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At least 1,351 records · Page 75

Filovirus Research: The Need for an Integrated Approach in Time and Space

The episodic appearance of Ebola virus (EBOV) and Marburg virus (MARV) across central Africa over the last 15 years not only underscores the importance of filoviruses as uniquely virulent agents to both human and wildlife communities but also implies a very complex transmission scenario that must be understood if we are to prevent or mitigate filovirus outbreaks in the future. Efforts of a global network of scientists and healthcare workers have expanded our knowledge of filoviruses to meet the growing threat of Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers in Africa. In recent decades, several newly emerging diseases have resulted in major threats to both affected communities and global public health. Viruses from wildlife hosts in particular, have exhibited a capability for cross-species transmission (CST), and have caused high-impact diseases in humans Such as Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers, Nipah and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SAILS). It has been estimated that about 60.3% (Jones et al. 2008) of human infectious diseases are of animal origin (zoonoses) and even some important viral diseases that are traditionally considered of human origin, for example measles and smallpox, may very well have their prehistoric origins in wildlife (Wolfe et al 2007). It maybe logical and prudent therefore, to anticipate that there are other, new filoviruses out there that will cross into humans at some point in time. If we anticipate that these will happen and wish to be prepared for and mitigate this potential, then an understanding of filoviruses as a biologic system in the environment will be essential to that process. We will need to know how the ecological dynamic of CST interacts with a 'new' viruse's evolutionary factors to overcome environmental, demographic and host-specific barriers to transmission and infectivity to humans.

Pinzon, Jorge E.↗

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗

Anatomy of a Security Operations Center

Many agencies and corporations are either contemplating or in the process of building a cyber Security Operations Center (SOC). Those Agencies that have established SOCs are most likely working on major revisions or enhancements to existing capabilities. As principle developers of the NASA SOC; this Presenters' goals are to provide the GFIRST community with examples of some of the key building blocks of an Agency scale cyber Security Operations Center. This presentation viII include the inputs and outputs, the facilities or shell, as well as the internal components and the processes necessary to maintain the SOC's subsistence - in other words, the anatomy of a SOC. Details to be presented include the SOC architecture and its key components: Tier 1 Call Center, data entry, and incident triage; Tier 2 monitoring, incident handling and tracking; Tier 3 computer forensics, malware analysis, and reverse engineering; Incident Management System; Threat Management System; SOC Portal; Log Aggregation and Security Incident Management (SIM) systems; flow monitoring; IDS; etc. Specific processes and methodologies discussed include Incident States and associated Work Elements; the Incident Management Workflow Process; Cyber Threat Risk Assessment methodology; and Incident Taxonomy. The Evolution of the Cyber Security Operations Center viII be discussed; starting from reactive, to proactive, and finally to proactive. Finally, the resources necessary to establish an Agency scale SOC as well as the lessons learned in the process of standing up a SOC viII be presented.

Wang, John↗

Risk Management of Jettisoned Objects in LEO

The construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) has led to the release of many objects into its orbital plane, usually during the course of an extra-vehicular activity (EVA). Such releases are often unintentional, but in a growing number of cases, the jettison has been intentional, conducted after a careful assessment of the net risk to the partnership and to other objects in space. Since its launch in 1998 the ISS has contributed on average at least one additional debris object that is simultaneously in orbit with the station, although the number varies widely from zero to eight at any one moment. All of these objects present potential risks to other objects in orbit. Whether it comes from known and tracked orbiting objects or from unknown or untrackable objects, collision with orbital debris can have disastrous consequences. Objects greater than 10cm are generally well documented and tracked, allowing orbiting spacecraft or satellites opportunities to perform evasive maneuvers (commonly known as Debris Avoidance Maneuvers, or DAMs) in the event that imminent collision is predicted. The issue with smaller debris; however, is that it is too numerous to be tracked effectively and yet still poses disastrous consequences if it intercepts a larger object. Due to the immense kinetic energy of any item in orbit, collision with debris as small as 1cm can have catastrophic consequences for many orbiting satellites or spacecraft. Faced with the growing orbital debris threat and the potentially catastrophic consequences of a collision-generated debris shower originating in an orbit crossing the ISS altitude band, in 2007 the ISS program manger asked program specialists to coordinate a multilateral jettison policy amongst the ISS partners. This policy would define the acceptable risk trade rationale for intentional release of a debris object, and other mandatory constraints on such jettisons to minimize the residual risks whenever a jettison was accepted. Although ISS-related debris often presents untenable risks to the EVA crew, IVA crew, or to a departing cargo vehicle for a controlled disposal, such released objects also present a ballistic nuisance to the visiting vehicle traffic, and a potential fragmentation threat to the hundreds of other functional and debris objects whose perigees lie below the ISS orbital altitude. Thus, every such jettison decision is a conscious risk trade.

Bacon, John B.↗

Shuttle Communications and Tracking, Avionics, and Electromagnetic Compatibility

By definition, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) is the capability of components, sub-systems, and systems, to operate in their intended electromagnetic environment, within an established margin of safety, and at design levels of performance. Practice of the discipline itself incorporates knowledge of various aspects of applied physics, materials science, and engineering across the board, and includes control and mitigation of undesirable electromagnetic interaction between intentional and unintentional emitters and receivers of radio frequency energy, both within and external to the vehicle; identification and control of the hazards of non-ionizing electromagnetic radiation to personnel, ordnance, and fuels and propellants; and vehicle and system protection from the direct and indirect effects of lightning and various other forms of electrostatic discharge (ESD) threats, such as triboelectrification and plasma charging. EMC is extremely complex and far-reaching, affecting in some degree every aspect of the vehicle s design and operation. The most successful efforts incorporate EMC design features and techniques throughout design and fabrication of the vehicle s structure and components, as well as appropriate operational considerations with regard to electromagnetic threats in the operational environment, from the beginning of the design effort to the end of the life cycle of the manufactured product. This approach yields the highest design performance with the lowest cost and schedule impact.

deSilva, K.↗

Software To Secure Distributed Propulsion Simulations

Distributed-object computing systems are presented with many security threats, including network eavesdropping, message tampering, and communications middleware masquerading. NASA Glenn Research Center, and its industry partners, has taken an active role in mitigating the security threats associated with developing and operating their proprietary aerospace propulsion simulations. In particular, they are developing a collaborative Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) Security (CORBASec) test bed to secure their distributed aerospace propulsion simulations. Glenn has been working with its aerospace propulsion industry partners to deploy the Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) object-based technology. NPSS is a program focused on reducing the cost and time in developing aerospace propulsion engines

Blaser, Tammy M.↗

Hurricane Recovery Report 2004

During August and September 2004, four hurricanes tested the mettle of Space Coast residents and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) leadership and workforce. These threats underscored two important points: the very real vulnerability of KSC and its valuable space program assets to the devastating power of a hurricane, and the planning required to effectively deal with such threats. The damage was significant even though KSC did not experience sustained hurricane-force winds. To better understand and appreciate these points, this report provides an overview of the meteorological history of the Space Coast and what is involved in the planning, preparation, and recovery activities, as well as addressing the impacts of the 2004 hurricane season.

Gordon, Joseph P.↗

Use of Dual-Polarization Radar Variables to Assess Low-Level Wind Shear in Severe Thunderstorm Near-storm Environments in the Tennessee Valley

The upgrade of the National Weather Service (NWS) network of S ]band dual-polarization radars is currently underway, and the incorporation of polarimetric information into the real ]time forecasting process will enhance the forecaster fs ability to assess thunderstorms and their near ]storm environments. Recent research has suggested that the combination of polarimetric variables differential reflectivity (ZDR) and specific differential phase (KDP) can be useful in the assessment of low level wind shear within a thunderstorm. In an environment with strong low ]level veering of the wind, ZDR values will be largest along the right inflow edge of the thunderstorm near a large gradient in horizontal reflectivity (indicative of large raindrops falling with a relative lack of smaller drops), and take the shape of an arc. Meanwhile, KDP values, which are proportional to liquid water content and indicative of a large number of smaller drops, are maximized deeper into the forward flank precipitation shield than the ZDR arc as the smaller drops are being advected further from the updraft core by the low level winds than the larger raindrops. Using findings from previous work, three severe weather events that occurred in North Alabama were examined in order to assess the utility of these signatures in determining the potential for tornadic activity. The first case is from October 26, 2010, where a large number of storms indicated tornadic potential from a standard reflectivity and velocity analysis but very few storms actually produced tornadoes. The second event is from February 28, 2011, where tornadic storms were present early on in the event, but as the day progressed, the tornado threat transitioned to a high wind threat. The third case is from April 27, 2011, where multiple rounds of tornadic storms ransacked the Tennessee Valley. This event provides a dataset including multiple modes of tornadic development, including QLCS and supercell structures. The overarching goal of examining these three events is to compare dual ]polarization features from this larger dataset to previous work and to determine if these signatures can be a useful indication of the potential for tornadic activity associated with the amount of low ]level wind shear in the near ]storm environment.

Crowe, Christina C.↗

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗

Numerical Simulation of Rocket Exhaust Interaction with Lunar Soil

This technology development originated from the need to assess the debris threat resulting from soil material erosion induced by landing spacecraft rocket plume impingement on extraterrestrial planetary surfaces. The impact of soil debris was observed to be highly detrimental during NASA s Apollo lunar missions and will pose a threat for any future landings on the Moon, Mars, and other exploration targets. The innovation developed under this program provides a simulation tool that combines modeling of the diverse disciplines of rocket plume impingement gas dynamics, granular soil material liberation, and soil debris particle kinetics into one unified simulation system. The Unified Flow Solver (UFS) developed by CFDRC enabled the efficient, seamless simulation of mixed continuum and rarefied rocket plume flow utilizing a novel direct numerical simulation technique of the Boltzmann gas dynamics equation. The characteristics of the soil granular material response and modeling of the erosion and liberation processes were enabled through novel first principle-based granular mechanics models developed by the University of Florida specifically for the highly irregularly shaped and cohesive lunar regolith material. These tools were integrated into a unique simulation system that accounts for all relevant physics aspects: (1) Modeling of spacecraft rocket plume impingement flow under lunar vacuum environment resulting in a mixed continuum and rarefied flow; (2) Modeling of lunar soil characteristics to capture soil-specific effects of particle size and shape composition, soil layer cohesion and granular flow physics; and (3) Accurate tracking of soil-borne debris particles beginning with aerodynamically driven motion inside the plume to purely ballistic motion in lunar far field conditions. In the earlier project phase of this innovation, the capabilities of the UFS for mixed continuum and rarefied flow situations were validated and demonstrated for lunar lander rocket plume flow impingement under lunar vacuum conditions. Applications and improvements to the granular flow simulation tools contributed by the University of Florida were tested against Earth environment experimental results. Requirements for developing, validating, and demonstrating this solution environment were clearly identified, and an effective second phase execution plan was devised. In this phase, the physics models were refined and fully integrated into a production-oriented simulation tool set. Three-dimensional simulations of Apollo Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) and Altair landers (including full-scale lander geometry) established the practical applicability of the UFS simulation approach and its advanced performance level for large-scale realistic problems.

Liever, Peter↗

Motion Imagery and Robotics Application (MIRA): Standards-Based Robotics

This technology development originated from the need to assess the debris threat resulting from soil material erosion induced by landing spacecraft rocket plume impingement on extraterrestrial planetary surfaces. The impact of soil debris was observed to be highly detrimental during NASA s Apollo lunar missions and will pose a threat for any future landings on the Moon, Mars, and other exploration targets. The innovation developed under this program provides a simulation tool that combines modeling of the diverse disciplines of rocket plume impingement gas dynamics, granular soil material liberation, and soil debris particle kinetics into one unified simulation system. The Unified Flow Solver (UFS) developed by CFDRC enabled the efficient, seamless simulation of mixed continuum and rarefied rocket plume flow utilizing a novel direct numerical simulation technique of the Boltzmann gas dynamics equation. The characteristics of the soil granular material response and modeling of the erosion and liberation processes were enabled through novel first principle-based granular mechanics models developed by the University of Florida specifically for the highly irregularly shaped and cohesive lunar regolith material. These tools were integrated into a unique simulation system that accounts for all relevant physics aspects: (1) Modeling of spacecraft rocket plume impingement flow under lunar vacuum environment resulting in a mixed continuum and rarefied flow; (2) Modeling of lunar soil characteristics to capture soil-specific effects of particle size and shape composition, soil layer cohesion and granular flow physics; and (3) Accurate tracking of soil-borne debris particles beginning with aerodynamically driven motion inside the plume to purely ballistic motion in lunar far field conditions.

Martinez, Lindolfo↗

Optimization of Photovoltaic Performance Through the Integration of Electrodynamic Dust Shield Layers

The viability of photovoltaics on the Lunar and Martian surfaces may be determined by their ability to withstand significant degradation in the Lunar and Martian environments. One of the greatest threats is posed by fine dust particles which are continually blown about the surfaces. In an effort to determine the extent of the threat, and to investigate some abatement strategies, a series of experiments were conducted outdoors and in the Moon and Mars environmental chamber at the Florida Solar Energy Center. Electrodynamic dust shield prototypes based on the electric curtain concept have been developed by our collaborators at the Kennedy Space Center [1]. These thin film layers can remove dust from surfaces and prevent dust accumulation. Several types of dust shields were designed, built and tested under high vacuum conditions and simulated lunar gravity to validate the technology for lunar exploration applications. Gallium arsenide, single crystal and polycrystalline silicon photovoltaic integrated devices were designed, built and tested under Moon and Mars environmental conditions as well as under ambient conditions. Photovoltaic efficiency measurements were performed on each individual cell with the following configurations; without an encapsulation layer, with a glass covering, and with various thin film dust shields. It was found that the PV efficiency of the hybrid systems was unaffected by these various thin film dust shields, proving that the optical transmission of light through the device is virtually uninhibited by these layers. The future goal of this project is to incorporate a photovoltaic cell as the power source for the electrodynamic dust shield system, and experimentally show the effective removal of dust obstructing any light incident on the cell, thus insuring power production is maximized over time.

Nason, Steven↗

The Importance of Earth as a Meteor Detector

In order to understand the complex meteoroid environment that threatens spacecraft in near Earth space, ground based observational techniques provide us with an effective option for evaluating the important parameters of flux, speed, mass, density and directionality. While no observational method (in ]situ or ground based detectors) provides bias free measurements of direct quantities, there are several benefits to using the Earth as a detector for calibrating meteoroid models that extend to the inner Solar System and beyond Earth fs orbit. The Earth constantly interacts with meteoritic particles from comets and asteroids as they evolve from their parent objects through dynamical processes. Modeling these dynamical processes with a physics ]based approach can help reveal the causes of observational features but developing those models involves constraining sequences of poorly defined parameters. These parameters must be tuned to a particular detector that offers direct or indirect measurements of mass, density, flux and speed - the quantities used in evaluating penetration risk. The following topics will be discussed: a) Consistency between ground based and in.situ measurements of flux in Earth orbit. b) Consistency between radar and electro.optical speed determinations and agreement of these with dynamical studies. c) The fact that there are six sporadic sources which cannot be determined by integrated line of sight emissivity: Observations using IRAS or COBE cannot give you all important directionality needed for risk evaluations. d) The large collecting area of the Earth s atmosphere compared to in.situ detectors gives better number statistics in the threat regime. The NASA Meteoroid Environment Office utilizes ground based radar and electro.optical measurements to calibrate the Meteoroid Engineering Model (MEM). As MEM is an engineering design model our main emphasis is on threat size particle, speed, flux and directionality. However, MEM has acknowledged limitations particularly with regard to source strength as a function of mass and work is proceeding with improved distributions that will rectify many of these shortcomings.

Koehler, Heather↗

Development of a Standard Test Scenario to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Portable Fire Extinguishers on Lithium-ion Battery Fires

Many sources of fuel are present aboard current spacecraft, with one especially hazardous source of stored energy: lithium ion batteries. Lithium ion batteries are a very hazardous form of fuel due to their self-sustaining combustion once ignited, for example, by an external heat source. Batteries can become extremely energetic fire sources due to their high density electrochemical energy content that may, under duress, be violently converted to thermal energy and fire in the form of a thermal runaway. Currently, lithium ion batteries are the preferred types of batteries aboard international spacecraft and therefore are routinely installed, collectively forming a potentially devastating fire threat to a spacecraft and its crew. Currently NASA is developing a fine water mist portable fire extinguisher for future use on international spacecraft. As its development ensues, a need for the standard evaluation of various types of fire extinguishers against this potential threat is required to provide an unbiased means of comparing between fire extinguisher technologies and ranking them based on performance.

Juarez, Alfredo↗

Kennedy Space Center Spaceport Analysis

Until the Shuttle Atlantis' final landing on July 21, 2011, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) served as NASA's main spaceport, which is a launch and landing facility for rockets and spacecraft that are attempting to enter orbit. Many of the facilities at KSC were created to assist the Shuttle Program. One of the most important and used facilities is the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), This was the main landing area for the return of the shuttle after her mission in space. · However, the SLF has also been used for a number of other projects including straight-line testing by Gibbs Racing, weather data collection by NOAA, and an airfield for the KSC helicopters. This runway is three miles long with control tower at midfield and a fire department located at the end in care of an emergency. This facility, which was part of the great space race, will continue to be used for historical events as Kennedy begins to commercialize its facilities. KSC continues to be an important spaceport to the government, and it will transform into an important spaceport for the commercial industry as well. During my internship at KSC's Center Planning and Development Directorate, I had the opportunity to be a part of the negotiation team working on the agreement for Space Florida to control the Shuttle Landing Facility. This gave me the opportunity to learn about all the changes that are occurring here at Kennedy Space Center. Through various meetings, I discovered the Master Plan and its focus is to transform the existing facilities that were primarily used for the Shuttle Program, to support government operations and commercial flights in the future. This. idea is also in a new strategic business plan and completion of a space industry market analysis. All of these different documentations were brought to my attention and I. saw how they came together in the discussions of transitioning the SLF to a commercial operator, Space Florida. After attending meetings and partaking in discussions for the SLF Agreement, I formed the idea of a Spaceport Analysis as my over internship project. As previously stated, I had the opportunity to sit in on the market analysis meetings and read through the analysis itself. I suggested the creation of a Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats (SWOT) analysis, which allows an individual to see an overview of the company's strengths and weaknesses alongside any industry opportunities and threats. After discussions with the lead writer of the new strategic business plan and getting approval, I took the action upon myself and created the Kennedy Space Center SWOT Analysis.

Wary, Samantha A.↗

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper

data links↗

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper.

Iannicca, Dennis C.↗

An Investigation of Low Earth Orbit Internal Charging

Low Earth orbit is usually considered a relatively benign environment for internal charging threats due to the low flux of penetrating electrons with energies of a few MeV that are encountered over an orbit. There are configurations, however, where insulators and ungrounded conductors used on the outside of a spacecraft hull may charge when exposed to much lower energy electrons of some 100's keV in a process that is better characterized as internal charging than surface charging. For example, the minimal radiation shielding afforded by thin thermal control materials such as metalized polymer sheets (e.g., aluminized Kapton or Mylar) and multilayer insulation may allow electrons of 100's of keV to charge underlying materials. Yet these same thermal control materials protect the underlying insulators and ungrounded conductors from surface charging currents due to electrons and ions at energies less than a few keV as well as suppress the photoemission, secondary electron, and backscattered electron processes associated with surface charging. We investigate the conditions required for this low Earth orbit "internal charging" to occur and evaluate the environments for which the process may be a threat to spacecraft. First, we describe a simple one-dimensional internal charging model that is used to compute the charge accumulation on materials under thin shielding. Only the electron flux that penetrates exposed surface shielding material is considered and we treat the charge balance in underlying insulation as a parallel plate capacitor accumulating charge from the penetrating electron flux and losing charge due to conduction to a ground plane. Charge dissipation due to conduction can be neglected to consider the effects of charging an ungrounded conductor. In both cases, the potential and electric field is computed as a function of time. An additional charge loss process is introduced due to an electrostatic discharge current when the electric field reaches a prescribed breakdown strength. For simplicity, the amount of charge lost in the discharge is treated as a random percentage of the total charge between a set maximum and minimum amount so a user can consider partial discharges of insulating materials (small loss of charge) or arcing from a conductor (large loss of charge). We apply the model to electron flux measurements from the NOAA-19 spacecraft to demonstrate that charging can reach levels where electrostatic discharges occur and estimate the magnitude of the discharge.

NeergaardParker, Linda↗