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Flexible Siting Criteria and Staff Minimization for Micro-Reactors

The economic potential of micro-reactors is vast and underestimated. Commonly-emphasized applications include niche markets such as remote communities, mines and military bases. However, micro-reactors could be used as flexible energy generators also for larger markets, such as mobile and containerized agriculture and manufacturing facilities, district heating, micro-grids for data centers, sea ports, airports and hospitals. The implication is that micro-reactors may have to be deployed also in non-remote locations. Successful implementation of micro-reactors needs a navigable and predictable licensing process, technology-appropriate siting restrictions, risk-informed emergency and safety requirements, and practical operating and maintenance requirements. The primary goal of this project was to develop siting criteria that are tailored to micro-reactors deployable in densely-populated areas, e.g., urban environments. To achieve that goal, we compared the characteristics of the MIT research reactor (MITR) with those of leading micro-reactor concepts (e.g., eVinci, USNC, Aurora), and evaluated whether and how the MITR design basis (e.g., inherent safety features, engineered safety systems, source term, emergency planning and emergency operating procedures) and associated regulations may be applicable to these new micro-reactors as well. What makes MITR a unique analogue in this context is its small power rating (6 MWt) and physical size, mode of operations (24/7 with a somewhat more commercial flavor than typical university reactors), and especially its urban location. Of course significant differences exist, such as mission (power production vs. research) and the reactor design itself. Leveraging the MITR experience, this project was able to generate criteria that will allow micro-reactors to realize their full economic potential as flexible heat and electricity generators for a diverse portfolio of applications in non-remote locations. As such, the outcome of this project might encourage investment in and use of micro-reactors. A second goal of the project was to conceptualize a model of operations for micro-reactors that would minimize the staffing requirements, and thus reduce the cost of electricity and heat generated by these systems. Here too our approach was to systematically review the MITR experience and requirements, as well as survey the innovations in autonomous control technologies and monitoring (e.g., advanced sensors, drones, robotics, AI) that would permit a dramatic reduction in staffing at future micro-reactor installations. The scope of work was expanded after the start date to include also an evaluation of micro-reactor security, using the so-called consequence-based analysis, and the development of a methodology to perform dynamic risk assessment for micro-reactors, using system theory and modeling and simulation.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Role of reinforcement learning for risk-based robust control of cyber-physical energy systems

Critical infrastructures such as cyber-physical energy systems (CPS-E) integrate information flow and physical operations that are vulnerable to natural and targeted failures. Safe, secure, and reliable operation and control of CPS-E is critical to ensure societal well-being and economic prosperity. Automated control is key for real-time operations and may be mathematically cast as a sequential decision-making problem under uncertainty. Emergence of data-driven techniques for decision making under uncertainty, such as reinforcement learning (RL), have led to promising advances for addressing sequential decision-making problems for risk-based robust CPS-E control. However, existing research challenges include understanding the applicability of RL methods across diverse CPS-E applications, addressing the effect of risk preferences across multiple RL methods, and development of open-source domain-aware simulation environments for RL experimentation within a CPS-E context. This article systematically analyzes the applicability of four types of RL methods (model-free, model-based, hybrid model-free and model-based, and hierarchical) for risk-based robust CPS-E control. Problem features and solution stability for the RL methods are also discussed. We demonstrate and compare the performance of multiple RL methods under different risk specifications (risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking) through the development and application of an open-source simulation environment. Motivating numerical simulation examples include representative single-zone and multizone building control use cases. Finally, six key insights for future research and broader adoption of RL methods are identified, with specific emphasis on problem features, algorithmic explainability, and solution stability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Development and Demonstration of a Security Core Component

In recent years, the convergence of a number of trends has resulted in Cyber Security becoming a much greater concern for electric utilities. A short list of these trends includes: · Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) have evolved from depending on proprietary hardware and operating software toward using standard off-the-shelf hardware and operating software. This has meant that these ICSs can no longer depend on “security through obscurity. · Similarly, these same systems have evolved toward using standard communications protocols, further reducing their ability to rely upon obscurity. · The rise of the Internet and the accompanying demand for more data about virtually everything has resulted in formerly isolated ICSs becoming at least partially accessible via Internet-connected networks. · “Cyber crime” has become commonplace, whether it be for industrial espionage, reconnaissance for a possible cyber attack, theft, or because some individual or group “has something to prove.” Electric utility system operators are experts at running the power grid. The reality is, especially at small and mid-sized utilities, these SCADA operators will by default be “on the front line” if and when a cyber attack occurs against their systems. These people are not computer software, networking, or cyber security experts, so they are ill-equipped to deal with a cyber security incident. Cyber Security Manager (CSM) was conceived, designed, and built so that it can be configured to know what a utility’s SCADA/EMS/DMS system looks like under normal conditions. To do this, CSM monitors log messages from any device that uses the syslog standard. It can also monitor a variety of statistics from the computers that make up the SCADA/EMS/DMS: outputs from host-based security tools, intrusion detection systems, SCADA alarms, and real-time SCADA values – even results from a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) system. When the system deviates from “normal,” CSM can alert the operator in language that they understand that an incident may be occurring, provide actionable intelligence, and informing them what actions to take. These alarms may be viewed on CSM’s built-in user interface, sent to a SCADA alarm list, or communicated via email, phone, pager, or SMS message. In recognition of the fact that “real world” training for cyber security events is impractical, CSM has a built-in Operator Training Simulator capability. This can be used stand alone to create simulated event scenarios for training purposes. It may also be used in conjunction with the recipient’s SCADA/EMS/DMS Operator Training Simulator. In addition to providing cyber security situational awareness for electric utility operators, CSM also provides tools for analysts and support personnel; in fact, the majority of user interface displays are designed for use in analyzing current and past security events. CSM keeps security-related information in long-term storage, as well as writing any decisions it makes to a (syslog) log for use forensic or other post-event analysis.

Turke, Andy↗

Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning Technology in Power System Applications

The primary purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the advancement in artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) technologies and their applications in power systems. It offers a foundation for understanding the transformative role of AI/ML in power systems and aims to stimulate further research and development in this area. This report begins with a historical perspective of AI/ML technologies, then explores their advancement to today’s prominence. The document highlights key contributors to the success of AI/ML technologies, including increased computational power, greater data availability, innovative algorithms, and advanced tools. It further introduces various AI/ML techniques, including supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement learning, graph neural networks, and generative AI. It also emphasizes the critical importance of ensuring the safety, security, and trustworthiness of these AI/ML techniques within this sector. The report reviews the recent representative advancements in various power system applications enhanced by AI/ML techniques, underscoring key developments and their transformative impact as evidenced by numerous studies. It also explores both the opportunities and challenges associated with the application of AI/ML technologies to improve power system applications. While the report extensively covers AI/ML applications in power systems, focusing primarily on the technical and operational aspects, it may not thoroughly explore the sociopolitical, economic, and broader regulatory implications of AI/ML integration in power systems. AI/ML techniques hold significant potential for enhancing power system applications; however, they are not omnipotent. It is crucial to acknowledge their limitations and understand that they may not be able to address all challenges in the power system domain. Various factors must be considered that influence the implementation, adoption, and effectiveness of AI/ML solutions, including but not limited to safety, security, transparency, and trustworthiness. Additionally, the incorporation of advanced human–machine interfaces is essential, as it enables humans to validate the effectiveness of AI/ML solutions while remaining actively engaged, fostering trust in AI/ML deployment. Finally, the report summarizes AI/ML research activities supported by the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity (OE) through the Advanced Grid Modeling (AGM) program. The work aligns with the interests and mission of DOE-OE AGM, with the report serving as a resource for identifying existing progress and for pinpointing future applications within AI/ML that need further exploration and support.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Nebraska Integrated Carbon Capture and Storage Pre-Feasibility Study

In collaboration with the Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD), the Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC) has conducted a pre-feasibility study for a commercial-scale carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) geologic storage complex in western Nebraska integrated with potential CO 2 capture at Gerald Gentleman Station (GGS). GGS is the largest coal-fired electricity-generating station in Nebraska, emitting 8.5 million metric tons (Mt) of CO 2 annually, and is located near the town of Sutherland. This pre-feasibility (Phase 1) project has been executed as part of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CarbonSAFE program, a multiphase initiative to support the deployment of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects. Each CarbonSAFE project is required to demonstrate the potential to capture and store at least 50 million tonnes (Mt) of CO 2 over a 25-year operational period. The EERC and NPPD established a coordination team to identify challenges to a potential Nebraska CCS project, comprising local stakeholder organizations, which met twice in Lincoln and via several Webinars, providing feedback and guidance throughout the pre-feasibility study. The EERC also secured the technical support of Schlumberger Carbon Services and Computer Modelling Group Ltd. (CMG). The project comprised four technical themes, all using published information sources. Regional and stakeholder analysis, including identification of sensitive environmental areas, potential resource conflicts, and strategies for public outreach. A review of geographic and socioeconomic characteristics, in combination with geologic characterization in the subbasinal analysis described below, identified an area to the southwest and within a 75-mile radius of GGS as the most prospective for development of a storage site. This area largely avoided lands with protected status such as wetlands. A public outreach plan has also been developed for implementation in any further phases of CCS assessment in western Nebraska, for example a CarbonSAFE Phase 2 feasibility study. Scenario analysis, addressing economic and regulatory factors. GGS is the only single major source of CO 2 emissions capable of satisfying the CarbonSAFE 50-Mt scale requirement within the study region. Chemical absorption using amines was identified as the most viable technology for postcombustion CO 2 capture at GGS. The total cost of a CCS project at GGS was estimated to be between $67/tonne CO 2 for capture and auxiliary boiler to minimize parasitic load and $70/tonne CO 2 avoided cost, using the Carnegie-Mellon University Integrated Environmental Control Model (IECM). The total avoided cost included the capture facility and parasitic load, a flue gas desulfurization plant required for the use of amine solvent technology, transport via pipeline, and dedicated storage infrastructure. Nebraska has no legislation in place to address typical CCS-specific issues, for example pore space ownership for storage. Long-term liability, therefore, falls under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Underground Injection Control (UIC) Class 6 program regulations. Subbasinal analysis, addressing the potential for a dedicated subsurface “container” to store the required 50-Mt quantity of CO 2 . Modeling and simulation studies identified an area to the southwest of GGS with the potential for storage of 50 Mt CO 2 in the Cloverly Formation, comprising sandstones with interbedded and intermingled shales. The area of review (AOR) that would be required for monitoring under a Class VI operating permit was estimated to be as high as 400–700 square miles, due to uncertain pressure effects. The viability of this storage option is subject to significant uncertainty due to the relatively limited amount of existing characterization data available to the pre-feasibility study; for example, dynamic simulation indicated that the proposed storage rate might require as little as two or as many as 14 injection wells. A key uncertainty is the relative proportion and distribution of sandstone and shale within the Cloverly Formation. A preliminary, semiquantitative risk assessment also suggested uncertainty over storage capacity and injectivity constitute the most significant project risks at this pre-feasibility stage. No assessed risks were considered to rule out the possibility of a project moving to deployment. National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) validation, using software tools developed by the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) to assess risks associated with the potential 50-Mt CO 2 storage complex. NRAP tools were used to assess hypothetical leakage scenarios. Results broadly supported the conclusion of the semiquantitative risk analysis – for example, even worst-case analysis of theoretical leakage scenarios found limited migration rates and impacts. In summary, the work undertaken in this Phase 1 pre-feasibility study has shown that western Nebraska has potential to host a commercial-scale CCS project, including a dedicated storage “container” for 50 Mt of CO 2 . However, the following key challenges would need to be overcome: The business case for deploying CCS projects is uncertain; recently announced federal tax credits and sales of CO 2 for enhanced oil recovery may not cover the full costs of a CCS project at GGS, as estimated by this pre-feasibility study. The potential 50-Mt CO 2 dedicated storage container defined in this pre-feasibility study should be regarded as having a relatively low level of readiness to support a CCS project. Public outreach would be a vital element in western Nebraska, where sensitivities around such environmental issues as water resource protection and pipeline construction would need to be carefully addressed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Completion Report for Well ER-2-2 Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Revision 1

Well ER-2-2 was drilled for the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada National Security Administration Nevada Field Office in support of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity. The well was drilled from January 17 to February 8, 2016, as part of the Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The primary purpose of the well was to collect hydrogeologic data to evaluate uncertainty in the flow and transport conceptual model and its contamination boundary forecasts, and to detect radionuclides in groundwater from the CALABASH (U2av) underground test. Well ER-2-2 was not completed as planned due to borehole stability problems. As completed, the well includes a piezometer (p1) to 582 meters (m) (1,909 feet [ft]) below ground surface (bgs) installed in the Timber Mountain lower vitric-tuff aquifer (TMLVTA) and a 12.25-inch (in.) diameter open borehole to 836 m (2,743 ft) bgs in the Lower tuff confining unit (LTCU). A 13.375-in. diameter carbon-steel casing is installed from the surface to a depth of 607 m (1,990 ft) bgs. Data collected during borehole construction include composite drill cutting samples collected every 3.0 m (10 ft), geophysical logs to a depth of 672.4 m (2,206 ft) bgs, water-quality measurements (including tritium), water-level measurements, and slug test data. The well penetrated 384.05 m (1,260 ft) of Quaternary alluvium, 541.93 m (1,778 ft) of Tertiary Volcanics (Tv) rocks, and 127.71 m (419 ft) of Paleozoic carbonates. The stratigraphy and lithology were generally as expected. However, several of the stratigraphic units were significantly thicker then predicted—principally, the Tunnel formation (Tn), which had been predicted to be 30 m (100 ft) thick; the actual thickness of this unit was 268.22 m (880 ft). Fluid depths were measured in the borehole during drilling as follows: (1) in the piezometer (p1) at 552.15 m (1,811.53 ft) bgs and (2) in the main casing (m1) at 551.69 m (1,810.01 ft) bgs. As expected, field measurements for tritium were above the Safe Drinking Water Act limit (20,000 picocuries per liter) for a portion of the Tertiary volcanic section near the water table. Tritium concentrations were at or near the field detection limit in the Lower carbonate aquifer (LCA) while drilling. During drilling, a sample was collected while circulating in the LCA. The sample was submitted for off-site laboratory analysis. The sample results indicated low but measurable tritium concentrations. All Fluid Management Plan requirements were met during drilling activities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site 2018 Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program, Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

This report is a compilation of the groundwater and waste cell leachate sampling results from the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada. Groundwater samples from the aquifer immediately below the Area 5 RWMS have been collected and analyzed and static water levels have been measured in this aquifer since 1993. These groundwater data are evaluated for evidence of effects on the aquifer related to the Area 5 RWMS. Leachate from one lined mixed waste cell at the Area 5 RWMS (Cell 18) has been sampled since the cell opened in 2011. These leachate data are analyzed for hazardous contaminants to determine appropriate leachate handling and disposal. A second lined mixed waste cell at the Area 5 RWMS (Cell 25) began receiving waste in August 2018, but no leachate samples were collected or analyzed during 2018. This report includes data from 2014 through 2018 but focuses on the 2018 data. During 2018, groundwater samples were collected and static water levels were measured at three wells surrounding the Area 5 RWMS. Groundwater samples were collected at wells UE5PW-1, UE5PW-2, and UE5PW-3 on March 6 and August 14, 2018. Static water levels were measured at each of these wells on March 5, June 4, August 13, and October 25, 2018. Groundwater monitoring at the Area 5 RWMS complies with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 264.97, General ground-water monitoring requirements , and 40 CFR 264.98, Detection monitoring program. Groundwater samples were analyzed for indicators of contamination (pH, specific conductance [SC], total organic carbon, total organic halides, and tritium) and, beginning in 2017, toxicity characteristic metals (arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, selenium, and silver). General water chemistry parameters (calcium, iron, magnesium, manganese, potassium, sodium, sulfate, chloride, fluoride, bicarbonate, and silicate) were also measured. Results from samples collected in 2018 are within the limits for each parameter established by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit NEV HW0101, Revision 6. Data from the shallow aquifer indicate there has been no measurable impact to the uppermost aquifer from the Area 5 RWMS, and there were no significant changes in measured groundwater parameters compared to previous years. Leachate from lined mixed waste Cell 18 drains into a sump and is pumped into an above ground tank. Samples are collected from the tank when the leachate volume approaches the 3,000-gallon tank capacity. During 2018, leachate samples were collected on March 1, 2018 and August 1, 2018. All leachate analysis results are below the regulatory levels for toxicity characteristic contaminants (40 CFR 261.24) and below the investigation levels for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), tritium, pH, and SC specified in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101, Revision 6. No quantifiable PCB levels were detected in any leachate sample. Based on the leachate analysis results, RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 allowed all leachate collected from Cell 18 to be pumped from the collection tank and used for dust control at Cell 18.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Enviromental Report for 2008

The purpose of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2008 (ASER) is to provide information required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting. Specifically, the ASER presents summary environmental data to characterize site environmental management performance; summarize environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year; confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements; highlight significant facility programs and efforts; and describe how compliance and environmental improvement is accomplished through the WIPP Environmental Management System (EMS). The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and the management and operating contractor (MOC), Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS), maintain and preserve the environmental resources at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE Order 231.1A; DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, require that the affected environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and workers, and preservation of the environment. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, which requires that DOE facilities submit an ASER to the DOE Headquarters Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) Number NM4890139088-TSDF (treatment, storage, and disposal facility) further requires that the ASER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). The WIPP mission is to safely dispose of transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste generated by the production of nuclear weapons and other activities related to the national defense of the United States. In 2008, 5,265 cubic meters (m3) of TRU waste were disposed of at the WIPP facility, including 5,216 m3 of contact-handled (CH) TRU waste and 49 m3 of remote-handled (RH) TRU waste. From the first receipt of waste in March 1999 through the end of 2008, 57,873 m3 of TRU waste had been disposed of at the WIPP facility.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Utility-Scale Solar, 2024 Edition: Empirical Trends in Deployment, Technology, Cost, Performance, PPA Pricing, and Value in the United States [Slides]

Berkeley Lab’s “Utility-Scale Solar, 2024 Edition” presents analysis of empirical plant-level data from the U.S. fleet of ground-mounted photovoltaic (PV), PV+battery, and concentrating solar-thermal power (CSP) plants with capacities exceeding 5 MWAC (PV plants of 5 MWAC or less, including residential rooftop systems, are covered separately in Berkeley Lab’s companion annual report, Tracking the Sun). Key findings from this year’s report include: -18.5 GWAC of new utility-scale PV capacity came online in 2023, bringing cumulative installed capacity to more than 80.2 GWAC across 47 states. Installed costs continued to fall in 2023. Relative to 2022, capacity-weighted averages decreased by 8% to -$\$1.43$/WAC (or $\$1.08$/WDC). Costs, based on a 7.1 GWAC sample of 76 plants completed in 2023, have fallen by 75% (averaging 10% annually) since 2010. Plant-level capacity factors vary widely, from 6% to 36% (on an AC basis), with a sample median of 24%. -Levelized cost of energy (LCOE) of new 2023 projects increased slightly to $\$46$/MWh prior to the application of tax credits but continued to fall to $\$31$/MWh when accounting for federal incentives. PPA prices have largely followed the decline in solar’s LCOE over time, but newly signed longer-term PPA prices have increased since 2021, to an average of $\$35$/MWh (levelized, in 2023 dollars). -Solar’s average energy and capacity value (i.e., ability to offset costs of other power generation sources) across the U.S. was $\$45$/MWh in 2023. Solar’s average market value was lowest in CAISO ($\$27$/MWh), the market with the greatest solar generation share, and highest in ERCOT ($\$67$/MWh). -Newer solar projects had greater market value in 2023 than their generation costs, yielding $\$1.1$ billion in benefits. Projects built in 2022 delivered on average $\$15$/MWh more market value than their costs in 2023. -Solar’s combined value from wholesale electricity markets, public health and climate damage reduction were greater than generation costs and incentives, yielding $\$13.7$ billion in net benefits in 2023. We estimate U.S. health benefits of $\$24$/MWh and reduced global climate damages of $\$101$/MWh. -Adding battery storage is one way to increase the value of solar. Deployment of 52 new PV+battery hybrid plants set a record with 5.3 GW installed in 2023. Our public data file tracks metadata and PPA prices from more than 100 PV+battery hybrid projects that are already online or that have secured offtake arrangements. -Looking ahead, a massive pipeline of at least 1,085 GW of solar capacity dominates the nation’s interconnection queues at the end of 2023. Nearly 571 GW, or 53%, of that total was paired with a battery – in CAISO it was a staggering 98%. Historically only 10% of the requested solar capacity is built. -For more information, and to explore related interactive data visualizations, go to utilityscalesolar.lbl.gov.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Fuel Cycle Research & Development: Technical Monthly – June 2012

Topics are: (1) MPACT Campaign - (a) Management and Integration • Coordination meetings between NE and NA-22, NA-24, and NA-82 were conducted the week of June 11th. Preparations are being made for the next MPACT working group meeting, scheduled for Aug 28-30 at Idaho Falls. In addition to covering accomplishments and discussing future plans, a site tour of INL facilities (MFC, EBR, ATR, INTEC) is being organized. (2) Accounting and Control Technologies - (a) Microcalorimetry • Now operating 256-pixel array at LANL. We are in the process of tuning detector parameters to improve and optimize performance. Preliminary measurements show approximate number of live pixels is similar to that observed previously at NIST. Continuing to study contribution to systematic error from uncertainties in tabulated gamma-ray energies. (b) Electrochemical Sensor • Testing of sensors fashioned from different precursor materials continued. SEM analysis of all used sensors has been or will be performed. (c) Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer • Ongoing perturbation calculations are providing information on the fundamental systematic error limits of LSDS. In order to achieve separating the contribution of Pu and 235U to the signal, there will need to be tight controls on systematic errors. Continuing to look into a He4 detector. Research into local construction of a He4 detector continued. We have started to apply the algorithm to test the LSDS using experimental data from previous RPI measurements. PNNL also developed a plan to address the lack of statistics in the MCNP modeling of the NGSI 64 assemblies. The ISU graduate student built and tested a fission chamber to gain experience with them. (d) Fast Neutron Imaging to Quantify Nuclear Materials • The imaging detector design was modified for each pixel to have an 8 x 8 pixel array. Quotations and purchasing process for components, including the new PSD scintillator are in progress. (e) Fast Neutron Multiplicity Analysis • The team submitted two papers to the upcoming INMM meeting that are related to the fast neutron multiplicity R&D effort. Progress was made on the project's main goal of designing a concept for a prototype fast-neutron multiplicity counter. We started laying out the outline for the final report. We have been working with our ORNL collaborators to develop a new digitizer system to support our experimental campaign planned for next year. (3) MPACT Analysis Tools - (a) Multi-isotope Process Monitor • Fuel characterization framework development continued during June. A report describing the methodologies is being completed. Kenneth Dayman, from University of Texas, spent a week at PNNL wrapping up his master's research and working on a journal submission covering that work. The target journal is the IEEE transactions on Nuclear Science; submission is planned for the end of July. A proposal to instrument H-Canyon is being prepared in conjunction with SRNL and the NNSA's NGSI program. The impact of gamma-ray spectrum counting statistics on the precision of relative radioisotope component intensities as reconstructed via Principal Component Regression (PCR) continued in June with Monte Carlo simulations of a two-component (i.e., two radioisotope) system. This work generalizes earlier studies in FY12 in which Poisson counting variations of only a single spectrum component were simulated. (b) Modeling and Simulation for Analysis of Safeguards Performance (Electrochemical) • Preliminary insights into safeguards challenges and the initial design for an electrochemical plant have been written up into an INMM paper and will be presented at the INMM Summer Meeting. Work is currently adding a new visualization capability for integrating materials accountancy with physical protection. (c) Material Control including Process Monitoring (Pattern Recognition, Sensors) • Fabrication of quartz chips continued at an external foundry. Awaiting delivery of the heat exchange manifold and chip holder. (d) MPACT System Integration and Technical Support • The initial report on cost-basis metrics for nuclear material security risk and proliferation risk was completed as scheduled. (4) Safeguards and Security by Design - (a) Used fuels storage security analysis, guidance and best practices • RFP was finalized and sent out. Awaiting response from World Institute for Nuclear Security. Coordinated with Scott Demuth on joint report • LANL milestone on best practices. Attended Nuclear Energy Institute National Nuclear Security Conference. Developed plan for soliciting input on prioritized issues for used fuel storage security. Worked on setting up a meeting with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Worked on FY2013 work package planning.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Strategy for Fuel Rod Receipt, Characterization, Sample Allocation for the Demonstration Sister Rods

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology, has established the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) to conduct the research and development activities related to storage, transportation, and disposal of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The mission of the UFDC is to identify alternatives and conduct scientific research and technology development to enable storage, transportation and disposal of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and wastes generated by existing and future nuclear fuel cycles. The UFDC Storage and Transportation staffs are responsible for addressing issues regarding the extended or long-term storage of UNF and its subsequent transportation. The near-term objectives of the Storage and Transportation task are to use a science-based approach to develop the technical bases to support the continued safe and secure storage of UNF for extended periods, subsequent retrieval, and transportation. While low burnup fuel [that characterized as having a burnup of less than 45 gigawatt days per metric tonne uranium (GWD/MTU)] has been stored for nearly three decades, the storage of high burnup used fuels is more recent. The DOE has funded a demonstration project to confirm the behavior of used high burnup fuel under prototypic conditions. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is leading a project team to develop and implement the Test Plan to collect this data from a UNF dry storage system containing high burnup fuel. The Draft Test Plan for the demonstration outlines the data to be collected; the high burnup fuel to be included; the technical data gaps the data will address; and the storage system design, procedures, and licensing necessary to implement the Test Plan. To provide data that is most relevant to high burnup fuel in dry storage, the design of the test storage system must closely mimic real conditions high burnup SNF experiences during all stages of dry storage: loading, cask drying, inert gas backfilling, and transfer to an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) for multi-year storage. To document the initial condition of the used fuel prior to emplacement in a storage system, “sister ” fuel rods will be harvested and sent to a national laboratory for characterization and archival purposes. This report supports the demonstration by describing how sister rods will be shipped and received at a national laboratory, and recommending basic nondestructive and destructive analyses to assure the fuel rods are adequately characterized for UFDC work. For this report, a hub-and-spoke model is proposed, with one location serving as the hub for fuel rod receipt and characterization. In this model, fuel and/or clad would be sent to other locations when capabilities at the hub were inadequate or nonexistent. This model has been proposed to reduce DOE-NE’s obligation for waste cleanup and decontamination of equipment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Novel Deployment of Elpasolites as a Dual Neutron/Gamma-Ray Directional Detector

At a time when upholding national security has never been more important, there exists a need for the advancement of radiation detection technologies. Neutron and photon detectors are essential to fulfilling mission areas including detection and localization of missing, stolen or smuggled radiological or nuclear materials, quantification of the effects of a radiological or nuclear event, and supporting nonproliferation efforts. The aim of this study was to evaluate a new radiation detector based on the scintillation elpasolite compound Cs 2 LiYCl 6 :Ce (CLYC) for simultaneous measurements of neutron and photon flux and the localization of radiation sources. Previous studies performed on the CLYC scintillator indicate its potential for thermal neutron and gamma-ray measurements. This study is dedicated to the novel application of the CLYC as a dual neutron / photon detector and as part of a directional detection system. Both computational modeling and an experimental study were carried out within this research project. As part of the computational study, the response of a CLYC scintillator detector to gamma rays induced by thermal neutron interaction with Cl and 7 Li nuclei was investigated using the MCNP6 code. In addition, arrays of three and four CLYC detectors were modeled in order to evaluate the directional detection of both a thermal neutron source and a gamma-ray source. It was shown that little or no quality of source direction determination would be lost when three detectors were used in the array compared to four detectors. In the experimental study, the photon spectroscopy capabilities of the CLYC detectors were evaluated. A gamma-ray energy resolution of 4.9% was measured for the 662-keV peak of 137 Cs and 3.6% for the 1.33-MeV peak of 60 Co. Using a thermal neutron source, the pulse shape discrimination analysis was successfully performed for the CLYC detector signal waveforms. Thermal neutrons and gamma rays were separated with an exceptional figure of merit (FOM) of 2.3. An array of three CLYC detectors was assembled for the purpose of directional neutron / gamma-ray detection. The intrinsic peak efficiency of CLYC detectors was evaluated. The three-CLYC detector array was deployed for directional measurements with a single gamma-ray 137 Cs source, two gamma-ray sources of 137 Cs and 60 Co isotopes and a thermal neutron source designed using a 239PuBe neutron source supplied with a polyethylene moderator. Measurements were carried out using sources located in the longitude and latitude planes over the angles from 0° to 360°. The measured data were processed through a maximum likelihood estimation algorithm providing a possible direction for which the radioactive source in each case was positioned. The estimated directions were close if not exact matches for the actual directions to the radioactive source. The largest discrepancy in direction produced by the algorithm was approximately 11%. However, it was hypothesized that this percent error can be decreased by homogenizing the directional detection system to consist of scintillators of the same size and quality, identical photomultiplier tubes and identical aluminum housings. The feasibility of this hypothesis to decrease the percent error was confirmed by the zero percent error achieved in the directional measurements produced in the computational study utilizing a homogenous directional detection system. The results of computational and experimental studies completed within this research project provide means to propose the array of three CLYC scintillators as an efficient dual neutron / gamma-ray directional detector.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Supercritical carbon dioxide cycle control analysis.

This report documents work carried out during FY 2008 on further investigation of control strategies for supercritical carbon dioxide (S-CO{sub 2}) Brayton cycle energy converters. The main focus of the present work has been on investigation of the S-CO{sub 2} cycle control and behavior under conditions not covered by previous work. An important scenario which has not been previously calculated involves cycle operation for a Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) following a reactor scram event and the transition to the primary coolant natural circulation and decay heat removal. The Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) Plant Dynamics Code has been applied to investigate the dynamic behavior of the 96 MWe (250 MWt) Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) S-CO{sub 2} Brayton cycle following scram. The timescale for the primary sodium flowrate to coast down and the transition to natural circulation to occur was calculated with the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 computer code and found to be about 400 seconds. It is assumed that after this time, decay heat is removed by the normal ABTR shutdown heat removal system incorporating a dedicated shutdown heat removal S-CO{sub 2} pump and cooler. The ANL Plant Dynamics Code configured for the Small Secure Transportable Autonomous Reactor (SSTAR) Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) was utilized to model the S-CO{sub 2} Brayton cycle with a decaying liquid metal coolant flow to the Pb-to-CO{sub 2} heat exchangers and temperatures reflecting the decaying core power and heat removal by the cycle. The results obtained in this manner are approximate but indicative of the cycle transient performance. The ANL Plant Dynamics Code calculations show that the S-CO{sub 2} cycle can operate for about 400 seconds following the reactor scram driven by the thermal energy stored in the reactor structures and coolant such that heat removal from the reactor exceeds the decay heat generation. Based on the results, requirements for the shutdown heat removal system may be defined. In particular, the peak heat removal capacity of the shutdown heat removal loop may be specified to be 1.1 % of the nominal reactor power. An investigation of the oscillating cycle behavior calculated by the ANL Plant Dynamics Code under specific conditions has been carried out. It has been found that the calculation of unstable operation of the cycle during power reduction to 0 % may be attributed to the modeling of main compressor operation. The most probable reason for such instabilities is the limit of applicability of the currently used one-dimensional compressor performance subroutines which are based on empirical loss coefficients. A development of more detailed compressor design and performance models is required and is recommended for future work in order to better investigate and possibly eliminate the calculated instabilities. Also, as part of such model development, more reliable surge criteria should be developed for compressor operation close to the critical point. It is expected that more detailed compressor models will be developed as a part of validation of the Plant Dynamics Code through model comparison with the experiment data generated in the small S-CO{sub 2} loops being constructed at Barber-Nichols Inc. and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Although such a comparison activity had been planned to be initiated in FY 2008, data from the SNL compression loop currently in operation at Barber Nichols Inc. has not yet become available by the due date of this report. To enable the transient S-CO{sub 2} cycle investigations to be carried out, the ANL Plant Dynamics Code for the S-CO{sub 2} Brayton cycle was further developed and improved. The improvements include further optimization and tuning of the control mechanisms as well as an adaptation of the code for reactor systems other than the Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor (LFR). Since the focus of the ANL work on S-CO{sub 2} cycle development for the majority of the current year has been on the applicability of the cycle to SFRs, work has started on modification of the ANL Plant Dynamics Code to allow the dynamic simulation of the ABTR. The code modifications have reached the point where a transient simulation can be run in steady state mode; i.e., to determine the steady state initial conditions at full power without an initiating event. The results show that the steady state solution is maintained with minimal variations during at least 4,000 seconds of the transient. More SFR design specific modifications to the ANL Plant Dynamics Code are required to run the code in a full transient mode, including models for the sodium pumps and their control as well as models for reactivity feedback and control of the reactor power.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Modeling and Analysis of the Transport and Disposal of Beryllium Moderator Blocks and Greater than Class C (GTCC) Waste

Radioactive waste in the United states is categorized based on its source, radioactivity, and security risk. The categorization method employed by the Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC) for low-level radioactive waste is not currently applied to any waste generated by the Department of Energy (DOE) or disposed of in DOE facilities. As a result, there is a large volume of DOE-generated waste with characteristics similar to the NRC’s “Greater than Class C” (GTCC) waste category which presently do not have a path for long-term disposal. Much of this waste cannot undergo the standard commercial disposition process due to it being categorized as Transuranic (TRU) waste under DOE guidelines, due to elevated concentrations of key fission products. Possible solutions to this dilemma are explored in the Environmental Impact Statement for the “Disposal of Greater-Than-Class-C Low Level Radioactive Wave” (EIS-0375). This paper analyzes several EIS possible paths for disposal for this “orphaned” waste. One example that highlights this categorization issue is the spent beryllium cladding that has been extracted from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) throughout its operational lifetime. These beryllium blocks surround the reactor’s main chambers and components and serve as neutron moderators. This paper will use this particular waste form to analyze the economic and technological viability of transporting and storing this material under the storage and transportation criteria of the Waste isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which was deemed the most feasible disposition path according to the EIS. The example of this waste form used in this paper that highlights this categorization issue is the spent beryllium cladding extracted from Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). These beryllium blocks surround the reactor’s components and serve as neutron moderators, and thus have accumulated high concentration of high-activity transuranic isotopes. This paper analyzed the viability of transporting and storing this material under the storage and transportation criteria of the five primary disposition paths covered in EIS-0375. An array of calculations was carried out to assess the viability of the various disposition paths for the beryllium shipments as well as other waste shipments that fall within the GTCC category. Modeling with MCNP 6.2 was conducted to determine whether the beryllium blocks could be safely stored and transported within a 72-B cask; the standard shipping container for remote-handled, transuranic waste, while also meeting regulatory limits at various disposition paths. A cost analysis of the transportation and long-term disposal paths mentioned in the EIS was also carried out using available data and information from similar waste shipments. Lastly, a geochemical analysis of the various geological repository discussed in the EIS was also carried out using the Geochemists Workbench Release 14. Long-term disposal of the beryllium blocks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) proved to be the most cost-effective long-term disposition option of the ones considered in the EIS. A dose rate calculation at both contact and remote-handling distances indicate that the analyzed beryllium shipments should not exceed the exposure limits at any of the considered locations. Greater-than-class-C waste has been left in a regulatory state of limbo for years, resulting in backlogs of inventory across several research sites in the United States. Due to its high activity and presence of transuranic isotopes, it is imperative to ensure that it remains inaccessible and sequestered both in its short-term interim as well as a long-term geologic time scale. The information and assessments done in the paper could potentially serve as a reference for any future shipments of this waste form at the WIPP facility as well as other disposition paths that may be considered in the future.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Active Interrogation using Photofission Technique for Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability

Innovative systems with increased sensitivity and resolution are in great demand to detect diversion and to prevent misuse in support of nuclear materials management for the U.S. fuel cycle. Nuclear fission is the most important multiplicative process involved in non-destructive active interrogation. This process produces the most easily recognizable signature for nuclear materials. In addition to thermal or high-energy neutrons, high-energy gamma rays can also excite a nucleus and cause fission through a process known as photofission. Electron linear accelerators (linacs) are widely used as the interrogating photon sources for inspection methods involving photofission technique. After photofission reactions, prompt signals are much stronger than the delayed signals, but it is difficult to quantify them in practical measurements. Delayed signals are easily distinguishable from the interrogating radiation. Linac-based, advanced inspection techniques utilizing the delayed signals after photofission have been extensively studied for homeland security applications. Previous research also showed that a unique delayed gamma ray energy spectrum exists for each fissionable isotope. In this work, high-energy delayed γ-rays were demonstrated to be signatures for detection, identification, and quantification of special nuclear materials. Such γ-rays were measured in between linac pulses using independent data acquisition systems. A list-mode system was developed to measure low-energy delayed γ-rays after irradiation. Photofission product yields of 238 U and 239 Pu were determined based on the measured delayed γ-ray spectra. The differential yields of delayed γ-rays were also proven to be able to discriminate nuclear from non-nuclear materials. The measurement outcomes were compared with Monte Carlo simulation results. It was demonstrated that the current available codes have capabilities and limitations in the simulation of photofission process. A two-fold approach was used to address the high-rate challenge in used nuclear fuel assay based on photofission technique. First, a standard HPGe preamplifier was modified to improve its capabilities in high-rate pulsed photofission environment. Second, advanced pulse processing algorithms were shown to greatly improve throughput rate without large sacrifice in energy resolution at ultra-high input count rate. Two customized gamma spectroscopy systems were also developed in real-time on FPGAs. They were shown to have promising performance matching available commercial units.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

rHealth One Demonstration Aboard ISS: A Microfluidic Bioanalyzer Based on Sheath/Hydrodynamic Focusing Flow Cytometry

The Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element aims to provide astronauts with the means for their own health monitoring, diagnosis, and treatment during exploration missions. As space flight ventures further from earth, the need for autonomous medical care increases under greater constraints on size, mass, and resources. One pillar for diagnosis that crew would be separated from is laboratory analysis. Even now on ISS, blood samples must be collected and returned to earth for testing. In response, ExMC is assessing how assays for hematology, bone health, radiation exposure etc. could be addressed through commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) funded bioanalyzers that are miniaturizing lab technology. Since missions will reach distances where there are no timely replacements, validation on the International Space Station (ISS) is a necessary part of that assessment. In partnership with NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Immunology Lab and the Research Operations and Integration (ROI) element, ExMC conducted a technology demonstration on ISS of the rHEALTH ONE, a flow cytometry based bioanalyzer, to assess future devices based on this design. In flow cytometry, there are predominantly three ways to focus the cells (or particles) into a single file stream: hydrodynamic focusing, microcapillary, and acoustic focusing. The rHEALTH ONE utilizes the commercial standard, sheath-based hydrodynamic focusing. rHEALTH itself represents both a company and a suite of medical tools NASA has funded through SBIR grants towards the development of a promising diagnosis instrument for exploration missions. rHEALTH ONE is the interim version of the technology, functional as a benchtop analyzer and test bed for the next generation of rHEALTH in development. Several modifications were made to the rHEALTH ONE analyzer for operation in microgravity. For function, fluid management was key. A sheath-based analyzer uses sheath fluid to flow the sample, cleaning fluid to prevent biological contamination, and a reservoir to collect the liquid waste. The rHEALTH ONE analyzer uses bottles dependent on gravity to separate the air and liquid pathways and keep the liquids contained. It uses only 1 psig of air pressure to directly push the liquid through the device, requiring little-to-no resistance at inlet and outlet. A microtubing assembly with self-sealing luer connectors was designed – featuring 0.014 mm thick durable medical balloons to hold water inside the supply bottles – to create safe containment and easy access for the crew while maintaining the analyzer’s function. For safety, copper tape was added to the interior of the plastic housing to reduce electromagnetic interference, fluid and electrical connections were secured against vibration and leaks, and gaps were further sealed to ensure containment of the optical block and lasers. Water as the sheath and cleaning fluid and TOX 0 samples were used to reduce the biohazard risk to the crew. In May 2022, European Space Agency astronaut Samantha Cristoforetti demonstrated the rHEALTH ONE aboard ISS for its sample loading, flow cytometry, and data collection capability in microgravity. The JSC Immunology Lab provided flow cytometry expertise, designed the sample test protocol, and manufactured and benchmarked the flight samples on a ‘gold-standard’ flow cytometer. The analyzer was primed with water, purged of air, and four calibration solutions of polystyrene microparticles were tested to characterize its performance. Tightly controlled procedures and excellent execution prevented air bubble interference during air/water separation, fluid transfer, sample mixing and loading. Data showed a slight increase in signal noise on 3 of 5 channels and an anomaly of fluorophores migrating in one sample (confirmed by JSC post-flight). Flight results correctly detected the change in sample, matched the analyzer’s ground performance, and were consistent with the gold-standard’s ground results. Although areas were noted for improvement, these outcomes signified complete mission success.

R. S. Miller↗