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At least 1,297 records · Page 72
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Large Cask, Small Building, AREVA's Safe MLLW Disposal Solution Despite Facility Limitations - 16295

In order to begin decommissioning of a 1950's research reactor, Class C Mixed Low Level Waste (MLLW) had to be removed from the facility and disposed of. The AREVA TN RAM cask, designed and licensed for shipping Type B waste packages, was chosen as the most appropriate shipping solution. Due to the building layout, crane capacity and pool size, the standard TN RAM cask loading process could not be utilized. Unique solutions and approaches had to be developed to complete the project. AREVA designed a smaller liner insert that would house the four MLLW components in a single waste package to solve the problems related to crane capacity and physical pool dimensions. AREVA also designed and fabricated a shield bell to provide radiation shielding while moving the liner insert from the reactor pool to the cask that was staged adjacent to the reactor pool. The AREVA team worked with the disposal facility to cover requirements for disposal of Class B MLLW. This included designing spacers filled with inert material to fulfill the requirement for maximum 10% void space in the waste package. This disposal method for Class C waste met the requirements of macro-encapsulation. Therefore, no additional treatment action was required when disposing of Class C MLLW. AREVA's solution provides a model for disposing MLLW requiring macro-encapsulation in a single waste package. This solution also provides a model for how to adapt large shipping casks and liners to smaller aging commercial, DOE or research facilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Low Activity Waste Glass Waste Form Data Package for Hanford's Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment - 16480

A Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW) flowsheet has been initiated to begin immobilization of Hanford tank wastes. In the DFLAW configuration, a pretreatment system will segregate the high level and the low activity wastes (LAW). The LAW will be immobilized in the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) and disposed of in Hanford's Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF). To obtain authorization to dispose of wastes in the IDF, a Performance Assessment (PA) must be completed in accordance with DOE Order 435.1. The PA shall include calculations of potential doses to representative future members of the public and potential releases from the facility to provide a reasonable expectation that performance objectives will not be exceeded as a result of operation and closure of the facility. To support the development of the PA, data from ILAW glass testing are needed to model the long term release of contaminants over the compliance period and verify that impacts to groundwater quality will be within performance objective limits. Washington River Protection Solutions is conducting an ILAW glass testing program to produce the required data. This program is a combined effort involving National Laboratories with known expertise in glass waste form research. The work involves accelerated testing to develop parameters that can be used in computer simulations of glass corrosion and contaminant release in the IDF environment. The results of this work will be compiled in an ILAW glass waste form performance data package for the IDF PA. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Regulating Operational Safety at a Future Geological Disposal Facility in the UK - 18038

The United Kingdom (UK) has generated commercial nuclear energy for over 60 years; generating a significant and varied inventory of higher activity radioactive waste (HAW). In accordance with international practice, UK Government policy for long-term management of HAW is disposal in a geological disposal facility (GDF). The nuclear materials comprising HAW include high level waste, intermediate level waste and some low level waste, not suitable for disposal to the Low Level Waste Repository. In addition, other nuclear materials may be reclassified as waste in the future and will require to be managed as HAW for disposal to a GDF; these include spent fuel, uranium and plutonium. The operator of a GDF will be required to obtain a nuclear site licence from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), as the nuclear safety and security regulator, in order to construct and operate the facility. In the period prior to submission of a licence application, ONR is working to develop its regulatory expectations and provide advice on its regulatory role with regards to a future GDF. ONR has developed regulatory guidance on operational safety, benchmarked against the relevant IAEA Safety Standards and the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) Safety Reference Levels for Disposal. This guidance draws upon ONR's current expectations for nuclear sites; including operational reactors, fuel manufacture and reprocessing facilities, and reactors undergoing decommissioning; and incorporates relevant good practice drawn from international programmes for geological disposal and related industries (eg mining). In addition to the technical assessment guidance, ONR has developed guidance on the licensing process specific to a GDF; providing clarity for example on when a licence will be required. A review of the standard licence conditions applied to all nuclear sites concluded no significant amendment would be required for application to a GDF. Through its voluntary agreement with Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM), the developer and future operator of a GDF in the UK, ONR exerts regulatory influence on the design and organisational development of the future licensee. As part of this scrutiny, ONR has assessed RWM's generic Disposal System Safety Case. Subjecting the generic design and safety case to regulatory review provides opportunity for early engagement to ensure the appropriate standards will be achieved. ONR will only grant the necessary regulatory permissions if RWM adequately demonstrates the GDF will be constructed, operated and closed safely. Future challenges faced by ONR with respect to a GDF include building and maintaining regulatory competence and confidence, and engaging effectively with the public as the UK begins its search for a suitable site to provide appropriate assurance that a GDF will be operated safely and securely. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

A Novel Mobile Examination and Remediation Facility for On-Site Remediation of Dry Storage Systems - 18389

Most of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in dry storage in the United States is safely and securely stored in dual-purpose (i.e., storage and transportation) canisters [1]. However, some of the SNF is stored in storage-only (i.e., non-transportable) packages, or packages that may become nonconforming for continued storage or transportation for a variety of reasons. Currently, the capability to remediate dry storage systems (DSSs) for SNF that are not transportable or that need to be repaired to maintain confinement boundary integrity during storage service does not exist without on-site access to a spent fuel pool. Hence, there is a potential future need for a mobile facility with remediation capabilities that can be used at multiple storage installations. These capabilities would permit needed repairs to an existing DSS to support continued storage or for the dry transfer of fuel to a new conveyance suitable for transport, if necessary. This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. A novel design concept for a Mobile Examination and Remediation Facility (MERF) is proposed with functions and capabilities to remediate a DSS. The proposed MERF would be a multi-purpose facility, remotely operated and computer-controlled with semi-automated equipment to allow trained operators to safely perform remediation activities while keeping worker radiation dose as low as reasonably achievable. It would include a shielded rotating platform with support towers and would use commercial off- the-shelf examination and repair equipment. A slip ring arrangement underneath the rotating platform would allow for the power supply without impeding the continuous rotation and would simplify cable management. The support towers would be mounted on the rotating platform, and each tower would have vertical and horizontal positioning capability for axial and radial tool location. The rotating platform would be attached to the main MERF structure. Capabilities would include visual, surface, and volumetric examinations to fully characterize physical conditions on canister surface before and after a repair; repair techniques, e.g., laser beam welding, friction stir welding, or cold spray, to perform needed remediation activities; and associated equipment for surface preparation such as cutting and grinding equipment. The proposed design would be simple, modular, robust, economically viable, and easily transportable and would have a small footprint. The modular design would present several advantages including compatibility with a variety of different DSSs, on-site assembly, and transportability; it also would be built in interchangeable sections to facilitate decontamination. Further, shielding would be supplemented through interface with the existing transfer cask and storage overpack. Robustness and canister stability would be achieved using pneumatic holders and steel support structures designed with vibration absorbers to reduce impacts and/or a 'pendulum' effect during a seismic event. Thus, the proposed MERF would be designed to: (i) minimize handling of an affected DSS to the extent practicable, (ii) provide radiation shielding and minimize dose to operators and the public during remediation activities, and (iii) enable examination, repair, and repackaging. This paper describes the proposed MERF design concept and capabilities, main components, equipment, different modes of operation, and operating procedures. Structural and safety assessments would need to be performed before final design, licensing, and deployment. The MERF is evaluated with respect to regulatory impact (first of a kind, prior experience), operational impact (safety, security, staffing, ongoing operations, constraints), worker dose (low, medium, high), cost (low, medium, high), schedule (duration, time sequence), and technology readiness level. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Cold Commissioning Simulant Selection for the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment Plant LAW Facility - 18465

Commissioning the Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility of the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will require large volumes (∼2,000,000 liters) of a non-radioactive, chemically analogous waste simulant. Cold commissioning will provide for operator training in an integrated facility, demonstration of mechanical process equipment capacity, environmental performance demonstration of emissions control systems, and process control systems shakedown and tuning. Selection of the cold commissioning simulant is following a structured four-phase process to arrive at the preferred composition and recipe. Phases I, II and III are complete. Phase I laid the framework for decision making with preparation of a Project Management Plan, an update to the Simulant Development, Approval, Validation, and Documentation procedure, and a kickoff meeting to gather stakeholder input into the simulant definition and selection criteria. Phase II consisted of a comprehensive literature search and compilation of LAW simulant recipes, followed by initial screening against the selection criteria identified in Phase I. This process identified 72 candidate simulant recipes and down-selected 9 for further study. Phase III studies involved a) statistical comparisons of the similarity of candidate simulant compositions to the tank waste feed vector, b) process modelling of the commissioning sequence with each simulant to estimate glass former and simulant material consumption, offgas and effluent volumes and compositions, and product glass volumes and compositions, and c) evaluation of simulants against the immobilized LAW glass composition algorithm to determine allo able waste loading to ensure compliance with product specifications and process constraints. The results of these studies identified two of the candidate recipes to be carried forward to full-scale testing. Phase IV consists of testing these two recipes at vendor facilities to determine scalability, fabricability, and stability of the simulants when produced at industrial scale. Scalability is the ability to take a recipe from bench scale (1 to 40 liters) batch size to full scale (>35,000 liters) batch size. Fabricability is the ability of a recipe to be prepared in large batches without the need for complex or expensive mechanical equipment, heating, or cooling systems. Stability is the ability of a simulant to withstand long term storage and variations in environmental conditions without unacceptable changes in key characteristics (the set of chemical, physical, and rheological parameters that the simulant is intended to exhibit during cold commissioning tests). Simulants will also be tested for compatibility with other startup material (i.e., frit), tuning simulants, and environmental performance demonstration test spiking solutions to ensure against unexpected situations. Using a structured process is essential when making high impact decisions such as waste simulant selection. Proper planning and a clear explanation of how the decision process will unfold is key to obtaining stakeholder buy-in as more information is gathered. The documentation resulting from this structured selection process will be compiled and summarized in a Cold Commissioning Simulant Definition deliverable due to the Department of Energy 24 months before the start of Cold Commissioning. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Low-Level Waste Minimization and Management Planning at the Western Waste Management Facility, Ontario Power Generation - 19235

The purpose of this study was to examine the strategies intended to mitigate the temporary storage restrictions for Low-Level radioactive waste at the Western Waste Management Facility to enable continued accommodation of waste generation rates, and to recover storage capacity from 2018-2023 to optimize long-term sustainability for radioactive waste management. The management options considered were based on existing waste processing technologies and programs available at the Western Waste Management Facility, in combination with third party volume-reduction services. Completed analysis measured the consumption of Low-Level Waste storage space as influenced by the projected volumes from nuclear generating stations, and the various processing scenarios developed; such as reducing the volume of surplus processable waste on-site, and the reduction of specific waste streams previously considered to be non-processable. Results from the quantitative analysis indicated which strategies will be most effective for minimizing waste volumes for long-term storage and for recovering low-level storage space at the Western Waste Management Facility. The strategic path forward is presented in short- to long-term management objectives. Results from this study will contribute to the waste stream planning and management of major reactor refurbishment projects and to the technological advancements and innovation of radioactive waste processing and minimization. With further understanding of the refurbishment-specific waste types and volumes, it is expected that Nuclear Waste Management and the nuclear generating stations will achieve increasingly improved minimization results with the progression of each refurbished reactor. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Developing Waste Characterization Capabilities in Support of the Near Surface Disposal Facility - 19245

Upon approval from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) Proposed Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF) to be constructed at CNL's Chalk River Laboratories will be the first permanent disposal facility in Canada for the disposal of low level radioactive waste. The NSDF is currently in the approval process and as such, a preliminary Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) has been implemented for the proposed facility. Waste currently generated at CNL is being characterized to verify that it meets the WAC and will be 'disposal ready' once the NSDF is operational. A robust waste characterization program is required for the following reasons: 1. Improved waste segregation to support waste minimization and recycling to ensure non-radioactive waste is reliably segregated and removed from radioactive waste streams destined for the NSDF. This includes characterization and discrimination of Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) and anthropogenic radioactive material. 2. To ensure low level waste (LLW) is properly characterized as per the limits stipulated within the WAC to ensure criteria is met for NSDF packaging requirements 3. To ensure intermediate level waste is reliably segregated from NSDF destined wastes streams The purpose of this paper is to provide a review of the development of a waste characterization program strategy at Chalk River Laboratories and applicability of various waste streams; including consideration of important factors such as measurement methods, techniques, and the management of data. Emphasis is necessarily placed on non-destructive gamma spectrometry systems which are central to CNL's approach. A review of near-term developments is also provided. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Operational Safety Analysis for Disposal Period of the Future Belgian Geological Disposal Facility - 19249

For more than 40 years, ONDRAF/NIRAS (the federal agency responsible for managing radioactive waste and enriched fissile materials in Belgium) has been studying the concept of a geological disposal facility (GDF) in poorly indurated clays as an option for the long-term management of both category B waste (low-level and intermediate-level long-lived waste - LILW-LL) and category C waste (high-level waste - HLW and spent fuel). In the absence of a policy decision, the proposed Belgian reference option for disposal of such waste is a GDF in poorly indurated clays, located at a depth between 200 m and 600 m. ONDRAF/NIRAS has developed a reference disposal concept for research, development and demonstration (RD and D) purposes. At the current stage of this program, the primary objective of ONDRAF/NIRAS is to establish the safety and feasibility of constructing, operating and closing a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) at the conceptual design level, without any presumption about the exact location of the facility. This will be evaluated in a first version of the safety and feasibility case (SFC-1 V1) for the geological disposal of category B and C radioactive wastes. Analysis of the operational safety is an important part of the SFC-1 V1. ONDRAF/NIRAS, supported by BGE Technology GmbH, has prepared an operational safety analysis of the current GDF reference design and the processes occurring during the operation and closure period. A SWIFT methodology (Structured What If Technique) is used to identify risks and the measures required to mitigate their consequences. In parallel to this SWIFT analysis, specific attention is also given to fire risk, especially in the blind-ending disposal galleries (DG). Based on understanding of fire risk analysis, recommendations suggest using exclusively electrically driven equipment to reduce fire loads and minimize the fire hazard. In addition, strict working procedures could prevent the presence of workers between the DG dead end and equipment presenting significant fire load. The use of mobile refuge chambers should also be part of the safety concept. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Performance Assessment for Closure of the Calcined Solids Storage Facility at the INL Site - 19289

The Calcined Solids Storage Facility is composed of six discrete stainless steel 'bin sets' at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center at the INL Site. Approximately 4,440 m{sup 3} of the dry, granular calcine waste is stored in the facility. Closure of the facility will entail removal of the calcine waste followed by grouting. A 5-cm thick residual amount of calcine was assumed to remain at the bottom of the bins. Important radionuclides in the residual layer for the groundwater pathway were identified as the fission and activation products Tc-99, Se-79, I-129, Cs-135, H-3, and actinides Pu-239, and Pu-240. The stainless-steel bins prevent near-term release of grouted residual calcine waste to the environment. Future releases were conservatively based on the corrosion rate of the weld seams on the stainless-steel bins, which site-specific studies measured mean tunnel corrosion rates of 0.0132 mm/yr with a coefficient of variation of 0.333. Based on tunnel corrosion rates, mean bin hydrologic containment times were estimated to be between 238 years and 1,191 years, depending on the thickness of the bin. Any breach in the weld seam was assumed to result in water flow and radionuclide leaching through the bin. The structural integrity of the bin was assumed to be controlled by the general stainless-steel corrosion rate, which was much slower (3.5 x 10{sup -5} mm/yr), resulting in structural integrity times between 24,000 years to over 100,000 years. A mixing-cell model was used to compute water flow and transport through the hydrologically failed bins and the vadose zone. Credit was taken for the geochemical properties of the grout used to fill the bins at closure, which significantly slows the releases from the bins for key radionuclides like Tc-99. A semi-analytical model for three-dimensional dissolved-phase transport in an aquifer of constant unidirectional flow, infinite length and width, and finite thickness was used to compute concentrations in the aquifer across the model domain for a time varying source. Cumulative impacts from all bin sets were calculated by summation across the bin set sources that were superimposed on a uniform Cartesian grid. Effective doses were calculated for direct groundwater ingestion from wells located 100-m downgradient from each of the bin sets and ingestion of meat, milk, and vegetables irrigated with water derived from the well. Intruder doses were based on a well drilled through the grouted waste and cuttings spread around a home site after a 500-year institutional control period. Peak doses during the 1,000-year compliance period were less than 5% of the 250 μSv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective and intruder doses were generally less 5% of the of the 5000 μSv/yr (500 mrem) and 1000 μSv/yr (100 mrem) performance objective for acute and chronic intruder exposure, respectively. Groundwater concentrations were all less than the maximum contaminant limits. In all cases, doses were highest for the oldest bin set because, compared to the other bin sets, it had the highest radionuclide concentrations in the calcine waste. The performance assessment results indicate that performance objectives can be met leaving considerably more than 5-cm of residual calcine waste in the bin sets. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Advanced Modeling of Contaminant Fate and Transport in Soil and Groundwater from F-Canyon and the Central Laboratory Facility

F-Canyon (221-F) was constructed in the early 1950's and, together with FB Line, began operations in 1954 as the main processing facilities in FArea of SRS. The primary operations conducted in F-Canyon and FB Line included the separation and recovery of Pu-239 and U-238 from irradiated materials and the stabilization of plutonium residues. The F/H Laboratory Complex consists of buildings 772-F, 772-1F, and 772-4F which began operations in 1954, 1987, and 1993, respectively. The primary mission of the F/H Laboratory Complex for the last 45 years has been to support the chemical separations processing activities at Building 221-F and H-Canyon. The objective of this study is to determine the radionuclide and hazardous material holdup in F-Canyon and its support facilities, and to evaluate In-Situ Disposal (ISD) alternatives for deactivation and decommissioning (D and D) of these facilities to ensure groundwater protection and environmental compliance with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Services (SCDHES) and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). GoldSim is a dynamic probabilistic simulation software that allows modeling of chemical mass transport through engineered and environmental systems For this study, it will model the potential future release of radiological contamination through the vadose zone, Upper Three Runs (UTR) Aquifer and the Upper Three Runs Creek. Using a GoldSim model developed for building 235-F D and D, contaminant inventories as well as building geometry were updated to create the basis of the new F-Canyon model. The inventories from F-Canyon, FB Line, and the 800 Series Tanks (Tanks 804, 808, and 809) as well as F/H labs (including buildings 772-F, 772-1F, and 772- 4F) were used to make a total of four sources. The concentrations of total uranium and beta-gamma are within compliance for the study, while radium and alpha concentrations exceed their MCL's around 30,000 years and total effective water dose exceeds its MCL around 1,200 years. This suggests that some level of action will be needed to meet SCDHES and USEPA requirements. This evaluation was conducted only for the no-action alternative. Consideration and modeling of other alternatives will be required in the future to determine the best ISD alternative for D and D of F-Canyon and F/H labs with regard to groundwater protection, worker safety, and financial cost.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 46: Final Closure of Unlined LLW Disposal Facilities Worldwide (R3.5)

This panel discussed the on-going and emerging issues with the design and construction of final cover system of unlined disposal facilities (e.g., material disposal areas (MDAs), subsurface disposal areas (SDAs), burial grounds, and similar historical waste trenches, pits and vaults). The discussion focused on key technical and regulatory issues as well as lessons learned from years of engineering and construction in US and non-US locations. Panelists with presentations: Closure of Unlined LLW Disposal Sites (Craig Benson); Closure of LLW Facilities (Paul Pointon); Final Closure of Unlined LLW Disposal Facilities - Lessons Learned (Kevin Foye)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Operations and Recent Upgrades to a Tritium Recycling Facility - 20375

Nuclear Sources and Services Inc. (NSSI) is a waste handling treatment company that has been operating since 1971. In 2000, NSSI began building a 1,000 m{sup 2} (∼10,000 sqft) tritium recycling facility on the Houston, Texas premises to address a growing need in the waste disposal market. Over the years, the capability of the facility grew to address many different waste streams with the goal of recycling > 99.9% of all tritium activity back into the fusion community. This is achieved by maintaining an effluent stack release well below the 150 GBq/year (C Ci/year) operating limit and maintaining all liquid and solid waste disposal below the low-level radioactive release limit of 0.C MBq/kg (10 μCi/kg). The unique processing systems in the facility attracts many challenging contracts. Within the past two years, NSSI has engaged with customers to treat; organic mixed wastes that simultaneously contain tritium and carbon-14, safely extract tritium from large quantities of exit sign lights, and remove tritium from uncharacterised legacy depleted uranium beds from a superfund site. This paper will outline the initial testing, the system upgrades to treat these varied streams, and the progress in processing the feedstocks provided by these projects. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Nuclear Science User Facilities Irradiation Capabilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

The Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF) within the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy offer researchers the opportunity to access world-class nuclear facilities at no cost to the user. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) offers users access to the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) in addition to a wide variety of post-irradiation examination facilities. The ORNL irradiation engineering team has compiled a large number of successful designs for irradiating nuclear fuel and material specimens. NSUF users can leverage these existing designs to significantly reduce the time, cost, and risk of failure when designing new irradiation experiments. This work summarizes some of the irradiation experiment designs and capabilities that have been developed at ORNL in the hope that this information will help improve future NSUF proposals and inspire new ideas for irradiations that can be performed in the HFIR.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Counterpart Test on IBLOCA of 13% Cold Leg Break in ATLAS Facility

In the analysis for Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) as a design-basis accident (DBA) of a pressurized water reactor (PWR), redefinition of the break size based on the risk-informed regulation (RIR) is being extensively investigated due to the potential safety benefits. The pipe integrity and break frequency has been found to depend on the pipe size, so that a complete rupture of a smaller pipe such as a pressurizer surge-line or an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) nozzle is more probable than a double-ended guillotine break (DEGB) of primary coolant circuit piping. The scenario with the break of these pipes can be regarded as intermediate break (IB) LOCA. With an aim of expanding code validation to address safety issues of the IBLOCA and developing an evaluation model (EM) for full spectrum LOCA, the database for the IBLOCA test in an integral effect test (IET) facility is essential. In particular, an experimental data from the counterpart test can contribute to enhance our understanding on the phenomena and resolve the scaling issues in the scaled-down test facilities. The objective of this study is to investigate thermal hydraulic phenomena during the IBLOCA by the counterpart test for the 13% cold leg break in ATLAS facility, which was the A.2 test in the OECDATLAS project. This integral effect test would contribute to evaluate the scaling effect of the ATLAS design and test condition.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Entrainment of Juvenile and Adult American Shad at a Pumped Storage Facility

The American Shad Alosa sapidissima has been targeted for restoration to the upper Susquehanna River, and entrainment losses at hydroelectric facilities on the river, including the Muddy Run Pumped Storage Facility, are of concern for the potential growth of the American Shad population. Based on the integration of pumping volume, time of entrainment, and literature–reported diel emigration of juvenile American Shad, the entrainment rate (N = 145; 53 exposed to pumping) was estimated at 3.5%. The entrainment rate for adults (N = 507) was estimated at 0.3–3.9%. Using multistate mark–recapture models, the estimated entrainment probabilities (Ψ) of radio–tagged juveniles were higher during periods of extended pumping (>1 h; Ψ = 0.093; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.054–0.156) than at periods of no pumping or short–duration pumping (<1 h; Ψ < 0.0001; 95% CI = 0.0–0.001); the high extended pumping occurred between 2300 and 0600 hours. Entrainment probabilities for adults were low (Ψ < 0.02); the highest probability occurred for fish detected downstream of the intake during the peak portion of the run (Ψ = 0.015; 95% CI = 0.004–0.047). Entrainment probability for most adult fish did not differ from zero. The low values of Ψ for both life stages were attributed to (1) the deep location of the intake (intake ceiling >11.7 m below the water surface), (2) the surface orientation of American Shad (upper 3.1 m), (3) the low overlap between high–volume pumping and peak emigration/migration times, (4) the pumping volume relative to prevailing river flows, and (5) the prolonged, robust swimming speed of American Shad, particularly that of adults (>2.2 m/s), which exceeded the intake velocity (0.2–0.9 m/s). Entrainment of juveniles increased with co–occurrence of low incoming river flows, high pumping volume, and peak emigration times. Furthermore, quantification of migratory species’ entrainment at pumped storage facilities requires integration of diel migration/emigration times with the frequency, timing, and duration of pumping volume.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Acoustic Exposure to Turbine Operation Quantifies Risk to Bats at Commercial Wind Energy Facilities

ABSTRACT Turbine‐related bat mortality at commercial wind energy facilities may threaten populations of migratory tree‐roosting bat species in North America. Industry stakeholders and regulatory agencies alike are investigating strategies to reduce risk of population‐level consequences as the wind energy industry grows. Bats collide with turbines only when turbine rotors are spinning and curtailing turbine operation at low wind speeds can effectively reduce bat fatality rates. Nonetheless, few quantitative data exist to determine appropriate threshold wind speeds below which turbine operations should be curtailed. Carcass monitoring is labor‐intensive and does not provide information on factors linked to bat fatality rates on any scale finer than nightly. We tested whether acoustic bat data recorded at turbine nacelles could provide a more precise and sensitive measure of fatality risk to bats by analyzing acoustics, weather, turbine operation, and carcass data collected at 2 commercial wind energy facilities in West Virginia over 7 years. Each wind facility implemented several distinct curtailment treatments during our study, allowing us to compare fatality rates and acoustic bat activity across multiple operational strategies. We found that bat passes exposed to turbine operation explained close to 80% of the variation in carcass‐based estimates of bat fatality rates and accounted for significant variation in raw carcass counts per turbine and probability of finding bat carcasses during individual turbine searches. Conversely, bat activity occurring when turbines were not operating had little or no relationship to fatality rates. We also found that patterns in bat activity exposure could be predicted accurately among turbines and years. Our results demonstrate that measuring exposure of acoustic bat activity provides a quantitative basis for designing, evaluating, and adaptively managing curtailment strategies. This is an important advance towards using curtailment to reduce bat fatality rates strategically while allowing for increased generation of renewable energy. © 2021 The Authors. Wildlife Society Bulletin published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of The Wildlife Society.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2018

Narrowing transient testing pulse widths to enhance LWR RIA experiment design in the TREAT facility

The Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility provided thousands of transient irradiations and plays a crucial role in nuclear-heated safety research. The facility’s flexible design and multi-mission nature saw historic experiments for numerous reactor fuels and transient types but was never specifically adapted to address very-brief pulse transients akin to postulated Light Water Reactor (LWR) Reactivity Initiated Accidents (RIA). Since the behaviors of fuel under these conditions depends strongly on energy input duration and resulting cladding time/temperature response under pellet cladding mechanical interactions, this three-year project was conceived to investigate new pulse-narrowing capabilities. Kinetic models showed incremental improvements for minor facility enhancements including increased reactivity step insertions (to initiate the power pulse) and slightly-increased transient rod drive speed for pulse termination (“clipping”). Replacing peak fuel assemblies, repositioning non-transient control rods to hold down the “hot side” of the core, and balancing against required excess reactivity needs, the limiting fuel assembly power can be reduced by ~20 %. Furthermore, this is a remarkable discovery of latent capability in TREAT, not only in enabling the subject capabilities for reduced pulse widths, but also significantly “uprating” the core’s transient energy capacity. Incremental improvements can likely enhance TREAT’s capability into BWR-relevant missions; briefer PWR pulse shapes can only be achieved with an advanced clipping system. Helium-3 ( 3 He) was found to offer the greatest benefits for clipping design and overall performance. A unique concept showed great promise for enabling a 3 He-based system with a reasonable cost; this design concept will likely become the focal point of future work.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Design of an experimental facility with a unit cell test section for studies of the lower plenum in prismatic high temperature gas reactors

A proposed design for a Generation IV reactor is the very-high temperature reactor (VHTR), which employs helium as the primary coolant. Although many advantages exist with this design, a number of challenges remain. One such area of concern is the turbulent mixing of non-isothermal flows in the lower plenum, where an array of coolant jets collectively mix and traverse around a series of structural support posts before exiting the core. Neighboring jets in the lower plenum could experience temperature differences as high as 300–400 K, causing potential hot streaking in the support posts. Additional problems could occur further downstream if the level of non-uniformity in the temperatures is too high (e.g, inducing thermal stresses on gas turbine blades). Therefore, it is important that adequate tools exist to predict the turbulent mixing within the VHTR lower plenum. This task remains difficult to achieve due to the complex geometry and flow physics that dictate the mixing. Various modeling approaches can only be assessed using data acquired from a carefully designed experimental facility. This paper presents details of such a facility, where high-fidelity measurements can be acquired for a scaled portion of the lower plenum defined herein as a ‘‘unit cell”, which consists of a hexagonal array of jets whose flow is directed into a test section with support posts positioned between neighboring jets, and subjected to a crossflow. Through adjusting velocity and temperature conditions at the jet inlets, different locations within the lower plenum can be experimentally simulated. System response quantities (SRQs) include both temperature and velocity measurements, captured via multiple thermocouples embedded in each post, and particle image velocimetry (PIV), respectively. These SRQs provide assessment metrics for both the momentum and energy models present in current computational solvers, and therefore the experimental facility is a valuable source for validation data. Another benefit is a more comprehensive understanding of the thermal-hydraulic loading conditions and flow physics present in the VHTR lower plenum.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗