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High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for staffing reduction. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Having the minimal possible number of access points and methods to completely block access from these points if a threat is detected will greatly help us justify staffing reduction.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Report on Subsurface Characterization of the Phase III Anthropogenic Test Project Site (SECARB Phase III Work Product 4.2.1.d)

A test site and anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) source have been selected for a large-scale demonstration of CO 2 separation, capture and sequestration in southwestern Alabama as part of the Southeastern Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership’s (SECARB) Phase III initiative. The James M. Barry Generating Plant, a major coal-fired power plant in southwestern Alabama, is the selected anthropogenic CO 2 source for the project. The proposed storage test site is located in the Citronelle oil field, which lies at the crest of the Citronelle Dome. The proposed storage site is favorable for deep underground injection of CO 2 . Seismic activity in southwest Alabama is low and the absence of identified faulting in and near the Citronelle oil field indicates that the area provides a structurally stable environment for CO 2 storage operations. The porous and permeable sands of the proposed injection zone, the Paluxy Formation, present a favorable injection reservoir in terms of areal extent and petrophysical characteristics. The proposed confining zone, the Basal Shale of the overlying Washita-Fredericksburg Formation is persistent throughout the Citronelle area and appears to possess the appropriate criteria to act as an effective CO 2 seal. In addition to the Basal Washita-Fredericksburg Shale, secondary overlying confining units including the Middle (Marine) Tuscaloosa Formation, the Selma Group, and the Midway Shale, occur stratigraphically between the injection zone and the base of the lowermost underground source of drinking water (USDW). The Citronelle Dome is an ideal geometry for containment of CO 2 The dome is a subtle, anticlinal structure that contains a broad salt pillow at the core and provides fourway closure. At the test site, subsurface geologic strata, including the proposed injection and confining zones, dip to the east-south-east at about 1.25 degrees. Buoyant CO 2 is expected to migrate up dip towards the crest of the dome, where it will be contained within the structure of the dome. No faulting or significant fracture zones occur within the Dome. A vertical interval of over 8,000 feet with numerous low permeability barriers occurs between the proposed injection zone and the base of the lowermost USDW.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

SECARB Design Specifications for Seismic Survey (SECARB Phase III Work Product 4.2.2.a)

A test site and anthropogenic CO 2 source have been selected for a large-scale demonstration of carbon dioxide separation, capture and sequestration in southwestern Alabama as part of the Southeastern Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership’s (SECARB) Phase III initiative. The James M. Barry Generating Plant, a major coal-fired power plant in southwestern Alabama, is the selected anthropogenic CO 2 source for the project. The proposed storage test site is located in the Southeast Unit of the Citronelle oil field, which lies at the crest of the Citronelle Dome about 10 miles to the west of the power plant. The proposed storage site appears to be suitable for deep underground injection of CO 2 . An evaluation of the storage capacity and geological integrity of the proposed injection and confining intervals is a critical step in the assessment of the test site. This evaluation is important for several reasons, including project planning, permitting of injection wells, and the design and execution of injection and monitoring operations. Accordingly, the Geological Survey of Alabama (GSA) will conduct a detailed geological evaluation of the Southeast Citronelle Unit that emphasizes the acquisition, interpretation, and analysis of seismic reflection data. The goals of this work are to characterize the geologic structure of the area, verify that no faults are present, determine and analyze the seismic expression of sandstone and shale bodies in the Paluxy target interval, and to assist in the Underground Injection Control (UIC) permitting process.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Injection Well Construction Diagrams and Specifications (SECARB Work Product 5.2.1.b)

This report discusses the Anthropogenic Test’s Injection Wells (D-9-7#2 and D-9- 9#2) design and construction specifications. The report includes sections on: Drilling and casing program, Drilling fluids, Coring, Completion program, Logging and testing program, Drilling prognosis, Well closure and post-closure care plans. The injection wells have been designed to meet or exceed the Alabama Department of Environmental Management’s (ADEM) Class V Underground Injection Control (UIC) standards including those designed to protect underground sources of drinking water.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Southeast Carbon Sequestration Partnership (SECARB) Phase III Anthropogenic Test at Citronelle Field, Mobile Co., AL. Post-Injection Period Reservoir Modeling Report

The Southeast Carbon Sequestration Partnership (SECARB) Anthropogenic Test is a U.S. Department of Energy funded fully integrated carbon capture and storage initiative designed to demonstrate deep underground injection and containment of anthropogenic CO 2 sourced from Alabama Power’s Plant Barry. From August 20, 2012 to September 1, 2014, a total of 114,014 metric tonnes of CO 2 were transported via pipeline from Plant Barry and stored in a saline aquifer under a portion of the Citronelle Field operated by Denbury Onshore, LLC near Citronelle, Alabama. A major component of this project was to test and develop techniques to monitor, verify and account (MVA) for the CO 2 stored in the aquifer by the project. A suite of technologies were applied and developed to demonstrate non-endangerment of underground sources of drinking water (USDW’s) and to ensure that CO2 does not migrate out of intended zones within the subsurface. This involved several levels of monitoring: 1) Surface monitoring, 2) shallow groundwater monitoring, 3) deep reservoir monitoring and experimental MVA activities. Numerical models were developed to determine the project’s Area of Review (AoR) and to investigate the simulated advancement of the CO 2 plume through the subsurface aquifer for 30 years after the end of injection. An initial baseline area of review of 1,700 ft. was established. The key results demonstrating non-endangerment of USDW’s are presented.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Southeast Carbon Sequestration Partnership (SECARB) Phase III Anthropogenic Test at Citronelle Field, Mobile Co., AL Surface and Shallow Subsurface Monitoring

The Southeast Carbon Sequestration Partnership Phase III Anthropogenic Test at Citronelle Field is one of the United States’ largest demonstrations of CO 2 capture, transportation, injection, storage and monitoring using CO 2 derived from a coal-fired electric generating unit. This report summarizes the background and initial injection phase groundwater and soil flux monitoring results. The purpose of the groundwater monitoring program, as prescribed in the Underground Injection Control (UIC) permits is to assure that the project’s activities do not harm Underground Sources of Drinking Water (USDWs). In particular, the objective of the program is to monitor for the release of injected CO2 into groundwater aquifers at the project site. Three shallow USDW monitoring wells were installed as part of the groundwater monitoring program. In addition, a water supply well located near the project’s deep characterization well was utilized for monitoring. Seventeen metals, general chemistry and field parameters (e.g. pH, specific conductance, turbidity) were sampled three times prior to injection and quarterly during the injection period to date. Changes in groundwater geochemistry potentially attributable to a release of carbon dioxide into the USDW from the injection activities are decreasing pH and increasing TIC. The change in pH may also accompany the mobilization of certain metals within the groundwater, but the changes are likely site-specific, based on the natural aquifer mineralogy (Wilkin and Diguilio, 2010). At this time, no downward trends for pH and increasing trends for TIC have been statistically determined in the monitor wells. Valid detections exceeding both the UIC discharge limit and the range of background concentrations observed as of the N=11 event include: Exceedance of the UIC permit discharge limit of manganese at D-9-7 MW-2S and D-9-9 MW-1, and exceedance of the UIC permit discharge limit of iron at D-9-9 MW-1. In addition, a statistically significant increase of barium and manganese has been observed at D-9-9 MW-1. However, Additional lines of evidence (namely, expected shifts in TIC or pH, per the research cited above) to interpret the cause (e.g., potential carbon dioxide influence) of the statistically determined exceedances and/or increases are absent at this time. Quarterly groundwater sampling and analysis will continue throughout the project. The UIC permit requires that soil CO 2 flux shall be monitored at the land surface at the injection site and at nearby locations. Twelve locations were chosen for surveys including a mix of near wellbore and offset locations. To date, 24 surveys have taken place with 12 occurring prior to the onset of injection operations in August 2012. Soil CO 2 flux appears to positively covary with soil temperature. A notably high soil CO 2 flux value (21 µmol/m 2 /sec) was observed from the D-9-9 #2 chamber location during sampling event #24 (9/24/2014). As a result of this finding, the frequency of soil CO 2 flux monitoring events will be increased to twice-monthly until this anomaly can be confirmed or determined to be an outlier. Soil CO 2 flux monitoring will continue for the duration of the project.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Effects of Intrusive Confining Units on Groundwater Flow at Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

Geological, geophysical, hydrogeological, and hydrological evidence indicates that feeder dikes to lava flows play a role as confining units in the groundwater flow system underlying the Pahute Mesa area of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Of geological significance, the Pahute Mesa testing area is largely situated within the Silent Canyon caldera, which includes both tuffs and lavas that were fed by (and are connected to) intrusive rock units such as feeder dikes prior to and during volcanic eruptions (Orkild et al., 1968; Byers et al., 1976). Groundwater modeling results presented in this report support extension of “pool-dam” and “breach scenario” concepts presented in Jackson and Fenelon (2018) and Jackson et al. (2021) to low-permeability intrusive confining units (ICUs) such as feeder dikes that are expected to dissect and ring the caldera. As laterally extensive, steeply-dipping, and sub-parallel planar structures, ICUs can be expected to further compartmentalize groundwater flow in the volcanic aquifers systems at Pahute Mesa beyond the stratigraphically-defined tuff confining units (TCUs). ICUs provide an explanation for changes in water levels before and after the Cheshire test, detonated 2/14/76 (USDOE, 2015), and the unusually high horizontal gradient southwest of Cheshire. These ICU concepts are supported by groundwater modeling results presented in this report. The evidence and groundwater modeling results indicate that the downgradient extent of radionuclide contamination in some areas of Pahute Mesa could be overestimated by ignoring the confining effects of ICUs. On the other hand, contaminant extent could be underestimated by not considering transient flow effects and/or the re-equilibrated flow field caused by breaching of an ICU by an underground nuclear test.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Effects of Intrusive Confining Units on Groundwater Flow at Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

Geological, geophysical, hydrogeological, and hydrological evidence indicates that feeder dikes to rhyolitic lava flows may play a role as confining units in the groundwater flow system underlying the Pahute Mesa (PM) area of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (Figure 1). Of geological significance, the PM testing area is largely situated within the Silent Canyon caldera complex (SCCC), which includes both tuffs and lavas that were fed by (and are connected to) intrusive rock units such as feeder dikes prior to and during volcanic eruptions (Orkild et al., 1968; Byers et al., 1976a). Groundwater modeling results presented in this report support extension of “pool-dam” and “breach scenario” concepts presented in Jackson and Fenelon (2018) and Jackson et al. (2021) to low-permeability intrusive confining units (ICUs) such as feeder dikes that are expected to dissect and ring silicic calderas. As laterally extensive, steeply-dipping, and sub-parallel planar structures, ICUs may further compartmentalize groundwater flow in some areas of the volcanic aquifer system at PM. ICUs may explain unusually high horizontal hydraulic gradient southwest of Cheshire. Breaching of an ICU within which the Cheshire test was emplaced may explain changes in water levels before and after the Cheshire test was detonated in the U-20n emplacement hole on 2/14/76 (USDOE, 2015b). This analysis of the effects of ICUs on groundwater flow at PM addresses a need to evaluate uncertainty in the conceptual model or structural aspects of hydrologic source term (HST) or corrective action unit (CAU) models for groundwater flow and contaminant transport (FFACO, 1996, as amended). At Cheshire and possibly other test locations at PM, downgradient extent of radionuclide contamination may be overpredicted by not including the confining effects of ICUs. On the other hand, contaminant extent may be underpredicted by not considering transient flow effects and/or the re-equilibrated flow field caused by breaching of an ICU by an underground nuclear test. Near Cheshire, the effects of ICUs may be most apparent and impactful to the groundwater flow system at PM because of an unusual combination of thickness, extent, and frequency of dikes transecting the saturated CHLFA4 aquifer and feeding into the overlying unsaturated rhyolite lava of Windy Wash. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 present geological, geophysical, hydrogeological, and hydrological evidence for ICUs at PM. Chapters 5 and 6 examine effects of ICUs on groundwater flow including analysis by groundwater modeling.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Integrated Hydrogen Energy Storage System (IHESS) for Power Generation (Final Report)

GTI Energy partnered with Praxair Inc., a subsidiary of Linde PLC (Praxair), the Center for Electromechanics at the University of Texas at Austin (CEM), Entergy Corporation (Entergy), Quanta Services (Quanta) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) to perform a feasibility study that determines the economic and technical feasibility of low-carbon hydrogen energy storage integrated with a site-specific fossil fuel asset to decarbonize electricity production using the Integrated Hydrogen Energy Storage System (IHESS). The proposed IHESS concept is novel, as it sought to leverage the existing natural gas infrastructure, hydrogen production and pipelines, existing underground hydrogen storage system and power plants in the Gulf Coast region to reduce carbon emissions and generate lowcarbon electricity. This study has shown that IHESS has a promising commercial outlook as the concept leverages existing natural gas infrastructure assets and hydrogen production and storage that are unique to the Texas gulf coast region. A key hurdle with hydrogen supply and transportation has been capital investment. By storing hydrogen in underground storage and delivering it as a fuel source during peak demand using the existing infrastructure minimizes the capital investment. Regional petrochemical producers who are actively seeking opportunities to reduce costs and lower emissions should find the IHESS concept very appealing.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Hardtack II

Armed and ready to fire, Adams remained suspended under a balloon high over the Nevada Test Site throughout the day and night of October 31, 1958. Shortly after midnight, Adams was lowered to the ground and disarmed. With that, Operation Hardtack II ended and a test moratorium, primarily a gentlemen’s agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, took effect. As the possibility of a moratorium became more and more likely in late 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission and its two weapon laboratories sought Presidential approval for an unprecedented number of tests for the coming year, including a proposal by the UCRL for a series of underground and safety tests in an operation called Millrace. Not wanting to jeopardize ongoing international disarmament talks as well as the moratorium, itself, Eisenhower resisted giving approval for Millrace until late August 1958, barely two months before the anticipated start of the moratorium. Millrace, quickly renamed Hardtack II, was expanded to thirty-seven tests beginning with Otero on September 12 th and concluding with Titania on October 30 th . Eighteen devices, including Otero and Titania, were safety tests. Three of these tests explored “safety characteristics for underground detonations” in tunnels. Two of the three such tests vented. In this respect, Hardtack II was a harbinger of the future in that the problem of venting was never fully resolved. Other safety tests, designed to give no yield, were more successful with San Juan, Oberon, and Ganymede having “no measurable yield.”

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Tracer Gas Model Development and Verification in PFLOTRAN

Tracer gases, whether they are chemical or isotopic in nature, are useful tools in examining the flow and transport of gaseous or volatile species in the underground. One application is using detection of short-lived argon and xenon radionuclides to monitor for underground nuclear explosions. However, even chemically inert species, such as the noble gases, have bene observed to exhibit non-conservative behavior when flowing through porous media containing certain materials, such as zeolites, due to gas adsorption processes. This report details the model developed, implemented, and tested in the open source and massively parallel subsurface flow and transport simulator PFLOTRAN for future use in modeling the transport of adsorbing tracer gases.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Separation of CO 2 from Flue Gas and Potential for Geologic Sequestration

The objectives of this study were to review various methods reported in the literature for the separation and geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide and evaluate the potential of TVA fossil fuel-burning plant locations for onsite geologic sequestration of CO 2 from stack emissions. Several conventional and nonconventional technologies for the separation of CO 2 from flue gas, including absorption, adsorption, cryogenic distillation, membranes, hydrate formation and dissociation, and ammonia carbonation, have been reviewed in terms of separation mechanisms, flow diagrams, and costs. Most of the technologies that have been reviewed are still at the research and development stage. Critical information needed to assess and compare these technologies is still lacking. In addition, information on some of the technologies that have been tested at a pilot or industrial scale has not been fully disclosed in the open literature. Because of this lack of data, it is difficult to make a critical assessment of each of the separation technologies. Based on limited information, it was concluded that the most promising methods are membrane separation and the Mitsubishi process for chemical absorption. Both processes involve separating CO 2 at high temperature, minimizing the cost for cooling prior to separation. Physical and chemical geologic formations of CO 2 were also reviewed. It was concluded that due to the geologic time scale of CO 2 sequestration periods, relatively safe conditions, general proximity to CO 2 sources, and extensive knowledge of underground conditions, sequestration of CO 2 in underground aquifers and coal beds is a very promising method of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. The cost is predicted to be relatively low and the suitable sites are numerous for this application, with many of these sites located close to the plants.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Office of Nuclear Verification FY 2023 Quarterly Report TSVT Q1

This project encompasses the continued development and training of a U.S. operational team, the Test Site Verification Team (TSVT), supporting verification of nuclear testing activities. TSVT builds on decades of U.S. nuclear testing history and nuclear explosion monitoring experience. The Team maintains readiness to deploy internationally on short notice to provide field-based support of verification of declared or undeclared nuclear testing and associated activities, as well as follow-on activities including monitoring and capability disablement and dismantlement, as established by negotiated agreement or treaty. The roles and structure of the TSVT are integrated with other NA-243 deployable verification teams and the interagency. FY23 TSVT activities focus on continued capability buildup within the team, including Team trainings and exercises with a focus on missions in confined spaces (e.g., tunnels, mines, other underground facilities), increased familiarity with foreign nuclear weapons testing programs, demonstration of Team capacity to deploy, train, and practice sustained OPSEC in non-western locations, establishment of sustainable storage and maintenance of equipment, specification and procurement of additional equipment to support field observations, further evolution of concepts of operation documents (CONOPs), and mission coordination with Headquarters and associated Stakeholders. Activities will culminate with a full-scale domestic team exercise at the end of FY23 focusing on underground activities signatures/observations and safety including advanced outdoor safety and familiarity in working around explosive test environments. In addition, we will be further articulating approaches and capacity relevant to the identification of nuclear tests, as well as monitoring of nuclear testing activities and/or dismantlement of nuclear test sites and anticipate developing additional equipment requests in support of this evolution. The TSVT Team Leads will also coordinate with its Senior Advisor, the TSVT Logistics and Readiness (L&R) Training Lead, and NNSA Headquarters to draft a five-year TSVT training and exercise plan, that strategically and incrementally builds capacity and expertise in key areas of significance for the continuum of nuclear and nuclear-related testing activities that fall within the team’s mission space.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Technical Feasibility of Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES) Utilizing a Porous Rock Reservoir

Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) conducted a project to explore the viability of underground compressed air energy storage (CAES) technology. CAES uses low-cost, off-peak electricity to compress air into a storage system in an underground space such as a rock formation or salt cavern. When electricity is needed, the air is withdrawn and used to drive a generator for electricity production.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

UNESE Phase 2: Injection and measurement of gaseous tracers at U-12p Tunnel

In June 2018 radioactive ( 37 Ar and 127 Xe) and stable (SF 6 ) tracers were injected into the chimney of the Disko Elm underground nuclear explosion, located in the U-12p tunnel complex. After the injection sampling was performed from locations within the tunnel, a borehole drilled from the surface, and from the surface of the mesa. Additionally, the 127 Xe activity within the chimney was continuously monitored for two months after the injection. While none of the injected radiotracers were detected in the monitoring borehole, elevated levels of 39 Ar (an activation product produced by underground nuclear explosions) were detected and quantified in each sample.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

UNESE Argon-39 Measurement Techniques: Developing an above-ground Argon-39 Measurement Capability

The Underground Nuclear Explosion Signatures Experiment (UNESE) sought to use 37 Ar as a tracer for measuring noble-gas migration in the soil surrounding historic Underground Nuclear Explosions (UNE). One unexpected observation was the presence of the much longer-lived isotope 39 Ar from historic UNEs. Quantifying the activity of 39 Ar proved difficult due to the lack of capability to measure significantly-above-background levels of 39 Ar and a general discomfort to repeatedly expose Ultra-Low-Background Proportional Counters (ULBPCs) to significant radioactivity. Because the whole-air samples collected for the 37 Ar tracer measurement were already being measured on the above-ground argon capability, it was decided to expand that capability to include 39 Ar. This document describes the efforts required to achieve quantitative reporting of the 39 Ar backgrounds measured during experiments at the sites of the historic Barnwell and Disko Elm UNEs.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Measurement of Argon-37 Background Concentrations in the Atmosphere

Radioisotopes of noble gases, primarily xenon and argon, are important indicators of underground nuclear explosions. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes monitoring capabilities to identify potential nuclear explosions conducted in violation of the CTBT. This monitoring currently focuses on measurement of the xenon isotopes 133 Xe, 135 Xe, 131 mXe and 133 mXe. However, it is predicted that within 100 days of an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) 37 Ar would be released to the atmosphere at higher concentrations than xenon isotopes (Haas et al. 2010). Therefore, inclusion of 37 Ar measurement capabilities at atmospheric International Monitoring System (IMS) stations could improve the capability to detect a nuclear explosion. At an IMS station, it could be difficult to determine what constitutes an elevated concentration as a result of an UNE without first understanding the expected range of background concentrations. This work describes our analysis of atmospheric samples for 37 Ar to evaluate the range of background concentrations. The range of 37 Ar concentrations measured in atmospheric air samples was relatively narrow ranging between less than 1 mBq/m 3 to greater than 2 mBq/m 3 . The average atmospheric concentration of all samples was 0.98 mBq/m 3 , with a standard deviation of 0.5 mBq/m 3 . This is consistent with previous published results. The results presented here demonstrate the capability to detect background concentrations of 37 Ar in atmospheric air.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

2014 Groundwater Monitoring Report Central Nevada Test Area Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

The Central Nevada Test Area was the site of a 0.2- to 1-megaton underground nuclear test in 1968. The surface of the site has been closed, but the subsurface is still in the corrective action process. The corrective action alternative selected for the site was monitoring with institutional controls. Annual sampling and hydraulic head monitoring of the well network are conducted as part of the subsurface corrective action strategy for the site. The monitoring well network consists of 12 locations (wells and piezometers) in the alluvium, seven locations (wells and piezometers) in the volcanic section, and one well in the collapse chimney that resulted from the underground nuclear test. The site is currently in the conceptual model evaluation phase of the corrective action strategy.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗