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DOE OSTI2016

Status of Electronics Upgrades to the LANL Green is Clean Phoswich Detector Systems - 16419

Los Alamos National Laboratory radiological facilities produce low-density room trash that, in many cases, is not contaminated with radioactivity. It has been estimated that 50 to 90% of low-density room trash is free of radioactive contamination and eligible for inclusion in LANL's Green is Clean (GIC) program. The GIC program is a verification program for non-regulated waste from radiation controlled areas that has been actively segregated as nonradioactive through the use of the waste generator's acceptable knowledge. The GIC program has employed two large area Phoswich gamma ray detector systems (HERCULES and ZEUS) to assay and verify that GIC candidate waste meets free release disposal requirements. The large area (127 cm{sup 2}) Phoswich detectors consist of a thin NaI front crystal (3 mm thick) that is optically coupled to a thick CsI back crystal (50 mm thick). The crystals are set in an oxygen-free high-conductivity copper housing with a very thin (0.025 mm) aluminum entrance window. The scintillation properties of the two crystals are different enough to allow the system's electronic components to identify the origin of any pulse. The original systems utilize Nuclear Instrumentation Module (NIM) electronics to process the detector signals. These electronic modules provide the buffering, amplification, and pulse shape analyzer needed for the proper presentation of signals to the custom Phosmux router module. The router module separates the sodium iodide and cesium iodide signals by their rise times and transfers this information into the computer-mounted multichannel analyzer, a Canberra Model S-100 system. While these NIM Bin counting electronics configurations have been effective for approximately 20 years of operation, they are bulky requiring numerous modules per detector and the important Phosmux module is no longer manufactured by LANL. Modern advancement of commercial counting electronics now offer more compact options for equivalent detector signal processing. A pulse shape discriminator module, the DGF Pixie-4, made by XIA LLC, has been identified that can replace the majority of the original NIM bin electronics in a much more compact chassis - one Pixie-4 replaces four NIM amplifiers and four NIM PSAs and fits in a small National Instruments{sup TM} chassis. Thus, LANL has initiated a system upgrade project to replace the historic NIM electronics with the XIA Pixie4 and associated configuration software. The hardware for one Phoswich systems has been procured for the project and the configuration software, customized for the LANL Phoswich detector application, has been written by the manufacturer. Initial setup and optimization of the Pixie-4 configuration has been performed. Qualitative and quantitative baseline comparisons to the NIM electronics has been performed. Good agreement of key low energy gamma lines between the systems has allowed 'Proof of Concept' to be concluded. Further optimization and performance evaluations are in progress. Modifications to the LabVIEW{sup TM} based operating software (originally written by VI Control Systems Ltd.) are being performed by a LANL LabVIEW{sup TM} programmer to accommodate the electronics upgrade. A new LabVIEW{sup TM} interface to control the Pixie-4 has already been developed. Final optimization and testing, formal software QA, and revisions to operating procedures are in progress to achieve completion of the GIC system upgrade project. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2021

Results of the Analyses of SMECT Mercury Sample Collected During Mercury Pump (MB1) Functional Check

A pump added to remove mercury from the sump of the Slurry Mix Evaporator Condensate Tank (SMECT) in DWPF was successfully tested in 2020, resulting in a sample of contaminated mercury obtained from the Mercury Purification Process (MPP) cell. The mercury in the sump of the SMECT was present as a result of steam stripping of sludge slurry in the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) at DWPF. A schematic of the MPP system provided by DWPF personnel is shown in Appendix A. DWPF personnel supplied the following detailed description of the Hg sampling: “The sample provided is the result of DWPF extraction of mercury by means of the Mercury Pump-Water Cart. The Mercury Pump extracted the sample from the SMECT mercury sump. The pump uses pressurized water to transfer a small amount of mercury to a leachate bucket located at the Lab Mercury cell. The mercury and water were allowed to be self separated, and mercury was gravity decanted from the leachate bucket.” DWPF personnel indicate that the leachate bucket is equipped with both a top stopcock/drain and a lower/bottom stopcock/drain from which the mercury was decanted or drained out, while the separated water layer remained above the mercury during draining. The DWPF customer requested SRNL to analyze the sample for the following: gross alpha/nonvolatile beta analysis and perform a Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) per the Environmental Protection Agency's Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Waste: Physical/Chemical Methods, SW-846. While the TCLP was preferred, a Total Metals analysis of the eight Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) metals was deemed acceptable.2 The analytical data collected on this mercury sample will be used in planning for sample disposition as well to start a profile for future Hg disposition of Hg collected from steam stripping.

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DOE OSTI2013

Characterizing surplus US plutonium for disposition

The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems.

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DOE OSTI2013

Characterizing Surplus US Plutonium for Disposition - 13199

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DOE OSTI2019

Integration of Local Knowledge is a Key for the Remediation Success of Legacy Uranium Mine Sites - 19564

A key to success, during all aspects of the remediation process on legacy uranium sites, and easily transferable between countries and projects, is the integration of local knowledge. However, before this knowledge can be integrated, local trust and project understanding must be developed. Local trust and project understanding can only be developed through a principle-centred approach to a shared project vision, two-way communication of knowledge, alignment of project goals, and understanding the local needs early in the remediation process. Once public confidence is obtained, local trust and project understanding must be maintained throughout the entirety of the remediation process. Project understanding is an ongoing endeavor that needs continuous communication and varied methods to succeed. During the management of assessment, remediation, and post remediation monitoring on the Saskatchewan Research Council's CLEANS project (remediation of 37 legacy uranium mine sites in Northern Saskatchewan, Canada), integration of local knowledge has been an instrumental tool attributing to success. During site assessment, integration of local knowledge has included the development and implementation of land use surveys to determine realistic travel and occupancy on and adjacent to these legacy sites, and site specific traditional knowledge and land use studies that have contributed to the development of a detailed knowledge of local land use, resource utilization, country food intake, and human history of the sites. The local knowledge gained during the assessment process is invaluable as it provides information required to support remediation planning, such as: valued ecosystem components, human trophic utilization, length of site occupancy, cultural value assessment, and future land use considerations. During remediation planning, local and traditional knowledge can also be incorporated through determination of plant species suitability for revegetation, development and selection of remediation options, and setting realistic sustainable development targets for local project inclusion. During site remediation operations, local involvement can be utilized through direct labour and equipment, cultural resource monitoring (i.e. archaeological and heritage protection), local logistics and historic information transfer, and stakeholder communications and engagement support. Post remediation, local involvement is an efficient mechanism for long-term monitoring, and care and maintenance activities. Although there may be differences between countries, regions and sites, the remediation process on legacy uranium mines can universally be more successful through the integration of local knowledge; while developing rights/stakeholder engagement and capacity building. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Health and Safety Considerations Associated with Sodium-Cooled Experimental Nuclear Fuel Dismantlement

Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s Sandia National Laboratory constructed eleven experimental assemblies to simulate debris beds formed in a sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor. All but one of the assemblies were irradiated. The experimental assemblies were transferred to the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in 2007 and 2008 for storage, dismantlement, recovery of the uranium for reuse in the nuclear fuel cycle, and disposal of unneeded materials. This paper addresses the effort to dismantle the assemblies down to the primary containment vessel and repackage them for temporary storage until such time as equipment necessary for sodium separation is in place.

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DOE OSTI2020

Nevada Higher Education Benefits from US Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program's Transfer of Geologic Samples - 20442

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, was the location of 100 historic atmospheric and 828 historic underground nuclear tests from 1951 to 1992. Related to this historic nuclear testing, geologic and hydrologic studies of the site were conducted utilizing the skills and the expertise of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and national laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), who were principal in leading the development of weapons and were responsible for specific underground testing programs. The subsurface samples and technical/scientific data associated with NNSS geologic studies (past and present) are preserved and stored at the USGS Mercury Core Library and Data Center located at the NNSS. Currently, the facility stores over 2,000,000 linear feet of cores and cuttings from more than 2,600 drill holes that can be accessed for study. Most of the samples and historic geologic work was focused directly on subsurface geologic settings that relate directly to historic underground nuclear testing. Since 1992, the United States has observed a unilateral moratorium on full-scale nuclear testing, and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program is now responsible for hydrogeologic characterization of the potential impacts to the natural groundwater systems that may have resulted from historic underground nuclear tests. As part of this effort, the EM Nevada Program Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity has drilled and completed over 58 deep (2,000 - 7,000 ft.) characterization wells, totaling in excess of 170,000 linear feet of cuttings and core samples. Cutting samples were collected as triplicate samples for each respective depth interval, to account for potential later nondestructive/destructive analysis and to preserve samples for regulatory purposes. Recently, it was recognized by the EM Nevada Program that opportunities may exist to reduce the cost and floor space required for the storage of geologic samples at the Mercury Core Library without impacting the integrity and representative nature of the samples necessary for project execution. An initiative was sponsored by EM Nevada Program to evaluate several options: 1) disposal of a portion of cuttings and cores in a land fill setting; 2) reduction in sample volume through skeletonizing core and cuttings from wells to a representative but much smaller number of samples; and 3) solicit potential interest in the academic community where other geoscientists could freely access the samples for studies. The Nevada state university system through the Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology responded positively to the opportunity to receive these NNSS samples from the EM Nevada Program. In June 2019, approximately 17,000 geologic samples, representing greater than 170,000 linear feet of drilling and weighing over 20,000 pounds, were shipped from the NNSS to the Great Basin Science Sample and Records Library located in Reno, Nevada. The benefits resulting from this transfer were realized by the EM Nevada Program in terms of cost and space savings for geologic sample storage at the NNSS. The transfer did not impact the EM Nevada Program mission as access to representative geologic samples for regulatory and scientific purposes was preserved. Moreover, the Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology acquired a significant resource of subsurface geologic samples and supporting technical data to support academic and scientific studies in a complex volcanic setting in southwest Nevada. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Retrieval, Disposal, and Disposition of Legacy 252 Cf Sealed Sources

In this article, we describe work performed on behalf of the US Department of Energy (DOE) to disposition 467 government-owned, sealed californium-252 ( 252 Cf) sources located at 52 academic and government research sites. These sources are the legacy of the DOE 252 Cf Loan/Lease Program, which operated from the late 1960s until 2008, when the loan program closed abruptly. Although the DOE took decades to fabricate and distribute the sources, best safety and nuclear accountability practices demanded retrieval or disposition of all loaned sources as soon as achievable after the loan program was closed. An adaptable disposition approach was developed, and disposition of the sources was pursued. The approach involved a combination of source retrievals, disposal actions, and source ownership transfers. A new shielded shipping container was designed and deployed to aid in source retrievals. In a couple cases, incomplete source fabrication and shipping records prevented shipment, and those sources were left indefinitely with the customer in a safe configuration. Lastly, all the sources in the inventory were safely dispositioned in some way, and lessons learned from this effort are provided.

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DOE OSTI2017

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC, Excess Facility Disposition Program - 17289

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), the management and operating contractor for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Pantex Plant (Pantex) in Amarillo, Texas, has developed an integrated strategy to address badly deteriorating excess facilities presenting risks to people, the environment, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) mission. The comprehensive, integrated Excess Facilities Disposition Program (EFDP) incorporates NNSA scope for excess facility risk reduction, preparation of facilities to be transferred to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) for demolition, and demolition of non-process contaminated facilities. The Program has been developed using the NNSA Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations (NA-50) Program Management Plan as a guide. The Program has undertaken actions to address the most immediate risks associated with CNS excess facilities. At Y-12, new foam roofs have been installed on Buildings 9201-5 (Alpha 5), 9204-4 (Beta 4), and 9206 to minimize further facility degradation. Tanks and dikes outside of Alpha 5 and Beta 4 are also being disconnected, drained, and filled with concrete. In addition, Beta 4 will be getting a new electrical system as its Manhattan Project-era system will be replaced by a temporary 'construction power' setup that will provide as-needed electricity to the building that is safer, more reliable, and will ease demolition activities in the future. The EFDP is also focusing on the basement of Alpha 5 and is planning to remove the water from the aging facility's flooded basement, which in some areas contains up to 54 inches of water. The EFDP is also planning several efforts to remove excess materials from Alpha 5 and Beta 4, de-inventory the Alpha 5 Mercury House System and numerous transformers, and de-inventory Beta 4 hydraulic pumps and systems. Efforts are also underway to deactivate and decommission non-process-contaminated facilities at Y-12 and at Pantex. The EFDP has prioritized the performance of work to reduce risk while at the same time supporting the preparation of process-contaminated Y-12 facilities for transfer to EM. The Program aligns with the EM goal to have the NNSA scope completed in Alpha 5 and Beta 4 by the end of FY 2020, and Building 9206 completed by the end of FY 2024. These dates and project sequencing will support the Y-12-related DOE EM cleanup initiatives. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

The Challenge of Moving Science into Practice: Lessons Learned and New Approaches - 16443

Remediation of residual subsurface soil and groundwater contamination remains a significant problem facing the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (EM). EM has completed cleanup activities at many of their sites, however, many of the remaining sites are technically complex, either due to the nature of the contaminants or to the nature of the subsurface environment. Often these complex sites require supporting scientific studies to resolve key technical uncertainties. A key challenge is the difficulty in efficiently moving advancements from basic and applied science research studies to field applications to address key technical needs. The successful transfer of technologies from the laboratory to the field generally benefits from an overt structure that combines the results of scientific studies with professional judgement to translate them into actionable practice. The process requires a 'connecting of the dots', e.g., bringing the best science and technical judgement to real and measurable improvements to baseline remedial activities. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2024

Sludge Batch 11 Assembly: Tank 51

Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) Nuclear Safety and Engineering Integration has requested that Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) perform Tank 51 characterization analyses in support of Sludge Batch 11 (SB11) assembly. This report provides important characterization of the slurry in Tank 51 after transfers from Tank 22, Tank 35, and Tank 13 (post Tank 15 to Tank 13 transfer) to Tank 51 that demonstrates the sludge concurs with the estimated transfer mass for the SB11 recipe. A total of 3 sets of Tank 51 samples were delivered to SRNL from March 2023 to February 2024. The composite sample was analyzed for the following: density, weight percent solids, chemical composition, radionuclides, and supernate corrosion control analyses. The results of the Tank 51 samples are consistent with and representative of expected sludge projections for Sludge Batch 11.

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DOE OSTI2024

Engineered Microorganisms for Enhanced Rare Earth Element Bio-mining and Separations (Final Technical Report)

Rare earth elements (REE) are critical ingredients of sustainable energy technologies, but their extraction from ore and separation from one another pose formidable challenges. To solve the challenge of REE supply, we used advanced genomics, high-throughput screening with synthetic REE minerals, and synthetic biology to engineer two sets of exotic microbes to (1) extract REE from ores, spent cracking catalysts, coal ash and electronic waste with high efficiency and selectivity, and (2) to purify REE into single element batches, all under benign conditions without the need of harsh solvents and high temperatures. This work integrated our expertise in systems and synthetic biology (Buz Barstow); rare-earth geochemistry (Esteban Gazel) and mineral synthesis (Megan Holycross); and microsystems engineering (Mingming Wu) by first elucidating the set of rules that predict an organism’s phenotype and then applying them to solve this critical problem in sustainable energy. These new technologies could help to revitalize the US rare earth industry and provide a new source of these critical elements for future energy technologies. We have already had some big success in tech transfer. Two of our team members (postdoctoral fellow Alexa Schmitz and graduate student Sean Medin) were able to study the supply chain for REE in the United States, and identify an opportunity to commercialize our REE mineral-dissolution technology. Alexa and Sean recently founded REEgen, Inc., an REE biomining company. Dr. Schmitz was recently awarded a fellowship from the Activate Foundation to support the first two years of REEgen. Cornell showed its support for this technology and company, and Dr. Schmitz was awarded the Rising Women Innovator’s award. These two awards unlocked support from Cornell’s Praxis Incubator.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Control Selection for the Neutralization Tank in the Aqueous Recovery System at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

The Aqueous Recovery System (ARS) at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) recovers and purifies plutonium (Pu) using aqueous chemistry techniques. The neutralization tanks in the ARS collect waste streams with various impurities and greatly reduced concentrations of Pu than are produced during aqueous processing. Criticality safety is primarily achieved in the ARS by using geometrically favorable process vessels. However, due to the geometry of neutralization tanks, each tank is administratively limited to no more than 450 g Pu, thus representing the transition from geometry to mass control. To ensure that this mass limit is not exceeded, an administrative control requires taking two samples of any solution to be sent to a neutralization tank. Normal operations are expected to result in less than 50 g Pu in a neutralization tank filled to its capacity of 250 L. Process upsets may cause an inadvertent transfer of up to 1000 g Pu to a neutralization tank, producing a system that is potentially not subcritical for all possible configurations of the tank. To ensure that a neutralization tank remains safety subcritical, passive engineered controls (e.g. changing tank geometry or adding fixed poisons), active engineered controls (e.g. interlocks), and administrative controls (e.g. soluble poisons and valve isolation) were considered and their viability evaluated. Ultimately, the team chose an administrative, dual-valve isolation strategy. This paper will thoroughly discuss the various control strategy options and why many of the options were not feasible for maintaining criticality safety.

Dressman, Phillip M. [Savannah River Nuclear Solut↗

DOE OSTI2025

Control Selection for the Neutralization Tank in the Aqueous Recovery System at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

The Aqueous Recovery System (ARS) at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) recovers and purifies plutonium (Pu) using aqueous chemistry techniques. The neutralization tanks in the ARS collect the waste streams, containing various impurities and greatly reduced concentrations of Pu, that are produced during aqueous processing. Criticality safety is primarily achieved in the ARS by using geometrically favorable process vessels. However, due to the geometry of neutralization tanks, each tank is administratively limited to no more than 450 g Pu, thus representing the transition from geometry to mass control. To ensure that this mass limit is not exceeded, an administrative control requires taking two samples of any solution to be sent to a neutralization tank. Normal operations are expected to result in less than 50 g Pu in a neutralization tank filled to its capacity of 250 L. Process upsets may cause an inadvertent transfer of up to 1000 g Pu to a neutralization tank, producing a system that is potentially not subcritical for all possible configurations of the tank. To ensure that a neutralization tank remains safety subcritical, passive engineered controls (e.g.changing tank geometry or adding fixed poisons), active engineered controls (e.g. interlocks), and administrative controls (e.g. soluble poisons and valve isolation) were considered and their viability evaluated. Ultimately, the team chose an administrative, dual-valve isolation strategy. This paper will thoroughly discuss the various control strategy options and why many of the options were not feasible for maintaining criticality safety.

Dressman, Phillip M. [Savannah River Nuclear Solut↗

DOE OSTI2013

Assessment of the impact of the next generation solvent on DWPF melter off-gas flammability

An assessment has been made to evaluate the impact on the DWPF melter off-gas flammability of replacing the current solvent used in the Modular Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction Process Unit (MCU) process with the Next Generation Solvent (NGS-MCU) and blended solvent. The results of this study showed that the concentrations of nonvolatile carbon and hydrogen of the current solvent in the Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) product would both be about 29% higher than their counterparts of the NGS-MCU and blended solvent in the absence of guanidine partitioning. When 6 ppm of guanidine (TiDG) was added to the effluent transfer to DWPF to simulate partitioning for the NGS-MCU and blended solvent cases and the concentration of Isopar ® L in the effluent transfer was controlled below 87 ppm, the concentrations of nonvolatile carbon and hydrogen of the NGS-MCU and blended solvent were still about 12% and 4% lower, respectively, than those of the current solvent. It is, therefore, concluded that as long as the volume of MCU effluent transfer to DWPF is limited to 15,000 gallons per Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT)/SME cycle and the concentration of Isopar ® L in the effluent transfer is controlled below 87 ppm, using the current solvent assumption of 105 ppm Isopar ® L or 150 ppm solvent in lieu of NGS-MCU or blended solvent in the DWPF melter off-gas flammability assessment is conservative for up to an additional 6 ppm of TiDG in the effluent due to guanidine partitioning. This report documents the calculations performed to reach this conclusion.

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DOE OSTI2020

Mechanical Properties of Permanent Foaming Fixatives for Deactivation and Decommissioning Activities

DOE-EM have identified an operational requirement for a fixative that can immobilize and/or encapsulate residual contamination in 3D void volumes (pipes, gloveboxes, waste containers, etc.) during D and D activities. Failure to safely and effectively immobilize residual contamination can: Put workers at risk, Contaminate the public and environment, Drive up operational costs. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) polyurethane (PU) foams is one possible solution and is currently being investigated in collaboration with Savannah River National Lab (SRNL). Mechanical property testing will dictate how well PU foams can withstand physical stressors outlined in safety documents while immobilizing residual contamination. Results can provide a performance criteria for Section 5 of ASTM E3191: Standard Specification for Permanent Foaming Fixatives Used to Mitigate Spread of Radioactive Contamination. Polyurethanes consists of repeating units of urethanes which are produced from an exothermic reaction between a polyol (an alcohol with two or more hydroxyl groups in a molecule) and an isocyanate [2]. PUs consists of 3D cells that are formed by a blowing agent which is normally water. Water interacting with the isocyanate creates carbon dioxide and urea which contributes to cells' growth and expansion. The cross-linking between the polyol and isocyanate solidify the cell faces and walls. Micro scale properties that can influence mechanical properties include: Relative density (ratio between density of cellular material and density of the solid of which the cell walls are made of). Cells connectivity between edges and faces, and number of cells contact neighbors [3]. Whether a foam is open-celled or closed-celled. Closed-celled foams have a thin membrane that encloses each cell which can contribute to the stiffness of the foam. Incorporating fillers in the PU matrix like carbon-based nanoparticles in the form of expandable graphite (EG) can increase the thermal and mechanical performance [4]. When exposed to heat, EG produces a char layer that prevents heat and oxygen transfer which is known as intumescing. Mechanical performance is dependent on amount of EG loading since the cell sizes are linearly dependent on it. Overall, the rigid foams (I-R2) proved superior. SEM Analysis: I-R2 had the most consistent spherical sizes (average cell diameter: 489 μm), which enhance the relative density the most [5]. Tensile Testing Results: I-R2 experienced the largest breaking load (103.65 lbf) and stress (289.42 psi). I-R2 also had a higher Young's Modulus compared to R1 (2.99 ksi to 2.09 ksi). Compression Testing Results: I-R2 had the highest stress at 80% deflection (360.67 psi), load (1387.48 lbf) and modulus (3.92 ksi)

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NASA NTRS1990

A heat receiver design for solar dynamic space power systems

An advanced heat pipe receiver designed for a solar dynamic space power system is described. The power system consists of a solar concentrator, solar heat receiver, Stirling heat engine, linear alternator and waste heat radiator. The solar concentrator focuses the sun's energy into a heat receiver. The engine and alternator convert a portion of this energy to electric power and the remaining heat is rejected by a waste heat radiator. Primary liquid metal heat pipes transport heat energy to the Stirling engine. Thermal energy storage allows this power system to operate during the shade portion of an orbit. Lithium fluoride/calcium fluoride eutectic is the thermal energy storage material. Thermal energy storage canisters are attached to the midsection of each heat pipe. The primary heat pipes pass through a secondary vapor cavity heat pipe near the engine and receiver interface. The secondary vapor cavity heat pipe serves three important functions. First, it smooths out hot spots in the solar cavity and provides even distribution of heat to the engine. Second, the event of a heat pipe failure, the secondary heat pipe cavity can efficiently transfer heat from other operating primary heat pipes to the engine heat exchanger of the defunct heat pipe. Third, the secondary heat pipe vapor cavity reduces temperature drops caused by heat flow into the engine. This unique design provides a high level of reliability and performance.

Baker, Karl W.↗

DOE OSTI2017

Addendum to Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for Assessment of LANL-Derived Residual Radionuclides in Soils within Tract A-16-d for Land Conveyance and Transfer for Sewage Treatment Facility Area

This report summarizes the sampling design used, associated statistical assumptions, as well as general guidelines for conducting post-sampling data analysis. Sampling plan components presented here include how many sampling locations to choose and where within the sampling area to collect those samples. The type of medium to sample (i.e., soil, groundwater, etc.) and how to analyze the samples (in-situ, fixed laboratory, etc.) are addressed in other sections of the sampling plan.

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