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Evaluation of Possible Surrogates for Validation of the Oxidation Furnace for the Plutonium Disposition Project

The Plutonium Disposition project (PuD) is considering an alternative furnace design for direct metal oxidation (DMO) of plutonium metal to use as a feed for potential disposition routes. The proposed design will use a retort to oxidize the feed at temperatures up to 500 C. The atmosphere will be controlled using a metered mixture of oxygen, helium and argon to control the oxidation at approximately 400 torr. Since plutonium melts at 664 C, and may potentially react with retort material to form a lower melting point eutectic, the oxidation process will be controlled by metering the flow of oxygen to ensure that the bulk temperature of the material does not exceed this temperature. A batch processing time of <24 hours is desirable to meet anticipated furnace throughput requirements. The design project includes demonstration of concept in a small-scale demonstration test (i.e., small scale) and validation of design in a full-scale test. These tests are recommended to be performed using Pu surrogates due to challenges in consideration of the nature of plutonium and operational constraints required when handling large quantities of accountable material. The potential for spreading contamination and exposing workers to harmful levels of cumulative radioactive dose are motivation to utilize non-radioactive surrogates. Once the design is demonstrated and optimized, implementation would take place in a facility designed to accommodate these constraints. Until then, the use of surrogates would be a safer, less expensive option for the validation phase of the project. This report examines the potential for use of surrogates in the demonstration and validation of the DMO furnace for PuD. This report provides a compilation of the technical information and process requirements for the conversion of plutonium metal to oxide by burning in dry environments. Several potential surrogates were evaluated by various criteria in order to select a suitable candidate for large scale demonstration. First, the structure of the plutonium metal/oxide interface was compared to potential surrogates. Second the data for plutonium oxidation kinetics were reviewed and rates for oxidation were compared with surrogates. The criteria used as a basis for recommendation was selected in order to provide a reasonable oxidation rate during the validation phase. Several reference documents were reviewed and used to compile the information in this report. Since oxidation of large monolithic pieces of plutonium in 75% oxygen is the preferable oxidizing atmosphere for the intended process, this report does not focus on the oxidation of powders, but focuses instead on larger samples in flowing gas.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Safety Design Strategy for the Advanced Test Reactor Primary Coolant Pump and Motor Replacement Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3B, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3B and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Advanced Test Reactor Reliability Sustainment Project. While this project does not introduce new hazards to the ATR, it has the potential for significant impacts to safety-related systems, structures, and components that are credited in the ATR safety basis and are being replaced. Thus the project has been determined to meet the definition of a major modification and is being managed accordingly.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety Design Strategy for the Advanced Test Reactor Emergency Firewater Injection System Replacement Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3B, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3B and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Advanced Test Reactor Reliability Sustainment Project. While this project does not introduce new hazards to the ATR, it has the potential for significant impacts to safety-related systems, structures, and components that are credited in the ATR safety basis and are being replaced. Thus the project has been determined to meet the definition of a major modification and is being managed accordingly.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety Design Strategy for the Advanced Test Reactor Diesel Bus (E-3) and Switchgear Replacement Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3B, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3B and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Advanced Test Reactor Reliability Sustainment Project. While this project does not introduce new hazards to the ATR, it has the potential for significant impacts to safety-related systems, structures, and components that are credited in the ATR safety basis and are being replaced. Thus the project has been determined to meet the definition of a major modification and is being managed accordingly.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for 2010

The purpose of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Annual Site Environmental Report for 2010 (ASER) is to provide information required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting. Specifically, the ASER presents summary environmental data to: (1) Characterize site environmental management performance. (2) Summarize environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year. (3) Confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements. (4) Highlight significant environmental accomplishments, including progress toward the DOE Environmental Sustainability Goals made through implementation of the WIPP Environmental Management System (EMS). The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and the management and operating contractor (MOC), Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS), maintain and preserve the environmental resources at the WIPP. DOE Order 231.1A; DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, require that the affected environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and workers, and preservation of the environment. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, which requires that DOE facilities submit an ASER to the DOE Headquarters Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Number NM4890139088-TSDF (Permit) further requires that the ASER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

The purpose of this CADD/CAP is to present the corrective action alternatives (CAAs) evaluated for CAU 547, provide justification for selection of the recommended alternative, and describe the plan for implementing the selected alternative. Corrective Action Unit 547 consists of the following three corrective action sites (CASs): (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; and(3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly. The gas sampling assemblies consist of inactive process piping, equipment, and instrumentation that were left in place after completion of underground safety experiments. The purpose of these safety experiments was to confirm that a nuclear explosion would not occur in the case of an accidental detonation of the high-explosive component of the device. The gas sampling assemblies allowed for the direct sampling of the gases and particulates produced by the safety experiments. Corrective Action Site 02-37-02 is located in Area 2 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and is associated with the Mullet safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U2ag on October 17, 1963. Corrective Action Site 03-99-19 is located in Area 3 of the NNSS and is associated with the Tejon safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U3cg on May 17, 1963. Corrective Action Site 09-99-06 is located in Area 9 of the NNSS and is associated with the Player safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U9cc on August 27, 1964. The CAU 547 CASs were investigated in accordance with the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for CAU 547. Existing radiological survey data and historical knowledge of the CASs were sufficient to meet the DQOs and evaluate CAAs without additional investigation. As a result, further investigation of the CAU 547 CASs was not required. The following CAAs were identified for the gas sampling assemblies: (1) clean closure, (2) closure in place, (3) modified closure in place, (4) no further action (with administrative controls), and (5) no further action. Based on the CAAs evaluation, the recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 is closure in place. This corrective action will involve construction of a soil cover on top of the gas sampling assembly components and establishment of use restrictions at each site. The closure in place alternative was selected as the best and most appropriate corrective action for the CASs at CAU 547 based on the following factors: (1) Provides long-term protection of human health and the environment; (2) Minimizes short-term risk to site workers in implementing corrective action; (3) Is easily implemented using existing technology; (4) Complies with regulatory requirements; (5) Fulfills FFACO requirements for site closure; (6) Does not generate transuranic waste requiring offsite disposal; (7) Is consistent with anticipated future land use of the areas (i.e., testing and support activities); and (8) Is consistent with other NNSS site closures where contamination was left in place.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Annual Site Environmental Report: 2010 (ASER)

This report provides information about environmental programs during the calendar year of 2010 at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (SLAC), Menlo Park, California. Activities that overlap the calendar year - i.e., stormwater monitoring covering the winter season of 2010/2011 (October 2010 through May 2011) are also included. SLAC is a federally-funded research and development center with Stanford University as the M&O contractor. Under Executive Order (EO) 13423, Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, EO 13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, and DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program, SLAC effectively implements and integrates the key elements of an Environmental Management System (EMS) to achieve the site's integrated safety and environmental management system goals. For normal daily activities, SLAC managers and supervisors are responsible for ensuring that policies and procedures are understood and followed so that: (1) Worker safety and health are protected; (2) The environment is protected; and (3) Compliance is ensured. Throughout 2010, SLAC continued to improve its management systems. These systems provided a structured framework for SLAC to implement 'greening of the government' initiatives such as EO 13423, EO 13514, and DOE Orders 450.1A and 430.2B. Overall, management systems at SLAC are effective, supporting compliance with all relevant statutory and regulatory requirements. During 2010, there were no reportable releases to the environment from SLAC operations. In addition, many improvements in waste minimization, recycling, stormwater management, groundwater restoration, and SLAC's chemical management system (CMS) were continued. The following are among SLAC's environmental accomplishments for 2010. To facilitate management and identification of future potential greenhouse gases (GHG) reduction opportunities, SLAC voluntarily completed GHG inventories for calendar year (CY) 2008 and CY 2009 and submitted the results to The Climate Registry. A Lead Management Plan was completed to reduce the potential of lead impacting the environment, and two large legacy tube-trailer modules, each containing 38 tubes of compressed ethane, were reused or recycled by an outside contractor, resulting in hazardous waste avoidance and cost savings of approximately $100,000 in transportation and disposal costs. SLAC continues to make progress on achieving the sustainability goals of EOs 13423 and 13514, which include, but are not limited to reductions in the use of water, energy, and fuel, building to green standards and reductions in GHG emissions. Phase I of the SLAC Advanced Metering project for electrical and natural gas systems was completed. Phase I included the design of the metering system and purchase of the enterprise software. The planning, design, and installation of an advanced water metering system for select buildings, landscape, and process systems were completed. In addition, the last major onsite chiller containing a Class I ozone-depleting substance was taken out of service, and SLAC continued to replace conventional vehicles with electric vehicles. In 2010, there were no radiological impacts to the public or the environment from SLAC operations. The potential doses to the public were negligible and far below the regulatory and SLAC administrative limits. No radiological incidents occurred that increased radiation levels to the public or released radioactivity to the environment. In addition to managing its radioactive wastes safely and responsibly, SLAC worked to reduce the amount of waste generated. SLAC shipped 2,891 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste, half of which was legacy waste, to appropriate treatment and disposal facilities for low-level radioactive waste. SLAC also continued its efforts to reduce the inventory of materials no longer needed for its mission by permanently removing 125 sealed radioactive sources from the inventory. Ninety-seven of the sealed sources were returned to the manufacturer, and 28 were sent to Energy Solutions for processing before being sent to the Nevada Test Site for burial. In addition, 87 concrete blocks which had been stored in an area known as the Bone Yard were surveyed for potential surface contamination and volumetric activation prior to off-site release. Based on the comprehensive measurements, all 87 blocks were qualified for release and were disposed of as ordinary materials at a landfill. In 2010, the SLAC Environmental Restoration Program personnel continued work on site characterization and evaluation of remedial alternatives at four sites with volatile organic compounds in groundwater and several areas with polychlorinated biphenyls and low concentrations of lead in soil.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater And Surface Water Sampling And Analysis Plan For Calendar Year 2012

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2012 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the GWPP during CY 2012 is in accordance with the following goals: (1) to protect the worker, the public, and the environment; (2) to maintain surveillance of existing and potential groundwater contamination sources; (3) to provide for the early detection of groundwater contamination and determine the quality of groundwater and surface water where contaminants are most likely to migrate beyond the Oak Ridge Reservation property line; (4) to identify and characterize long-term trends in groundwater quality at Y-12; and (5) to provide data to support decisions concerning the management and protection of groundwater resources. Groundwater and surface water monitoring will be performed in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12 (Figure A.1). Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Modifications to the CY 2012 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. Each modification to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as an addendum to this sampling and analysis plan. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2012 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding a data summary table presented in Section 4) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2012) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Safety Design Strategy for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3A, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3A and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Process Knowledge Data Gathering and Reporting in Support of Decommissioning [Slides]

Summary of recent ORAU decommissioning activities at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP). Project objective was to generate approved Waste Lot Profiles for legacy facilities scheduled for demolition and shipment to the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) or appropriate alternate facility. The form and content of process knowledge (PK) reports were developed with input from the EMWMF Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) Attainment Team and regulators. PK may be defined as the knowledge of the design and the history of operations that occurs during the life cycle of a facility (paraphrased from SRNL guidance) - similar to the MARSSIM historical site assessment. Some types of PK data used to decommission ORNL and ETTP facilities include: (1) Design drawings; (2) Historical documents [e.g., History of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory by Thomas (1963) and A Brief History of the Chemical Technical Division (ORNL/M-2733)]; (3) Historical photographs; (4) Radiological survey reports; (5) Facility-specific databases - (a) Spill history, (b) Waste Information Tracking System (WITS), and (c) Hazardous Materials Management Information System (HMMIS); (6) Facility walkdown summary reports; and (7) Living memory data. Facility walkdowns are critical for worker safety planning and to assure on-the-ground-conditions match historical descriptions. For Oak Ridge operations, investigators also document the nature and number of items requiring special handling or disposition planning, such as the following: (1) Items containing polychlorinated biphenyls, asbestos, lead, or refrigerants; (2) Items with physical WAC restriction (e.g., large items, pipes, and concrete); and (3) Too 'hot' for EMWMF. Special emphasis was made to interview facility managers, scientists, technicians, or anyone with direct knowledge of process-related activities. Interviews often led to more contact names and reports but also offered anecdotal accounts of releases, process-related operations, maintenance activities, and other relevant information not addressed in the written record. 'Fun' part of PK data gathering. Often got not-so-useful information such as, 'The operations manager was a jerk and we all hated him.' PK data are used to indicate the presence or absence of contaminants. Multiple lines of investigation are necessary for characterization planning and to help determine which disposal facility is best suited for targeted wastes. The model used by ORAU assisted remediation contractors and EMWMF managers by identifying anomalous waste and items requiring special handling.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Th Cell Gene Expression and Function in Response to Low Dose and Acute Radiation

Human low dose radiation data have been derived primarily from studies of space and airline flight personnel, nuclear plant workers and others exposed occupationally, as well as victims in the vicinity of atomic bomb explosions. The findings remain inconclusive due to population inconsistencies and complex interactions among total dose, dose rate, radiation quality and age at exposure. Thus, safe limits for low dose occupational irradiation are currently based on data obtained with doses far exceeding the levels expected for the general population and health risks have been largely extrapolated using the linear-nonthreshold dose-response model. The overall working hypothesis of the present study is that priming with low dose, low-linear energy transfer (LET) radiation can ameliorate the response to acute high-dose radiation exposure. We also propose that the efficacy of low-dose induced protection will be dependent upon the form and regimen of the high-dose exposure: photons versus protons versus simulated solar particle event protons (sSPE). The emphasis has been on gene expression and function of CD4+ T helper (Th) lymphocytes harvested from spleens of whole-body irradiated C57BL/6 mice, a strain that provides the genetic background for many genetically engineered strains. Evaluations of the responses of other selected cells, tissues such as skin, and organs such as lung, liver and brain were also initiated (partially funded by other sources). The long-term goal is to provide information that will be useful in estimating human health risks due to radiation that may occur during exposures in the work environment, nuclear/radiological catastrophes, as well as radiotherapy. Several papers have been published, accepted for publication or are in preparation. A number of poster and oral presentations have been made at scientific conferences and workshops. Archived tissues of various types will continue to be evaluated via funding from other sources (the DoE Low Dose Radiation Research Program, Office of Science and this specific grant will be appropriately included in the Acknowledgements of all subsequent publications/presentations). A post-doc and several students have participated in this study. More detailed description of the accomplishments is described below.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Roughness Lengths for the Savannah River Site

Surface roughness values for the areas surrounding the H, D and N-Area meteorological towers were computed from archived 2010 meteorological data. These 15-minute-averaged data were measured with cup anemometers and bidirectional wind vanes (bivanes) 61 m above the surface. The results of the roughness calculation using the standard deviation of elevation angle σ E , and applying the simple formula based on tree canopy height, gave consistent estimates for roughness around the H-Area tower in the range of 1.76 to 1.86 m (95% confidence interval) with a mean value of 1.81 m. Application of the σ E method for the 61-m level at D and N-Areas gave mean values of 1.71 and 1.81 with confidence ranges of 1.62-1.81 and 1.73-1.88 meters, respectively. Roughness results are azimuth dependent, and thus are presented as averages over compass sectors spanning 22.5 degrees. Calculated values were compared to other methods of determining roughness, including the standard deviation of the azimuth direction, σ A , and standard deviation of the wind speed, σ U . Additional data was obtained from a sonic anemometer at 61-m on the H-Area tower during a period of a few weeks in 2010. Results from the sonic anemometer support our use of σ E to calculate roughness. Based on the H-Area tower results, a surface roughness of 1.8 m using is recommended for use in dispersion modeling applications that consider the impacts of a contaminant release to individuals along the Site boundary. The canopy surrounding the H-Area tower is relatively uniform (i.e., little variance in roughness by upwind direction), and data supplied by the U.S. Forest Service at Savannah River show that the canopy height and composition surrounding the H-Area tower is reasonably representative of forested areas throughout the SRS reservation. For dispersion modeling analyses requiring assessments of a co-located worker within the respective operations area, recommended area-specific values range from 0.3 m for E Area to 0.7 m for A Area at the Savannah River National Laboratory. These area-specific values, summarized in Table 4-1, were determined using the Environmental Protection Agency's AERSURFACE computer algorithm.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Metal thin film growth on multimetallic surfaces: From quaternary metallic glass to binary crystal

The work presented in this thesis mainly focuses on the nucleation and growth of metal thin films on multimetallic surfaces. First, we have investigated the Ag film growth on a bulk metallic glass surface. Next, we have examined the coarsening and decay of bilayer Ag islands on NiAl(110) surface. Third, we have investigated the Ag film growth on NiAl(110) surface using low-energy electron diffraction (LEED). At last, we have reported our investigation on the epitaxial growth of Ni on NiAl(110) surface. Some general conclusions can be drawn as follows. First, Ag, a bulk-crystalline material, initially forms a disordered wetting layer up to 4-5 monolayers on Zr-Ni-Cu-Al metallic glass. Above this coverage, crystalline 3D clusters grow, in parallel with the flatter regions. The cluster density increases with decreasing temperature, indicating that the conditions of island nucleation are far-from-equilibrium. Within a simple model where clusters nucleate whenever two mobile Ag adatoms meet, the temperature-dependence of cluster density yields a (reasonable) upper limit for the value of the Ag diffusion barrier on top of the Ag wetting layer of 0.32 eV. Overall, this prototypical study suggests that it is possible to grow films of a bulk-crystalline metal that adopt the amorphous character of a glassy metal substrate, if film thickness is sufficiently low. Next, the first study of coarsening and decay of bilayer islands has been presented. The system was Ag on NiAl(110) in the temperature range from 185 K to 250 K. The coarsening behavior, has some similarities to that seen in the Ag(110) homoepitaxial system studied by Morgenstern and co-workers. At 185 K and 205 K, coarsening of Ag islands follows a Smoluchowski ripening pathway. At 205 K and 250 K, the terrace diffusion limited Ostwald ripening dominants. The experimental observed temperature for the transition from SR to OR is 205 K. The SR exhibits anisotropic island diffusion and the OR exhibits 1D decay of island length while keeping the corresponding island width constant. Third, LEED indicates that, up to about 6 BL (12 ML), the Ag film adopts the (110) structure on lattice matched NiAl(110) surface, supporting the previous assignment based upon island heights measured in STM. Starting at 4.5 to 6 BL, (111) diffraction pattern is detected. This is also in agreement with previous STM study. Careful examinations of the LEED patterns reveal the slight difference in lattice constants between bulk Ag and bulk NiAl. At last, we performed STM studies of Ni deposition on NiAl(110) in the temperature range from 200 K to 400 K. Ni forms 'dense' Ni(100)-like islands on NiAl(110) with a zig-zag shaped stripe feature which is probably due to strain relief. DFT analysis provides insights into the island growth shapes, which are rationalized by the thermodynamics and kinetics of the film growth process. For thick Ni films (coverage exceeding 6 ML), a Ni(111)-like structure developed. Traditional MF theory is applied to analyze island density at 200 K. Deviation from homogeneous nucleation behavior for island size distribution and island density reveals the presence of heterogeneous nucleation mediated by the Ni antisite point defects on NiAl(110) surface.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Reduction of Carbon Footprint and Energy Efficiency Improvement in Aluminum Production by Use of Novel Wireless Instrumentation Integrated with Mathematical Modeling

The work addressed the greenhouse gas emission and electrical energy consumption of the aluminum industry. The objective was to provide a means for reducing both through the application of wireless instrumentation, coupled to mathematical modeling. Worldwide the aluminum industry consumes more electrical energy than all activities in many major countries (e.g. the UK) and emits more greenhouse gasses (e.g. than France). Most of these excesses are in the 'primary production' of aluminum; that is the conversion of aluminum oxide to metal in large electrolytic cells operating at hundreds of thousands of amps. An industry-specific GHG emission has been the focus of the work. The electrolytic cells periodically, but at irregular intervals, experience an upset condition known as an 'anode effect'. During such anode effects the cells emit fluorinated hydrocarbons (PFCs, which have a high global warming potential) at a rate far greater than in normal operation. Therefore curbing anode effects will reduce GHG emissions. Prior work had indicated that the distribution of electrical current within the cell experiences significant shifts in the minutes before an anode effect. The thrust of the present work was to develop technology that could detect and report this early warning of an anode effect so that the control computer could minimize GHG emissions. A system was developed to achieve this goal and, in collaboration with Alcoa, was tested on two cells at an Alcoa plant in Malaga, Washington. The project has also pointed to the possibility of additional improvements that could result from the work. Notable among these is an improvement in efficiency that could result in an increase in cell output at little extra operating cost. Prospects for commercialization have emerged in the form of purchase orders for further installations. The work has demonstrated that a system for monitoring the current of individual anodes in an aluminum cell is practical. Furthermore the system has been installed twice on a smelter in the US without exposing workers to hazards usually associated with running signal wires in aluminum plants. The results display the early warning of an anode effect that potentially can be used to minimize such anode effects with their excessive GHG emissions. They also point to a possible, but substantial, economic benefit that could result in improved current efficiency by anode adjustment based on individual anode current measurements.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

The Contribution of Tissue Level Organization to Genomic Stability Following Low Dose/Low Dose Rate Gamma and Proton Irradiation

The formation of functional tissue units is necessary in maintaining homeostasis within living systems, with individual cells contributing to these functional units through their three-dimensional organization with integrin and adhesion proteins to form a complex extra-cellular matrix (ECM). This is of particular importance in those tissues susceptible to radiation-induced tumor formation, such as epithelial glands. The assembly of epithelial cells of the thyroid is critical to their normal receipt of, and response to, incoming signals. Traditional tissue culture and live animals present significant challenges to radiation exposure and continuous sampling, however, the production of bioreactor-engineered tissues aims to bridge this gap by improve capabilities in continuous sampling from the same functional tissue, thereby increasing the ability to extrapolate changes induced by radiation to animals and humans in vivo. Our study proposes that the level of tissue organization will affect the induction and persistence of low dose radiation-induced genomic instability. Rat thyroid cells, grown in vitro as 3D tissue analogs in bioreactors and as 2D flask grown cultures were exposed to acute low dose (1, 5, 10 and 200 cGy) gamma rays. To assess immediate (6 hours) and delayed (up to 30 days) responses post-irradiation, various biological endpoints were studied including cytogenetic analyses, apoptosis analysis and cell viability/cytotoxicity analyses. Data assessing caspase 3/7 activity levels show that, this activity varies with time post radiation and that, overall, 3D cultures display more genomic instability (as shown by the lower levels of apoptosis over time) when compared to the 2D cultures. Variation in cell viability levels were only observed at the intermediate and late time points post radiation. Extensive analysis of chromosomal aberrations will give further insight on the whether the level of tissue organization influences genomic instability patterns after low dose radiation exposure. Cells viability/cytotoxicity analysis data are currently being analyzed to determine how these endpoints are affected under our experimental conditions. The results from this study will be translatable to risk assessment for assigning limits to radiation workers, pre-dosing for more effective radiotherapy and the consequences of long duration space flight. The data from this study has been presented a various scientific meetings/workshops and a manuscript, containing the findings, is currently being prepared for publication. Due to unforeseen challenges in collecting the data and standardizing experimental procedures, the second and third aims have not been completed. However, attempts will be made, based on the availability of funds, to continue this project so that these aims can be satisfied.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Safety Design Strategy for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3A, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3A and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Automated design synthesis of robotic/human workcells for improved manufacturing system design in hazardous environments [Slides]

Manufacturing tasks that are deemed too hazardous for workers require the use of automation, robotics, and/or other remote handling tools. The associated hazards may be radiological or non-radiological, and based on the characteristics of the environment and processing, a design may necessitate robotic labor, human labor, or both. There are also other factors such as cost, ergonomics, maintenance, and efficiency that also effect task allocation and other design choices. Handling the tradeoffs of these factors can be complex, and lack of experience can be an issue when trying to determine if and what feasible automation/robotics options exist. To address this problem, we utilize common engineering design approaches adapted more for manufacturing system design in hazardous environments. We limit our scope to the conceptual and embodiment design stages, specifically a computational algorithm for concept generation and early design evaluation. In regard to concept generation, we first develop the functional model or function structure for the process, using the common 'verb-noun' format for describing function. A common language or functional basis for manufacturing was developed and utilized to formalize function descriptions and guide rules for function decomposition. Potential components for embodiment are also grouped in terms of this functional language and are stored in a database. The properties of each component are given as quantitative and qualitative criteria. Operators are also rated for task-relevant criteria which are used to address task compatibility. Through the gathering of process requirements/constraints, construction of the component database, and development of the manufacturing basis and rule set, design knowledge is stored and available for computer use. Thus, once the higher level process functions are defined, the computer can automate the synthesis of new design concepts through alternating steps of embodiment and function structure updates/decomposition. In the process, criteria guide function allocation of components/operators and help ensure compatibility and feasibility. Through multiple function assignment options and varied function structures, multiple design concepts are created. All of the generated designs are then evaluated based on a number of relevant evaluation criteria: cost, dose, ergonomics, hazards, efficiency, etc. These criteria are computed using physical properties/parameters of each system based on the qualities an engineer would use to make evaluations. Nuclear processes such as oxide conversion and electrorefining are utilized to aid algorithm development and provide test cases for the completed program. Through our approach, we capture design knowledge related to manufacturing and other operations in hazardous environments to enable a computational program to automatically generate and evaluate system design concepts.

42 ENGINEERING↗

LANL Continuity of Operations Plan

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is a premier national security research institution, delivering scientific and engineering solutions for the nation's most crucial and complex problems. Our primary responsibility is to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. LANL emphasizes worker safety, effective operational safeguards and security, and environmental stewardship, outstanding science remains the foundation of work at the Laboratory. In addition to supporting the Laboratory's core national security mission, our work advances bioscience, chemistry, computer science, earth and environmental sciences, materials science, and physics disciplines. To accomplish LANL's mission, we must ensure that the Laboratory EFs continue to be performed during a continuity event, including localized acts of nature, accidents, technological or attack-related emergencies, and pandemic or epidemic events. The LANL Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan documents the overall LANL COOP Program and provides the operational framework to implement continuity policies, requirements, and responsibilities at LANL, as required by DOE 0 150.1, Continuity Programs, May 2008. LANL must maintain its ability to perform the nation's PMEFs, which are: (1) maintain the safety and security of nuclear materials in the DOE Complex at fixed sites and in transit; (2) respond to a nuclear incident, both domestically and internationally, caused by terrorist activity, natural disaster, or accident, including mobilizing the resources to support these efforts; and (3) support the nation's energy infrastructure. This plan supports Continuity of Operations for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This plan issues LANL policy as directed by the DOE 0 150.1, Continuity Programs, and provides direction for the orderly continuation of LANL EFs for 30 days of closure or 60 days for a pandemic/epidemic event. Initiation of COOP operations may be required to support an allhazards event, including a national security emergency, major fire, catastrophic natural disaster, man-made disaster, terrorism event, or technological disaster by rendering LANL buildings, infrastructure, or Technical Areas unsafe, temporarily unusable, or inaccessible.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗