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Cooperative Load Scheduling for Multiple Aggregators Using Hierarchical ADMM

Demand response (DR) serves an important role in improving the efficiency and stability of power systems. In recent years, with advances in communication and smart device technologies, many aggregators have emerged to facilitate end customer participation in DR programs. These aggregators, equipped with customized optimal control algorithms, are capable of providing various grid services. Among them is load scheduling during DR events, namely following a load signal provided by the utility company while minimizing overall customer discomfort. However, as the number of aggregators keeps increasing, it becomes challenging for utility companies to conduct load scheduling for multiple aggregators and generate reference signals for each of them. This paper proposes an optimization framework using hierarchical alternating direction method of multipliers (H-ADMM) to optimally generate load following signals for multiple aggregators. Under this framework, utility and multiple aggregators work in a cooperative manner, aiming at minimizing an overall system cost from different levels of the power system hierarchy, while protecting user privacy. A case study has been conducted in a system with multiple aggregators, based on control of HVAC loads. Experimental results validate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cooperative Load Scheduling for Multiple Aggregators Using Hierarchical ADMM: Preprint

Demand response (DR) serves an important role in improving the efficiency and stability of power systems. In recent years, with advances in communication and smart device technologies, many aggregators have emerged to facilitate end customer participation in DR programs. These aggregators, equipped with customized optimal control algorithms, are capable of providing various grid services. Among them is load scheduling during DR events, namely following a load signal provided by the utility company while minimizing overall customer discomfort. However, as the number of aggregators keeps increasing, it becomes challenging for utility companies to conduct load scheduling for multiple aggregators and generate reference signals for each of them. This paper proposes an optimization framework using hierarchical alternating direction method of multipliers (H-ADMM) to optimally generate load following signals for multiple aggregators. Under this framework, utility and multiple aggregators work in a cooperative manner, aiming at minimizing an overall system cost from different levels of the power system hierarchy, while protecting user privacy. A case study has been conducted in a system with multiple aggregators, based on control of HVAC loads. Experimental results validate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

National contribution to the organization and carrying out monitoring activities on assessment of radiation and ecological situation in uranium tailings of SE 'Vostokredmet' - 15068

In this paper, the legislation governing radiation safety and radioactive waste management in Tajikistan is described. The role and responsibilities of both the regulator and the user as they apply to the remediation of legacy sites are presented, as is the infrastructure for the monitoring of legacy sites. The challenges presented by radiological contamination in Tajikistan and Central Asia are discussed. National and regional commitments with respect to legacy sites remediation in Tajikistan are described. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Licensing Challenges Associated with Autonomous Control

Very small special purpose reactors (SPRs), or microreactors at less than 50 MW electric, are under consideration by various entities for applications in remote installations and communities. These entities include remote municipalities, the US Department of Defense (DoD), and the US Department of Energy (DOE). SPRs or microreactors may be transportable from a factory with fresh fuel included to serve as a complete power battery. This type of plug-and-go resource requires inherently positive safety attributes and robust design. SPRs and microreactors are being designed to fulfill black-start or microgrid capabilities and to provide protection against severe natural phenomena or cyber security threats. These reactors would be available to operate for several years without a need to shut down for refueling.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval and Delivery of Hanford Tank Wastes for Vitrification in the Waste Treatment Plant - 13234

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety-conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction of WTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration and Controls, Front-End Design and Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety and Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH and QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant{sup R} Foundation-Configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nebraska Integrated Carbon Capture and Storage Pre-Feasibility Study

In collaboration with the Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD), the Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC) has conducted a pre-feasibility study for a commercial-scale carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) geologic storage complex in western Nebraska integrated with potential CO 2 capture at Gerald Gentleman Station (GGS). GGS is the largest coal-fired electricity-generating station in Nebraska, emitting 8.5 million metric tons (Mt) of CO 2 annually, and is located near the town of Sutherland. This pre-feasibility (Phase 1) project has been executed as part of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CarbonSAFE program, a multiphase initiative to support the deployment of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects. Each CarbonSAFE project is required to demonstrate the potential to capture and store at least 50 million tonnes (Mt) of CO 2 over a 25-year operational period. The EERC and NPPD established a coordination team to identify challenges to a potential Nebraska CCS project, comprising local stakeholder organizations, which met twice in Lincoln and via several Webinars, providing feedback and guidance throughout the pre-feasibility study. The EERC also secured the technical support of Schlumberger Carbon Services and Computer Modelling Group Ltd. (CMG). The project comprised four technical themes, all using published information sources. Regional and stakeholder analysis, including identification of sensitive environmental areas, potential resource conflicts, and strategies for public outreach. A review of geographic and socioeconomic characteristics, in combination with geologic characterization in the subbasinal analysis described below, identified an area to the southwest and within a 75-mile radius of GGS as the most prospective for development of a storage site. This area largely avoided lands with protected status such as wetlands. A public outreach plan has also been developed for implementation in any further phases of CCS assessment in western Nebraska, for example a CarbonSAFE Phase 2 feasibility study. Scenario analysis, addressing economic and regulatory factors. GGS is the only single major source of CO 2 emissions capable of satisfying the CarbonSAFE 50-Mt scale requirement within the study region. Chemical absorption using amines was identified as the most viable technology for postcombustion CO 2 capture at GGS. The total cost of a CCS project at GGS was estimated to be between $67/tonne CO 2 for capture and auxiliary boiler to minimize parasitic load and $70/tonne CO 2 avoided cost, using the Carnegie-Mellon University Integrated Environmental Control Model (IECM). The total avoided cost included the capture facility and parasitic load, a flue gas desulfurization plant required for the use of amine solvent technology, transport via pipeline, and dedicated storage infrastructure. Nebraska has no legislation in place to address typical CCS-specific issues, for example pore space ownership for storage. Long-term liability, therefore, falls under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Underground Injection Control (UIC) Class 6 program regulations. Subbasinal analysis, addressing the potential for a dedicated subsurface “container” to store the required 50-Mt quantity of CO 2 . Modeling and simulation studies identified an area to the southwest of GGS with the potential for storage of 50 Mt CO 2 in the Cloverly Formation, comprising sandstones with interbedded and intermingled shales. The area of review (AOR) that would be required for monitoring under a Class VI operating permit was estimated to be as high as 400–700 square miles, due to uncertain pressure effects. The viability of this storage option is subject to significant uncertainty due to the relatively limited amount of existing characterization data available to the pre-feasibility study; for example, dynamic simulation indicated that the proposed storage rate might require as little as two or as many as 14 injection wells. A key uncertainty is the relative proportion and distribution of sandstone and shale within the Cloverly Formation. A preliminary, semiquantitative risk assessment also suggested uncertainty over storage capacity and injectivity constitute the most significant project risks at this pre-feasibility stage. No assessed risks were considered to rule out the possibility of a project moving to deployment. National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) validation, using software tools developed by the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) to assess risks associated with the potential 50-Mt CO 2 storage complex. NRAP tools were used to assess hypothetical leakage scenarios. Results broadly supported the conclusion of the semiquantitative risk analysis – for example, even worst-case analysis of theoretical leakage scenarios found limited migration rates and impacts. In summary, the work undertaken in this Phase 1 pre-feasibility study has shown that western Nebraska has potential to host a commercial-scale CCS project, including a dedicated storage “container” for 50 Mt of CO 2 . However, the following key challenges would need to be overcome: The business case for deploying CCS projects is uncertain; recently announced federal tax credits and sales of CO 2 for enhanced oil recovery may not cover the full costs of a CCS project at GGS, as estimated by this pre-feasibility study. The potential 50-Mt CO 2 dedicated storage container defined in this pre-feasibility study should be regarded as having a relatively low level of readiness to support a CCS project. Public outreach would be a vital element in western Nebraska, where sensitivities around such environmental issues as water resource protection and pipeline construction would need to be carefully addressed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

SINGLE-SHELL TANKS LEAK INTEGRITY ELEMENTS/SX FARM LEAK CAUSES AND LOCATIONS - 12127

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) developed an enhanced single-shell tank (SST) integrity project in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. One primary recommendation was to expand the leak assessment reports (substitute report or LD-1) to include leak causes and locations. The recommendation has been included in the M-045-9IF Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) as one of four targets relating to SST leak integrity. The 241-SX Farm (SX Farm) tanks with leak losses were addressed on an individual tank basis as part of LD-1. Currently, 8 out of 23 SSTs that have been reported to having a liner leak are located in SX Farm. This percentage was the highest compared to other tank farms which is why SX Farm was analyzed first. The SX Farm is comprised of fifteen SSTs built 1953-1954. The tanks are arranged in rows of three tanks each, forming a cascade. Each of the SX Farm tanks has a nominal I-million-gal storage capacity. Of the fifteen tanks in SX Farm, an assessment reported leak losses for the following tanks: 241-SX-107, 241-SX-108, 241-SX-109, 241-SX-111, 241-SX-112, 241-SX-113, 241-SX-114 and 241-SX-115. The method used to identify leak location consisted of reviewing in-tank and ex-tank leak detection information. This provided the basic data identifying where and when the first leaks were detected. In-tank leak detection consisted of liquid level measurement that can be augmented with photographs which can provide an indication of the vertical leak location on the sidewall. Ex-tank leak detection for the leaking tanks consisted of soil radiation data from laterals and drywells near the tank. The in-tank and ex-tank leak detection can provide an indication of the possible leak location radially around and under the tank. Potential leak causes were determined using in-tank and ex-tank information that is not directly related to leak detection. In-tank parameters can include temperature of the supernatant and sludge, types of waste, and chemical determination by either transfer or sample analysis. Ex-tank information can be assembled from many sources including design media, construction conditions, technical specifications, and other sources. Five conditions may have contributed to SX Farm tank liner failure including: tank design, thermal shock, chemistry-corrosion, liner behavior (bulging), and construction temperature. Tank design did not apparently change from tank to tank for the SX Farm tanks; however, there could be many unknown variables present in the quality of materials and quality of construction. Several significant SX Farm tank design changes occurred from previous successful tank farm designs. Tank construction occurred in winter under cold conditions which could have affected the ductile to brittle transition temperature of the tanks. The SX Farm tanks received high temperature boiling waste from REDOX which challenged the tank design with rapid heat up and high temperatures. All eight of the leaking SX Farm tanks had relatively high rate of temperature rise. Supernatant removal with subsequent nitrate leaching was conducted in all but three of the eight leaking tanks prior to leaks being detected. It is possible that no one characteristic of the SX Farm tanks could in isolation from the others have resulted in failure. However, the application of so many stressors - heat up rate, high temperature, loss of corrosion protection, and tank design - working jointly or serially resulted in their failure. Thermal shock coupled with the tank design, construction conditions, and nitrate leaching seem to be the overriding factors that can lead to tank liner failure. The distinction between leaking and sound SX Farm tanks seems to center on the waste types, thermal conditions, and nitrate leaching.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Single-Shell Tanks Leak Integrity Elements/ SX Farm Leak Causes and Locations - 12127

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) developed an enhanced single-shell tank (SST) integrity project in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. One primary recommendation was to expand the leak assessment reports (substitute report or LD-1) to include leak causes and locations. The recommendation has been included in the M-045-91F Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) as one of four targets relating to SST leak integrity. The 241-SX Farm (SX Farm) tanks with leak losses were addressed on an individual tank basis as part of LD-1. Currently, 8 out of 23 SSTs that have been reported to having a liner leak are located in SX Farm. This percentage was the highest compared to other tank farms which is why SX Farm was analyzed first. The SX Farm is comprised of fifteen SSTs built 1953-1954. The tanks are arranged in rows of three tanks each, forming a cascade. Each of the SX Farm tanks has a nominal 1-million-gal storage capacity. Of the fifteen tanks in SX Farm, an assessment reported leak losses for the following tanks: 241-SX-107, 241-SX-108, 241-SX-109, 241-SX- 111, 241-SX-112, 241-SX-113, 241-SX-114 and 241-SX-115. The method used to identify leak location consisted of reviewing in-tank and ex-tank leak detection information. This provided the basic data identifying where and when the first leaks were detected. In-tank leak detection consisted of liquid level measurement that can be augmented with photographs which can provide an indication of the vertical leak location on the sidewall. Ex-tank leak detection for the leaking tanks consisted of soil radiation data from laterals and dry-wells near the tank. The in-tank and ex-tank leak detection can provide an indication of the possible leak location radially around and under the tank. Potential leak causes were determined using in-tank and ex-tank information that is not directly related to leak detection. In-tank parameters can include temperature of the supernatant and sludge, types of waste, and chemical determination by either transfer or sample analysis. Ex-tank information can be assembled from many sources including design media, construction conditions, technical specifications, and other sources. Five conditions may have contributed to SX Farm tank liner failure including: tank design, thermal shock, chemistry-corrosion, liner behavior (bulging), and construction temperature. Tank design did not apparently change from tank to tank for the SX Farm tanks; however, there could be many unknown variables present in the quality of materials and quality of construction. Several significant SX Farm tank design changes occurred from previous successful tank farm designs. Tank construction occurred in winter under cold conditions which could have affected the ductile to brittle transition temperature of the tanks. The SX Farm tanks received high temperature boiling waste from REDOX which challenged the tank design with rapid heat up and high temperatures. All eight of the leaking SX Farm tanks had relatively high rate of temperature rise. Supernatant removal with subsequent nitrate leaching was conducted in all but three of the eight leaking tanks prior to leaks being detected. It is possible that no one characteristic of the SX Farm tanks could in isolation from the others have resulted in failure. However, the application of so many stressors - heat up rate, high temperature, loss of corrosion protection, and tank design working jointly or serially resulted in their failure. Thermal shock coupled with the tank design, construction conditions, and nitrate leaching seem to be the overriding factors that can lead to tank liner failure. The distinction between leaking and sound SX Farm tanks seems to center on the waste types, thermal conditions, and nitrate leaching. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

New risk metrics and mathematical tools for risk analysis: Current and future challenges

The current status of the food safety supply world wide, has led Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Health Organization (WHO) to establishing Risk Analysis as the single framework for building food safety control programs. A series of guidelines and reports that detail out the various steps in Risk Analysis, namely Risk Management, Risk Assessment and Risk Communication is available. The Risk Analysis approach enables integration between operational food management systems, such as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points, public health and governmental decisions. To do that, a series of new Risk Metrics has been established as follows: i) the Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP), which indicates the maximum numbers of illnesses in a population per annum, defined by quantitative risk assessments, and used to establish; ii) Food Safety Objective (FSO), which sets the maximum frequency and/or concentration of a hazard in a food at the time of consumption that provides or contributes to the ALOP. Given that ALOP is rather a metric of the public health tolerable burden (it addresses the total ‘failure’ that may be handled at a national level), it is difficult to be interpreted into control measures applied at the manufacturing level. Thus, a series of specific objectives and criteria for performance of individual processes and products have been established, all of them assisting in the achievement of FSO and hence, ALOP. In order to achieve FSO, tools quantifying the effect of processes and intrinsic properties of foods on survival and growth of pathogens are essential. In this context, predictive microbiology and risk assessment have offered an important assistance to Food Safety Management. Predictive modelling is the basis of exposure assessment and the development of stochastic and kinetic models, which are also available in the form of Web-based applications, e.g., COMBASE and Microbial Responses Viewer), or introduced into user-friendly softwares, (e.g., Seafood Spoilage Predictor) have evolved the use of information systems in the food safety management. Such tools are updateable with new food-pathogen specific models containing cardinal parameters and multiple dependent variables, including plate counts, concentration of metabolic products, or even expression levels of certain genes. Then, these tools may further serve as decision-support tools which may assist in product logistics, based on their scientifically-based and “momentary” expressed spoilage and safety level.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Defining trait-based microbial strategies with consequences for soil carbon cycling under climate change

Microorganisms are critical in terrestrial carbon cycling because their growth, activity and interactions with the environment largely control the fate of recent plant carbon inputs as well as protected soil organic carbon [1, 2]. Soil carbon stocks reflect a balance between microbial decomposition of organic carbon and stabilisation of microbial assimilated carbon. The balance can shift under altered environmental conditions [3], and new research suggests that knowledge of microbial physiology may be critical for projecting changes in soil carbon and improving the prognosis of climate change feedbacks [4,5,6,7]. Still, predicting the ecosystem implications of microbial processes remains a challenge. In this paper we argue that this challenge can be met by identifying microbial life history strategies based on an organism’s phenotypic characteristics, or traits, and representing these strategies in ecosystem models.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Research to Develop Flood Barrier Testing Strategies for Nuclear Power Plants

This report presents results of research performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to identify and develop strategies for testing nuclear power plant (NPP) flood barriers. This research project began with a literature review that documented the results of previous NRC-funded research, work performed by other government agencies, reports generated by industry organizations, NRC licensee submittals, information from testing facilities, and information from commercial firms engaged in NPP decommissioning. This literature review was then used to develop a simplified flood protection categorization scheme and related glossaries. Using this categorization scheme and glossaries, a survey of currently used flood barriers was conducted, focusing on both permanent and temporary flood barriers. External flood barriers such as levees and berms were outside the scope of this survey. This research project also assessed the current state of NPP decommissioning for potential flood barrier harvesting opportunities, surveyed capabilities of domestic and international flood testing facilities, and explored technical challenges to harvesting and testing of flood barriers. Other factors that should be considered in developing flood barrier testing strategies were also explored and are documented in this report (e.g., selection of flood barriers for testing, codes and standards for flood barrier testing, potential alternatives to harvesting such as in-situ testing, testing performance criteria, and testing parameters).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Data-Driven Buy Clean: Decarbonization and Beyond

This report was compiled to provide recommendations on the availability of public background data from the U.S. Federal life cycle assessment (LCA) Data Commons to be conformant with the Association for Life Cycle Assessment (ACLCA) 2022 Product Category Rule (PCR) Open Standard to build technical tools that can assist industry in creating more comparable Type II Environmental Product Declarations (EPDs) for Federal Buy Clean and sustainability initiatives. The Federal LCA Commons is not only a public data source but also a consistently structured, self-referencing mega-repository for data developed by federal agency experts (in agency repositories) and by academia, nonprofit organizations, and industry (via the US Life Cycle Inventory Database). The Federal LCA Commons Technical Working Group is continuously improving the standardization of data documentation, formatting, and nomenclature to ensure lossless data loading and accurate data representation. This report and appendixes include the following: 1) An introduction to data-driven Buy Clean and decarbonization initiatives at the federal level; 2) The current status and associated challenges with LCA data and EPD standards and comparability; 3) Opportunities for the Federal LCA Commons to support conformance with the ACLCA 2022 PCR Open Standard and provide resources to implement the Federal Sustainability Plan, Buy Clean Program, and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) sustainability goals and objectives. To date, the Federal LCA Commons is the result of coordinated work by National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST). The Federal LCA Commons will continue to combine databases from the collaborating agencies while remaining a public resource. There are several initiatives among the collaborating agencies to expand the Federal LCA Commons and dedicated federal funding and resources could accelerate and strengthen these initiatives.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Towards a Scalable Group Vehicle-based Security System

In August 2014, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) proposed new rulemaking to require V2V communication in light vehicles. To establish trust in the basic safety messages (BSMs) that are exchanged by vehicles to improve driver safety, a vehicle public key infrastructure (VPKI) is required. We outline a system where a group or groups of vehicles manage and generate their own BSM signing keys and authenticating certificates -- a Vehicle-Based Security System (VBSS). Based on our preliminary examination, we assert the mechanisms exist to implement a VBSS that supports V2V communications; however, maintaining uniform trust throughout the system while protecting individual privacy does require reliance on nascent group signature technology which may require a significant amount of communication overhead for trust maintenance. To better evaluate the VBSS approach, we compare it to the proposed Security Credential Management System (SCMS) in four major areas including bootstrapping, pseudonym provisioning, BSM signing and authentication, and revocation. System scale, driver privacy, and the distribution and dynamics of participants make designing an effective VPKI an interesting and challenging problem; no clear-cut strategy exists to satisfy the security and privacy expectations in a highly efficient way. More work is needed in VPKI research, so the life-saving promise of V2V technology can be achieved.

Carter, Jason M↗

Towards a Cyber Defense Framework for SCADA Systems Based on Power Consumption Monitoring

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is an industrial automation system that remotely monitor, and control critical infrastructures. SCADA systems are major targets for espionage and sabotage attackers. According to the 2015 Dell security annual threat report, the number of cyber-attacks against SCADA systems has doubled in the past year. Cyber-attacks (i.e., buffer overflow, rootkits and code injection) could cause serious financial losses and physical infrastructure damages. Moreover, some specific cyber-attacks against SCADA systems could become a threat to human life. Current commercial off-the-shelf security solutions are insufficient in protecting SCADA systems against sophisticated cyber-attacks. In 2014 a report by Mandiant stated that only 69% of organizations learned about their breaches from third entities, meaning that these companies lack of their own detection system. Furthermore, these breaches are not detected in real-time or fast enough to prevent further damages. The average time between compromise and detection (for those intrusions that were detected) was 205 days. To address this challenge, we propose an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that detects SCADA-specific cyber-attacks by analyzing the power consumption of a SCADA device. Specifically, to validate the proposed approach, we chose to monitor in real-time the power usage of a a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). To this end, we configured the hardware of the tetsbed by installing the required sensors to monitor and collect its power consumption. After that two SCADA-specific cyber-attacks were simulated and TracerDAQ Pro was used to collect the power consumption of the PLC under normal and anomalous scenarios. Results showed that is possible to distinguish between the regular power usage of the PLC and when the PLC was under specific cyber-attacks.

Hernandez Jimenez, Jarilyn M↗

Poster - 27: Incident Learning Practices in Ontario

Purpose: The Radiation Incident and Safety Committee (RISC), established and supported by Cancer Care Ontario (CCO), is responsible for advising the Provincial Head of the Radiation Treatment program on matters relating to provincial reporting of radiation incidents with the goal of improved risk mitigation. Methods: The committee is made up of Radiation Incident Leads (RILs) with representation from each of the 14 radiation medicine programs in the province. RISC routinely meets to review recent critical incidents and to discuss provincial reporting processes and future directions of the committee. Regular face to face meetings have provided an excellent venue for sharing incident learning practices. A summary of the incident learning practices across Ontario has been compiled. Results: Almost all programs in Ontario employ an incident learning committee to review incidents and identify corrective actions or process improvements. Tools used for incident reporting include: paper based reporting, a number of different commercial products and software solutions developed in-house. A wide range of classification schema (data taxonomies) are employed, although most have been influenced by national guidance documents. The majority of clinics perform root cause analyses but utilized methodologies vary significantly. Conclusions: Most programs in Ontario employ a committee approach to incident learning. However, the reporting tools and taxonomies in use vary greatly which represents a significant challenge to provincial reporting. RISC is preparing to adopt the National System for Incident Reporting – Radiation Therapy (NSIR-RT) which will standardize incident reporting and facilitate data analyses aimed at identifying targeted improvement initiatives.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Experimental Testing of Personal Dosimetry Interference from a Portable X-ray Generator

The determination of the disposition route for a legacy drum in a nuclear facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex is supported by non-destructive testing of the drum and its contents. An advanced radiation measurements organization at the Y-12 National Security Complex proposed a series of active measurements using a portable x-ray generator, imaging the drum and its contents with 360-degree visualization. In rooms near the current storage location for the drum, Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) annunciation is degraded, and Personal Radiation Dosimetry Instruments (PRDI’s) are routinely worn by personnel. The Y-12 Development Organization has procured advanced radiation detection devices and a variety of radiation sources for use in active measurements. These devices are being used to support Y-12 operations and safety engineering disciplines to safely address complex challenges throughout the complex. This paper presents the results of experimental testing of the PRDI’s used at Y-12 with the x-ray generator [1], and notes the unique utilization of a decommissioned facility for this work.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Challenges in Implementing Methodologies for Nonproliferation Assessments

A handful of models for explaining and predicting States’ development of nuclear weapons programs have been proposed since the 1970s. Despite the array of techno-social variables and computational concepts employed in these models, no model has yet been established as an agreed-upon standard. Likewise, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—one of the main institutions evaluating social, political, and technological information for assessments of States’ current nuclear capabilities—uses only a qualitative framework by which to evaluate such information to assess the correctness and completeness of a State’s declaration. In this paper, analysts familiar with both the development of techno-social modelling and the IAEA’s implementation of a safeguards system that is information driven discuss the challenges faced in the development, implementation, and evaluation of models and methodologies for nonproliferation assessments, based on experiences at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the IAEA.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Engineering Design of the Geological Disposal Facility for the UK - 18074

This paper discusses plans for implementing UK government policy for the safe geological disposal of higher activity radioactive waste. In order to progress the programme for geological disposal in the absence of a specific site, RWM has developed generic, illustrative disposal system designs for three host geological environments. These geological environments are typical of those being considered in other countries and have been chosen because they represent the range that may need to be addressed when developing the Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) for the UK. This paper provides an overview of the updated 2016 design of the UK geological disposal facility and describes the processes of construction, transport, waste package receipt, handling and emplacement and the design characteristics that the disposal facility will need to include for the waste inventory. The paper provides examples of the approach to ensure confidence in safety over the GDF life cycle and discusses the challenges in the design, construction and operation of a nationally significant infrastructure project with a scheduled waste disposal of more than 150 years. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗