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DOE OSTI2013

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program

The Computer-Based Procedure (CBP) research effort is a part of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program The LWRS program is a research and development (R&D) program sponsored by Department of Energy (DOE) and performed in close collaboration with industry R&D programs that provides the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe, and economical operation of current nuclear power plants. One of the primary missions of the LWRS program is to help the U.S. nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2013

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control Systems Technologies Technical Program Plan for 2013

Reliable instrumentation, information, and control (II&C) systems technologies are essential to ensuring safe and efficient operation of the U.S. light water reactor (LWR) fleet. These technologies affect every aspect of nuclear power plant (NPP) and balance-of-plant operations. In 1997, the National Research Council conducted a study concerning the challenges involved in modernizing existing analog-based instrumentation and controls with digital instrumentation and control systems in NPPs. Their findings identified the need for new II&C technology integration. The objective of these efforts is to develop, demonstrate, and support deployment of new digital II&C technologies for nuclear process control, enhance worker performance, and provide enhanced monitoring capabilities to ensure the continued safe, reliable, and economic operation of the nation’s NPPs. Digital II&C technologies are deployed in a number of power generation settings worldwide. Current instrumentation and human-machine interfaces in the nuclear power sector employ analog technologies. In other power generation sectors, analog technologies have largely been replaced with digital technologies. This is in part due to the manufacturing and product support base transitioning to these newer technologies. It also accompanies the transition of education curricula for I&C engineers to digital technologies. Consequently, product manufacturers refer to analog I&C as having reached the end of its useful service life. Although considered obsolete by other industries, analog I&C continues to function reliably, though spare and replacement parts are becoming increasingly scarce as is the workforce that is familiar with and able to maintain it. Analog I&C was also the predominant means used for process control in an era when human labor was more affordable, and maintaining an I&C technology base through a larger workforce conducting frequent rounds for surveillances, inspections, and tests was accepted in the nuclear power generation business model. Today’s power generation business climate is much different and II&C technologies are needed in the long run that are more highly automated and require less cost to operate and maintain, are as highly reliable as those used today, and will be familiar to a future work force. They should also enable performance gains for the utility so that they are not merely a sunken cost, as this would weigh heavily on the balance sheet at a time of particularly high cost competitiveness in electricity markets.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Application of Spray Foam Insulation Under Plywood and Oriented Strand Board Roof Sheathing

Unvented roof strategies with open cell and closed cell spray polyurethane foam insulation sprayed to the underside of roof sheathing have been used since the mid-1990's to provide durable and efficient building enclosures. However, there have been isolated moisture related incidents reported anecdotally that raise potential concerns about the overall hygrothermal performance of these systems. The incidents related to rainwater leakage and condensation concerns. Condensation concerns have been extensively studied by others and are not further discussed in this report. This project involved hygrothermal modeling of a range of rainwater leakage and field evaluations of in-service residential roofs using spray foam insulation. All of the roof assemblies modeled exhibited drying capacity to handle minor rainwater leakage. All field evaluation locations of in-service residential roofs had moisture contents well within the safe range for wood-based sheathing. Explorations of eleven in-service roof systems were completed. The exploration involved taking a sample of spray foam from the underside of the roof sheathing, exposing the sheathing, then taking a moisture content reading. All locations had moisture contents well within the safe range for wood-based sheathing. One full-roof failure was reviewed, as an industry partner was involved with replacing structurally failed roof sheathing. In this case the manufacturer's investigation report concluded that the spray foam was installed on wet OSB based on the observation that the spray foam did not adhere well to the substrate and the pore structure of the closed cell spray foam at the ccSPF/OSB interface was indicative of a wet substrate.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2013

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Environmental Report 2012

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is a premier research laboratory that is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). As a national security laboratory, LLNL is responsible for ensuring that the nation’s nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable. The Laboratory also meets other pressing national security needs, including countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strengthening homeland security, and conducting major research in atmospheric, earth, and energy sciences; bioscience and biotechnology; and engineering, basic science, and advanced technology. The Laboratory is managed and operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS), and serves as a scientific resource to the U.S. government and a partner to industry and academia. LLNL operations have the potential to release a variety of constituents into the environment via atmospheric, surface water, and groundwater pathways. Some of the constituents, such as particles from diesel engines, are common at many types of facilities while others, such as radionuclides, are unique to research facilities like LLNL. All releases are highly regulated and carefully monitored. LLNL strives to maintain a safe, secure and efficient operational environment for its employees and neighboring communities. Experts in environment, safety and health (ES&H) support all Laboratory activities. LLNL’s radiological control program ensures that radiological exposures and releases are reduced to as low as reasonably achievable to protect the health and safety of its employees, contractors, the public, and the environment. LLNL is committed to enhancing its environmental stewardship and managing the impacts its operations may have on the environment through a formal Environmental Management System. The Laboratory encourages the public to participate in matters related to the Laboratory’s environmental impact on the community by soliciting citizens’ input on matters of significant public interest and through various communications. The Laboratory also provides public access to information on its ES&H activities. LLNL consists of two sites—an urban site in Livermore, California, referred to as the “Livermore Site,” which occupies 1.3 square miles; and a rural Experimental Test Site, referred to as “Site 300,” near Tracy, California, which occupies 10.9 square miles. In 2012 the Laboratory had a staff of approximately 7000.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2013

Distributed Sensor Coordination for Advanced Energy Systems

The ability to collect key system level information is critical to the safe, efficient and reliable operation of advanced energy systems. With recent advances in sensor development, it is now possible to push some level of decision making directly to computationally sophisticated sensors, rather than wait for data to arrive to a massive centralized location before a decision is made. This type of approach relies on networked sensors (called “agents” from here on) to actively collect and process data, and provide key control decisions to significantly improve both the quality/relevance of the collected data and the associating decision making. The technological bottlenecks for such sensor networks stem from a lack of mathematics and algorithms to manage the systems, rather than difficulties associated with building and deploying them. Indeed, traditional sensor coordination strategies do not provide adequate solutions for this problem. Passive data collection methods (e.g., large sensor webs) can scale to large systems, but are generally not suited to highly dynamic environments, such as advanced energy systems, where crucial decisions may need to be reached quickly and locally. Approaches based on local decisions on the other hand cannot guarantee that each agent performing its task (maximize an agent objective) will lead to good network wide solution (maximize a network objective) without invoking cumbersome coordination routines. There is currently a lack of algorithms that will enable self-organization and blend the efficiency of local decision making with the system level guarantees of global decision making, particularly when the systems operate in dynamic and stochastic environments. In this work we addressed this critical gap and provided a comprehensive solution to the problem of sensor coordination to ensure the safe, reliable, and robust operation of advanced energy systems. The differentiating aspect of the proposed work is in shifting the focus towards “what to observe” rather than “how to observe” in large sensor networks, allowing the agents to actively determine both the structure of the network and the relevance of the information they are seeking to collect. In addition to providing an implicit coordination mechanism, this approach allows the system to be reconfigured in response to changing needs (e.g., sudden external events requiring new responses) or changing sensor network characteristics (e.g., sudden changes to plant condition). Outcome Summary: All milestones associated with this project have been completed. In particular, private sensor objective functions were developed which are aligned with the global objective function, sensor effectiveness has been improved by using “sensor teams,” system efficiency has been improved by 30% using difference evaluation functions, we have demonstrated system reconfigurability for 20% changes in system conditions, we have demonstrated extreme scalability of our proposed algorithm, we have demonstrated that sensor networks can overcome disruptions of up to 20% in network conditions, and have demonstrated system reconfigurability to 20% changes in system conditions in hardware-based simulations. This final report summarizes how each of these milestones was achieved, and gives insight into future research possibilities past the work which has been completed. The following publications support these milestones [6, 8, 9, 10, 16, 18, 19].

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2013

Strategy for Used Fuel Acquisition

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology, has established the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) to conduct the research and development activities related to storage, transportation, and disposal of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The mission of the UFDC is to identify alternatives and conduct scientific research and technology development to enable storage, transportation and disposal of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and wastes generated by existing and future nuclear fuel cycles. The Storage and Transportation staffs within the UFDC are responsible for addressing issues regarding the extended or long-term storage of UNF and its subsequent transportation. The near-term objectives of the Storage and Transportation task are to use a science-based approach to develop the technical bases to support the continued safe and secure storage of UNF for extended periods, subsequent retrieval, and transportation. While both wet and dry storage have been shown to be safe options for storing UNF, the focus of the program is on dry storage at reactor or centralized locations. Because limited information is available on the properties of high burnup fuel (exceeding 45 gigawatt-days per metric tonne of uranium [GWd/MTU]), and because much of the fuel currently discharged from today’s reactors exceeds this burnup threshold, a particular emphasis of this program is on high burnup fuels. Since high burnup used fuels have only been loaded into dry storage systems in the past decade or so, these materials are available to the UFDC for testing in only very limited quantities. Much of what is available has come via NRC testing programs. Some of these fuels may have achieved "high burnup," but that does not mean they were designed for high burnup use (e.g. lower enrichments, smaller plenum spaces, extra reactor cycles). The handling and transfer of these materials from utility to laboratory has not always been prototypical of how used nuclear fuel is prepared for dry storage; these fuels are not subjected to the same vacuum drying conditions that can lead to changes in hydride morphology that will affect the mechanical properties of the fuel. It is recognized that sources of used high burnup fuel that can be handled in a manner consistent with how fuel is readied for dry storage is essential to the mission of the UFDC. This report documents what types of fuel are of interest to the campaign, and how those fuels could be acquired and shipped to the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for incorporation into the campaign R&D mission. It also identifies any gaps in INL capabilities that might preclude working with one fuel type or another.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Safety of Hydrogen Systems Installed in Outdoor Enclosures

The Hydrogen Safety Panel brings a broad cross-section of expertise from the industrial, government, and academic sectors to help advise the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Fuel Cell Technologies Office through its work in hydrogen safety, codes, and standards. The Panel’s initiatives in reviewing safety plans, conducting safety evaluations, identifying safety-related technical data gaps, and supporting safety knowledge tools and databases cover the gamut from research and development to demonstration and deployment. The Panel’s recent work has focused on the safe deployment of hydrogen and fuel cell systems in support of DOE efforts to accelerate fuel cell commercialization in early market applications: vehicle refueling, material handling equipment, backup power for warehouses and telecommunication sites, and portable power devices. This paper resulted from observations and considerations stemming from the Panel’s work on early market applications. This paper focuses on hydrogen system components that are installed in outdoor enclosures. These enclosures might alternatively be called “cabinets,” but for simplicity, they are all referred to as “enclosures” in this paper. These enclosures can provide a space where a flammable mixture of hydrogen and air might accumulate, creating the potential for a fire or explosion should an ignition occur. If the enclosure is large enough for a person to enter, and ventilation is inadequate, the hydrogen concentration could be high enough to asphyxiate a person who entered the space. Manufacturers, users, and government authorities rely on requirements described in codes to guide safe design and installation of such systems. Except for small enclosures used for hydrogen gas cylinders (gas cabinets), fuel cell power systems, and the enclosures that most people would describe as buildings, there are no hydrogen safety requirements for these enclosures, leaving gaps that must be addressed. This paper proposes that a technical basis be developed to enable code bodies to write requirements for the range of enclosures from the smallest to the largest.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2013

Joint IAEA/NNSA International Workshop Nuclear Forensics Methodologies for Practitioners 2013 Scenario Based Exercise – Version 4.0 Instructor’s Manual

[Participants will serve as border guards for Reimerland. They will be given brief instruction on the operation of hand-held RadioIsotope DetectorS (RIDS) and be provided an intelligence briefing that tells them to be on the lookout for suspicious activity at their post. Their instruction will include directing suspicious vehicles to a location for secondary screening. If, after secondary screening, suspicions of a criminal act involving nuclear and or radioactive materials remain, participants have been instructed to request assistance from the NLEA, who will then setup and manage a radiological crime scene. Participants will watch a demonstration of two vehicles containing radioactive materials driving through and setting off a portal monitor. The first vehicle, a semi-tractor trailer, sets off only a gamma alarm. After the driver provides a shipping manifest of fertilizer, participants, posing as border guards, are expected to waive this vehicle through inspection. The second vehicle, an SUV, set off both gamma and 2 neutron alarms. The alarming of the neutron monitor should prompt participants to set up a secondary inspection of the vehicle immediately. The driver of the vehicle indicates he is in legal possession of an industrial instrument containing an old 133Ba source that has decayed to a level no longer requiring official paperwork according to the IAEA and internationally accepted transportation regulations. Authorities have verified that the industrial source does fit the description of one that is sold commercially. However, upon setting up a secondary screening, participants will use hand-held detectors to locate several other radioactive sources emanating from a black duffle bag in the rear of the vehicle (Figure 1). Hand held detectors detect the presence of 133Ba, and Pu. Upon questioning, the driver only commits to having the 133Ba industrial source and cannot account for the detection of neutrons within his vehicle. Since neutron alarms also sounded, participants should indicate that a neutron alarm would be inconsistent with a 133Ba source alone and should therefore conclude further investigation is warranted. This will prompt participants to call in a response team from the NLEA to set up a radiological crime scene around the vehicle in question. The response team is able to shoot a 3-D X-ray radiograph of the duffle bag without moving it to ensure it is rendered safe and moveable without disturbing the contents in the field (Figure 2). At this point, the duffle bag is entered into inventory as evidence and a chain of custody form is initiated. Swipes are taken from the outer bag to confirm there is no dispersible contamination. The bag and its contents are considered valuable for the investigation by the lead investigator. He determines the duffle bag is safe to transport to RRL for evidence inventory and analysis. The duffle bag and its contents are packaged and sent off to the RRL.]

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2013

Risks from Past, Current, and Potential Hanford Single Shell Tank Leaks

Due to significant delays in constructing and operating the Waste Treatment Plant, which is needed to support retrieval of waste from Hanford’s single shell tanks (SSTs), SSTs may now be required to store tank waste for two to three more decades into the future. Many SSTs were built almost 70 years ago, and all SSTs are well beyond their design lives. Recent examination of monitoring data suggests several of the tanks, which underwent interim stabilization a decade or more ago, may be leaking small amounts (perhaps 150–300 gallons per year) to the subsurface environment. A potential leak from tank T-111 is estimated to have released approximately 2,000 gallons into the subsurface. Observations of past leak events, recently published simulation results, and new simulations all suggest that recent leaks are unlikely to affect underlying groundwater above regulatory limits. However, these recent observations remind us that much larger source terms are still contained in the tanks and are also present in the vadose zone from historical intentional and unintentional releases. Recently there have been significant improvements in methods for detecting and characterizing soil moisture and contaminant releases, understanding and controlling mass-flux, and remediating deep vadose zone and groundwater plumes. To ensure extended safe storage of tank waste in SSTs, the following actions are recommended: 1) Improve capabilities for intrusion and leak detection. 2) Develop defensible conceptual models of intrusion and leak mechanisms. 3) Apply enhanced subsurface characterization methods to improve detection and quantification of moisture changes beneath tanks. 4) Maintain a flux-based assessment of past, present, and potential tank leaks to assess risks and to maintain priorities for applying mitigation actions. 5) Implement and maintain effective mitigation and remediation actions to protect groundwater resources. These actions will enable limited resources to be applied to the most beneficial actions. A systems-based approach will support extended safe storage of tank waste, reduce the risks from tank leaks, and protect human health and the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the UNFSF. The framework for integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF will include 1) identification of applicable regulatory requirements, 2) selection of a common system that share dual safeguard and security functions, 3) development of functional design criteria and design requirements for the selected system, 4) identification and integration of the dual safeguards and security design requirements, and 5) assessment of the integration and potential benefit.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Radionuclide Migration through Sediment and Concrete: 16 Years of Investigations

The Waste Management Project provides safe, compliant, and cost-effective waste management services for the Hanford Site and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. Part of these services includes safe disposal of low-level waste and mixed low-level waste at the Hanford Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds in accordance with the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. To partially satisfy these requirements, performance assessment analyses were completed and approved. DOE Order 435.1 also requires continuing data collection to increase confidence in the critical assumptions used in these analyses to characterize the operational features of the disposal facility that are relied on to satisfy the performance objectives identified in the order. Cement-based solidification and stabilization is considered for hazardous waste disposal because it is easily done and cost-efficient. One critical assumption is that concrete will be used as a waste form or container material at the Hanford Site to control and minimize the release of radionuclide constituents in waste into the surrounding environment. Concrete encasement would contain and isolate the waste packages from the hydrologic environment and act as an intrusion barrier. Any failure of concrete encasement may result in water intrusion and consequent mobilization of radionuclides from the waste packages. The radionuclides iodine-129, selenium-75, technetium-99, and uranium-238 have been identified as long-term dose contributors (Mann et al. 2001; Wood et al. 1995). Because of their anionic nature in aqueous solutions, these constituents of potential concern may be released from the encased concrete by mass flow and/or diffusion and migrate into the surrounding subsurface environment (Serne et al. 1989; 1992; 1993a, b; 1995). Therefore, it is necessary to assess the performance of the concrete encasement structure and the ability of the surrounding soil to retard radionuclide migration. Each of the test methods performed throughout the lifetime of the project has focused on different aspects of the concrete waste form weathering process. Diffusion of different analytes [technetium-99 (Tc-99), iodine-125 (I-125), stable iodine (I), uranium (U), and rhenium (Re)] has been quantified from experiments under both saturated and unsaturated conditions. The water-saturated conditions provide a conservative estimate of the concrete’s performance in situ, and the unsaturated conditions provide a more accurate estimate of the diffusion of contaminants from the concrete.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2014

Cyber security evaluation of II&C technologies

The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is a research and development program sponsored by the Department of Energy, which is conducted in close collaboration with industry to provide the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe and economical operation of current nuclear power plants The LWRS Program serves to help the US nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses. Within the LWRS Program, the Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II&C) Systems Technologies Pathway conducts targeted research and development (R&D) to address aging and reliability concerns with the legacy instrumentation and control and related information systems of the U.S. operating light water reactor (LWR) fleet. The II&C Pathway is conducted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Cyber security is a common concern among nuclear utilities and other nuclear industry stakeholders regarding the digital technologies that are being developed under this program. This concern extends to the point of calling into question whether these types of technologies could ever be deployed in nuclear plants given the possibility that the information in them can be compromised and the technologies themselves can potentially be exploited to serve as attack vectors for adversaries. To this end, a cyber security evaluation has been conducted of these technologies to determine whether they constitute a threat beyond what the nuclear plants already manage within their regulatory-required cyber security programs. Specifically, the evaluation is based on NEI 08-09, which is the industry’s template for cyber security programs and evaluations, accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as responsive to the requirements of the nuclear power plant cyber security regulation found in 10 CFR 73.54. The evaluation was conducted by a cyber security team with expertise in nuclear utility cyber security programs and experience in conducting these evaluations. The evaluation has determined that, for the most part, cyber security will not be a limiting factor in the application of these technologies to nuclear power plant applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Guidelines for Implementation of an Advanced Outage Control Center to Improve Outage Coordination, Problem Resolution, and Outage Risk Management

This research effort is a part of the Light-Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, which is a research and development (R&D) program sponsored by Department of Energy (DOE) and performed in close collaboration with industry R&D programs that provide the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe, and economical operation of current nuclear power plants. The LWRS program serves to help the U.S. nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses. The purpose of this research is to improve management of nuclear power plant (NPP) outages through the development of an advanced outage control center (AOCC) that is specifically designed to maximize the usefulness of communication and collaboration technologies for outage coordination and problem resolution activities. This technical report for industry implementation outlines methods and considerations for the establishment of an AOCC. This report provides a process for implementation of a change management plan, evaluation of current outage processes, the selection of technology, and guidance for the implementation of the selected technology. Methods are presented for both adoption of technologies within an existing OCC and for a complete OCC replacement, including human factors considerations for OCC design and setup.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: Computer-Based Procedures for Field Activities: Results from Three Evaluations at Nuclear Power Plants

The Computer-Based Procedure (CBP) research effort is a part of the Light-Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, which is a research and development (R&D) program sponsored by Department of Energy (DOE) and performed in close collaboration with industry R&D programs that provides the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe, and economical operation of current nuclear power plants. One of the primary missions of the LWRS program is to help the U.S. nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses. One area that could yield tremendous savings in increased efficiency and safety is in improving procedure use. Nearly all activities in the nuclear power industry are guided by procedures, which today are printed and executed on paper. This paper-based procedure process has proven to ensure safety; however, there are improvements to be gained. Due to its inherent dynamic nature, a CBP provides the opportunity to incorporate context driven job aids, such as drawings, photos, and just-in-time training. Compared to the static state of paper-based procedures (PBPs), the presentation of information in CBPs can be much more flexible and tailored to the task, actual plant condition, and operation mode. The dynamic presentation of the procedure will guide the user down the path of relevant steps, thus minimizing time spent by the field worker to evaluate plant conditions and decisions related to the applicability of each step. This dynamic presentation of the procedure also minimizes the risk of conducting steps out of order and/or incorrectly assessed applicability of steps.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Environmental Report 2013

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is a premier research laboratory that is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). As a national security laboratory, LLNL is responsible for ensuring that the nation’s nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable. The Laboratory also meets other pressing national security needs, including countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strengthening homeland security, and conducting major research in atmospheric, earth, and energy sciences; bioscience and biotechnology; and engineering, basic science, and advanced technology. The Laboratory is managed and operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS), and serves as a scientific resource to the U.S. government and a partner to industry and academia. LLNL operations have the potential to release a variety of constituents into the environment via atmospheric, surface water, and groundwater pathways. Some of the constituents, such as particles from diesel engines, are common at many types of facilities while others, such as radionuclides, are unique to research facilities like LLNL. All releases are highly regulated and carefully monitored. LLNL strives to maintain a safe, secure and efficient operational environment for its employees and neighboring communities. Experts in environment, safety and health (ES&H) support all Laboratory activities. LLNL’s radiological control program ensures that radiological exposures and releases are reduced to as low as reasonably achievable to protect the health and safety of its employees, contractors, the public, and the environment. LLNL is committed to enhancing its environmental stewardship and managing the impacts its operations may have on the environment through a formal Environmental Management System. The Laboratory encourages the public to participate in matters related to the Laboratory’s environmental impact on the community by soliciting citizens’ input on matters of significant public interest and through various communications. The Laboratory also provides public access to information on its ES&H activities. LLNL consists of two sites—an urban site in Livermore, California, referred to as the “Livermore Site,” which occupies 1.3 square miles; and a rural Experimental Test Site, referred to as “Site 300,” near Tracy, California, which occupies 10.9 square miles. In 2013 the Laboratory had a staff of approximately 6,300.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2014

Safety Case for Service Contracts

Safety cases developed for the Facilities Management and Operations Center (FMOC) are based on the requirements in MN471021, Work Planning and Control Criteria for Safe Design and Operations. The FMOC performs maintenance activities in various locations at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM). SNL/NM consists of more than 6,000,000 square feet of buildings, structures, and site infrastructure on approximately 13,000 acres of land. The FMOC performs approximately 7500 service contract work orders a year to assist with operations and maintenance at the SNL/NM site and facilities. As part of the continual improvement process, this Safety Case will be reviewed and updated, as needed, or at a minimum every three years. People tend to underestimate the probability of an accident if none have occurred previously or if the person performing the work is skilled, and they tend to trust each other’s competence. Human error within systems must be identified and considered. The FMOC uses failure mode analysis (FMA) to determine how a system might fail and cause accidents, as well as the amount and types of controls needed. The FMOC includes interconnected elements, such as people, environment, procedures, facilities, equipment, and the hazards identified in the work analysis. A daily pre-task plan is required prior to any work activity. Changes in work practices will be communicated clearly to all service contractors and personnel by way of contractor pre-task planning, activity-specific plans, contract amendments, and/or training. The FMOC has created a safe-by-design intent approach for service contract execution starting at the planning stage and extending through the execution phase. The Safety Program (see Figure 2) summarizes how the FMOC connects work analysis elements with service contracts.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2014

R&D for Safety Codes and Standards: Materials and Components Compatibility

A principal challenge to the widespread adoption of hydrogen infrastructure is the lack of quantifiable data on its safety envelope and concerns about additional risk from hydrogen. To convince regulatory officials, local fire marshals, fuel suppliers, and the public at large that hydrogen refueling is safe for consumer use, the risk to personnel and bystanders must be quantified and minimized to an acceptable level. Such a task requires strong confidence in the safety performance of high pressure hydrogen systems. Developing meaningful materials characterization and qualification methodologies in addition to enhancing understanding of performance of materials is critical to eliminating barriers to the development of safe, low-cost, high-performance high-pressure hydrogen systems for the consumer environment.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2014

Design Process Overview

For the purposes of this paper, a Biocontainment facility is a laboratory, production facility, or similar building that handles contagious biological materials in a safe and responsible manner. This specialized facility, also called a containment facility or a high containment facility reduces the potential for biological agents to be released into the environment, provides a safe work environment for the employees, and supports good laboratory practices.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗