Results for “Risk Mitigation” — Page 72

NASA NTRS2021

Advanced Air Mobility and Safety Management Systems

Our current air transportation system has underserved markets, including local, regional, intraregional, and urban transportation of both people and cargo. Recent advances in aviation technology such as small highly-automated vehicles, electric aircraft, and automated air traffic are enabling business opportunities in these markets. Advanced Air Mobility, or AAM, refers to a community effort to overcome the gaps in operational rules, safety analysis, and overall acceptance, so that these new operations will be possible. For full details, please see: https://www.nasa.gov/aam As we think about how we can safely introduce these new operations, fundamental questions about how the structure of Safety Management Systems can be applied to AAM, and how that structure can be used to help us overcome the necessary technical and societal obstacles arise. Two of these questions are: • How do we tailor the requirements and desired level of monitoring and assessment to achieve safety given the breadth of possible operations and the associated risk of those operations? • How do we aid innovation by rapidly evaluating the safety of novel operations without losing associated rigor? We assume that a Safety Management System that enables these future systems will incorporate knowledge of the acceptable level of risk, and will utilize data science to automate the core monitor, assess and mitigate functions that will allow us to respond to risks and hazards in time to prevent safety incidents. In 2018, the National Academies proposed an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that would advance these goals. (https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24962/in-time-aviation-safety-management-challenges-and-research-for-an) The National Academies made a clear distinction between in-time systems, in which hazards could be identified and risks mitigated in time to prevent incidents, and real-time systems, since many hazards and risks do not need real-time data and analysis to detect and mitigate.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗

NASA NTRS2019

Method for Tracking and Communicating Aggregate Risk Through the Use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) Tools

Large, complex projects can identify a significant number and variety of risks, throughout the project life cycle. These risks are analyzed, mitigated, closed or accepted as independent uncertainties. Once closed or accepted, it is easy for projects to lose awareness of their impact. In reality, each of these risks contributes some amount to the overall risk posture of the project. The ability to track and effectively communicate this aggregate risk has represented a challenge to project management. There have been previous attempts to create a schema to communicate the aggregate effect of risks, without notable success. Most of these attempts have centered on some additive metric derived from the scoring of likelihood and consequence values. This, in and of itself, is a logical approach, but all too often the scores were then aggregated to a level where all context was lost. One weakness has been a lack of attempt to create linkages or logical groups of the risks upon which useful aggregation could then occur. The overall move to model-based (systems) engineering (MBSE) has opened up a vast frontier of opportunities to better integrate all project data. MBSE provides an underlying layer that links data items to each other. Objectives link to requirements, which then link to functions, functions to physical architecture items, and so on, as far down as projects want to model. While it started with a focus on modeling requirements based on things like use cases, efforts are now underway to integrate safety and mission assurance (S&MA) information and analyses, such as risks. This effort, called Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA), is yielding models that are more useful and are a more accurate representations of the systems. MBSE models, with this ability to link related items, provide a new means of tracking and communicating aggregate risks. In the proposed method, risks are added into the models as distinct items, having attributes that communicate a scoring derived from the likelihood and consequence values as charted on the standard NASA 5x5 risk matrix. Like earlier efforts, each box in the 5x5 has an associated scoring, which may include both a current score and potential post-mitigation/control score. The risk items are then linked to elements of the model, such as system objectives/goals, requirements, functions, or physical architecture items, with "Risk to" relationships. These risks will then be communicated by use of reports generated from the model, detailing all risks and/or hazards linked to model elements. These reports can include aggregate impacts, including a current scoring and potential future state scoring based on the planned mitigations and/or controls. These reports will show all risks, open, accepted, and closed, linked to project objectives or requirements. When run as part of an upcoming risk acceptance discussion, these reports will serve to remind the team of all previous risks that relate to the effected portion of the system. When included as part of periodic program or project reviews, risk reviews, and safety reviews, this method can improve the overall understanding of the system's true risk posture. This proposed method takes full advantage of the advances that modern modeling techniques provide, with a minimal investment of additional time. Utilizing the model environment also enables a near constant access to current state of aggregate risks.

model based mission assurance↗

NASA NTRS2005

Vehicle Assembly Building Fire Mishap Investigation Report. Volume I of V

On January 13, 2005, at approximately 1355, smoke was noticed on the 4th floor of D Tower in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Subsequently, a 911 call was made, a fire alarm pull station was activated, and the VAB was evacuated. The source of the smoke was determined to be a fire on the Low Bay M/N section roof near the Launch Control Center (LCC) Crossover. Due to the high visibility of the mishap, the KSC Center Director appointed a Mishap Investigation Board. Damage to government property was limited to the roof and a small number of ceiling tiles that were damaged by the fire fighters during the response. At the time of the mishap, there were hazardous commodities in the VAB including Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) with open grain due to Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) igniter inspections. The Board agrees with the SGS Fire Services' theory that large amounts of smoke concentrated in the VAB D Tower and moved downward into the cable tunnel. The Board determined the proximate cause of this incident to be torching. HRI was installing a torch applied roof membrane which resulted in the ignition of combustible materials under the membrane near a wooden roof expansion joint. The torch applied roofing method is a universally accepted safe industry practice when applied to non-combustible surfaces. The combination of an open flame torch and combustible materiaLs presents an increased level of risk even with skilled applicators. The addition of high winds to this combination results in a risk the Board thinks can not be adequately mitigated. An appropriate risk assessment and analysis must be performed on the proposed roofing method to be used on high visibility facilities which represent unique national assets even when using common industry practices for repair and modification. The Board identified three root causes which contributed to or created the proximate cause and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the mishap: 1. Combustible materials in existing roof system 2. Wind speed and direction 3. Inadequate fire watch technique. Two contributing factors were identified which may have contributed to the occurrence but, if eliminated or modified, would not have prevented the occurrence: 1. HRI rushed to dry in and seal the roof on January 13 because heavy rain was predicted for the next day 2. No guidance on torching in windy conditions A total of 17 significant observations were noted during this investigation, which could lead to another mishap, or increase the severity of a mishap, but were not contributing factors in this mishap.

Kight, Ira↗

NASA NTRS2000

The Critical Path Roadmap Project: Biomedical Risk Reduction for Extended Spaceflight

Human exploration of space requires an understanding of the risks to which crews will be exposed during such missions, and the mitigation of those risks to the fullest extent practical. This becomes a greater imperative as we prepare for interplanetary expeditions involving long periods in weightlessness in transit to and then from the destination (a planet, such as Mars, or perhaps a point in space, such as the Lagrangian point L2), and exposure to the unique environment of the destination itself. We need to know, more definitively, what the risks are to human health, safety, and performance, and how to prevent or counteract them throughout all phases of a long duration mission. The Johnson Space Center's Space and Life Sciences Directorate and the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) have implemented an effort to identify the most critical risks confronting humans on such mission and the types of research and technology efforts required to mitigate and otherwise reduce the probability and severity of those risks. This paper describes the "Critical Path Roadmap Project" to define, assess and prioritize the risks and present the results of the assessment with an emphasis on the research and technology priorities to meet the challenge of long duration human spaceflight mission.

Charles, John B.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Space Radiation Cancer Risk Projections for Exploration Missions: Uncertainty Reduction and Mitigation

In this paper we discuss expected lifetime excess cancer risks for astronauts returning from exploration class missions. For the first time we make a quantitative assessment of uncertainties in cancer risk projections for space radiation exposures. Late effects from the high charge and energy (HZE) ions present in the galactic cosmic rays including cancer and the poorly understood risks to the central nervous system constitute the major risks. Methods used to project risk in low Earth orbit are seen as highly uncertain for projecting risks on exploration missions because of the limited radiobiology data available for estimating HZE ion risks. Cancer risk projections are described as a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. Monte-Carlo sampling from subjective error distributions represents the lack of knowledge in each factor to quantify risk projection overall uncertainty. Cancer risk analysis is applied to several exploration mission scenarios. At solar minimum, the number of days in space where career risk of less than the limiting 3% excess cancer mortality can be assured at a 95% confidence level is found to be only of the order of 100 days.

Cucinotta, Francis↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management: Forge Institute Presentation

In this talk, INL will discuss how to develop a cyber supply chain risk management program, to include assessment of vendor risk and applying appropriate mitigations. INL will discuss key risk factors and the challenges of securing supply chain in complex and dynamic vendor environments. Finally, INL will share example language that can be adopted in RFPs and procurement contracts to promote supply chain security.

battery energy storage system↗

NASA NTRS2000

End-To-End Risk Assesment: From Genes and Protein to Acceptable Radiation Risks for Mars Exploration

The human exploration of Mars will impose unavoidable health risks from galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and possibly solar particle events (SPE). It is the goal of NASA's Space Radiation Health Program to develop the capability to predict health risks with significant accuracy to ensure that risks are well below acceptable levels and to allow for mitigation approaches to be effective at reasonable costs. End-to-End risk assessment is the approach being followed to understand proton and heavy ion damage at the molecular, cellular, and tissue levels in order to predict the probability of the major health risk including cancer, neurological disorders, hereditary effects, cataracts, and acute radiation sickness and to develop countermeasures for mitigating risks.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Architecture and Information Requirements to Assess and Predict Flight Safety Risks During Highly Autonomous Urban Flight Operations

As aviation adopts new and increasingly complex operational paradigms, vehicle types, and technologies to broaden airspace capability and efficiency, maintaining a safe system will require recognition and timely mitigation of new safety issues as they emerge and before significant consequences occur. A shift toward a more predictive risk mitigation capability becomes critical to meet this challenge. In-time safety assurance comprises monitoring, assessment, and mitigation functions that proactively reduce risk in complex operational environments where the interplay of hazards may not be known (and therefore not accounted for) during design. These functions can also help to understand and predict emergent effects caused by the increased use of automation or autonomous functions that may exhibit unexpected non-deterministic behaviors. The envisioned monitoring and assessment functions can look for precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs) by applying model-based and data-driven methods. Outputs would then drive downstream mitigation(s) if needed to reduce risk. These mitigations may be accomplished using traditional design revision processes or via operational (and sometimes automated) mechanisms. The latter refers to the ‘in-time’ aspect of the system concept. This report comprises architecture and information requirements and considerations toward enabling such a capability within the domain of low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This domain may span, for example, public-use surveillance missions flown by small unmanned aircraft (e.g., infrastructure inspection, facility management, emergency response, law enforcement, and/or security) to transportation missions flown by larger aircraft that may carry passengers or deliver products. Caveat: Any stated requirements in this report should be considered initial requirements that are intended to drive research and development (R&D). These initial requirements are likely to evolve based on R&D findings, refinement of operational concepts, industry advances, and new industry or regulatory policies or standards related to safety assurance.

Young, Steven↗

NASA NTRS2002

Operations Analysis of the 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle

The Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program is developing a second-generation reusable launch vehicle. The program goals include lowering the risk of loss of crew to 1 in 10,000 and reducing annual operations cost to one third of the cost of the Space Shuttle. The SLI missions include NASA, military and commercial satellite launches and crew and cargo launches to the space station. The SLI operations analyses provide an assessment of the operational support and infrastructure needed to operate candidate system architectures. Measures of the operability are estimated (i.e. system dependability, responsiveness, and efficiency). Operations analysis is used to determine the impact of specific technologies on operations. A conceptual path to reducing annual operations costs by two thirds is based on key design characteristics, such as reusability, and improved processes lowering labor costs. New operations risks can be expected to emerge. They can be mitigated with effective risk management with careful identification, assignment, tracking, and closure. SLI design characteristics such as nearly full reusability, high reliability, advanced automation, and lowered maintenance and servicing coupled with improved processes are contributors to operability and large operating cost reductions.

Noneman, Steven R.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRS2019

Mitigation Strategies for Space Radiation Health Risks

Astronauts embarking on missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) will be exposed to a radiation field that may increase the risks of developing cancer, cardiovascular diseases, central nervous system disorders, and immune decrements. Operational parameters will be the primary determinants of crew radiation exposure. NASA uses integrated design tools and risk models to optimize these parameters to minimize radiation exposure. NASA is also considering medical countermeasures (MCMs) to reduce radiation-associated health risks. MCMs for potential use in space-based applications can be developed from a variety of sources, including: a) population-based chemoprevention trials against targeted diseases b) drug development efforts focused on treating acute effects from accidental radiation exposures c) drug development to mitigate side effects of radiotherapy d) mechanistic studies of distinct damage caused by high charge (Z) and energy (HZE) radiation. Use of agents developed for other applications, or repurposed, is advantageous because long-term safety in humans is already established.

Huff, Janice L.↗

DOE OSTI2020

NASA’s first ground-based Galactic Cosmic Ray Simulator: Enabling a new era in space radiobiology research

With exciting new NASA plans for a sustainable return to the moon, astronauts will once again leave Earth’s protective magnetosphere only to endure higher levels of radiation from galactic cosmic radiation (GCR) and the possibility of a large solar particle event (SPE). Gateway, lunar landers, and surface habitats will be designed to protect crew against SPEs with vehicle optimization, storm shelter concepts, and/or active dosimetry; however, the ever penetrating GCR will continue to pose the most significant health risks especially as lunar missions increase in duration and as NASA sets its aspirations on Mars. The primary risks of concern include carcinogenesis, central nervous system (CNS) effects resulting in potential in-mission cognitive or behavioral impairment and/or late neurological disorders, degenerative tissue effects including circulatory and heart disease, as well as potential immune system decrements impacting multiple aspects of crew health. Characterization and mitigation of these risks requires a significant reduction in the large biological uncertainties of chronic (low-dose rate) heavy-ion exposures and the validation of countermeasures in a relevant space environment. Historically, most research on understanding space radiation-induced health risks has been performed using acute exposures of monoenergetic single-ion beams. However, the space radiation environment consists of a wide variety of ion species over a broad energy range. Using the fast beam switching and controls systems technology recently developed at the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) at Brookhaven National Laboratory, a new era in radiobiological research is possible. NASA has developed the “GCR Simulator” to generate a spectrum of ion beams that approximates the primary and secondary GCR field experienced at human organ locations within a deep-space vehicle. The majority of the dose is delivered from protons (approximately 65%–75%) and helium ions (approximately 10%–20%) with heavier ions (Z ≥ 3) contributing the remainder. The GCR simulator exposes state-of-the art cellular and animal model systems to 33 sequential beams including 4 proton energies plus degrader, 4 helium energies plus degrader, and the 5 heavy ions of C, O, Si, Ti, and Fe. A polyethylene degrader system is used with the 100 MeV/n H and He beams to provide a nearly continuous distribution of low-energy particles. A 500 mGy exposure, delivering doses from each of the 33 beams, requires approximately 75 minutes. To more closely simulate the low-dose rates found in space, sequential field exposures can be divided into daily fractions over 2 to 6 weeks, with individual beam fractions as low as 0.1 to 0.2 mGy. In the large beam configuration (60 × 60 cm 2 ), 54 special housing cages can accommodate 2 to 3 mice each for an approximately 75 min duration or 15 individually housed rats. On June 15, 2018, the NSRL made a significant achievement by completing the first operational run using the new GCR simulator. This paper discusses NASA’s innovative technology solution for a ground-based GCR simulator at the NSRL to accelerate our understanding and mitigation of health risks faced by astronauts. Ultimately, the GCR simulator will require validation across multiple radiogenic risks, endpoints, doses, and dose rates.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2013

An Evidence Base for Human Spaceflight Risks in Wikipedia

NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) is focused on understanding and mitigating thirty two risks to crew health and performance in exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit. The HRP has developed an evidence report for each of the risks. Most evidence reports are a brief review article describing the evidence related to a specified risk, written at a level appropriate for the scientifically educated, non‐specialist reader. Each evidence report captured the current state of knowledge from both research and operations. Two limitations of the evidence reports have become apparent: 1) they are updated infrequently and 2) they do not take full advantage of the expertise available in other space agencies and in related fields of terrestrial research. Therefore, the HRP is experimenting with the use of Wikipedia articles as a repository for evidence. Wikipedia's accessibility to the international space flight community and researchers in related terrestrial fields creates the opportunity to generate a more timely and comprehensive evidence base. Initial Wikipedia articles were populated for seven risks using a subset of the information in the HRP‐approved evidence reports: Fatigue and Sleep Loss, Treating An Ill or Injured Crew Member, Radiation Carcinogenesis, Visual Impairment and Intracranial Pressure, Renal Stone Formation, Team Cohesion, and Intervertebral Disc Damage. Since the initial articles were created, there have been additions to these Wikipedia articles, including content from sources outside the HRP, and editorial changes to the pages. We will report on the nature of the contributions made after the initial articles were created, the comprehensiveness of the resulting Wikipedia articles, and the effort required to maintain quality control of the content. The Wikipedia approach will also be compared to wiki efforts that exert more traditional editorial control of content prior to posting.

Kundrot, Craig↗

DOE OSTI2024

Mitigation of safety and environmental challenges posed by refrigerants

The abatement of safety and environmental burden associated with low and ultra-low Global Warming Potential (GWP) refrigerants is a critical undertaking. As the industry shifts towards more environmentally friendly alternatives, mitigating the potential risks and ensuring safety standards becomes paramount. The adoption of mildly and highly flammable refrigerants contributes significantly to minimizing the greenhouse gas impact on the environment, aligning with global climate and sustainability goals. However, it is essential to address safety concerns and potential environmental implications associated with the end use of these refrigerants. A method to mitigate the safety risk in a flammable refrigerant based heating, ventilation, air-conditioning, and refrigeration (HVACR) system is the primary focus of this paper. Advent of A2L and A3 refrigerants as replacements to high GWP refrigerants requires careful handling of leak episodes to lower or eliminate the risk associated with creating flammable mixtures capable of fire/explosion hazard. Solid materials tailored to target the molecule of interest (i.e., refrigerant.) by engineering the microporous structure as well as chemically functionalizing the surface to attract and hold on to the chemical compound being removed from the gas stream was realized. Quantitative analysis reveals the adsorbent's effectiveness in reducing leak potential in the range of 40 %–100 % for various refrigerants. Strategic placement and active leak management with negative pressure offer promising avenues for capturing leaked refrigerants, enhancing overall safety.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Mitigation of Safety and Environmental Challenges Posed by Low and Ultra-low GWP Refrigerants

The abatement of safety and environmental burden associated with low and ultra-low Global Warming Potential (GWP) refrigerants is a critical undertaking. As the industry shifts towards more environmentally friendly alternatives, mitigating the potential risks and ensuring safety standards becomes paramount. The adoption of low GWP and ultra-low GWP refrigerants contributes significantly to minimizing the greenhouse gas impact on the environment, aligning with global climate and sustainability goals. However, it is essential to address safety concerns and potential environmental implications associated with the end use of these refrigerants.A method to mitigate the safety risk in a flammable refrigerant based HVACR system is the primary focus of this paper. Advent of A2L and A3 refrigerants as replacements to high GWP refrigerants requires careful handling of leak episodes to lower or eliminate the risk associated with creating flammable mixtures capable of fire/explosion hazard. Solid materials tailored to target the molecule of interest (i.e., refrigerant.) by engineering the microporous structure as well as chemically functionalizing the surface to attract and hold on to the chemical compound being removed from the gas stream was realized. Additionally, a chromatic transformation technique is investigated for rapid on-site analysis of refrigerant blends. Preliminary results demonstrating the feasibility of both of these methods for successful deployment of low-GWP refrigerants are presented.

Cheekatamarla, Praveen↗

NASA NTRS2000

Critical Path Web Site

Approximately three years ago, the Agency's lead center for the human elements of spaceflight (the Johnson Space Center), along with the National Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) (which has the lead role in developing countermeasures) initiated an activity to identify the most critical risks confronting extended human spaceflight. Two salient factors influenced this activity: first, what information is needed to enable a "go/no go" decision to embark on extended human spaceflight missions; and second, what knowledge and capabilities are needed to address known and potential health, safety and performance risks associated with such missions. A unique approach was used to first define and assess those risks, and then to prioritize them. This activity was called the Critical Path Roadmap (CPR) and it represents an opportunity to develop and implement a focused and evolving program of research and technology designed from a "risk reduction" perspective to prevent or minimize the risks to humans exposed to the space environment. The Critical Path Roadmap provides the foundation needed to ensure that human spaceflight, now and in the future, is as safe, productive and healthy as possible (within the constraints imposed on any particular mission) regardless of mission duration or destination. As a tool, the Critical Path Roadmap enables the decisionmaker to select from among the demonstrated or potential risks those that are to be mitigated, and the completeness of that mitigation. The primary audience for the CPR Web Site is the members of the scientific community who are interested in the research and technology efforts required for ensuring safe and productive human spaceflight. They may already be informed about the various space life sciences research programs or they may be newcomers. Providing the CPR content to potential investigators increases the probability of their delivering effective risk mitigations. Others who will use the CPR Web Site and its content include program managers and administrators who track the program and are involved in decisions regarding resource allocation and program evaluation.

Robinson, Judith L.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Critical Path Web Site

Approximately three years ago, the Agency's lead center for the human elements of spaceflight (the Johnson Space Center), along with the National Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) (which has the lead role in developing countermeasures) initiated an activity to identify the most critical risks confronting extended human spaceflight. Two salient factors influenced this activity: first, what information is needed to enable a "go/no go" decision to embark on extended human spaceflight missions; and second, what knowledge and capabilities are needed to address known and potential health, safety and performance risks associated with such missions. A unique approach was used to first define and assess those risks, and then to prioritize them. This activity was called the Critical Path Roadmap (CPR) and it represents an opportunity to develop and implement a focused and evolving program of research and technology designed from a "risk reduction" perspective to prevent or minimize the risks to humans exposed to the space environment. The Critical Path Roadmap provides the foundation needed to ensure that human spaceflight, now and in the future, is as safe, productive and healthy as possible (within the constraints imposed on any particular mission) regardless of mission duration or destination. As a tool, the Critical Path Roadmap enables the decision maker to select from among the demonstrated or potential risks those that are to be mitigated, and the completeness of that mitigation. The primary audience for the CPR Web Site is the members of the scientific community who are interested in the research and technology efforts required for ensuring safe and productive human spaceflight. They may already be informed about the various space life sciences research programs or they may be newcomers. Providing the CPR content to potential investigators increases the probability of their delivering effective risk mitigations. Others who will use the CPR Web Site and its content include program managers and administrators who track the program and are involved in decisions regarding resource allocation and program evaluation.

Robinson, Judith L.↗