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At least 1,315 records · Page 73

Scalable Traffic Management for Emergency Response Operations

STEReO brings together several technologies in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM), Autonomy, Communications, Human Factors, and Domain Expertise & Tools, aimed at providing scalability and flexibility, as well as operational resiliency to dynamic changes during a disaster event. Some of the concepts STEReO explores are: collaborative tools to ingest remote sensing information and distribute a common mission operating picture, apply ad-hoc communication networks to facilitate timely information sharing and communication of changes, vehicle-to-vehicle and onboard autonomy technologies ensure the safety and resiliency of operations, and apply NASA’s UAS traffic management system (UTM) as a public safety UAS Service Supplier (USS) to access and coordinate use of the airspace by both manned and unmanned operations. The potential benefits of STEReO include: standardized, cross-platform communication means increased interoperability and ease of cooperation/collaboration, increased situation awareness and common operating picture allow for earlier detection and decision making, and scalable to size and complexity of environment, operations, and mission objectives. This poster gives an informational overview of the STEReO project to attendees of the imaginAviation event.

emergency response operations↗

Commercial Low-Earth Orbit Destination (CLD) Concept of Operations

This concept of operations describes: - High-level Government goals, objectives, and needs for the CLD program, vehicle(s), and missions, - Strategies, policies, and processes for developing, certifying, maintaining, using, and retiring CLDs in the context of Government use, and - Government and CLD partner roles, responsibilities, and interactions during various phases of Government CLD operations. The intent of this document is to describe the overall high-level concept of how the end-to-end CLD service will be used to convey the nature and scope of services the Government intends to procure from the CLD partner. It will provide insight into NASA’s concepts for CLD operations rather than to provide mature, explicit, or complete requirements. It addresses how the concept of operations will be used to meet NASA expectations from an operational perspective to facilitate an understanding of the end-to-end CLD service needs, goals, and objectives (NGOs). Formal CLD requirements and standards are detailed in the NASA Commercial LEO Development Program’s (CLDP) various requirements, interface, process, and standards documents, as well as the contractual Statements of Work (SOW) and Data Requirement Deliverables (DRD). As such, the Concept of Operations can use terms such as “should” or “may” or “expects to” since it is not a contractual requirements document. It exists solely to convey the initial nature and type of services the Government intends to procure and is not, per se, a requirements document.

Operations↗

NASA Lunar Surface Operations & Power Grid

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Program is developing, testing, and demonstrating new capabilities and technologies required to support a sustainable human presence on the lunar surface and a longer-term vision of sending astronauts to Mars. Artemis lunar surface operations will begin with robotically exploring the lunar south polar regions for locations suitable for harvesting lunar surface resources. Over time activities on the lunar surface will expand beyond robotic operations to human lunar surface operations with the delivery of a lunar habitat and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) assets increasing the need for highly reliable and available electrical power. As operations move beyond the Artemis technology demonstrations and exploration activities towards full commercial lunar surface activities, the ability to expand the original envisioned Artemis power system and repurpose power system components to support commercial activities will be crucial. One technology that will be necessary to support commercial lunar operations is a power grid. A lunar surface power grid would offer the ability to integrate various power sources to maximize power availability, including fission surface power (nuclear), solar arrays, batteries, and regenerative fuel cells. Newly designed terrestrial microgrids are flexible and can be designed to allow for islanded operation, where power is utilized near the loads to minimize power distribution losses or in a power sharing mode where power is transmitted longer distances. This capability is crucial during failures where overall power availability is reduced, and load demand exceeds generation/storage capability. These terrestrial microgrids will also allow for the power system to grow and evolve over time, meeting the need to expand beyond initial lunar surface activities. This presentation will discuss the NASA Artemis plans, potential power system architectures, and power distribution options that will enable growth from initial technology demonstrations towards a lunar economy with a lunar surface power grid that offers many of the advantages of terrestrial microgrids.

Microgrids↗

Overview of Crew Operations for Transit to Mars

Crewed Mars missions are estimated to be 700-1,200 days in length which is two to three times longer than any continuous human spaceflight mission to date. When architecting a Mars mission there are numerous resources that must be considered, evaluated, and planned for, including—but not limited to—mass, cost, performance, and risk. Crew time is a limited resource that will need to be appropriately allocated during future Mars missions. NASA’s “Moon to Mars Objectives” specifically recognizes as Recurring Tenets the need to return crews safely to Earth while mitigating adverse impacts to crew health and maximizing crew time available for science and engineering activities within planned mission durations. Crew operations and the crew time allocation for a Mars missions will likely be different than current operational planning aboard the ISS due to communication delays, crew health and performance needs, transportation system needs, potential vehicle dormancy, and mass ejection. Crew will need to operate much more Earth independently and potentially be responsible for more operations since traditional Earth ground support will be delayed. Incidents requiring immediate crew action will therefore either be the responsibility of the crew or an automated feature of the transit vehicle. This paper discusses the operational challenges of a Mars transit mission and the associated activities that will need to take place during each operational phase of transit to and from Mars.

Crew Time↗

Overview of Crew Operations for Transit to Mars

Crewed Mars missions are estimated to be 700-1,200 days in length which is two to three times longer than any continuous human spaceflight mission to date. When architecting a Mars mission there are numerous resources that must be considered, evaluated, and planned for, including—but not limited to—mass, cost, performance, and risk. Crew time is a limited resource that will need to be appropriately allocated during future Mars missions. NASA’s “Moon to Mars Objectives” specifically recognizes as Recurring Tenets the need to return crews safely to Earth while mitigating adverse impacts to crew health and maximizing crew time available for science and engineering activities within planned mission durations. Crew operations and the crew time allocation for a Mars missions will likely be different than current operational planning aboard the ISS due to communication delays, crew health and performance needs, transportation system needs, potential vehicle dormancy, and mass ejection. Crew will need to operate much more Earth independently and potentially be responsible for more operations since traditional Earth ground support will be delayed. Incidents requiring immediate crew action will therefore either be the responsibility of the crew or an automated feature of the transit vehicle. This paper discusses the operational challenges of a Mars transit mission and the associated activities that will need to take place during each operational phase of transit to and from Mars.

Crew Time↗

A Historical Review of Logistics Mass and Crew Time Demands for ISS Operations

Following over 20 years of continuously crewed operations on the International Space Station (ISS), NASA is planning to return to the Moon and eventually send humans to Mars. ISS operations provide vital data to inform mission analysts as NASA prepares for longer and more complex missions with increased mission endurance. Endurance, defined as crewed operating time between cargo deliveries (or crew launch and return to Earth), is an important metric when analyzing mission needs. NASA is developing architectures to support sustained deep-space habitats in cislunar space, the lunar surface, Mars transit, and the surface of Mars. Unlike the ISS, these systems will not be continuously crewed, and unlike the Space Shuttle, these systems will not return to Earth for regular refurbishment between missions. Lunar systems will routinely go through long uncrewed periods between crewed missions. The systems on board will need to survive these dormancy periods with no crew present to provide maintenance. Mars systems will experience significantly longer endurance than past experience. Additionally, the inability to have quick aborts to return to Earth increases the need for system reliability, redundancy, and maintainability, as well as plans for contingency operations. This paper examines the historical logistics and crew time demand for ISS operations and mission objectives and provides an overview of missions to the ISS over its operating history, the mass and items delivered with the missions, and the crew time spent during missions. These parameters provide insight and valuable data to inform logistics and crew time estimates for future long-endurance crewed exploration missions.

Crew Logistics↗

Safe Operational Envelope for the LSMS Family of Cable-Driven Cranes

The Lightweight Surface Manipulation System, or LSMS, is a family of long-reach cable-actuated robotic cranes. They are designed for planetary surface operations on the Moon and Mars. Their low structural weight and compact packaging reduces the fuel costs associated with space travel. The LSMS can be operated by humans, who can be on site or remotely, or autonomously. The goal of this research is to help human operators and path planning algorithms avoid unsafe states during operation. To this end, this work leverages a geometrical model of the LSMS and formulates a new dynamic model. These are later used to define the safe operational envelope for the LSMS family. The paper classifies the constraints that define the safe operational envelope in three groups: motor constraints, geometric constraints, and cable tension constraints. Keeping the cables under tension is necessary to maintain controllability over the joint angles. Two types of loss of tension events are identified for each of the cables. First, an excessive reel out of the cables can lead to a loss of tension, where the LSMS links behave like a pendulum. Second, an excessive reel in of the cables can lead to a link tip-over. This can cause a violent clash between the links on the LSMS. The paper visualizes these constraints for the LSMS-L35, the smallest robot within the family.

LSMS↗

A Historical Review of Logistics Mass and Crew Time Demands for ISS Operations

Following over 20 years of continuously crewed operations on the International Space Station (ISS), NASA is planning to return to the Moon and eventually send humans to Mars. ISS operations provide vital data to inform mission analysts as NASA prepares for longer and more complex missions with increased mission endurance. Endurance, defined as crewed operating time between cargo deliveries (or crew launch and return to Earth), is an important metric when analyzing mission needs. NASA is developing architectures to support sustained deep-space habitats in cislunar space, the lunar surface, Mars transit, and the surface of Mars. Unlike the ISS, these systems will not be continuously crewed, and unlike the Space Shuttle, these systems will not return to Earth for regular refurbishment between missions. Lunar systems will routinely go through long uncrewed periods between crewed missions. The systems on board will need to survive these dormancy periods with no crew present to provide maintenance. Mars systems will experience significantly longer endurance than past experience. Additionally, the inability to have quick aborts to return to Earth increases the need for system reliability, redundancy, and maintainability, as well as plans for contingency operations. This paper examines the historical logistics and crew time demand for ISS operations and mission objectives and provides an overview of missions to the ISS over its operating history, the mass and items delivered with the missions, and the crew time spent during missions. These parameters provide insight and valuable data to inform logistics and crew time estimates for future long-endurance crewed exploration missions.

Crew Logistics↗

Initial Development of an Upper Class E Traffic Management (ETM) System for Stratospheric Flight Operations

Advances in technologies across multiple areas have spurred the motivation and development of new entrants and use cases for the national airspace system to accommodate. The stratosphere, encompassing Upper Class E airspace, is of particular interest due to the types of aircraft that can operate there and the unique missions that can be carried out. The diversity of aircraft that plan to operate and the long durations envisioned presents a challenge for the management of that airspace in a manner that does not burden the current paradigm of air traffic service provision. Upper Class E Traffic Management (ETM) is an approach pioneered by NASA and FAA to enable the cooperative management of high-altitude airspace through operations in cooperative areas facilitated by information exchanges and coordination based on common operating practices. NASA has developed, implemented, and commenced initial tests of the underlying systems and architecture to enable ETM operations. The implementation is the first of its kind and meant to serve as a reference for broader adoption. This paper will present the architecture and details of the system components as well as how it has been implemented for the test. Summary results of initial connectivity tests are included to highlight the functionality of the ETM system, which provides the path forward for more complex operations and interactions at a greater scale.

Upper Class E Traffic Management↗

Survey of Methods for Assessing Safety Compliance of sUAS BVLOS Operations

To ensure the safety of small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) Beyond Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS), the FAA offers a guideline on how sUAS operators can demonstrate compliance with FAA rules, including regulations, advisory circulars, policy statements, and acceptable means of compliance (AMOC), using a formal and top-down approach. According to FAA Advisory Circular 23.2010-1, the AMOC refers to “one method, but not the only method, to show compliance with a regulatory requirement.” It is common for regulations to include a performance and safety standard rather than a detailed design or operation requirement, which allows for flexibility in fulfilling the regulatory requirements while still achieving a predetermined level of safety. This technical report explores existing frameworks for sUAS BVLOS safety analysis. It begins by discussing how sUAS BVLOS operations can be strategically deconflicted and then discusses their hazards. The next step is to establish safety assessment methods commonly used by the aviation industry and the FAA, illustrate how these methods can be applied to several safety-critical air traffic systems, and list collision models that the FAA and industry use. This investigation documents the processes for assessing safety risks in sUAS BVLOS operations and will allow sUAS BVLOS operations to be assessed for safety compliance more efficiently.

sUAS BVLOS Operations↗

Operational-Condition-Independent Criteria Dedicated to Monitoring Wind Turbine Generators: Preprint

To date the existing wind turbine condition monitoring technologies and commercially available systems have not been fully accepted for improving wind turbine availability and reducing their operation and maintenance costs. One of the main reasons is that wind turbines are subject to constantly varying loads and operate at variable rotational speeds. As a consequence, the influences of turbinefaults and the effects of varying load and speed are coupled together in wind turbine condition monitoring signals. So, there is an urgent need to either introduce some operational condition de-coupling procedures into the current wind turbine condition monitoring techniques or develop a new operational condition independent wind turbine condition monitoring technique to maintain high turbineavailability and achieve the expected economic benefits from wind. The purpose of this paper is to develop such a technique. In the paper, three operational condition independent criteria are developed dedicated for monitoring the operation and health condition of wind turbine generators. All proposed criteria have been tested through both simulated and practical experiments. The experimentshave shown that these criteria provide a solution for detecting both mechanical and electrical faults occurring in wind turbine generators.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Analysis of the Effects of a Flexible Ramping Ancillary Service Product on Power System Operations: Preprint

The recent increased interest in utilizing variable generation (VG) resources such as wind and solar in power systems has motivated investigations into new operating procedures. Although these resources provide desirable value to a system (e.g., no fuel costs or emissions), interconnecting them provides unique challenges. Their variable, non-controllable nature in particular requires significant attention, because it directly results in increased power system variability and uncertainty. One way to handle this is via new operating reserve schemes. Operating reserves provide upward and downward generation and ramping capacity to counteract uncertainty and variability prior to their realization. For instance, uncertainty and variability in real-time dispatch can be accounted for in the hour-ahead unit commitment. New operating reserve methodologies that specifically account for the increased variability and uncertainty caused by VG are currently being investigated and developed by academia and industry. This paper examines one method inspired by the new operating reserve product being proposed by the California Independent System Operator. The method is based on examining the potential ramping requirements at any given time and enforcing those requirements via a reserve demand curve in the market-clearing optimization as an additional ancillary service product.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Flexible Power Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are becoming cost prohibitive to operate. This is due to historically low natural gas prices and wind and solar prices often being less than the marginal cost of operating baseload coal and NPPs, which sometimes forces NPPs to pay for the electricity they create. Thus, the feasibility of using part of the heat from an NPP to create other commodities such as hydrogen is being evaluated; operating in this way is called flexible power operation (FPO). To change the NPP design and operation, a license review must happen. Part of the review is the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) which proves the safety of the design and operation by identifying sequences of events that result in plant failure and estimating their likelihood of occurrence. A Level 1 PRA model that evaluates the risk of removing heat from the secondary side of NPP was created. The model was developed using Systems Analysis Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE 8) software to calculate core damage frequency (CDF). It is a fault tree that represents the possible pathways that could lead to a loss of steam inventory in the secondary loop. A loss of steam inventory can induce steam generator tube rupture or other events that activates response systems to avoid core damage. This is the main concern for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the group in the United States that licenses NPPs. This model will calculate a total CDF of any of these pathways occurring which will be compared to the baseline CDF in a generic NPP PRA for licensing support.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Electrification Futures Study: Power Systems Operation with Newly Electrified and Flexible Loads

The Electrification Futures Study (EFS) is a multi-year study designed to analyze the impacts of widespread electrification in the U.S. energy system. In this webinar we present the detailed power systems operational analysis from the final report in the EFS series. For this analysis, we simulate multiple 2050 power systems for the conterminous United States to assess how variations in the magnitude and shape of electricity demand driven by electrification, and the extent of load participation to more-actively provide grid services, might impact the hourly operation, operational costs, and emissions of various power systems in 2050. The impacts of electrification and demand flexibility are overlayed across systems with significantly greater penetrations of variable renewable energy than today. Overall, we find that the high electrification scenarios envisioned in the EFS with significant VRE penetration (66% of annual national generation) can be operated to meet future increased levels of electrified demand. We also find that demand-side flexibility can enhance operational efficiency and reduce overall annual production costs by $5-$10 billion. The complementary relationship between flexible electric vehicle charging loads and solar generation is particularly pronounced, but in the absence of demand-side flexibility electrification can lead to increased wind and solar curtailment. By helping to reduce renewable curtailment, flexibility can also reduce power sector CO2 emissions. The analysis highlights the value of increased integration and coordination of demand- and supply-side resources in future electric system planning and operations—particularly under high electrification futures.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Critical Drivers for Safety Culture: Examining Department of Energy and U.S. Army Operational Experiences - 12382

Evaluating operational incidents can provide a window into the drivers most critical to establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture, thereby minimizing the potential project risk associated with safety incidents. By examining U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) versus U.S. Army drivers in terms of regulatory and contract requirements, programs implemented to address the requirements, and example case studies of operational events, a view of the elements most critical to making a positive influence on safety culture is presented. Four case studies are used in this evaluation; two from DOE and two from U.S. Army experiences. Although the standards guiding operations at these facilities are different, there are many similarities in the level of hazards, as well as the causes and the potential consequences of the events presented. Two of the incidents examined, one from a DOE operation and the other from a U.S. Army facility, resulted in workers receiving chemical burns. The remaining two incidents are similar in that significant conduct of operations failures occurred resulting in high-level radioactive waste (in the case of the DOE facility) or chemical agent (in the case of the Army facility) being transferred outside of engineering controls. A review of the investigation reports for all four events indicates the primary causes to be failures in work planning leading to ineffective hazard evaluation and control, lack of procedure adherence, and most importantly, lack of management oversight to effectively reinforce expectations for safe work planning and execution. DOE and Army safety programs are similar, and although there are some differences in contractual requirements, the expectations for safe performance are essentially the same. This analysis concludes that instilling a positive safety culture comes down to management leadership and engagement to (1) cultivate an environment that values a questioning attitude and (2) continually reinforce expectations for the appropriate level of rigor in work planning and procedure adherence. A review of the root causes and key contributing causes to the events indicate: - Three of the four root cause analyses cite lack of management engagement (oversight, involvement, ability to recognize issues, etc.) as a root cause to the events. - Two of the four root cause analyses cite work planning failures as a root cause to the events and all cause analyses reflect work planning failures as contributing factors to the events. - All events with the exception of the Tuba City plant shutdown indicate procedure noncompliance as a key contributor; in the case of Tuba City the procedure issues were primarily related to a lack of procedures, or a lack of sufficiently detailed procedures. - All events included discussion or suggestion of a lack of a questioning attitude, either on the part of management/supervision, work planners, or workers. This analysis suggests that the most critical drivers to safety culture are: - Management engagement, - Effective work planning and procedures, and - Procedure adherence with a questioning attitude to ensure procedural problems are identified and fixed. In high-hazard operational environments the importance of robust work planning processes and procedure adherence cannot be overstated. However, having the processes by themselves is not enough. Management must actively engage in expectation setting and ensure work planning that meets expectations for hazard analysis and control, develop a culture that encourages incident reporting and a questioning attitude, and routinely observe work performance to reinforce expectations for adherence to procedures/work control documents. In conclusion, the most critical driver to achieving a workforce culture that supports safe and effective project performance can be summarized as follows: 'Management engagement to continually reinforce expectations for work planning processes and procedure adherence in an environment that cultivates a questioning attitude'. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fuel performance analysis of FeCrAl cladding during LWR operation

This work focuses on modeling the integral thermo-mechanical performance of FeCrAl cladded fuel during normal operation in light-water reactors. Preliminary analysis has been performed to assess FeCrAl alloys (namely Alkrothal 720 and APMT) as a suitable fuel cladding replacement for Zr-alloys, using the MOOSE-based, finite-element fuel performance code BISON. These simulations identify the effects of the mechanical-stress and irradiation responses of FeCrAl and provide a comparison with Zr-alloys. In comparing these clad materials, fuel rods have been simulated for normal reactor operation and simple steady-state operation. Normal reactor operating conditions target the cladding performance over the rod lifetime (∼4 cycles) for the highest-power rod in the highest-power fuel assembly under reactor power maneuvering. The power histories and axial temperature profiles input into BISON were generated from a neutronics study on full-core reactivity equivalence for FeCrAl using the 3D full core simulator NESTLE. Evolution of the FeCrAl cladding behavior over time is evaluated by using steady-state operating conditions such as a simple axial power profile, a constant cladding surface temperature, and a constant fuel power history. The fuel rod designs and operating conditions used are based off the Peach Bottom BWR and design consideration was given to minimize the neutronic penalty of the FeCrAl cladding by changing fuel enrichment and cladding thickness. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NM in HLW Borosilicate Glass: Focus on the High Performances of the IHMM Operated at La Hague Plant - 19019

Ruthenium, palladium and rhodium, which belong to Platinum-Group Metals (PGM), are part of fission products resulting from nuclear fuel reprocessing. All High Level Waste (HLW) vitrification facilities have experienced operational issues that can be related to the presence of Noble Metals (NM) in the melter. These metals have low solubility and modify glass properties such as viscosity or electrical and thermal conductivity. These dense metals also tend to settle to the bottom of the melter. Whatever the vitrification process operated, the specific properties and behavior of NM have a propensity to impact the production capacity by decreasing the glass throughput and increasing downtimes. Orano and the CEA have studied the behavior of NM in borosilicate glass for many years. It has led to several technological improvements and process operation optimizations on the Induction Heated Metallic Melter (IHMM) currently operated at La Hague plant. These enhancements, implemented since active commissioning, have headed to a high efficiency in terms glass production and NM incorporation (more than 21000 canisters produced with up to 3 % of Noble Metals in the glass). This paper sets out the continuous improvement program implemented on the La Hague vitrification lines that has led to outstanding records of operation in terms of production capacity and NM incorporation. The benefits of the close collaboration between R and D, engineering, and operation teams is particularly emphasized. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Challenges of Repository Operation in an Existing Mine - 19339

A generally accepted principle related to long term management of radioactive waste/ spent fuel is the isolation in a geological repository. In Germany, the disposal operation of low-level waste (LLW) and intermediate-level waste (ILW) started in the Asse II mine in 1967 and in the former German Democratic Republic in the Morsleben repository in 1971. After the German reunification, the responsibility for the existing sites changed several times until the Bundesgesellschaft fuer Endlagerung (BGE) became new license holder for both sites in 2017. The BGE is responsible to carry out the operative tasks of searching for a high-level waste (HLW) repository, the planning and construction of the Konrad repository for the emplacement of low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW), the operation of the Asse II mine including the retrieval of the emplaced waste, and the preparation for the closure of the Morsleben repository. Nevertheless, the challenges of repository operation in an existing mine have not changed in all these years, as the regulatory framework is mainly written for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and is difficult to adapt for a repository mine. In particular, conditions in a mine are substantially different from 'clean' above-ground nuclear installations. Dust due to mining activities, relatively high temperatures, and a corrosive atmosphere in a salt mine might be present. Therefore, the usability of the repository for several decades during the different operational phases, i.e. planning, construction, emplacement, and closure, can only be ensured by continuous maintenance. Furthermore, the atomic law is applicable for above-ground facilities and the mining law for mines of every description. The difficulty of geological repositories is to ensure that both laws are going to be applied above and below ground with no regulatory framework tailored especially for such sites. A special case is the Asse II mine where the mining law was applied from the very beginning, before the atomic law needed to be established later on and now requires the retrieval of the radioactive waste before decommissioning. In this presentation, similarities and differences in the legal framework of the repositories in the responsibility of BGE and some operational experiences throughout the years are described. This applies to the radiation protection regime, the excavation ratio, the host rock stability and the backfilling concepts of the mining areas. Further challenges arise from the demonstration of long term safety according to the state-of-the-art of science and technology for either existing repositories/ mines or those under construction or planned. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗