as hypothetical locations for a future interim storage facility were evaluated using Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START). The objective of this evaluation was to identify and parameterize generic transportation routes for use in integrated waste management system analyses that include an interim storage facility, the associated uncertainty in these selections, and the uncertainty associated with different transportation route selection criteria. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Knowledge Transfer Program for International Nuclear Safeguards

Nuclear safeguards were first announced in 1945 by the U.S., Canadian and British governments as a means to exchange scientific information about peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevent the use of nuclear material for weapons. International nuclear safeguards, now under the provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serves to hold accountable the 140 member countries (States) that have entered into treaties and agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the IAEA acts as a nuclear materials inspectorate under the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought about in 1968, that specifies commitments member States make to the world?s non-proliferation regime. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (OINS) is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. Within OINS, the Human Capital Development program recognizes the need to build workforce capacity and safeguards expertise. This includes supporting the education and training of younger generations working in international nuclear safeguards. One of the program?s main concerns is core competencies being lost to retirement or attrition and building knowledge retention pipelines from senior to new professionals. One identified core competency is knowledge gained by individuals who have completed IAEA assignments such as missions to member States to conduct safeguards inspections. Such individuals possess unique knowledge, and efforts are being put forth to effectively capture this knowledge within the national laboratories complex. To this end, we report findings from a one-year mentor-mentee knowledge retention program in which an international safeguards subject matter expert imparted knowledge and skills to a willing professional mentee. The knowledge and skills stem from the mentor?s multi-year assignment at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

In situ irradiation of spent nuclear fuels

To improve the economics of commercial nuclear reactors, nuclear vendors and utilities are seeking approval for increased burnup usage of the existing nuclear fleet. This is especially critical for meeting the clean energy initiative by the United States Government, Department of Energy (DOE). However, one of the key challenges the nuclear industry faces in this regard is that the regions exposed to high burnup and low temperatures exhibit a fine-grained microstructure with large bubbles known as high-burnup structure (HBS) [1]. The formation of HBS has been correlated to the diminished performance of the reactor, as well as fuel fragmentation and pulverization during transient and accidental conditions [2]. Therefore, it is paramount to understand the mechanisms for HBS formation along with its impact on the properties and performance of nuclear fuels. While existing programs, such as Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) and Advanced Fuel Campaign (AFC) are focusing on evaluating the performance impact of HBS, the physical mechanisms contributing to HBS formation are still not fully understood. In addition, having predictive capabilities and sound understanding of the microstructural evolution of nuclear fuel is essential for accelerated development, qualification, and deployment of new nuclear materials and novel reactor designs for advanced nuclear reactors. There is a lack of consensus among researchers regarding the mechanisms leading to such restructuring observed in HBS. Grain subdivision due to polygonization versus recrystallization, continuous versus discrete recrystallization occurring in tandem or conjunction, etc., have been proposed and debated. In general, it is hypothesized that defect accumulation and dislocation interaction within the grains cause the realignment of dislocations into grain boundaries, leading to the new subgrain formation, which over time transforms into new grains. However, due to the lack of transient data, the importance of fission rate, irradiation, thermal, and stress history of the fuel on the restructuring could not be assessed. In situ microstructural evolution under various irradiation conditions is desired to bridge this gap. Alternatively, phase-field-based models have been developed to capture HBS formation via discrete recrystallization utilizing the classical nucleation approach [3–5]. However, in these models, the grain nucleation criteria are often defined based on empirical relations for burnup and fission gas density leading to dislocation density change. A mechanistic approach to capture the dislocation interaction with the microstructural features leading to grain subdivision is lacking.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radiochemistry and nuclear chemistry workforce in the United States

The disciplines of radiochemistry and nuclear chemistry have direct applications in the fields of national security, nuclear medicine, nuclear power production, and environmental management. Although, often, nuclear and radiochemistry are grouped together and many experts work in both areas, the definition for each field is slightly different. For example, radiochemistry may be defined as the application of the phenomena of radioactive decay and techniques common to nuclear physics so as to solve problems in the field of chemistry. In contrast, nuclear chemistry may be defined as the application of procedures and techniques common to chemistry to study the structure of the atomic nucleus. This chapter provides a brief update of the current state of, and critical U.S. needs for, nuclear chemistry and radiochemistry expertise as the Assuring a Future U.S.-Based Nuclear and Radiochemistry Expertise report was published by National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 2012.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗