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At least 1,297 records · Page 72

Safety Case Considerations for Deep Borehole Disposal of Cs/Sr Capsules - 16294

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) performed an assessment of disposal options that recommended the consideration of deep borehole disposal of smaller DOE-managed waste forms, such as cesium (Cs) and strontium (Sr) capsules. To assess the feasibility of the deep borehole disposal concept for Cs/Sr capsules, safety case considerations are identified and examined. A safety case includes quantitative (e.g., safety assessments) and qualitative information related to both pre-closure (operational) and post-closure safety. For deep borehole disposal of Cs/Sr capsules, pre-closure safety considers potential hazards associated with waste package surface handling and downhole emplacement activities; post-closure safety considers scenarios for long-term radionuclide transport to the biosphere. A preliminary list of qualitative indicators of pre-closure and post-closure safety is presented. Research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) activities that can provide a quantitative basis for these indicators are discussed. In particular, DOE-NE has initiated a Deep Borehole Field Test, using surrogate test packages without radioactive waste, to further investigate various aspects of site characterization, deep drilling, and waste package handling and emplacement that would be needed for a full-scale disposal facility for Cs/Sr capsules or other DOE-managed waste forms. Finally, preliminary results from pre-closure hazard analyses and post-closure performance assessment (PA) calculations are presented as examples of supporting information for the quantitative safety case considerations. These preliminary results suggest that a favorable safety case can be developed for deep borehole disposal of Cs/Sr capsules. (authors)

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Percolation in Salt Rocks - 18652

We present laboratory investigations of fluid percolation in salt rocks, performed on drilled core samples, which show that natural rock salt does not become permeable at high pressures and temperatures, as had been claimed in the literature. Rather, we confirm the existence of a percolation threshold: Fluid migration is only possible when the fluid pressure equals or exceeds the lowest confining stress. The lab tests corroborate in-situ-determinations of the percolation threshold in salt formations: The threshold is given by the minimal stress in the rock mass (minimal stress criterion), and fluid pressure-driven percolation starts once it is exceeded. The hypothesis that the percolation threshold vanishes at high pressure and temperature is thus refuted by experiments on natural rock salt. These experimental tests, performed in the framework of the KOSINA project, are an important prerequisite for the proof of integrity of saliferous barriers in the disposal of radioactive waste in salt rocks. (authors)

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Path to Subsurface Closure: When Real and Predicted Data Don't Match, Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) - 19560

The Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, was the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968, which resulted in residual contamination at and near the detonation depth of 975 meters (3200 feet). The environmental corrective action strategy for the site was conducted in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The corrective action strategy initiated in 1999 included developing a conceptual site model, preparing a numerical flow and transport model, calculating contaminant boundaries, negotiating compliance boundaries with NDEP, performing model validation, and monitoring groundwater. This strategy was executed through the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan phase, when it was determined that the flow and transport model could not be validated because it failed to adequately predict groundwater elevations in the monitoring/validation (MV) wells (MV-1, MV-2, and MV-3) drilled subsequent to the modeling effort. This led to a change in the corrective action strategy that is now designed to validate the compliance boundary through monitoring and institutional controls, rather than relying predominantly on a numerical flow and transport model. This new approach included enhancements to the monitoring well network and additional monitoring to confirm that data were sufficient to proceed to closure. The corrective action activities were completed in 2015, and the Closure Report, which established the long-term postclosure monitoring program, was approved in 2016. The postclosure monitoring program is designed to (1) assess the effectiveness of the compliance boundary by monitoring for the radionuclides of interest and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of monitoring locations within the groundwater flow system by monitoring water elevations to ensure that monitoring wells are located along the potential migration pathways. (authors)

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Radiation Simulation using Wi-Fi Signal Strength and Frequency

For routine radiological operations, lost radioactive sources, decommissioning and cleanup of nuclear facilities, and radiological terrorist events such as Radioactive Dispersive Devices (RDDs) or Radiological Exposure Devices (REDs), individuals are tasked with accurately locating both point and distributed sources of radiation. Radiation workers must often practice these tasks, whether part of initial training or periodically as part of formal or informal exercises or drills. In such circumstances, it is desirable to have an accurate recreation of a radioactive source, including a method of detecting it, which does not include dangerous amounts of radiation. The goal of this research was to develop a radiation simulation technology that uses IEEE 802.11x W-LAN protocol, i.e. Wi-Fi sources and detectors for these, as an inexpensive, precise and accurate method of replicating sources of gamma radiation. For this work, existing 802.11x sources were used. Software was developed for use with an Android smartphone to detect the presence of these sources. The measurements followed the expected behavior as a function of distance from the sources, mimicking that of gamma radiation, thus demonstrating the fundamental principle of operation. The ultimate system will be used in an outreach program to interest students in the radiation protection field.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Panel Session 24B: Records, Knowledge, and Memory for Radioactive Waste Repositories: Generational Equity Focus

This panel focused on the latest thoughts, ideas, and methodologies being explored throughout the world on how to communicate with future generations regarding nuclear waste disposal. Scientists determined many years ago that geological disposal in a repository was the preferred solution for nuclear waste disposal given the longevity concerns of the waste(s). Future generations must be informed through records, memory keeping and permanent markers to ensure they are aware of, and knowledgeable of, the dangers associated with nuclear waste isolated from the biosphere. Panelists with presentations: You Want to Drill Where? Human Intrusion Messaging Considerations (Thomas Peake, Jonathan Major); Ethical Reflections on the Basic Reasons for RK and M Measures (Carl-Reinhold Brakenhielm); NEA Activities on Information, Data and Knowledge Management (Rebecca Tadesse); Records, Knowledge and Memory (RK and M) Across Generations: Recent Activities and Progress in Sweden (Claudio Pescatore)

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Key Technical Issues for Greater-Than-Class-C (GTCC) Waste Disposal - 20164

Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) waste is low-level waste (LLW) that exceeds the Class C concentrations tabulated in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 61. Disposal of GTCC waste in the near surface (i.e. upper 30 m of the earth's surface) is prohibited in the United States. Though GTCC waste disposal is generally prohibited, the Commission can approve disposal according to 10 CFR 61.55(a)(2)(iv) on a case-by-case basis. The waste classification tables, developed in the early 1980's, were based on model projections of dose to an inadvertent intruder in agricultural, construction, and discovery exposure scenarios. The assumptions and parameters used were documented in a series of public reports. Though different disposal facility designs and site conditions were considered, the waste classification tables were based on a disposal facility design located in a specific environment. The tables were based on shallow (i.e., top few meters) trench facility designs and did not consider deeper facilities. To determine the suitability of GTCC waste disposal in the near-surface, site-specific analyses must account for differences between GTCC waste and Class A, B, and C LLW (hereafter, traditional LLW). GTCC waste can have concentrations of radionuclides that are much higher than traditional LLW. Because of these higher concentrations, processes that are typically not significant for traditional LLW may be significant with respect to disposal of GTCC waste. These processes include, but are not limited to, heat generation, criticality, and radiolysis. The form of the waste as well as the barriers to release of the waste (e.g. waste package) could be substantially different than they are for traditional LLW. These barriers need to be considered when assessing the impacts of accidents during receipt and placement and in evaluating long-term performance. Some GTCC radioactivity is either embedded in stainless steel or contained in stainless steel barriers. Stainless steel can have very low corrosion rates under a variety of environmental conditions. Finally, and possibly most importantly, GTCC waste would likely need to be disposed deeper than traditional LLW to reduce the probability of disturbance. The waste classification table values of traditional LLW are based on an inadvertent intruder excavating into the waste and bringing some of the material to the land surface. If waste is deeper than approximately 5 m, the excavation scenario becomes very unlikely. Therefore, other intruder scenarios, such as drilling exposure scenarios, need to be evaluated. This paper summarizes key technical issues for the disposal of GTCC waste. Our previous study shows that certain GTCC waste may be suitable for near surface disposal whereas others may not. This study may support ongoing technical analyses assessing potential disposal of GTCC in a near surface disposal facility. (authors)

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Considerations for Regulation and Practical Implementation of Analyses of Inadvertent Human Intrusion - 20169

Recommendations from the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identify the need to consider potential inadvertent human intrusion into a near-surface radioactive waste disposal facility when developing limits for radionuclide concentrations that can be disposed. The recommendations also provide perspective on expectations for performance criteria and general assumptions for such analyses. Inadvertent human intrusion analyses are conducted to address the potential failure of institutional controls and loss of memory of a disposal facility. The analyses consider potential consequences of human actions that result in unknowingly bringing waste to the surface. Inadvertent human intrusion scenarios consider potential impacts to someone involved in an activity that actually disturbs the waste (e.g., drilling or excavation of a basement) or that exposes the person to emanations from the waste (e.g., radioactive gases) and also for the case where there may be longer term exposures to waste that has been brought to the surface. In practice, inadvertent human intrusion analyses have proven to be a critical consideration for the development of waste classification systems and for the determination of disposal requirements and limitations on wastes that can be disposed at shallow depths. The IAEA implemented a project on Human Intrusion in the context of Disposal of Radioactive waste (HIDRA) to further explore the regulatory expectations and practical implementation of analyses of potential inadvertent human intrusion. The paper begins with a discussion of international recommendations related to consideration of inadvertent human intrusion and then summarizes examples of some topical considerations related to addressing inadvertent human intrusion that are being discussed as part of the second phase of the HIDRA project. The topical considerations are planned to be addressed in a formal IAEA publication. All information in this paper simply reflects on-going project discussions and no formal recommendations are implied for these topical considerations at this time. (authors)

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An Improved Model For Determining Salinity Recharge Time for Deep Borehole Disposal - 20405

In a previous publication (K. P. Travis, D. Burley and F. G. F. Gibb, WM2017 Conference, Phoenix Arizona paper no. 17480) we introduced a numerical model to estimate the time it would take for a pressure perturbation to subside following its creation from the construction of a deep geological borehole in water-saturated rock. The model was based on the notion of a point source of momentum - a solution of the time-dependent pressure-diffusion equation. Using the model, we estimated that it would take on the order of 10 k years for physical equilibrium to become re-established following the sinking of a 5 km borehole in granite. The significance of such a model is that it places an upper bound on the lifetime required of a borehole sealing system - a necessary input to a borehole post-closure safety case assessment. No engineered sealing system has ever been devised which is capable of retaining its sealing properties for 10 half-lives of long-lived radioisotopes in spent fuel or high-level waste. One of the key advantages of disposing of nuclear waste via Deep Borehole Disposal (DBD) is the natural sealing provided by density stratified groundwater. Upon sinking of a borehole, and subsequent filling with fresh water, brine or drilling mud, this natural barrier may be temporarily damaged. Over time, fresh brine from the far-field will flow towards or away from the hole (driven by a pressure gradient) and will eventually re-establish the original salinity gradient. It follows that the engineered seals need last only as long as the time required for this salinity gradient to reset itself. One of the limitations of our previous model was the use of a static boundary condition on the borehole wall. The model used a boundary pressure which varied quadratically with depth (arising from differences between the pressure of a column of fresh water in the borehole and that of a column of brine in the host rock). However as brine replaces fresh water in the borehole (driven by a pressure gradient), the boundary function must change with time. We now introduce an improved model which takes this time dependent boundary condition into account. The model also takes into account the time taken for a mixture of brine and fresh water to re-establish chemical equilibrium through the process of diffusion. The paper contains the mathematical details of our new iterative model as well as results showing the time taken to reach steady state, and concentration profiles for the components of the brine-filled borehole as a function of time together with a discussion on the implications of the results for developing a post-closure safety assessment for DBD. (authors)

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Investigation of Non-Nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform Sites - 20447

The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)

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Deep Isolation-Development of the Safety Case for Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in Horizontal Boreholes - 20028

Deep Isolation has developed a safe, secure, and permanent geological disposal method for high-level waste, including spent nuclear fuel as well as sealed sources and other highly radioactive materials. The method leverages well established directional drilling technology to create horizontal repositories deep underground. The combination of great depth (1-3 km) and the ability to precisely position repositories in a horizontal orientation provides access to geologic strata that are inaccessible for typical mined and deep vertical borehole repositories. A number of potential direct and indirect safety benefits accrue including:1) greater depth below regional freshwater aquifers; 2) increased flexibility and more geologic options for siting; 3) access to deep formations with persistent and sustained reducing conditions. In addition there are a number of safety elements related specifically to the horizontal repository geometry including: 1) passive direction of thermally driven fluid and radionuclide movement away from the vertical access hole and toward the 'dead end' portion of the repository; 2) mitigation of seismic hazards by orienting repositories parallel to local and regional fault structures. In this paper we explore and discuss some of the key technologic, geologic and hydrologic elements that support the deep horizontal borehole safety case. The stalemate seen across the globe on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste can be broken. Deep Isolation offers a novel option for safe, secure, and permanent deep geological disposal of nuclear waste that can be developed as centralized repositories or adapted to smaller regional or site-specific repositories located near waste sources. (authors)

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Integrating Electrical Resistivity Tomography with Vadose Zone Characterization - 20246

The environmental management mission at the U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site includes addressing subsurface contaminants that are present in the vadose zone because of historical waste discharges. Characterization is needed to support evaluation of whether contaminants at specific disposal sites will migrate to and contaminate the groundwater in the future. Drilling of boreholes and analysis of retrieved sediment samples is a standard approach to evaluating contaminant distribution in the vadose zone for the types of inorganic and radionuclide contaminants at the Hanford Site. However, borehole sampling has limitations for understanding the volumetric distribution of contaminants. The Hanford Site is now applying electrical resistivity tomography to characterize the path and volumetric extent of contaminant migration in the vadose zone. This information aids selection of appropriate locations for obtaining borehole samples and provides three-dimensional contaminant distribution information for incorporation into conceptual site models and to help configure fate and transport models. (authors)

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Achieving the End State for the Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Units at the Nevada National Security Site - 20355

Underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) ended in 1992. To address the impact of radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing on the groundwater resources of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program created the Underground Test Area (UGTA) activity to characterize the radionuclides in groundwater, understand the nature and extent of radionuclide migration, and forecast the distribution of radionuclides in groundwater for 1,000 years. The UGTA activity is regulated by the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), an agreement negotiated between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). DOE is close to achieving the end state (closure in place with monitoring and institutional control) for three of the five UGTA corrective action units (CAUs) on the NNSS. A number of challenges remain to achieve the end state of the other two CAUs, both located on Pahute Mesa. Pahute Mesa was the location of 82 underground nuclear tests, less than 10% of the total number of tests on the NNSS. Yet, Pahute Mesa contains slightly more than 60% of the total radionuclides (in curies). Based on groundwater sampling in monitoring wells, two radionuclide plumes have migrated several kilometers (km) in groundwater from selected test cavities and have crossed the boundary of the NNSS (yet remain within the boundaries of Federally controlled land). The path to achieve the end state continues to evolve as more data are collected and a better understanding of radionuclide migration in groundwater is developed. DOE has invested in drilling and sampling more than 50 characterization and monitoring groundwater wells over the past 25 years. The data indicate that the primary radionuclide of concern is tritium as it is about 89% of the total radionuclide inventory (in curies). As well, only tritium has been measured in groundwater outside of cavities at concentrations exceeding the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) standard. For one of the tritium plumes that has migrated across the NNSS boundary, the average rate of migration has been measured as about 45 meters (m) per year with the rate of migration at the leading edge of the plume of about 85 meters per year. At that rate of migration, the tritium plume will decay to safe levels and not reach the publicly accessible environment at concentrations above the SDWA standard. Other radionuclides, at concentrations below the SDWA standards, will be monitored to ensure they remain at safe levels. Consequently, the end state path forward for Pahute Mesa has evolved to take full advantage of the data from the monitoring network to constrain uncertainty in model forecasts and to reduce reliance on probabilistic simulations. The focus of the end state approach relies on developing a monitoring well network that is protective of human health by increasing confidence that no radionuclide plume in the groundwater will migrate undetected to the accessible environment, located about 22 km from the nearest up-gradient underground nuclear test. Using the measured data to remove uncertainty, the evaluation of radionuclide migration from Pahute Mesa is directed toward meeting the goals of the end state. (authors)

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Robust Method to Identify Groundwater Affected By Redox Conditions at Los Alamos National Laboratory Legacy Cleanup Site - 20497

To facilitate the mission of the Department of Energy's (DoE's) Environmental Management Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), a significant number of groundwater monitoring wells with depths ranging from 152-396 meter were completed for characterization and monitoring. Groundwater at Los Alamos tends to be oxygen saturated with very low concentrations of organic matter. Drilling fluids can introduce residual carbon causing an increase in microbial activity and local reducing conditions around the well, potentially impacting representativeness of groundwater data quality for redox sensitive constituents. We assert that the redox state of the wells can robustly be identified by aqueous solution concentrations of iron and manganese. An automated review process has been built into a computer-based data management system enabling an efficient screening process for identifying reducing conditions that are not caught using standard data-validation protocol, and ensures that important data quality issues are thoroughly identified and addressed in an efficient and timely manner. (authors)

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Rapid onset of mafic magmatism facilitated by volcanic edifice collapse

Volcanic edifice collapses generate some of Earth's largest landslides. How such unloading affects the magma storage systems is important for both hazard assessment and for determining long-term controls on volcano growth and decay. Here we present a detailed stratigraphic and petrological analyses of volcanic landslide and eruption deposits offshore Montserrat, in a subduction zone setting, sampled during Integrated Ocean Drilling Program Expedition 340. A large (6-10km 3 ) collapse of the Soufrière Hills Volcano at ~130 ka was followed by explosive basaltic volcanism and the formation of a new basaltic volcanic center, the South Soufrière Hills, estimated to have initiated <100 years after collapse. This basaltic volcanism was a sharp departure from the andesitic volcanism that characterized Soufrière Hills' activity before the collapse. Mineral-melt thermobarometry demonstrates that the basaltic magma's transit through the crust was rapid and from midcrustal depths. We suggest that this rapid ascent was promoted by unloading following collapse.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Ascent velocity and dynamics of the Fiumicino mud eruption, Rome, Italy: MUD ASCENT VELOCITY

drilling triggered the eruption of mud near the international airport of Fiumicino (Rome, Italy). We monitored the evolution of the eruption and collected samples for laboratory characterization of physicochemical and rheological properties. Over time, muds show a progressive dilution with water; the rheology is typical of pseudoplastic fluids, with a small yield stress that decreases as mud density decreases. The eruption, while not naturally triggered, shares several similarities with natural mud volcanoes, including mud componentry, grain-size distribution, gas discharge, and mud rheology. We use the size of large ballistic fragments ejected from the vent along with mud rheology to compute a minimum ascent velocity of the mud. Computed values are consistent with in situ measurements of gas phase velocities, confirming that the stratigraphic record of mud eruptions can be quantitatively used to infer eruption history and ascent rates and hence to assess (or reassess) mud eruption hazards.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Organic matter maturation in the contact aureole of an igneous sill as a tracer of hydrothermal convection: A TRACER OF HYDROTHERMAL CONVECTION

The intrusion of magmas can start hydrothermal convection which in turn enhances the transport of heat and solutes. We use a heat convection model to interpret the temperature evolution documented by organic matter maturation, as recorded by the vitrinite reflectance Rr, in a contact aureole of a 15 m thick basaltic sill in the Deep Sea Drilling Project (DSDP) 41-368 hole near Cape Verde Rise, eastern Atlantic. Here we report on a pronounced asymmetry of variations of Rr with distance above and below the sill that cannot be explained by heat conduction alone. Neglecting the results of possible two-phase flow and thermal pressurization from the production of fluids, convection begins to enhance the observed asymmetry for permeabilities greater than about 1md, and the observations can be matched with permeabilities of at least several tens of millidarcies.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Mineralogy, provenance, and diagenesis of a potassic basaltic sandstone on Mars: CheMin X-ray diffraction of the Windjana sample (Kimberley area, Gale Crater)

The Windjana drill sample, a sandstone of the Dillinger member (Kimberley formation, Gale Crater, Mars), was analyzed by CheMin X-ray diffraction (XRD) in the MSL Curiosity rover. From Rietveld refinements of its XRD pattern, Windjana contains the following: sanidine (21% weight, ~Or 95 ); augite (20%); magnetite (12%); pigeonite; olivine; plagioclase; amorphous and smectitic material (~25%); and percent levels of others including ilmenite, fluorapatite, and bassanite. From mass balance on the Alpha Proton X-ray Spectrometer (APXS) chemical analysis, the amorphous material is Fe rich with nearly no other cations—like ferrihydrite. The Windjana sample shows little alteration and was likely cemented by its magnetite and ferrihydrite. From ChemCam Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectrometer (LIBS) chemical analyses, Windjana is representative of the Dillinger and Mount Remarkable members of the Kimberley formation. LIBS data suggest that the Kimberley sediments include at least three chemical components. The most K-rich targets have 5.6% K 2 O, ~1.8 times that of Windjana, implying a sediment component with >40% sanidine, e.g., a trachyte. A second component is rich in mafic minerals, with little feldspar (like a shergottite). A third component is richer in plagioclase and in Na 2 O, and is likely to be basaltic. The K-rich sediment component is consistent with APXS and ChemCam observations of K-rich rocks elsewhere in Gale Crater. The source of this sediment component was likely volcanic. Finally, the presence of sediment from many igneous sources, in concert with Curiosity's identifications of other igneous materials (e.g., mugearite), implies that the northern rim of Gale Crater exposes a diverse igneous complex, at least as diverse as that found in similar-age terranes on Earth.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Hierarchical Bayesian method for mapping biogeochemical hot spots using induced polarization imaging

In floodplain environments, a naturally reduced zone (NRZ) is considered to be a common biogeochemical hot spot, having distinct microbial and geochemical characteristics. Although important for understanding their role in mediating floodplain biogeochemical processes, mapping the subsurface distribution of NRZs over the dimensions of a floodplain is challenging, as conventional wellbore data are typically spatially limited and the distribution of NRZs is heterogeneous. In this work, we present an innovative methodology for the probabilistic mapping of NRZs within a three-dimensional (3-D) subsurface domain using induced polarization imaging, which is a noninvasive geophysical technique. Measurements consist of surface geophysical surveys and drilling-recovered sediments at the U.S. Department of Energy field site near Rifle, CO (USA). Inversion of surface time domain-induced polarization (TDIP) data yielded 3-D images of the complex electrical resistivity, in terms of magnitude and phase, which are associated with mineral precipitation and other lithological properties. By extracting the TDIP data values colocated with wellbore lithological logs, we found that the NRZs have a different distribution of resistivity and polarization from the other aquifer sediments. To estimate the spatial distribution of NRZs, we developed a Bayesian hierarchical model to integrate the geophysical and wellbore data. In addition, the resistivity images were used to estimate hydrostratigraphic interfaces under the floodplain. Validation results showed that the integration of electrical imaging and wellbore data using a Bayesian hierarchical model was capable of mapping spatially heterogeneous interfaces and NRZ distributions thereby providing a minimally invasive means to parameterize a hydrobiogeochemical model of the floodplain.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗