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This document attempts to compile the requirements for the top-levels of a hierarchical arrangement of nuclear data such as found in the ENDF format. This set of requirements will be used to guide the development of a new data structure to replace the legacy ENDF format.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science (SC) Offices of High Energy Physics (HEP) and Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) convened a programmatic Exascale Requirements Review on June 10–12, 2015, in Bethesda, Maryland. This report summarizes the findings, results, and recommendations derived from that meeting. The high-level findings and observations are as follows. Larger, more capable computing and data facilities are needed to support HEP science goals in all three frontiers: Energy, Intensity, and Cosmic. The expected scale of the demand at the 2025 timescale is at least two orders of magnitude — and in some cases greater — than that available currently. The growth rate of data produced by simulations is overwhelming the current ability of both facilities and researchers to store and analyze it. Additional resources and new techniques for data analysis are urgently needed. Data rates and volumes from experimental facilities are also straining the current HEP infrastructure in its ability to store and analyze large and complex data volumes. Appropriately configured leadership-class facilities can play a transformational role in enabling scientific discovery from these datasets. A close integration of high-performance computing (HPC) simulation and data analysis will greatly aid in interpreting the results of HEP experiments. Such an integration will minimize data movement and facilitate interdependent workflows. Long-range planning between HEP and ASCR will be required to meet HEP’s research needs. To best use ASCR HPC resources, the experimental HEP program needs (1) an established, long-term plan for access to ASCR computational and data resources, (2) the ability to map workflows to HPC resources, (3) the ability for ASCR facilities to accommodate workflows run by collaborations potentially comprising thousands of individual members, (4) to transition codes to the next-generation HPC platforms that will be available at ASCR facilities, (5) to build up and train a workforce capable of developing and using simulations and analysis to support HEP scientific research on next-generation systems.
The Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) Program target fabrication facility is currently located in building 131 (B131) of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). A portion of this current facility has been committed to another program as part of a larger effort to consolidate LLNL capabilities into newer facilities. This facility assembles precision targets for scientific studies at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). B131 is also going through a modernization project to upgrade the infrastructure and abate asbestos. These activities will interrupt the continuous target fabrication efforts for the JASPER Program. Several options are explored to meet the above conflicting requirements, with the final recommendation to prepare a new facility for JASPER target fabrication operations before modernization efforts begin in the current facility assigned to JASPER. This recommendation fits within all schedule constraints and minimizes the disruption to the JASPER Program. This option is not without risk, as it requires moving an aged, precision coordinate measuring machine, which is essential to the JASPER Program’s success. The selected option balances the risk to the machine with continuity of operations.
This study assesses the effectiveness of block valve closure swiftness in mitigating the consequences of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline releases on public and environmental safety. It also evaluates the technical, operational, and economic feasibility and potential cost benefits of installing automatic shutoff valves (ASVs) and remote control valves (RCVs) in newly constructed and fully replaced transmission lines. Risk analyses of hypothetical pipeline release scenarios are used as the basis for assessing: (1) fire damage to buildings and property in Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 high consequence areas (HCAs) caused by natural gas pipeline releases and subsequent ignition of the released natural gas; (2) fire damage to buildings and property in HCAs designated as high population areas and other populated areas caused by hazardous liquid pipeline releases and subsequent ignition of the released propane; and (3) socioeconomic and environmental damage in HCAs caused by hazardous liquid pipeline releases of crude oil. These risk analyses use engineering principles and fire science practices to characterize thermal radiation effects on buildings and humans and to quantify the total damage cost of socioeconomic and environmental impacts. The risk analysis approach used for natural gas pipelines is consistent with risk assessment standards developed by industry and incorporated into Federal pipeline safety regulations. Feasibility evaluations for the hypothetical pipeline release scenarios considered in this study show that installation of ASVs and RCVs in newly constructed and fully replaced natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines is technically, operationally, and economically feasible with a positive cost benefit. However, these results may not apply to all newly constructed and fully replaced pipelines because site-specific parameters that influence risk analyses and feasibility evaluations often vary significantly from one pipeline segment to another and may not be consistent with those considered in this study. Consequently, the technical, operational, and economic feasibility and potential cost benefits of installing ASVs and RCVs in newly constructed or fully replaced pipelines need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In theory, installing ASVs and RCVs in pipelines can be an effective strategy for mitigating potential consequences of unintended releases because decreasing the total volume of the release reduces overall impacts on the public and to the environment. However, block valve closure has no effect on preventing pipeline failure or stopping the product that remains inside the isolated pipeline segments from escaping into the environment. The benefits in terms of cost avoidance attributed to block valve closure swiftness increase as the time required to isolate the damaged transmission pipeline segment decreases. Block valve closure swiftness is most effective in mitigating damage resulting from a pipeline release and subsequent fire when the damaged pipeline segment is isolated and the thermal radiation produced by the fire declines in time so that emergency responders can safely begin fire fighting activities immediately upon arrival at the scene. Similarly, the avoided cost of socioeconomic and environmental damage for hazardous liquid pipeline releases without ignition increase as time required to isolate the damaged pipeline segment decreases.
Simulation Data Management (SDM), the ability to securely organize, archive, and share analysis models and the artifacts used to create them, is a fundamental requirement for modern engineering analysis based on computational simulation. We have worked separately to provide secure, network SDM services to engineers and scientists at our respective laboratories for over a decade. We propose to leverage our experience and lessons learned to help develop and deploy a next-generation SDM service as part of a multi-laboratory team. This service will be portable across multiple sites and platforms, and will be accessible via a range of command-line tools and well-documented APIs. In this document, we’ll review our high-level and low-level requirements for such a system, review one existing system, and briefly discuss our proposed implementation.
Over the next 10 years, the Department of Energy will be transitioning from Petascale to Exascale Computing resulting in data storage, networking, and infrastructure requirements to increase by three orders of magnitude. The technologies and best practices used today are the result of a relatively slow evolution of ancestral technologies developed in the 1950s and 1960s. These include magnetic tape, magnetic disk, networking, databases, file systems, and operating systems. These technologies will continue to evolve over the next 10 to 15 years on a reasonably predictable path. Experience with the challenges involved in transitioning these fundamental technologies from Terascale to Petascale computing systems has raised questions about how these will scale another 3 or 4 orders of magnitude to meet the requirements imposed by Exascale computing systems. This report is focused on the most concerning scaling issues with data storage systems as they relate to High Performance Computing- and presents options for a path forward. Given the ability to store exponentially increasing amounts of data, far more advanced concepts and use of metadata will be critical to managing data in Exascale computing systems.
States enter into safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to fulfill their nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Each nonnuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [1] is required, pursuant to Article III, to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA. This document aims to provide information regarding the system requirements of software designed for comprehensive safeguards reporting.
This document provides the software requirements for a computer code to perform point kinetics-based simulations of nuclear reactor transients. These requirements address all aspects of code development and use, including input and output parameters and structure, software capabilities, and supporting documentation. This software is intended to replace the existing point kinetics code TREKIN, which is currently used for the analysis of the Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT).
This document summarizes the flow-down of requirements from TFR-483 and SAR-419 and provides a roadmap for a verification of the requirements. The project vital safety systems include the vault shield plugs (VSP) and the cask-to-vault adapting structure (CVAS).
This document describes the recent progress of the RELAP-7 Software Verification and Validation Plan (SVVP). The RELAP-7 RTM has been updated by adding the validation requirement items, rearranging the requirement items, and introducing the classifier to better describe the RELAP-7 V&V status at a specified point in time. Also, from the perspective of nuclear system code validation, six items from the list of LWR safety-relevant phenomena were identified as validation data gaps. Lastly, motivated by the needs revealed from the previous RELAP-7 IV&V activities, the independent verification plan for RELAP-7 has been established. The verification method, procedure, and verification test coverage suite discussed in this document will be applied to the future work for the RELAP-7 independent verification.
This report documents the test plans, including detailed duty cycles, used in evaluating the technical performance of five energy storage systems (ESSs) sponsored by the Washington State Clean Energy Fund (CEF). These ESSs were installed at three participating utilities’ (Avista, Snohomish Public Utility District or SnoPUD, and Puget Sound Energy or PSE) designated sites. Under each test plan, a number of baseline and use case tests are defined. This report documents the test plan for each utility, including duty cycles, data and performance reporting requirements. Baseline tests defined in this report mainly focus on determining an initial or reference performance for each ESS, which may be compared with the performance at any later time to assess the state of health of the ESS. Parameter values of a given ESS obtained from baseline tests are applied for different modeling purposes and use case tests. The stored energy capacity test is the first test conducted in the baseline test program, which generates data to calculate round trip efficiency (RTE). The response time and ramp rate tests provide the time required for an ESS to change from zero to full charging/discharging rate and hence the ramp rate, which is important in understanding ESS performance for applications calling for fast response. Internal resistance testing of ESS cells is also conducted in conjunction with the response time and ramp rate tests. Finally, the baseline tests include frequency regulation (FR) and peak shaving (PS) tests based on real-world duty cycles. Upon completion of the baseline tests, use case tests are conducted at each of the storage sites with duty cycles developed to meet the site-specific criteria and conditions. The use cases are grouped according to their intended target benefits within the electric infrastructure topology (e.g., transmission versus distribution). Although an ESS may be located on the low-voltage side of a substation that provides power to a distribution feeder, a use case that addresses bulk power services could still be provided and would be grouped under the transmission or bulk-power benefits. Use cases for ESS applications deep into the distribution circuit would be categorized under the distribution system cases.
The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the Safety Rated Accumulated Charge Monitor Interlock (ACMI) that is being designed for the Linac to Booster Transport Line requires redundant monitoring components and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and define the minimum Safety Integrity Level (SIL) for the ACMI system. The ACMI is required to monitor and limit the amount of total injected electron charge that can be transported from the Linac into the Booster, and consequently into the Storage Ring. The ACMI is one of the key components that assure compliance with the NSLS-II Accelerator Safety Envelope [1].
As the role of wind energy grows in the U.S. power grid, there is increased interest and requirements for it to provide 'essential reliability' services (historically often referred to as 'ancillary' services). These services are critical to maintaining the reliability and stability of the grid, and historically were provided by large 'synchronous' generators, mainly fossil-fueled and hydroelectric generators. To help evaluate the potential role of wind in providing these services, this report provides an overview of services provided to the grid, including their technical requirements, quantities currently procured, and some estimates of costs. The report also summarizes the technical and regulatory issues around wind providing these services.
As the role of wind energy grows in the U.S. power grid, there is increased interest and requirements for it to provide 'essential reliability' services (historically often referred to as 'ancillary' services). These services are critical to maintaining the reliability and stability of the grid, and historically were provided by large 'synchronous' generators, mainly fossil-fueled and hydroelectric generators. To help evaluate the potential role of wind in providing these services, this report provides an overview of services provided to the grid, including their technical requirements, quantities currently procured, and some estimates of costs. The report also summarizes the technical and regulatory issues around wind providing these services.
This document provides requirements for all CDU designs to be used at the Q-6 firing sites [i.e., Technical Area 22, Building 34 (TA-22-00340; TA-40-0005; and TA-40-0015], including LANL-designed CDUs, firesets from other Department of Energy (DOE) sites, and commercial firesets. CDUs for other, non-Q-6 sites [e.g., Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility, Proton Radiography (pRad) Facility, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), etc.] may have additional requirements that are not reflected here. While this document provides recommendations and examples for some aspects of fireset design, it is not intended to be a design guide. This document is intended for use by subject matter experts (SMEs) in fireset design. Those new to fireset design should consult SMEs before submitting a fireset for Q-6 approval.
This unit process evaluates energy requirements and fuel leakage emissions for the transport of F-T jet fuel by pipeline, plus electricity required for blending with conventional jet fuel. To access the model referenced in the report, please visit https://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analysis/details?id=40860FAB-E845-4A89-950E-0E65E6C7B2B4
The Air Delivered Weapons Tester Development Group (2256) is currently designing a new type of test system, the Universal Real Time Controller (URTCON). The URTCON will provide the surveillance community with technologies that advance the state of knowledge in stockpile stewardship. Success for its implementation depends on whether the components comprising the URTCON can be reliably and accurately maintained in the field. A system is maintainable when the worker has visual and physical access to the components that need to be serviced. To address this need, a layout was determined that best facilitates the worker's ability to easily see and reach components. A list of user-system requirements was initially prepared to guide decisions affecting the layout. Then, five design options depicting various ways to lay out the components were evaluated. Based on this effort, a best design option was identified for implementation. It is expected that the design recommended herein will provide the workers with a workplace that permits unhindered access to the components requiring their attention.
The purpose of the commissioning process for this project is to provide SNL assurance that equipment/systems have been provided as required, installed in the prescribed manner and operate in compliance with SNL project requirements, basis of design, contract documentation, and operational needs. In addition, commissioning provides SNL assurance that any special safety engineered features to prevent or control the accidental release of hazardous energy operate appropriately. Commissioning is intended to enhance the quality of system startup, operation and aid in the orderly and timely transfer of fully functioning systems.