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Herbaceous Feedstock 2020 (State of Technology Report)

The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 required a minimum supply of 36 million gallons of renewable fuels per year by 2022. In order to achieve these goals, the Bioenergy Technologies Office (BETO) has set cost and technology targets for producing advanced and cellulosic biofuels. One of the targets is to validate feedstock supply infrastructures and systems with 90% overall operating effectiveness and field-to-reactor throat delivered cost less than $85.51/dry ton (2016). As stated by the 2017 Multi-Year Program Plan (DOE 2017), the research and development focus of the Feedstock Technologies (FT) platform is reducing the cost, improving the supply chain logistic efficiency, improving biomass quality, and increasing the supply volume. In addition, BETO oversees annual State of Technology (SOT) report that assesses current technologies that are relevant to BETO’s targets based on actual data and experimental results. Feedstocks are essential to achieving BETO goals because the cost, quality, and quantity of feedstock available and accessible at any given time limit the maximum volume of biofuels that can be produced. In accordance with the 2016 Multi-Year Program Plan (DOE 2016a), FT focuses on (1) reducing the delivered cost of sustainably produced biomass, (2) preserving and improving the physical and chemical quality parameters of harvested biomass to meet the individual needs of biorefineries and other biomass users, and (3) expanding the quantity of feedstock materials accessible to the bioenergy industry. This is done by identifying, developing, demonstrating, and validating efficient and economical integrated systems for harvest and collection, storage, handling, transport, and preprocessing raw biomass from a variety of crops to reliably deliver the required supplies of high-quality, affordable feedstocks to biorefineries as the industry expands. The elements of cost, quality, and quantity are key considerations when developing advanced feedstock supply concepts and systems (DOE 2016a).

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

DHS Research Experience Summary

I learned a great deal during my summer internship at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). I plan to continue a career in research, and I feel that my experience at LLNL has been formative. I was exposed to a new area of research, as part of the Single Particle Aerosol Mass Spectrometry (SPAMS) group, and I had the opportunity to work on projects that I would not have been able to work on anywhere else. The projects both involved the use of a novel mass spectrometer that was developed at LLNL, so I would not have been able to do this research at any other facility. The first project that Zachary and I worked on involved using SPAMS to detect pesticides. The ability to rapidly detect pesticides in a variety of matrices is applicable to many fields including public health, homeland security, and environmental protection. Real-time, or near real-time, detection of potentially harmful or toxic chemical agents can offer significant advantages in the protection of public health from accidental or intentional releases of harmful pesticides, and can help to monitor the environmental effects of controlled releases of pesticides for pest control purposes. The use of organophosphate neurotoxins by terrorists is a possibility that has been described; this is a legitimate threat, considering the ease of access, toxicity, and relatively low cost of these substances. Single Particle Aerosol Mass Spectrometry (SPAMS) has successfully been used to identify a wide array of chemical compounds, including drugs, high explosives, biological materials, and chemical warfare agent simulants. Much of this groundbreaking work was carried out by our group at LLNL. In our work, we had the chance to show that SPAMS fulfills a demonstrated need for a method of carrying out real-time pesticide detection with minimal sample preparation. We did this by using a single particle aerosol mass spectrometer to obtain spectra of five different pesticides. Pesticide samples were chosen to represent four common classes of pesticides that are currently used in the US. Permethrin (a pyrethrin insecticide), dichlorvos and malathion (organophosphates), imidacloprid (a chloronicotinyl pesticide), and carbaryl (a carbamate) were selected for analysis. Samples were aerosolized either in water (using a plastic nebulizer) or in ethanol (using a glass nebulizer), and the particles entered the SPAMS instrument through a focusing lens stack. The particles then passed through a stage with three tracking lasers that were used to determine each particle's velocity. This velocity was used to calculate when to fire a desorption/ionization (D/I) laser in order to fragment the particle for analysis in a dual polarity time of flight mass spectrometer. Signals were digitized, and then analyzed using LLNL-developed software. We obtained chemical mass spectral signatures for each pesticide, and assigned peaks to the mass spectra based on our knowledge of the pesticides chemical structures. We then proved the robustness of our detection method by identifying the presence of pesticides in two real-world matrices: Raid{trademark} Ant Spray and a flea collar. To sample these, we simply needed to direct aerosolized particles into the SPAMS instrument. The minimal sample preparation required makes SPAMS very attractive as a detector. Essentially, we were able to show that SPAMS is a reliable and effective method for detecting pesticides at extremely low concentrations in a variety of matrices and physical states. The other project that I had the opportunity to be a part of did not involve data collection in the lab; it consisted of analyzing a large amount of data that had already been collected. We got to look at data collected over the course of about two months, when the SPAMS instrument was deployed to a public place. The machine sampled the air and collected spectra for over two months, storing all the spectra and associated data; we then looked at an approximately two-month subset of this data to search for patterns in the types of particles being detected. Essentially, we were able to identify particle types among all the spectra collected by clustering the spectra into groups of similar spectra. This was done using software that had been previously developed by our group (Dr. Paul Steele, a former group member, was instrumental in helping us learn how to use the software). Once we had found particles that seemed to recur, we faced the task of trying to figure out what these particles were. To do this, we compared the average spectra for each major cluster to those of several common compounds. We were able to tentatively identify at least one compound this way. We also looked at patterns in the appearance of different compounds. For instance, there were some compounds that only appeared at certain times of the day.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Sensitive Resources Assessment and Forest Analysis for the Proposed Versatile Test Reactor, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

The US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a leading institution in advanced materials, supercomputing, neutrons, and nuclear science. As a research laboratory managed by UT-Battelle, LLC for DOE, ORNL has national priorities in energy, security, and scientific discovery that necessitate facility improvements and expansions. DOE is also committed to environmental stewardship. The laboratory is located on the ~32,000-acre (~13,000-ha) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), much of which is categorized as a National Environmental Research Park (NERP) and a state Wildlife Management Area. DOE works with the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA), Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), US Department of Agriculture, and other agencies to serve as an effective steward of the ORR. Accordingly, project managers must conform to environmental regulations, agreements, and policies at the federal, state, and institutional levels. Per 40 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) 1508.14, potential effects on research and science education also represent potential effects of federal actions on the NERP, and impacts on, e.g., deer harvest, must be considered on the Oak Ridge Wildlife Management Area when other aspects of the human environment are affected. The United States currently has no fast neutron testing capability to support advanced nuclear research and development. The proposed Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) will take advantage of current investments by the US government and private industry in nuclear reactors to expedite the design and construction process, using proven technology to create a world-class scientific infrastructure. The VTR will take advantage of fast neutrons provided by this proven technology, along with a capability to rapidly insert, conduct, and remove state-of-the-art experiments. An advantage of the VTR is that it can support future innovations in experimental capabilities without modifying the facility. The VTR will support progress in a variety of science and technology areas, including testing and qualification of advanced reactor fuels; testing and qualification of innovative structural materials; testing of innovative components and instruments; validation of advanced modeling and simulation tools; and versatility for future technical missions. Through proven technology, the VTR can take advantage of existing reactor designs and operating experience to reduce the risk, cost, and time for design and construction. The top available resources of DOE laboratories, industry, and universities will be used to expedite reactor design and construction toward developing the scientific infrastructure that affords a strong testing capability that can be sustained over many years. This report summarizes current knowledge of natural and cultural resources primarily within the VTR construction area. At the time of this report, the proposed VTR site design includes a construction area of ~150.4 acres (~69.9 ha), which contains an ~51.3-acre (~20.8-ha) operations area, located within forested natural areas of the ORR. The primary goal of the work presented here was to evaluate potential effects on sensitive resources that might result from development and construction activities associated with VTR. In addition to on-the-ground surveys during spring and summer 2020 by the ORNL Natural Resources Management Program and Aquatic Ecology Group staff, this report makes use of historical (pre-1995) and contemporary (1995 to present) data from additional confirmed sources (e.g., TDEC). Likewise, forest conditions were compiled from a 2011 forest inventory and supplemented with limited ground observations in 2020. The individuals who obtained and compiled the data presented here are familiar with and routinely assess sensitive resources on the ORR. Anyone who references this report must consider that the timing of surveys did not permit a complete delineation of the resources that will be affected. If the VTR project proceeds, additional surveys will be required to account for the seasonal patterns of various threatened and endangered species. Data deficiencies and potential resources that likely went undetected are indicated where possible. Accordingly, this report should facilitate more environmentally sound decisions during planning and 2 development of the VTR site, provide a foundation for further assessment of sensitive and cultural resources, and help project managers better address regulatory guidance and DOE policies on sustainable development in compliance with, for example, the US Endangered Species Act (ESA), Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), Tennessee Rare Plant Protection and Conservation Act of 1985, Tennessee Nongame and Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Conservation Act of 1974, several federal and state regulations regarding aquatic resource protection, and site-specific policies as outlined in various ORR management plans developed by ORNL and TWRA for DOE.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

In-situ X-Ray Analysis of Rapid Thermal Processing for Thin-Film Solar Cells: Closing the Gap between Production and Laboratory Efficiency

For materials synthesis, it is well known that the material final state may not reach equilibrium and depends on the synthetic process. In particular, processes that quickly remove the available energy from the material may leave it in a metastable state and the metastability may actually impart desirable functional properties. By its very nature, Rapid thermal processing (RTP) is ideally suited to produce such metastable materials. However, metastability and the dynamics of reaching a metastable state are poorly understood, since this is best accomplished through in situ monitoring. In this regard, RTP is particularly challenging as the processing time are very short (seconds to minutes). As a result, there is only poor understanding, and hence use, of RTP in industry. This is potentially a cost-increasing limitation, because RTP can decrease cost by decreasing processing time, and as such, increase throughput and decrease the total thermal budget of processing - a significant cost. RTP is already being used for key processing steps in PV technologies. With silicon wafer PV, it is used for establishing electrical contact between the Ag metal grid and the silicon (known as firing). In this process, a silicon wafer with deposited metal/frit in a grid pattern is heated rapidly to temperatures between 750 and 800 ºC. The processing time when the temperature is held above 600ºC is short (<5 seconds). This process has historically been optimized empirically and it is unclear how the thermal processing affects formation of the final contact between the metal and the silicon. In the case of thin-film PV, RTP has been demonstrated in the process of making absorber layers, i.e. CIGS and CZTS. Use of RTP can reduce the processing time from 10s of minutes to seconds, reducing the thermal budget and increasing the throughput significantly. The conversion from precursor material to final PV material is not well understood, and most of the process optimization is done empirically. Again, the proposed in situ monitoring will provide insight into the conversion process. We have developed a unique instrument for in situ monitoring of the reaction process during RTP. The most fundamental property to monitor is the atomic arrangement (for solids, crystalline structure) and thus we have focused on this property. The chamber was designed to collect X-ray diffraction (XRD) for crystal phase determination, although it has lent insight in the formation of liquids. We designed and constructed both inert (air) and reactive (S/Se) versions of this chamber. We have applied the RTP-XRD methodology to: silicon solar cell electrical contact formation; the reaction sequence for forming CIGS PV thin films from copper selenide and indium gallium selenide precursors; the phase sequence for forming HC(NH2)2PbI3 (FAPbI3) and CH3NH3PbI3 (MAPbI3) hybrid-perovskite PV thin films. The RTP instrument enables real-time collection of X-ray diffraction data with intervals as short as 100 ms, and while heating at ramp rates as high 100 ºCs-1 up to 1200 ºC. The system is portable and can be installed on a synchrotron beamline. The RTP reactor consists of a metallic body (front cap assembly, central block and end cap assembly) that houses a quartz reaction chamber. The sample is secured inside the reaction chamber on a sample holder connected to the front-cap assembly. Modifications of the chamber were made for safely handling sulfur and selenium vapor environments. A Se/S source holder was added to generate a Se/S over pressure in the chamber on heating and the entrance window is made wider in order to accommodate the detachable additional holder. Se/S are toxic in nature and therefore a proper Se/S trapping is used before releasing the gases to exhaust. Screen-printing provides an economically attractive means for making Ag electrical contacts to Si solar cells, but the use of Ag substantiates a significant manufacturing cost, and the glass frit used in the paste to enable contact formation contains Pb. To achieve optimal electrical performance and to develop pastes with alternative, abundant, and non-toxic materials requires understanding the contact formation process during firing. We use the RTP-XRD chamber during firing of Ag-Si contacts to reveal the reaction sequence for contact formation. The findings show that between 500 ºC and 650 ºC PbO in the frit etches the SiNx antireflective-coating on the solar cell, exposing the Si surface. Then, above 650 ºC, Ag+ dissolves into the molten glass frit – key for enabling deposition of metallic Ag on the emitter surface and precipitation of Ag nanocrystals within the glass. This clarifies contact formation mechanisms and can be used to suggest approaches for development of inexpensive, nontoxic solar cell contacting pastes. We used the RTP/XRD chamber to study the formation of CuInGaS/Se (CIGS) PV films by in-situ selenization of pre-deposited metal stacks and annealing of pre-deposited Cu-In-Ga-Se precursors. During the metal stack selenization, we observed that Se first reacts with the metals and forms selenides. We observed formation of intermetallics such as Cu2In and binary selenides during heating. On further annealing in a Se atmosphere, CuInSe2 and CuGaSe2 forms which on heating up to 550 °C reacts further to form the CIGS phase. On prolonged exposure to 550 °C for more than 5 mins or higher temperature, we see separation into Ga-rich and Ga-depleted CIGS phases. On introducing a holding step at 400 °C for 10 min during the annealing ramp, the CIGS phase (forms between 500-550 °C), appears to be less prone to decomposition into high-Ga and low-Ga phases during holding at peak temperature. Lead halide perovskites have emerged as successful optoelectronic materials with high photovoltaic power conversion efficiencies and low material cost. However, substantial challenges remain in the scalability, stability and fundamental understanding of the materials. We demonstrated the application of radiative thermal annealing, an easily scalable processing method, for synthesizing formamidinium lead iodide (FAPbI3) perovskite solar absorbers. Devices fabricated from films formed via radiative thermal annealing have equivalent efficiencies to those annealed using a conventional hotplate. By coupling results from in situ x-ray diffraction using a radiative thermal annealing system with device performances, we mapped the processing phase space of FAPbI3 and corresponding device efficiencies. Our map of processing-structure-performance space suggests the commonly used FAPbI3 annealing time, 10 min at 170 °C, can be significantly reduced to 40 s at 170 °C without affecting the photovoltaic performance. Applying the Johnson-Mehl-Avrami model to the decomposition into PbI2, the activation energy was determined. We also presented a well-controlled, manufacturing relevant annealing method, radiative thermal annealing, for the methylammonium lead triiodide films formed by solvent engineering process, with dimethylformamide (DMF) and dimethyl sulfoxide as solvent and diethyl ether as the antisolvent. Radiative thermal annealing can produce high quality perovskite films, evidenced by high efficiency solar cell devices, in a shorter time than the widely-used hotplate annealing. Using in-situ x-ray diffraction during the radiative annealing, we show that the role of the antisolvent is not to form an intermediate compound (a methylammonium iodide, lead iodide, and dimethyl sulfoxide compound) by washing of the main solvent (DMF) but to achieve a pin-hole free, uniform film of methylammonium lead iodide. We find that having the intermediate compound does not guarantee a high quality (pin-hole free) perovskite film. Our study was extended to reveal the effect of annealing environment, annealing temperature profile, and deposition substrate.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

A Plan to Qualify New Fuel for the High Flux Isotope Reactor for Material Minimization

The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is one of five high power research reactors the Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) Program, Office of Conversion is working to convert from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This effort stems from the primary objective within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to achieve permanent threat reduction by minimizing, and when possible, eliminating weapon-usable nuclear material around the world. Under M3’s Office of Conversion, the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor (USHPRR) Project is pursuing fuel qualification and licensing of the high-performance reactors to operate with LEU fuels. All high-performance reactors except HFIR will be converted to LEU monolithic uranium-molybdenum alloy fuel. HFIR will be evaluated for conversion to LEU using a uranium silicide fuel, namely, U3Si2-Al dispersion fuel.The mission of the USHPRR Project is to develop the technology needed to reduce, and eventually eliminate, worldwide use of HEU in civilian applications. The goal is to develop the technical means needed to use low enriched uranium (LEU) instead of HEU fuel in research and test reactors without significant penalties in performance, economics, or safety of the reactors. The USHPRR Project has four major elements, called Pillars: Fuel Qualification (FQ) managed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Fuel Fabrication (FF) managed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Reactor Conversion (RC) managed at Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), and Cross-Cutting (CC) managed at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). FQ is responsible for the qualification of the fuel type. RC is responsible for supporting reactor conversion analysis and overseeing licensing submittals leading to conversions of domestic reactors to LEU fuel. For the FQ effort, FQ (INL) worked in collaboration with RC (Argonne) and ORNL to develop the plan for the uranium silicide fuel qualification for HFIR.The resulting HFIR Fuel Qualification Plan provides the general approach for the USHPRR team to move the selected uranium silicide fuel design for HFIR conversion through qualification. Authorization and use in HFIR will be approved through the DOE’s Office of Science. Uranium silicide fuel was previously qualified in NUREG-1313 at an approximate maximum heat flux of 1.4 MW/m2 and a maximum fuel section temperature of about 130°C. In addition to the different regulator process utilized by DOE, these upper limits will be exceeded in HFIR; therefore, further testing will be necessary to ensure the fuel can meet HFIR qualification requirements. The HFIR fuel loading may exceed 4.8 gU/cm3 which was determined in the NUREG-1313 safety evaluation to be acceptable for use in non-power NRC-regulated reactors provided there exist no other safety considerations. In addition, the uranium silicide fuel will need to be qualified in a HFIR-specific design. This plan includes the currently available information from the USHPRR Project Functions and Requirements document and expands these requirements to ensure that planned tests have traceable results providing evidence that the requirements have been met. Data collection methods are discussed as well as the process to show that the requirements have been met. This document is designed to provide a pathway for researchers to obtain data necessary and at the appropriate quality level for HFIR fuel qualification.

Shokes, Tamara↗

A Plan to Qualify New Fuel for the High Flux Isotope Reactor for Material Minimization

The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is one of five high power research reactors the Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) Program, Office of Conversion is working to convert from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This effort stems from the primary objective within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to achieve permanent threat reduction by minimizing, and when possible, eliminating weapon-usable nuclear material around the world. Under M3’s Office of Conversion, the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor (USHPRR) Project is pursuing fuel qualification and licensing of LEU fuels to support the high-performance reactors. All high-performance reactors except HFIR will be converted to LEU monolithic uranium-molybdenum alloy fuel. HFIR will be evaluated for conversion to LEU using a uranium silicide fuel, namely, U3Si2-Al dispersion fuel. The mission of the USHPRR Project is to develop the technology needed to reduce, and eventually eliminate, worldwide use of HEU in civilian applications. The goal is to develop the technical means needed to use low enriched uranium (LEU) instead of HEU fuel in research and test reactors without significant penalties in performance, economics, or safety of the reactors. The USHPRR Project has four major elements, called Pillars: Fuel Qualification (FQ) managed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Fuel Fabrication (FF) managed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Reactor Conversion (RC) managed at Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), and Cross-Cutting (CC) managed at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). FQ is responsible for the qualification of the fuel type. RC is responsible for supporting reactor conversion analysis and overseeing licensing submittals leading to conversions of domestic reactors to LEU fuel. For the FQ effort, FQ (INL) worked in collaboration with RC (Argonne) and ORNL to develop the plan for the uranium silicide fuel qualification for HFIR. The resulting HFIR Fuel Qualification Plan provides the general approach for the USHPRR team to move the selected uranium silicide fuel design for HFIR conversion through qualification. Authorization and use in HFIR will be approved through the DOE’s Office of Science. Uranium silicide fuel was previously qualified in NUREG-1313 at an approximate maximum heat flux of 1.4 MW/m2 and a maximum fuel section temperature of about 130°C. In addition to the different regulator process utilized by DOE, these upper limits will be exceeded in HFIR; therefore, further testing will be necessary to ensure the fuel can meet HFIR qualification requirements. The HFIR fuel loading may exceed 4.8 gU/cm3 which was determined in the NUREG-1313 safety evaluation to be acceptable for use in non-power NRC-licensed reactors provided there exist no other safety considerations. In addition, the uranium silicide fuel will need to be qualified in a HFIR-specific design. This plan includes the currently available information from the USHPRR Project Functions and Requirements document and expands these requirements to ensure that planned tests have traceable results providing evidence that the requirements have been met. Data collection methods are discussed as well as the process to show that the requirements have been met. This document is designed to provide a pathway for researchers to obtain data necessary and at the appropriate quality level for HFIR fuel qualification

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Compatibility Study for Plastic, Elastomeric, and Metallic Fueling Infrastructure Materials Exposed to Aggressive Formulations of Isobutanol-blended Gasoline

The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 is an omnibus energy policy law designed to move the United States toward greater energy security and independence. A key provision of EISA is the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which requires the nation to use 36 billion gallons per year (BGPY) of renewable fuel in vehicles by 2022. Ethanol is the most widely used renewable fuel, and increasing the allowable ethanol content from 10% to 15% is expected to push renewable fuel consumption to as much as 21 BGPY. Therefore, a large portion of the 36 billion gallon requirement can be met by increasing the ethanol content in gasoline to 15%. However, raising the ethanol content to 15%, by itself, will still not fully meet the RSF requirement, and concerns have been raised that this increase in ethanol may not be entirely compatible with current and legacy materials used in standard gasoline fueling systems. In the summer of 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recognized the need to assess the impact of intermediate blends of ethanol on the fueling infrastructure, specifically those systems located at the fueling station. A short time later (March 2009), Growth Energy (a coalition of ethanol producers and supporters) requested a waiver from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to allow the use of 15% ethanol in gasoline. In 1981 the EPA approved a waiver (known as the OCTAMIX waiver) that allowed other alcohol types (such as methanol) to be blended with gasoline as long as the resulting fuel blend was substantially similar to gasoline. Another requirement is that the fuel oxygen content cannot exceed 3.7 wt %. Currently, this requirement limits ethanol in gasoline to 10 vol %. The corresponding oxygen equivalent for isobutanol is 16 vol %; therefore, isobutanol offers a pathway towards meeting the RFS requirement by allowing greater biofuel usage than can be achieved by ethanol alone. In fact, the United States has already hit the “blend wall” for ethanol, the point at which virtually all gasoline sold is E10 and no remaining market is left for ethanol, meaning that the country cannot substantially increase ethanol usage unless the EPA allows for higher levels of ethanol or until E85 use is expanded significantly. Butamax Advanced Biofuels, LLC has developed proprietary technologies to convert corn into isobutanol. Much of the infrastructure already existing at ethanol plants can be readily converted to produce isobutanol instead. The focus of this investigation was to compare the compatibility of fueling infrastructure materials (such as elastomers, plastics, and metals) to test fuels representing E10 and E15 and their corresponding oxygen equivalents with isobutanol (iBu16 and iBu24). Butamax sponsored a research project at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to perform empirical studies using aggressive fuel formulations representing 16 and 24% isobutanol. The results contained within this report include a solubility analysis for each material type and fuel formulation and empirical results for elastomers, plastics, and metals. Data obtained from the preceding ethanol compatibility studies on these materials are included for additional interpretation and summary.

Kass, Michael D.↗

Preliminary Long-term Safety Assessment for the Planned LLW Disposal Facility at Al-Tuwaitha, Iraq - 18142

Before 1991, Iraq had a significant nuclear program which encompassed ten nuclear sites spread out across the country. The largest nuclear site was located at the Al-Tuwaitha site near Baghdad where 18 nuclear facilities were concentrated. During the first Gulf War in 1991, all sites suffered significant damage from bombing and subsequent looting. Currently, the Ministry of Science and Technology is responsible for the ten heavily damaged nuclear sites and for the management of radioactive waste in Iraq in general. The task of decommissioning the damaged nuclear facilities and managing the resulting waste is being supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Commission (EC), and the United States (US). In the framework of its Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), the EC has launched a cooperation project to support the planned construction of an engineered repository for short-lived low- and intermediate level waste for the safe disposal of radioactive waste resulting from the decommissioning activities, as well as for waste from the continuing use of radioisotopes in medicine and the oil and gas industry in the country. The main objectives of this project, which was awarded to a Consortium led by NUKEM Technologies Engineering Services GmbH and joined by DBE Technology GmbH of Germany and JAVYS a.s. of Slovakia, are the development of an initial conceptual level basic design and preliminary safety assessment report (PSAR) and the subsequent detailed engineering design and supporting pre-construction safety assessment report (PCSAR). The current paper focuses on the development of the PSAR. Special focus is given to the long-term calculations and difficulties associated with the limited data base in regard to site characterization as well as the expected inventory for the future repository. Because of the ongoing security concerns in Iraq, the Ministry of Science and Technology had already selected the Al-Tuwaitha Site as the best suited location for the planned surface repository at the start of the project. Although some site characterization work had already been carried out prior to the start of the project, certain data for modelling the geology and hydrology of the site are still lacking. Missing data have been compensated by conservative assumptions and the assessment of alternative scenarios. Consequently, for the development of the simplified GoldSim{sup R} computer model used to carry out the long-term calculations supporting the PSAR, existing site information was used and, as appropriate, amended or replaced by conservative assumptions. Due to the nature of the waste, data on the expected inventory are associated with large uncertainties. Although certain estimates related to the future volume of the waste exist, little to no information is available on the expected radionuclide vector and respective activities. Therefore, the long-term calculations were carried out for a generic inventory including a broad range of radionuclides that are to be expected as being important considering the kind of waste to be disposed of in the facility. Based on the results of these calculations, the maximum total capacity of the facility was estimated and converted into activity limits for individual radionuclides that will be integrated into the existing general WAC for the facility. Compliance with these WAC will then guarantee the safety of the repository in regard to potential radionuclide releases via the groundwater pathway. In parallel to the determination of activity limits for the WAC, long-term calculations were carried using different estimates for the expected total activity to determine the general suitability of the proposed technical solution of the repository for receiving the total amount of Iraqi radioactive waste principally acceptable for surface disposal. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Ultra-High-Performance Concrete And Advanced Manufacturing Methods For Modular Construction

Small modular reactors (SMR) allow for less onsite construction, increase nuclear material security, and provide a flexible and cost-effective energy alternative. SMR can be factory-built as modular components, and shipped to desired locations for fast assembly. This project successfully developed a new class of ultra-high performance concrete (UHPC), which features a compressive strength greater than 22 ksi (150 MPa) without special treatment and self-consolidating characteristics desired for SMR modular construction. With an ultra-high strength and dense microstructure, it will facilitate rapid construction of steel plate-concrete (SC) beams and walls with thinner and lighter modules, and can withstand harsh environments and mechanical loads anticipated during the service life of nuclear power plants. In addition, the self-consolidating characteristics are crucial for the fast construction and assembly of SC modules with reduced labor costs and improved quality. Following the UHPC material development, the capacity of producing self-consolidating UHPC in mass quantities was investigated and compared to accepted self-consolidating concrete standards. With slightly adjusted mixing procedure using large-scale gravity-based mixers (compared with small-scale force-based mixer), the self-consolidating UHPC has been successfully processed at six cubic yards; the product met both minimum compressive strength requirements and self-consolidating concrete standards. Steel plate-UHPC beams (15 ft. long, 12 in. wide and 16 in. deep) and wall panels (40 in. X 40 in. X 3 in.) were then constructed using the self-consolidating UHPC without any external vibration. Quality control guidelines for producing UHPC in large scale were developed. When the concrete is replaced by UHPC in a steel plate concrete (SC) beam, it is critical to evaluate its structural behavior with both flexure and shear-governed failure modes. In recent years, SC has been widely used for buildings and nuclear containment structures to resist lateral forces induced by severe earthquakes and heavy winds. SC modules have good potential for SMR because of their cost-effectiveness and reduced construction time. However, the minimum shear reinforcement (i.e. cross tie) ratio needs to be determined for the steel plate-UHPC (S-UHPC) beams to exhibit a ductile failure mode. In this project, S-UHPC beams were designed and constructed. The beams were tested to evaluate structural capacity and identify the minimum cross ties ratios. In addition, as the bond between UHPC and steel plate is essential for ensuring structural integrity under shear and flexure, it was measured and examined in this project through digital image correlation system and smart piezoelectric aggregate sensors. Large-scale testing and finite element simulation were also performed on S-UHPC wall panels. New bond slip-based constitutive models of steel plate were developed for S-UHPC, which were used in finite element analysis program to predict S-UHPC behavior under shear. The results were well validated through experimental data. The long-term durability of UHPC were established in this project. UHPC specimens were tested under free shrinkage, restrained shrinkage, elevated temperature, water permeation, chloride diffusion, corrosion, and alkali silica reaction. UHPC has demonstrated significantly improved durability compared with control concrete specimens. This research led to a new generation of steel plate-UHPC modules for SMR that can provide large benefits to the electric power industry. Taking advantage of the high strength and durability of UHPC, their modularity and ease of assembly can address the high cost barriers of typical nuclear power plants.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Bringing Alaska's Carbon Ore, Rare Earth, and Critical Minerals (CORE-CM) into Perspective

The final report outlines the outcomes of the Alaska CORE-CM Program, funded by the U.S. Department of Energy under award DE-FE0032050. Led by the University of Alaska Fairbanks and the Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys, with assistance from other organizations, the project assessed Alaska's potential for Carbon Ore, Rare Earth Elements, and Critical Minerals (CORE-CM). Leveraging advanced analytical techniques, the project identified high-potential resource basins, evaluated geochemical and satellite data, and conducted targeted field investigations. Findings revealed promising concentrations of critical minerals in legacy samples and newly collected materials. The project also investigated innovative extraction technologies, including BioExtraction and use of supercritical CO2, which show significant promise for sustainable resource recovery. Additionally, the study explored the reuse of waste streams from active mining operations and coal byproducts such as using alkali-activated coal ash to manufacture concrete. Infrastructure and logistical challenges in Alaska’s remote regions are discussed, alongside strategies to establish a Technology Innovation Center aimed at advancing CORE-CM development in Alaska. The report includes actionable insights to support Alaska’s critical role in securing domestic supplies of essential minerals while addressing economic, environmental, and technological challenges.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

SIGNATURES OF ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY APPROACHES AND RESULTS

The illicit trafficking of strategic nuclear commodities (defined here as the goods needed for a covert nuclear program excluding special nuclear materials) poses a significant challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation community. Export control regulations, both domestically and internationally, seek to inhibit the spread of strategic nuclear commodities by restricting their sale to parties that may use them for nefarious purposes. However, export controls alone are not sufficient for preventing the illicit transfer of strategic nuclear goods. There are two major pitfalls to relying solely on export control regulations for the deterrence of proliferation of strategic goods. First, export control enforcement today relies heavily on the honesty and willingness of participants to adhere to the legal framework already in place. Secondly, current practices focus on the evaluation of single records which allow for the necessary goods to be purchased separately and hidden within the thousands of legitimate commerce transactions that occur each day, disregarding strategic information regarding several purchases. Our research presents two preliminary data-centric approaches for investigating procurement networks of strategic nuclear commodities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been putting significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. In particular, the PNNL Signature Discovery Initiative (SDI) has codified several scientific methodologies for the detection, characterization, and prediction of signatures that are indicative of a phenomenon of interest. The methodologies and tools developed under SDI have already been applied successfully to problems in bio-forensics, cyber security and power grid balancing efforts and they have now made the nonproliferation of strategic goods into a challenge problem for testing their methodology and tools. As a first step towards the detection and characterization of illicit procurement networks, our research examines procurement networks as defined by a system of entities (people or companies) that enter into transactions of specific items with one another. Once we have defined such networks, we are interested in answering questions about the behavior and characterization of such networks. The questions we wish to answer regarding procurement networks are, first, “Can we detect networks within large, noisy datasets?” and second, “To what extent can we compare multiple networks and identify their similarities?” As procurement networks can be naturally viewed as a graph, we have employed several graph analytic tools to aid in these tasks. In particular, Graphscape, an SDI tool, uses a novel method to approximate edit distance, a graph distance measure based on the number of changes needed to transform one graph into another, in order to measure how similar two given graphs are to each other. Given a set of graphs where vertices represent companies and edges represent a shipment from company A to company B, we can calculate an all-for-all comparison of graphs. In this way, we are able to determine which graphs are most similar, and which require more changes to transform one into the other. The set of graphs to be compared can be further specialized to provide more insight, e.g., using different time periods to explore events in a company life cycle.

graph analysis↗

Technology Candidates for Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground Data Exchange

Technology Candidates for Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground Data Exchange is a two-year research effort to visualize the U. S. aviation industry at a point 50 years in the future, and to define potential communication solutions to meet those future data exchange needs. The research team, led by XCELAR, was tasked with identifying future National Airspace System (NAS) scenarios, determining requirements and functions (including gaps), investigating technical and business issues for air, ground, & air-to-ground interactions, and reporting on the results. The project was conducted under technical direction from NASA and in collaboration with XCELAR's partner, National Institute of Aerospace, and NASA technical representatives. Parallel efforts were initiated to define the information exchange functional needs of the future NAS, and specific communication link technologies to potentially serve those needs. Those efforts converged with the mapping of each identified future NAS function to potential enabling communication solutions; those solutions were then compared with, and ranked relative to, each other on a technical basis in a structured analysis process. The technical solutions emerging from that process were then assessed from a business case perspective to determine their viability from a real-world adoption and deployment standpoint. The results of that analysis produced a proposed set of future solutions and most promising candidate technologies. Gap analyses were conducted at two points in the process, the first examining technical factors, and the second as part of the business case analysis. In each case, no gaps or unmet needs were identified in applying the solutions evaluated to the requirements identified. The future communication solutions identified in the research comprise both specific link technologies and two enabling technologies that apply to most or all specific links. As a result, the research resulted in a new analysis approach, viewing the underlying architecture of ground-air and air-air communications as a whole, rather than as simple "link to function" paired solutions. For the business case analysis, a number of "reference architectures" were developed for both the future technologies and the current systems, based on three typical configurations of current aircraft. Current and future costs were assigned, and various comparisons made between the current and future architectures. In general, it was assumed that if a future architecture offers lower cost than the current typical architecture, while delivering equivalent or better performance, it is likely that the future solution will gain industry acceptance. Conversely, future architectures presenting higher costs than their current counterparts must present a compelling benefit case in other areas or risk a lack of industry acceptance. The business case analysis consistently indicated lower costs for the proposed future architectures, and in most cases, significantly so. The proposed future solutions were found to offer significantly greater functionality, flexibility, and growth potential over time, at lower cost, than current systems. This was true for overall, fleet-wide equipage for domestic and oceanic air carriers, as well as for single, General Aviation (GA) aircraft. The overall research results indicate that all identified requirements can be met by the proposed solutions with significant capacity for future growth. Results also illustrate that the majority of the future communication needs can be met using currently allocated aviation RF spectrum, if used in more effective ways than it is today. A combination of such optimized aviation-specific links and commercial communication systems meets all identified needs for the 50-year future and beyond, with the caveat that a new, overall function will be needed to manage all information exchange, individual links, security, cost, and other factors. This function was labeled "Delivery Manager" (DM) within this research. DM employs a distributed client/server architecture, for both airborne and ground communications architectures. Final research results included identifying the most promising candidate technologies for the future system, conclusions and recommendations, and identifying areas where further research should be considered.

Communications↗

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Refinement and Exploration

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nevada National Security Site Site-Directed Research and Development Report (FY 2018 Annual Report)

This report compiles multiple articles describing activities developed and performed under the Site-Directed Research and Development Program for the benefit the Nation during Fiscal Year 2018. Sustained investment and ongoing core innovation are the keys to successful research and development programs. These elements drive the Site-Directed Research and Development (SDRD) Program and provide solutions to some of the most challenging problems our nation and our allies face. Our Nevada enterprise, consisting of both our management and operating entity and our NNSA field office, is aggressively investing in SDRD and injecting innovation through strategic partnerships. Our partnerships with universities, industry, and our sister institutions within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) build upon our core capabilities and allow us to create innovative solutions to support our mission requirements. In 2018, we raised the investment level of SDRD for only the second time in the history of the program. Nearly at our congressionally authorized limit, SDRD has substantial resources to successfully address numerous issues. Investment is only one part of the equation; innovation is generated through collaborations that bring discovery and provide the “technical differentiation” and the return on investment we seek. This report demonstrates an enduring theme of how partnerships help us drive the best outcomes and provide the maximum impact possible, while using our resources efficiently.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Completion Report for Well ER-20-12: Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa

Well ER-20-12 was drilled for the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada National Security Administration Nevada Field Office in support of the Underground Test Area Activity. The well was drilled from October 2015 to January 2016 as an addition to the Central and Western Pahute Mesa corrective action units 101 and 102 the Phase II drilling program. Well ER-20-12 was identified based on recommendations of the Pahute Mesa Guidance Team as a result of anomalous tritium detections in groundwater samples collected from Well PM-3 in 2011 and 2013. The primary purpose of the well was to provide information on the hydrogeology in the area downgradient of select underground tests on Western Pahute Mesa and define hydraulic properties in the saturated Tertiary volcanic rocks. The main 46.99-centimeter (cm) (18.5-inch [in.]) borehole was drilled to a depth of 765.14 meters (m) (2,510.3 ft) and the hole opened to 66.04 cm (26 in.); followed by the 50.80-cm (20-in.) surface casing, which was installed and sealed with cement; and a piezometer (p4) was set in the Timber Mountain welded-tuff aquifer (TMWTA) between the casing and the open borehole. The borehole was continued with a 46.99-cm (18.5-in.) drill bit to a depth of 1,326.53 m (4,352.16 ft), and an intermediate 24.44-cm (9.625-in.) casing was installed and sealed to 1,188.72 m (3,900.00 ft) A piezometer (p3) was installed across the Calico Hills zeolitic composite unit (CHZCM) (lava-flow aquifer [LFA]) in the annulus of the open borehole. Two additional piezometers were installed and completed between the intermediate casing and the borehole wall, one (p2) in the CHZCM and one (p1) in the Belted Range aquifer (BRA). The piezometers are set to monitor groundwater properties in the completed intervals. The borehole was continued with a 21.59-cm (8.5-in.) drill bit to a total depth of 1,384.80 m (4,543.33 ft), and the main completion 13.97-cm (5.5-in.) casing was installed in the open borehole across the Pre-Belted Range composite unit (PBRCM). Data collected during hole construction include composite drill cutting samples collected every 3.0 m (10 ft), geophysical logs, hydrophysical logs, percussion core samples, water-quality measurements (including tritium), and water-level measurements. The well penetrated 1,384.4 m (4,543.33 ft) of Tertiary volcanic rocks. The stratigraphy and lithology were generally as expected with one noted exception. A thick lava-flow and related ash-flow tuffs were identified as Calico Hills Formation (Th), and no Crater Flat units were noted. Additionally, many of the Thirsty Canyon and Timber Mountain units were thicker than expected. Fluid levels measured in the borehole during drilling are the following: (1) on November 2, 2015, Navarro measured the fluid level in the borehole at a depth of 492.33 m (1,615.25 ft) below ground surface (bgs); (2) Schlumberger and COLOG recorded fluid levels during geophysical logging on November 4 and 5, 2015, at a depth of 492.86 m (1,617 ft) and 492.25 m (1,615 ft) bgs, respectively; and (3) on December 4, 2015, COLOG and Navarro measured fluid level in the 20-in. casing with an open borehole to 1,326.54 m (4,352.16 ft) bgs at 575.77 m (1,889.00 ft) and 574.03 m (1,883.3 ft) bgs, respectively. These and subsequent water-level measurements indicate a potential head difference of greater than 76.2 m (250 ft) for groundwater in aquifers above and below the Upper Paintbrush confining unit (UPCU). As expected, tritium was occasionally measured above the Safe Drinking Water Act limit (20,000 picocuries per liter [pCi/L]). Lab analysis on four bailed samples and taken from the undeveloped well indicate that the tritium activities average approximately 36,545 pCi/L. All Fluid Management Plan (FMP) requirements for Well ER-20-12 were met. Analysis of monitoring samples and FMP confirmatory samples indicate that fluids generated during drilling at ER-20-12 met the FMP criteria for discharge to the lined sump and designated infiltration area. All sanitary and hydrocarbon waste generated was properly handled and disposed of.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Proceedings of the 2009 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2009: Ground -Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 21-23 September, 2009 in Tucson, Arizona,. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States’ capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗