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Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion verification. The remainder of this paper focuses on transparency and verification for nuclear arms and fissile material reductions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Co-ordination of the International Network of Nuclear Structure and Decay Data Evaluators; Summary Report of an IAEA Technical Meeting

The IAEA Nuclear Data Section convened the 18th meeting of the International Network of Nuclear Structure and Decay Data Evaluators at the IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, 23 to 27 March 2009. This meeting was attended by 22 scientists from 14 Member States, plus IAEA staff, concerned with the compilation, evaluation and dissemination of nuclear structure and decay data. A summary of the meeting, recommendations/conclusions, data centre reports, and various proposals considered, modified and agreed by the participants are contained within this document. The International Network of Nuclear Structure and Decay Data (NSDD) Evaluators holds biennial meetings under the auspices of the IAEA, and consists of evaluation groups and data service centres in several countries. This network has the objective of providing up-to-date nuclear structure and decay data for all known nuclides by evaluating all existing experimental data. Data resulting from this international evaluation collaboration is included in the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File (ENSDF) and published in the journals Nuclear Physics A and Nuclear Data Sheets (NDS).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Redundancy of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Market: Are Fabrication Services Assured?

For several years, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been assessing the reliability of nuclear fuel supply in support of the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. Three international low enriched uranium reserves, which are intended back up the existing and well-functioning nuclear fuel market, are currently moving toward implementation. These backup reserves are intended to provide countries credible assurance that of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel to operate their nuclear power reactors in the event that their primary fuel supply is disrupted, whether for political or other reasons. The efficacy of these backup reserves, however, may be constrained without redundant fabrication services. This report presents the findings of a recent PNNL study that simulated outages of varying durations at specific nuclear fuel fabrication plants. The modeling specifically enabled prediction and visualization of the reactors affected and the degree of fuel delivery delay. The results thus provide insight on the extent of vulnerability to nuclear fuel supply disruption at the level of individual fabrication plants, reactors, and countries. The simulation studies demonstrate that, when a reasonable set of qualification criteria are applied, existing fabrication plants are technically qualified to provide backup fabrication services to the majority of the world's power reactors. The report concludes with an assessment of the redundancy of fuel supply in the nuclear fuel market, and a description of potential extra-market mechanisms to enhance the security of fuel supply in cases where it may be warranted. This report is an assessment of the ability of the existing market to respond to supply disruptions that occur for technical reasons. A forthcoming report will address political disruption scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Nonproliferation

With an explosion equivalent of about 20kT of TNT, the Trinity test was the first demonstration of a nuclear weapon. Conducted on July 16, 1945 in Alamogordo, NM this site is now a Registered National Historic Landmark. The concept and applicability of nuclear power was demonstrated on December 20, 1951 with the Experimental Breeder Reactor Number One (EBR-1) lit four light bulbs. This reactor is now a Registered National Historic Landmark, located near Arco, ID. From that moment forward it had been clearly demonstrated that nuclear energy has both peaceful and military applications and that the civilian and military fuel cycles can overlap. For the more than fifty years since the Atoms for Peace program, a key objective of nuclear policy has been to enable the wider peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Volumes have been written on the impact of these two actions on the world by advocates and critics; pundits and practioners; politicians and technologists. The nations of the world have woven together a delicate balance of treaties, agreements, frameworks and handshakes that are representative of the timeframe in which they were constructed and how they have evolved in time. Collectively these vehicles attempt to keep political will, nuclear materials and technology in check. This paper captures only the briefest abstract of the more significant aspects on the Nonproliferation Regime. Of particular relevance to this discussion is the special nonproliferation sensitivity associated with the uranium isotope separation and spent fuel reprocessing aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

c-Jun localizes to the nucleus independent of its phosphorylation by and interaction with JNK and vice versa promotes nuclear accumulation of JNK

Highlights: {yields} HSP70, Ku70 and 80 as well as importin 8 are novel interactors of c-Jun. {yields} Nuclear accumulation of c-Jun does not require its functions as a transcription factor. {yields} Nuclear accumulation of c-Jun does not require the interaction with its kinase JNK. {yields} Nuclear accumulation of JNK is regulated by interaction with c-Jun. -- Abstract: In order to activate gene expression, transcription factors such as c-Jun have to reside in the nucleus. The abundance of c-Jun in the nucleus correlates with the activity of its target genes. As a consequence of excessive c-Jun activation, cells undergo apoptosis or changes in differentiation whereas decreased c-Jun function can reduce proliferation. In the present study we addressed how nuclear accumulation of the transcription factor c-Jun is regulated. First, we analyzed which functions of c-Jun are required for efficient nuclear accumulation. Mutants of c-Jun deficient in dimerization or DNA-binding show no defect in nuclear transport. Furthermore, c-Jun import into the nucleus of living cells occurred when the c-Jun phosphorylation sites were mutated as well in cells that lack the major c-Jun kinase, JNK, suggesting that c-Jun transport into the nucleus does not require JNK signaling. Conversely, however, binding of c-Jun seemed to enhance nuclear accumulation of JNK. In order to identify proteins that might be relevant for the nuclear translocation of c-Jun we searched for novel binding partners by a proteomic approach. In addition to the heat shock protein HSP70 and the DNA damage repair factors Ku70 and 80, we isolated human importin 8 as a novel interactor of c-Jun. Interaction of Imp 8 with c-Jun in human cells was confirmed by co-immunoprecipitation experiments. Nuclear accumulation of c-Jun does not require its functions as a transcription factor or the interaction with its kinase JNK. Interestingly, nuclear accumulation of JNK is regulated by interaction with c-Jun. Unraveling the mechanisms of c-Jun and JNK transport to the nucleus and its regulation will improve our understanding of their role in biological and pathophysiological processes.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Nuclear import of cutaneous beta genus HPV8 E7 oncoprotein is mediated by hydrophobic interactions between its zinc-binding domain and FG nucleoporins

We have previously discovered and characterized the nuclear import pathways for the E7 oncoproteins of mucosal alpha genus HPVs, type 16 and 11. Here we investigated the nuclear import of cutaneous beta genus HPV8 E7 protein using confocal microscopy after transfections of HeLa cells with EGFP-8E7 and mutant plasmids and nuclear import assays in digitonin-permeabilized HeLa cells. We determined that HPV8 E7 contains a nuclear localization signal (NLS) within its zinc-binding domain that mediates its nuclear import. Furthermore, we discovered that a mostly hydrophobic patch {sub 65}LRLFV{sub 69} within the zinc-binding domain is essential for the nuclear import and localization of HPV8 E7 via hydrophobic interactions with the FG nucleoporins Nup62 and Nup153. Substitution of the hydrophobic residues within the {sub 65}LRLFV{sub 69} patch to alanines, and not R66A mutation, disrupt the interactions between the 8E7 zinc-binding domain and Nup62 and Nup153 and consequently inhibit nuclear import of HPV8 E7. - Highlights: • HPV8 E7 has a cNLS within its zinc-binding domain that mediates its nuclear import. • Discovery of a hydrophobic patch that is critical for the nuclear import of HPV8 E7. • HPV8 E7 nuclear import is mediated by hydrophobic interactions with FG-Nups, Nup62 and Nup153.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Nuclear imprisonment of host cellular mRNA by nsp1β protein of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus

Positive-strand RNA genomes function as mRNA for viral protein synthesis which is fully reliant on host cell translation machinery. Competing with cellular protein translation apparatus needs to ensure the production of viral proteins, but this also stifles host innate defense. In the present study, we showed that porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV), whose replication takes place in the cytoplasm, imprisoned host cell mRNA in the nucleus, which suggests a novel mechanism to enhance translation of PRRSV genome. PRRSV nonstructural protein (nsp) 1β was identified as the nuclear protein playing the role for host mRNA nuclear retention and subversion of host protein synthesis. A SAP (SAF-A/B, Acinus, and PIAS) motif was identified in nsp1β with the consensus sequence of {sub 126}-LQxxLxxxGL-{sub 135}. In situ hybridization unveiled that SAP mutants were unable to cause nuclear retention of host cell mRNAs and did not suppress host protein synthesis. In addition, these SAP mutants reverted PRRSV-nsp1β-mediated suppression of interferon (IFN) production, IFN signaling, and TNF-α production pathway. Using reverse genetics, a series of SAP mutant PRRS viruses, vK124A, vL126A, vG134A, and vL135A were generated. No mRNA nuclear retention was observed during vL126A and vL135A infections. Importantly, vL126A and vL135A did not suppress IFN production. For other arteriviruses, mRNA nuclear accumulation was also observed for LDV-nsp1β and SHFV-nsp1β. EAV-nsp1 was exceptional and did not block the host mRNA nuclear export. - Highlights: •PRRS virus blocks host mRNA nuclear export to the cytoplasm. •PRRSV nsp1β is the viral protein responsible for host mRNA nuclear retention. •SAP domain in nsp1β is essential for host mRNA nuclear retention and type I interferon suppression. •Mutation in the SAP domain of nsp1β causes the loss of function. •Host mRNA nuclear retention by nsp1β is common in the family Arteriviridae, except equine arteritis virus.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

The quantitative assessment of the role played by basic amino acid clusters in the nuclear uptake of human ribosomal protein L7

In this study, we used a multiple copy (EGFP){sub 3} reporter system to establish a numeric nuclear index system to assess the degree of nuclear import. The system was first validated by a FRAP assay, and then was applied to evaluate the essential and multifaceted nature of basic amino acid clusters during the nuclear import of ribosomal protein L7. The results indicate that the sequence context of the basic cluster determines the degree of nuclear import, and that the number of basic residues in the cluster is irrelevant; rather the position of the pertinent basic residues is crucial. Moreover, it also found that the type of carrier protein used by basic cluster has a great impact on the degree of nuclear import. In case of L7, importin β2 or importin β3 are preferentially used by clusters with a high import efficiency, notwithstanding that other importins are also used by clusters with a weaker level of nuclear import. Such a preferential usage of multiple basic clusters and importins to gain nuclear entry would seem to be a common practice among ribosomal proteins in order to ensure their full participation in high rate ribosome synthesis. - Highlights: ► We introduce a numeric index system that represents the degree of nuclear import. ► The rate of nuclear import is dictated by the sequence context of the basic cluster. ► Importin β2 and β3 were mainly responsible for the N4 mediated nuclear import.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Decreased nuclear stiffness via FAK-ERK1/2 signaling is necessary for osteopontin-promoted migration of bone marrow-derived mesenchymal stem cells

Migration of bone marrow-derived mesenchymal stem cells (BMSCs) plays an important role in many physiological and pathological settings, including wound healing. During the migration of BMSCs through interstitial tissues, the movement of the nucleus must be coordinated with the cytoskeletal dynamics, which in turn affects the cell migration efficiency. Our previous study indicated that osteopontin (OPN) significantly promotes the migration of rat BMSCs. However, the nuclear behaviors and involved molecular mechanisms in OPN-mediated BMSC migration are largely unclear. In the present study, using an atomic force microscope (AFM), we found that OPN could decrease the nuclear stiffness of BMSCs and reduce the expression of lamin A/C, which is the main determinant of nuclear stiffness. Increased lamin A/C expression attenuates BMSC migration by increasing nuclear stiffness. Decreased lamin A/C expression promotes BMSC migration by decreasing nuclear stiffness. Furthermore, OPN promotes BMSC migration by diminishing lamin A/C expression and decreasing nuclear stiffness via the FAK-ERK1/2 signaling pathway. This study provides strong evidence for the role of nuclear mechanics in BMSC migration as well as new insight into the molecular mechanisms of OPN-promoted BMSC migration. - Highlights: • OPN promotes BMSC migration by decreasing nuclear stiffness. • Lamin A/C knockdown decreases, while its overexpression enhances, the nuclear stiffness of BMSCs. • Lamin A/C overexpression and downregulation affect the migration of BMSCs. • OPN diminishes lamin A/C expression and decreases nuclear stiffness through the activation of the FAK-ERK1/2 signaling pathway. • OPN promotes BMSC migration via the FAK-ERK1/2 signaling pathway.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Nuclear speed and cycle length co-vary with local density during syncytial blastoderm formation in a cricket

Abstract The blastoderm is a broadly conserved stage of early animal development, wherein cells form a layer at the embryo’s periphery. The cellular behaviors underlying blastoderm formation are varied and poorly understood. In most insects, the pre-blastoderm embryo is a syncytium: nuclei divide and move throughout the shared cytoplasm, ultimately reaching the cortex. In Drosophila melanogaster , some early nuclear movements result from pulsed cytoplasmic flows that are coupled to synchronous divisions. Here, we show that the cricket Gryllus bimaculatus has a different solution to the problem of creating a blastoderm. We quantified nuclear dynamics during blastoderm formation in G. bimaculatus embryos, finding that: (1) cytoplasmic flows are unimportant for nuclear movement, and (2) division cycles, nuclear speeds, and the directions of nuclear movement are not synchronized, instead being heterogeneous in space and time. Moreover, nuclear divisions and movements co-vary with local nuclear density. We show that several previously proposed models for nuclear movements in D. melanogaster cannot explain the dynamics of G. bimaculatus nuclei. We introduce a geometric model based on asymmetric pulling forces on nuclei, which recapitulates the patterns of nuclear speeds and orientations of both unperturbed G. bimaculatus embryos, and of embryos physically manipulated to have atypical nuclear densities.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Do not forget the electrons: Extending moderately-sized nuclear networks for multidimensional hydrodynamic codes

Context.Nuclear networks are widely used coupled with hydrodynamical simulations of explosive scenarios to account for the change of nuclear species and energy generation rate due to nuclear reactions. In this way, there is a feedback mechanism between the hydrodynamical state and the nuclear processes. Unfortunately, the timescale of nuclear reactions is orders of magnitude smaller than the dynamical timescale that drives hydrodynamical simulations. Therefore, these nuclear networks are usually very small, reduced in most cases to a dozen elements, especially when simulations are carried out in more than one dimension. Aims.We present here an extended nuclear network, with 90 species, designed for being coupled with hydrodynamic simulations, which includes neutrons, protons, electrons, positrons, and the corresponding neutrino and anti-neutrino emission. This network is also coupled with temperature, making it extremely robust and, together with its size, unique of its kind. The inclusion of electron captures on free protons makes the network very appropriate for multidimensional studies of Type Ia supernova explosions, especially when the exploding object is a massive white dwarf. Methods.We perform several tests that are relevant to simulate explosive scenarios, such as Type Ia supernovae and core-collapse supernovae. We compare the results of the 90 nuclei network with a standardα-chain network with 14 elements to evaluate the differences in the energy generation rate. We also evaluate the relevance of including the electrons in the network in terms of generated yields and how it affects the pressure of a degenerate fluid such as that of white dwarfs. The results obtained with the 90-nuclei network have been verified with a much larger 2000-nuclei network built from REACLIB (WinNet), in terms of nuclear energy generation rate, pressure, and produced yields. Results.The results obtained with the proposed medium-sized network compare fairly well, to a few percent, with those computed withWinNetin scenarios reproducing the gross physical conditions of current Type Ia supernova explosion models. In those cases where the carbon and oxygen fuel ignites at high density, the high-temperature plateau typical of the nuclear statistical equilibrium regime is well defined and stable, allowing large integration time steps. We show that the inclusion of electron captures on free protons substantially improves the estimation of the electron fraction of the mixture. Therefore, the pressure is better determined than in networks where electron captures are excluded, which will ultimately lead to more reliable hydrodynamic models. Explosive combustion of helium at low density, occurring near the surface layer of a white dwarf, is also better described with the proposed network, which gives nuclear energy generation rates much closer toWinNetthan typical reduced alpha networks. Conclusions.A nuclear network withN= 90 species, including electrons, aimed at multidimensional calculations of supernova explosions is described and verified. The proposed network is suitable for the study of Type Ia supernova explosions because it provides better values of pressure and electron abundance than other existing networks with smaller or even a similar size but without including electron capture processes.

Astronomy & Astrophysics↗

Tommy Morris’ Comments on Nuclear Explosive Safety

Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Qualitative and Quantitative Assessment of Nuclear Materials Contained in High-Activity Waste Arising from the Operations at the 'SHELTER' Facility

As a result of the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl NPP in 1986, the explosion dispeesed nuclear materials contained in the nuclear fuel of the reactor core over the destroyed facilities at Unit No. 4 and over the territory immediately adjacent to the destroyed unit. The debris was buried under the Cascade Wall. Nuclear materials at the SHELTER can be characterized as spent nuclear fuel, fresh fuel assemblies (including fuel assemblies with damaged geometry and integrity, and individual fuel elements), core fragments of the Chernobyl NPP Unit No. 4, finely-dispersed fuel (powder/dust), uranium and plutonium compounds in water solutions, and lava-like nuclear fuel-containing masses. The new safe confinement (NSC) is a facility designed to enclose the Chernobyl NPP Unit No. 4 destroyed by the accident. Construction of the NSC involves excavating operations, which are continuously monitored including for the level of radiation. The findings of such monitoring at the SHELTER site will allow us to characterize the recovered radioactive waste. When a process material categorized as high activity waste (HAW) is detected the following HLW management operations should be involved: HLW collection; HLW fragmentation (if appropriate); loading HAW into the primary package KT-0.2; loading the primary package filled with HAW into the transportation cask KTZV-0.2; and storing the cask in temporary storage facilities for high-level solid waste. The CDAS system is a system of 3He tubes for neutron coincidence counting, and is designed to measure the percentage ratio of specific nuclear materials in a 200-liter drum containing nuclear material intermixed with a matrix. The CDAS consists of panels with helium counter tubes and a polyethylene moderator. The panels are configured to allow one to position a waste-containing drum and a drum manipulator. The system operates on the ‘add a source’ basis using a small Cf-252 source to identify irregularities in the matrix during an assay. The platform with the source is placed under the measurement chamber. The platform with the source material is moved under the measurement chamber. The design allows one to move the platform with the source in and out, thus moving the drum. The CDAS system and radioactive waste containers have been built. For each drum filled with waste two individual measurements (passive/active) will be made. This paper briefly describes the work carried out to assess qualitatively and quantitatively the nuclear materials contained in high-level waste at the SHELTER facility. These efforts substantially increased nuclear safety and security at the facility.

Cherkas, Dmytro↗

Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Engineering Design Courses: Engaging Universities in Safeguards by Design

Engaging professionals across the breadth of the nuclear industry to educate them on international safeguards objectives and methodology is logistically challenging, especially in the United States, where individuals may not interact with the IAEA and are not as familiar with implementing international safeguards. However, incorporating international safeguards concepts into the mandatory curriculum of nuclear-related university degree programs around the world, complementary to nuclear safety and security concepts, could reach individuals who will go on to be professionals acting in a variety of roles across the nuclear industry (e.g., developing nuclear-related advanced technologies, designing or operating nuclear facilities, serving as State regulators). This would ultimately lead to more effective and efficient safeguards, including helping to move safeguards by design from a concept to a standard practice, as future designers, operators, and State regulators would be more familiar with international safeguards. This could also potentially address human resource challenges by creating a broader base of individuals knowledgeable about the IAEA mission from which to draw future inspectors and analysts. In order to implement this idea, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in conjunction with the Center for Nuclear Security Science & Policy Initiatives (a research institute associated with Texas A&M University), targeted nuclear engineering undergraduate students taking the mandatory design course at Texas A&M and the University of Tennessee. The project objective was to introduce safeguards by design concepts to individuals who are planning to work in a broad range of nuclear-related careers. The paper describes the project methodology, which included the project leads creating and presenting lectures on safeguards to the design class and mentoring teams working on design team projects that incorporated safeguards. The paper also identifies lessons learned while incorporating safeguards topics into nuclear engineering university degree programs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Regulatory Design for Transport Security Regulations of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

A cornerstone within a nuclear security regime of a country is a legislative and regulatory framework that both regulates the individuals using radioactive and nuclear materials, but also regulates the regulators for their commitments under International Law. When drafting nuclear law and regulations, both technical and legal expertise is needed to ensure the regulation meets the technical requirements for security, but also is legally enforceable within a country’s jurisdiction. While the Primary Nuclear Law, or Enabling Act provides establishes the Competent Authority and responsibilities for nuclear security, regulatory development is where the proverbial, rubber meets the road for requirements. The regulations provide instruction for inspections, authorizations, and managed activities, such as use storage, and transport. Transport Security regulatory development for radioactive and nuclear material is complex because the regulation maybe multi-jurisdictional, multi-modal, and involve multiple stakeholders. Development of transport security regulations requires coordination with other ministerial stakeholders, transport operators, and alignment to international treaties and conventions outside the nuclear domain. This paper provides a brief discussion of the challenges associated with regulatory development for transport security regulations for nuclear and other radioactive materials in transport. The paper will briefly identify key stakeholders, international law involved, and current efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in supporting Member States in regulatory development. While active in that regulations are necessary for a robust nuclear security regime, regulatory development is more a slow-burn than an active activity in nuclear security.

Fialkoff, Marc↗

National and International Assistance in the Technical Assessment of Nuclear and other Radiological Materials out of Regulatory Control

Considerable resources are dedicated worldwide to detect illicit materials of all types amid the concern of their potential use in criminal acts or acts of terrorism. Of particular concern are illicit nuclear and radiological materials as they have potential to cause serious harm to the general public if not maintained under regulatory control. As such, the international community has developed recommendations and guidance for States and their Competent Authorities to establish, implement, maintain, and strengthen their nuclear security regimes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides recommendations for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control through the publication Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, Nuclear Security Series No.15. Based on this guidance and national/international practical experience and best practices, the international community has made considerable advances in the detection, interdiction, and adjudication of nuclear and other radiological materials out of regulatory control. The United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Office of Nuclear Incident Policy and Cooperation has national/international experience to share on providing emergency responders and front line officers assistance in the technical assessment of interdicted nuclear and other radioactive Materials Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Heat transfer systems for nuclear reactor cores, and related systems

A system for transferring heat from a nuclear reactor comprises a nuclear reactor comprising a nuclear fuel and a reactor vessel surrounding the nuclear reactor and a heat transfer system surrounding the nuclear reactor. The heat transfer system comprises an inner wall surrounding the nuclear reactor vessel, first fins coupled to an outer surface of inner wall, an outer wall between the inner wall and a surrounding environment, and second fins coupled to an inner surface of the outer wall and extending in a volume between the outer surface of the inner wall and the inner surface of the outer wall, the outer surface of the inner wall and the first fins configured to transfer heat from the nuclear reactor core to the second fins and the inner surface of the outer wall by thermal radiation. The heat transfer system may be directly coupled to the nuclear reactor vessel, or may be coupled to an external reflector surrounding the nuclear reactor vessel. Related heat transfer systems and systems for selectively removing heat from a nuclear reactor are disclosed.

Ougouag, Abderrafi Mohammed El-Amine↗

Gender Mainstreaming in Nuclear Security: Strategies for Incorporating Gender Equality by Design in the IAEA Milestones Approach

Gender mainstreaming has emerged as a critical mechanism towards achieving gender equality in the development and implementation of laws, policies, and programs, including those related to national security. Gender mainstreaming is generally defined as the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies, and programs, in all areas and at all levels, with the ultimate goal to achieve gender equality. Gender mainstreaming, which in essence can be thought of as “gender equality by design,” is an important element for building a robust nuclear security infrastructure. To date, however, gender mainstreaming has not been fully operationalized in the nuclear sector. For instance, the IAEA Milestones Approach, which provides important guidance to states seeking to develop nuclear power programs, has not yet incorporated or addressed gender considerations in its various phases or nuclear infrastructure issues, including those related to nuclear security. Therefore, this paper will argue that specifically for nuclear newcomer states, gender mainstreaming could serve as a powerful tool to integrate gender considerations into the design of laws, policies, programs, and entities necessary to successfully implement a nuclear power program. The objective of this study is twofold: first, to explore the concept of gender mainstreaming and its relevance to nuclear security, and second, to identify how gender can be incorporated into the IAEA Milestones Approach. The paper will emphasize the importance of developing guidance for the IAEA and nuclear newcomer states on how gender considerations could be incorporated throughout the development of a nuclear security program.

Siserman-Gray, Ioana-Cristina↗