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At least 1,333 records · Page 74

Determination of Solar System R-Process Abundances using ENDF/B-VIII.0 and TENDL-2015 libraries

Recent multi-messenger detection of the binary neutron star merger (GW170817) energized the astrophysical community and encouraged further research for determination of nuclear physics observables. Comprehensive studies of atomic nuclei in the cosmos provide an opportunity for investigating these astrophysical phenomena and acquiring complementary information on stellar nucleosynthesis processes that can be verified using the latest nuclear data. Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) libraries contain complete collections of reaction cross sections over the energy range relevant to astrophysics, fission yields and decay data. These data collections have been used worldwide in nuclear science, industry and national security applications. There is great interest in exploring the ENDF/B-VIII.0 and TALYS Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (TENDL-2015) for nuclear astrophysics purposes and comparing findings with the Karlsruhe Astrophysical Database of Nucleosynthesis in Stars (KADoNiS). The Maxwellian-averaged cross sections (MACS) and astrophysical reaction rates have been calculated using the ENDF/B-VIII.0 and TENDL-2015 evaluated data sets. The calculated cross sections were combined with the solar system abundances and fitted using the classical model of stellar nucleosynthesis. Astrophysical rapid- and slow-neutron capture, r- and s-process, respectively, abundances were obtained from present data and compared with available values. Further analysis of MACS reveals potential evaluated libraries data deficiencies and a strong need for new measurements. The current results demonstrate a large nuclear astrophysics potential of evaluated libraries and mutually beneficial relations between nuclear industry and research e orts.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Support for Reactor Operators in Case of Cyber-Security Threats (NEUP Final Report)

Increasing use of digital technology in nuclear power plants (NPPs) poses cyber-security as a crucial threat to public safety and to continuous energy production. Cyber-security risks are comprised of complex known and unknown interactions between various entities, system vulnerabilities, network protocols, human users and malicious attacks. There is little understanding or research geared towards plant operators’ response under cyber-security threats and operational procedures to cope with such threats. This is particularly critical when a cyber-security event masquerades as a safety incident or an evolving accident. Instead of leading operators to the remediation of the accident, the masked cyber event may lead them to circumvent the safety mechanisms of the plant. Given these challenges, the objective of this project is to develop a tool to characterize abnormal NPP events as “cyber” or “safety” incidents, and to further develop this tool as a real-time operator aid to assist in response to the incident. This NEUP Final Report summarizes the research efforts towards the above goals and the results in the following three aspects. First, a methodology for classifying abnormal NPP events as cyber-attacks or safety incidents was developed. This provides the basis for responding to potential cyber-attacks. In this methodology, the causal relationships between various variables (i.e., physical variables, network variables, and control variables) for a nuclear system under consideration are modeled using dynamic Bayesian networks. Based on observations of certain variables (i.e., the evidence), inference is performed to identify the state of hidden variables, which helps indicate the occurrence of cyber-attacks or safety incidents. The proposed methodology was applied to the full scope NPP simulator system at The Ohio State University as a case study. The result shows that the proposed methodology is capable of distinguishing between cyber-attacks and safety incidents. Second, a game-theoretic approach for responding to cyber-attacks on nuclear power plants was developed. This is the second major goal of the project, and the method is used to recommend optimal responses to reactor operators in the case of cyber-attacks. We consider two cases in this research. In the first case, the interaction between the defender (i.e., the reactor operator) and the attacker is modeled as a two-player, nonzero-sum, Markov game with an infinite time horizon. In the second case, we consider a semi-Markov game between the defender and the attacker within a finite time horizon. The model in the second case enables us to consider the time sensitive response of the defender. In each case, the method for deriving the Nash equilibrium is developed. The Nash Equilibrium of the game provides the valid prediction of both players’ actions because no single player can benefit from unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium policy if the other player adheres to his/hers, hence it provides the best response of the defender to cyber-attacks. The proposed method in each case is demonstrated through a simplified benchmark digital feedwater control system. Third, a prototype display is developed to integrate the above information. The prototype display depicts the communication information to the operator and incorporates the cyber-security tool developed by the team into the interface. It consists of the regular display in current control rooms, as well as a panel used to indicate the occurrence of cyber-attacks or safety events and a panel used to guide the operator’s response to detected cyber-attacks.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Machine learning for reactor power monitoring with limited labeled data

Real-time reactor power monitoring is critical for a variety of nuclear applications, spanning safety, security, operations, and maintenance. While machine learning methods have shown promise in monitoring reactor power levels, there is limited research on their efficacy in label-starved environments. The goal of this work is to assess the feasibility of classifying nuclear reactor power level using multisource data in scenarios with limited labels. Data were collected using low-resolution multisensors at four nuclear reactor facilities: two large research reactors and two TRIGA reactors. Within each pair, one reactor dataset served as the source and the other as the target in a transfer learning paradigm. Twenty-three supervised models were trained on labeled sequences of magnetic field and acceleration data from each of the target sites. Self-learning and transfer learning methods were applied to the top performing models to assess their classification performance with increasing amounts of labeled data. While reactor power level classification was achieved with a Matthews Correlation Coefficient of up to 0.739 ± 0.003 and 0.622 ± 0.009 with only 400 sequences per power state for the large research reactor and TRIGA target sites, respectively, self-learning and transfer learning leveraging source site data did not improve target classification performance. These findings suggest that alternative methods, such as higher sensitivity sensors, digital twins, or the use of physics-informed models, are required to enable high-performance classification in machine learning approaches to reactor monitoring with a dearth of target ground truth.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The Nuclear Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface

The nuclear supply chain attack surface is a large, complex network of interconnected stakeholders and activities. The global economy has widened and deepened the supply chain, resulting in larger numbers of geographically dispersed locations and increased difficulty ensuring the authenticity and security of digital assets. Although the nuclear industry has made significant strides in securing facilities from cyber-attacks, the supply chain remains vulnerable. This paper outlines supply chain threats and vulnerabilities and provides a Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface diagram to illustrate the complexity of securing hardware, firmware, software, and system information throughout the entire supply chain lifecycle. The knowledge presented in this paper provides a foundation to use in cybersecurity supply chain risk analysis and to guide future supply chain research and development efforts leading to enhancement of a nuclear facility’s overall security posture.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Fedora, Fission, and Freedom [Slides]

Project Y laid the foundation for all work currently performed at LANL. LANL is responsible for the stewardship of most of the U.S. nuclear weapons, facilitates global security and nonproliferation, and has been a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) for more than 75 years.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A physical unclonable neutron sensor for nuclear arms control inspections

Abstract Classical sensor security relies on cryptographic algorithms executed on trusted hardware. This approach has significant shortcomings, however. Hardware can be manipulated, including below transistor level, and cryptographic keys are at risk of extraction attacks. A further weakness is that sensor media themselves are assumed to be trusted, and any authentication and encryption is done ex situ and a posteriori. Here we propose and demonstrate a different approach to sensor security that does not rely on classical cryptography and trusted electronics. We designed passive sensor media that inherently produce secure and trustworthy data, and whose honest and non-malicious nature can be easily established. As a proof-of-concept, we manufactured and characterized the properties of non-electronic, physical unclonable, optically complex media sensitive to neutrons for use in a high-security scenario: the inspection of a military facility to confirm the absence or presence of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Framework for Building Security into the Design Process

This report presents guidance to support the implementation of security objectives during the design process for nuclear facilities using an organization’s quality management system. The guidance in this document is intended for design vendors and operators of nuclear power facilities. Additionally, this guidance document can be beneficial to regulatory bodies, industry partners, customers, and other stakeholders within the nuclear power market. This report aims to ensure security consequences are identified before designs are completed, which may lead to reduced costs and higher security effectiveness and efficiency.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Recommendations for Secure Transport: Material Conveyance Physical Protection Technology

Nuclear material is at higher risk of theft and sabotage during transport than during any other phase of the nuclear fuel lifecycle. Nuclear materials are transported in the public domain where adversaries have an upper hand by taking advantage of the time and location of the theft or sabotage attempt. As such, even modest threat profiles for transport of nuclear and radioactive material can require substantial detection and delay measures to support timely response. Conveyance tracking augmented with technology that improves on-the-scene situational awareness at a remote monitoring center has been adopted as a de-facto standard approach for transportation security. At present, the extended tracking and situational awareness capabilities needed for a nuclear material shipment, as is provided by the purpose designed, Transportation – Security, Tracking and Reporting (T-STAR) System, do not exist in a single commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution. Typically, the COTS systems that excel in one area are deficient in other areas, presenting challenges to designing well-rounded, robust systems. Still, COTS solutions can offer the basic set of tracking and situational awareness capabilities by indicating last update time, current location, and route taken. By incorporating vehicle and driver performance measures via the vehicle’s controller area network (CAN bus) and video alongside other data streams allows telemetry and other shipment information to be assessed in novel ways.This paper describes the operation, capabilities and features of various conveyance protection systems and approaches, assesses emerging technologies and how they could be used through a unified interface, and enumerates additional ways to provide early detection using vehicle, onboard technologies, effective delay technologies and approaches and simple equipment to improve protection during transport.

Shannon, Michael↗

Remote inspection of adversary-controlled environments

Remotely monitoring the location and enduring presence of valuable items in adversary-controlled environments presents significant challenges. In this article, we demonstrate a monitoring approach that leverages the gigahertz radio-wave scattering and absorption of a room and its contents, including a set of mirrors with random orientations placed inside, to remotely verify the absence of any disturbance over time. Our technique extends to large physical systems the application of physical unclonable functions for integrity protection. Its main applications are scenarios where parties are mutually distrustful and have privacy and security constraints. Examples range from the verification of nuclear arms-control treaties to the securing of currency, artwork, or data centers.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Heat-Iabile Foams 2021 (Project Report)

Foamable materials which can be readily decomposed to yield inert gas in a precise and moderate temperature range are desirable for applications in nuclear waste storage and securement during transportation. In the proposed work, promising lead candidates for such foams were identified from extant peer-reviewed literature, and initial samples synthesized and characterized.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

FY 2021 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan

The mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) is to ensure America’s security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental, and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions. This FY 2021 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan (SSP) was developed to enable and sustain Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) mission to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear solutions, clean energy options, and critical infrastructure. The SSP was developed according to the narrative requirements from the “FY 2021 DOE Site Sustainability Plan Guidance” document issued in August 2020. The SSP contains strategies and activities that will lead to continual energy, water, and waste reductions that move INL toward meeting DOE sustainability goals and requirements. The SSP summarizes energy and available fuel use reporting requirements and references criteria for instituting sustainable design. SSP requirements are integrated into each INL contractor’s Integrated Safety Management System and Environmental Management System (EMS). Finally, the Sustainability Program directives, based on this SSP, are integrated into the INL Annual Laboratory Plan Fiscal Year 2020 (INL/LTD-20-59747), and operations and acquisition systems.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

FY 2022 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan

The mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) is to ensure America’s security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions. This FY 2022 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan (SSP) was developed to enable and sustain Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) mission to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear solutions, clean energy options, and critical infrastructure. DOE Order 436.1, “Departmental Sustainability,” provides requirements and assigns responsibilities for managing sustainability within DOE to ensure that DOE missions are carried out in a sustainable manner, to institute wholesale cultural change to factor sustainability into all DOE decisions, and to ensure DOE achieves sustainability goals. DOE Order 436.1 also requires DOE sites to commit appropriate personnel resources, establish a financing plan that prioritizes the use of life-cycle cost effective private-sector financing, optimize the application of appropriations and budgeted funds, and establish specific performance measures and deliverables designed to achieve the listed requirements. The SSP was developed according to the narrative requirements from the “FY 2022 DOE Site Sustainability Plan Guidance” document issued in September 2021. The SSP contains strategies and activities that will lead to continual energy, water, and waste reductions that move the INL site toward meeting DOE sustainability goals and requirements. The SSP summarizes energy and available fuel use reporting requirements and references criteria for instituting sustainable design. SSP requirements are integrated into each INL site contractor’s Integrated Safety Management System and Environmental Management System (EMS). Finally, the Sustainability Program directives, based on this SSP, are integrated into INL/LTD-21-62463, Annual Laboratory Plan 2021, and operations and acquisition systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

FY 2023 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan

The mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) is to ensure America’s security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions. This FY 2022 Idaho National Laboratory Site Sustainability Plan (SSP) was developed to enable and sustain Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) mission to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear solutions, clean energy options, and critical infrastructure. DOE Order 436.1, “Departmental Sustainability,” provides requirements and assigns responsibilities for managing sustainability within DOE to ensure that DOE missions are carried out in a sustainable manner, to institute wholesale cultural change to factor sustainability into all DOE decisions, and to ensure DOE achieves sustainability goals. DOE Order 436.1 also requires DOE sites to commit appropriate personnel resources, establish a financing plan that prioritizes the use of life-cycle cost effective private-sector financing, optimize the application of appropriations and budgeted funds, and establish specific performance measures and deliverables designed to achieve the listed requirements. The SSP was developed according to the narrative requirements from the “FY 2022 DOE Site Sustainability Plan Guidance” document issued in September 2021. The SSP contains strategies and activities that will lead to continual energy, water, and waste reductions that move the INL site toward meeting DOE sustainability goals and requirements. The SSP summarizes energy and available fuel use reporting requirements and references criteria for instituting sustainable design. SSP requirements are integrated into each INL site contractor’s Integrated Safety Management System and Environmental Management System (EMS). Finally, the Sustainability Program directives, based on this SSP, are integrated into INL/LTD-21-62463, Annual Laboratory Plan 2021, and operations and acquisition systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods

The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗