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Special Report on Review of "The Department of Energy's Quality Assurance Process for Prime Recipients' Reporting for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was established to jumpstart the U.S. economy, create or save millions of jobs, spur technological advances in health and science, and invest in the Nation's energy future. The Department of Energy (Department) will receive an unprecedented $37 billion in Recovery Act funding to support a variety of science, energy, and environmental initiatives. The majority of the funding received by the Department will be allocated to various recipients through grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, and other financial instruments. To ensure transparency and accountability, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires that recipients report on their receipt and use of Recovery Act funds on a quarterly basis to FederalReporting.gov. OMB also specifies that Federal agencies should develop and implement formal procedures to help ensure the quality of recipient reported information. Data that must be reported by recipients includes total funding received; funds expended or obligated; projects or activities for which funds were obligated or expended; and the number of jobs created and/or retained. OMB requires that Federal agencies perform limited data quality reviews of recipient data to identify material omissions and/or significant reporting errors and notify the recipients of the need to make appropriate and timely changes to erroneous reports. As part of a larger audit of recipient Recovery Act reporting and performance measurement and in support of a Government-wide review sponsored by the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, we completed an interim review to determine whether the Department had established a process to ensure the quality and accuracy of recipient reports. Our review revealed that the Department had developed a quality assurance process to facilitate the quarterly reviews of recipient data. The process included procedures to compare existing information from the Department's financial information systems with that reported to FederalReporting.gov by recipients. In addition, plans were in place to notify recipients of anomalies and/or errors exposed by the quality assurance process. While the Department has made a good deal of progress in this area, we did, however, identify several issues which could, if not addressed, impact the effectiveness of the quality assurance process.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

INFORMATION: Special Report on "Selected Department of Energy Program Efforts to Implement the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was enacted on February 17, 2009, to jumpstart the economy by creating or saving millions of jobs, spurring technological advances in health and science, and investing in the Nation's energy future. The Department of Energy received over $32.7 billion in Recovery Act funding for various science, energy, and environmental programs and initiatives. As of November 2009, the Department had obligated $18.3 billion of the Recovery Act funding, but only $1.4 billion had been spent. The Department's Offices of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Fossil Energy, Environmental Management, Science, and Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability received the majority of funding allocated to the Department, about $32.3 billion. Obligating these funds by the end of Fiscal Year 2010, as required by the Recovery Act, and overseeing their effective use in succeeding years, represents a massive workload increase for the Department's programs. The effort to date has strained existing resources. As has been widely acknowledged, any effort to disburse massive additional funding and to expeditiously initiate and complete projects increases the risk of fraud, waste and abuse. It is, therefore, important for the Department's program offices to assess and mitigate these risks to the maximum extent practicable. In this light, we initiated this review as an initial step in the Office of Inspector General's charge to determine whether the Department's major program offices had developed an effective approach for identifying and mitigating risks related to achieving the goals and objectives of the Recovery Act. The Department's program offices included in our review identified risks and planned mitigation strategies that, if successfully implemented and executed, should help achieve the goals and objectives of the Recovery Act. While each office identified risks unique to its respective areas of responsibility, there were a number of risks shared in common. These included the mechanical and substantive requirements related to the award and distribution of funds; program and project performance monitoring; and, program and project execution activities. In particular, the offices self-identified common risks such as: (1) The inability to award and distribute funds in a timely manner to achieve the goals of the Recovery Act; (2) The sufficiency of monitoring procedures and resources to, among other things, prevent and detect fraud, waste and abuse throughout the performance period of financial assistance awards and contracts; and (3) The inherent cost, schedule and performance risks associated with first-of-a-kind, innovative research and demonstration projects. Our review confirmed that the Department had begun to implement a number of strategies designed to mitigate these and other program-specific risks. Our testing, however, identified challenges to the effective implementation of these mitigation strategies that need to be addressed if the Department is to meet the goals and objectives established by the Recovery Act. At the time of our review: (1) Program staffing resources, critical to the success of all other mitigation strategies, remained inadequate both in numbers and qualifications (certifications and training) for positions in procurement and acquisition, project management, and monitoring and oversight functions; (2) Performance measures for achieving Recovery Act goals such as distributing funds in an expeditious manner had not always been established and included in performance plans, and, in financial assistance and contract documents; and (3) Programs had not consistently demonstrated that previously reported deficiencies, identified through audits, inspections, investigations and other oversight activities, had been considered in designing mitigation strategies for the Recovery Act related risks. As we noted in our Special Report on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act at the Department of Energy (OAS-RA-09-01, March 2009) these sorts of deficiencies, which were described in the March 2009 report, had adversely impacted the success of earlier Departmental projects. We concluded that consideration of these previously encountered internal control weaknesses was essential if the Department was to avoid the same or similar problems in executing the Recovery Act programs/projects. During the course of our audit we identified other internal control weakness indicators. When brought to their attention by the Office of Inspector General audit staff, program officials acted promptly to address these problems by modifying or improving their risk mitigation strategies. For instance, we found that the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, responsible for $16.8 billion in Recovery Act program activities, took steps to strengthen its merit review process to avoid potential conflict of interest concerns.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

INFORMATION: Audit Report on "Accounting and Reporting for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act by the Department of Energy's Funding Recipients"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was established to jumpstart the U.S. economy, create or save millions of jobs, and invest in the Nation's energy future. The Department of Energy received approximately $37 billion through the Recovery Act to support a variety of science, energy and environmental initiatives. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance for carrying out stimulus-related activities which requires, among other things, that recipients ensure funds provided by the Recovery Act are clearly distinguishable from non-Recovery Act funds in all reporting systems and that recipients' actions are transparent to the public. To meet these requirements, the Department's recipients must clearly and accurately track and report on 18 separate data elements. In addition, the Department was to develop and implement a process to ensure that recipient information reported to the public was free from material omissions and significant reporting errors. Our recent report (OAS-RA-10-01, October 2009) noted that the Department had developed a quality assurance process to facilitate the quarterly reviews of recipient data and planned to test it during the first quarterly reporting cycle. To determine whether the Department's quality assurance process was effective, we examined information reported by recipients of Departmental funding as of September 30, 2009. We also sought to determine whether the Department's prime contractors were prepared to track and report on Recovery Act activities. The Department had taken a number of actions designed to ensure the accuracy and transparency of reported Recovery Act results. This process identified potential anomalies with information reported by 1,113 of 2,038, or 55 percent of recipients. We view the Department's data quality assurance efforts as both timely and significant. As noted by our audit testing, however, opportunities exist to strengthen the process. In particular: (1) Site officials did not always ensure that anomalies, once identified during the quality assurance process, were actually resolved. For example, the Department's process identified that about 740 of the approximately 10,000 jobs reported in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2010 as created/retained were for projects reported as having no funds spent. Although these problems were referred to site officials for follow-up and/or correction, the information was never actually changed; (2) The Department did not always utilize the correct basis when evaluating the accuracy of 'funds provided' data submitted by grant recipients. For example, in its analysis process, the Department used data reflecting 'funds obligated' rather than the correct amount of 'total grant awards'. This generated a number of potential false positives; and, (3) Duplicate reports by certain recipients, resulting in overstatements of as much as $137 million of the more than $18 billion obligated, were not corrected. We observed that the Department had taken prompt action to ensure that its prime facility management contractors could properly report Recovery Act information. Notably, the seven contractors in this category included in our review had modified their accounting systems, as necessary, to ensure that they could accurately track and report on Recovery Act activities. The systems at each of these entities had been restructured so that they: (i) could separate Recovery Act and non-Recovery Act funds; and, (ii) had adequate processing capacity to handle the projected increase in transactions. We found the Department's decision to limit its reviews to the four elements that it considered to be critical (award amount, invoiced amount, jobs created/retained, and project status) to be reasonable. We concluded, however, other elements or dependent relationships should not be completely excluded from review. Beyond its initial development and implementation of its quality assurance process, the Department had taken steps to improve its ability to ensure that Recovery Act information was both accurate and transparent to the public. Specifically, officials changed the quality assurance plan based on initial data reviews. Department officials also informed us that they are in the process of updating their quality assurance process to meet new OMB requirements. For example, recent guidance directed agencies to focus on certain data elements, such as award number and recipient name, during their quality assurance reviews. In addition, subsequent to our review, the Department added two more data elements and comparisons to its quarterly assurance process, including an analysis of costs/expenditures and a comparison of the recipient reported project status to the Department's data contained in its financial system.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Audit Report on "Management Controls over the Department of Energy's American Recovery and Reinvestment Act - Louisiana State Energy Program"

The Department of Energy's (Department) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) provides grants to states, territories and the District of Columbia (states) to support their energy priorities through the State Energy Program (SEP). Federal funding is based on a grant formula that considers the population and energy consumption in each state, and amounted to $25 million for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) expanded the SEP by authorizing an additional $3.1 billion to states using the existing grant formula. EERE made grant awards to states after reviewing plans that summarize the activities states will undertake to achieve SEP Recovery Act objectives, including preserving and creating jobs; saving energy; increasing renewable energy sources; and, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. EERE program guidance emphasizes that states are responsible for administering SEP within each state, and requires each state to implement internal controls over the use of Recovery Act funds. The State of Louisiana received $71.6 million in SEP Recovery Act funds; a 164-fold increase over its FY 2009 SEP grant of $437,000. As part of the Office of Inspector General's strategy for reviewing the Department's implementation of the Recovery Act, we initiated this review to determine whether the Louisiana State Energy Office had internal controls in place to efficiently and effectively administer Recovery Act funds provided for its SEP program. Louisiana developed a strategy for SEP Recovery Act funding that focused on improving energy efficiency in state buildings, housing and small businesses; increasing Energy Star appliance rebates; and, expanding the use of alternative fuels and renewable energy. Due to a statewide hiring freeze, Louisiana outsourced management of the majority of its projects ($63.3 million) to one general contractor. Louisiana plans to internally manage one project, Education and Outreach ($2.6 million). The remaining funds are allocated to program specific management expenses, including the contractor's fee, a monitoring contract, and Louisiana's payroll expenses ($5.7 million). Louisiana formally approved the general contractor in February 2010. State officials plan to initiate a separate consulting contract for monitoring, verifying and auditing expenditures, energy savings and other metrics as required by EERE for Recovery Act funding.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Fuel Cell Bus Takes a Starring Role in the BurbankBus Fleet (Fact Sheet)

This fact sheet reports on the City of Burbank, California's fuel cell bus demonstration project and the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) involvement. Included are specifications for the fuel cell bus and information about its operation. BurbankBus, the city's mass transit entity, received a grant from the California Air Resources Board to fund its zero-emission bus demonstration and is collaborating with DOE's Fuel Cell Technologies Program to evaluate the bus performance. DOE's National Renewable Energy Laboratory will collect and analyze performance and operations data for at least one year. Researchers will use the data to better understand the technology and determine future development work. In addition, demonstration information will help fleets make informed purchase decisions.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Revealing the Hidden Value that the Federal Investment Tax Credit and Treasury Cash Grant Provide To Community Wind Projects

Although the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 has slowed wind power development in general, the crisis has, in several respects, been a blessing in disguise for community wind project development in the United States. For xample, the crisis-induced slowdown in the broader commercial wind market has, for the first time since 2004, created slack in the supply chain, creating an opportunity for shovel-ready community wind projects to finally proceed towards onstruction. Many such projects had been forced to wait on the sidelines as the commercial wind boom of 2005-2008 consumed virtually all available resources needed to complete a wind project (e.g., turbines, cranes, contractors).

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Office of the Chief Financial Officer Annual Report 2009

Presented is the 2009 Chief Financial Officer's Annual Report. The data included in this report has been compiled from the Budget Office, the Controller, Procurement and Property Management and the Sponsored Projects Office.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Audit Report on "The Department of Energy's American Recovery and Reinvestment Act -- Florida State Energy Program"

The Department of Energy's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) provides grants to states, territories, and the District of Columbia to support their energy priorities through the State Energy Program (SEP). The SEP provides Federal financial assistance to carry out energy efficiency and renewable energy projects that meet each state's unique energy needs while also addressing national goals such as energy security. Federal funding is based on a grant formula that takes into account population and energy consumption. The SEP emphasizes the state's role as the decision maker and administrator for the program. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) expanded the SEP, authorizing $3.1 billion in grants. Based on existing grant formulas and after reviewing state-level plans, EERE made awards to states. The State of Florida's Energy Office (Florida) was allocated $126 million - a 90-fold increase over Florida's average annual SEP grant of $1.4 million. Per the Recovery Act, this funding must be obligated by September 30, 2010, and spent by April 30, 2012. As of March 10, 2010, Florida had expended $13.2 million of the SEP Recovery Act funds. Florida planned to use its grant funds to undertake activities that would preserve and create jobs; save energy; increase renewable energy sources; and, reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To accomplish Recovery Act objectives, states could either fund new or expand existing projects. As a condition of the awards, EERE required states to develop and implement sound internal controls over the use of Recovery Act funds. Based on the significant increase in funding from the Recovery Act, we initiated this review to determine whether Florida had internal controls in place to provide assurance that the goals of the SEP and Recovery Act will be met and accomplished efficiently and effectively. We identified weaknesses in the implementation of SEP Recovery Act projects that have adversely impacted Florida's ability to meet the goals of the SEP and the Recovery Act. Specifically: (1) Florida used about $8.3 million to pay for activities that did not meet the intent of the Recovery Act to create new or save existing jobs. With the approval of the Department, Florida used these funds to pay for rebates related to solar energy projects that had been completed prior to passage of the Recovery Act; (2) State officials did not meet Florida's program goals to obligate all Recovery Act funds by January 1, 2010, thus delaying projects and preventing them from achieving the desired stimulative economic impact. Obligations were delayed because Florida officials selected a number of projects that either required a lengthy review and approval process or were specifically prohibited. In June 2009, the Department notified Florida that a number of projects would not be approved; however, as of April 1, 2010, the State had not acted to name replacement projects or move funds to other projects; (3) Florida officials had not ensured that 7 of the 18 award requirements for Recovery Act funding promulgated by the Department had been passed down to sub-recipients of the award, as required; and, (4) Certain internal control weaknesses that could jeopardize the program and increase the risk of fraud, waste and abuse were identified in the Solar Energy System Incentives Program during our September 2009 visit to Florida. These included a lack of separation of duties related to the processing of rebates and deficiencies in the written procedures for grant managers to review and approve rebates. From a forward looking perspective, absent aggressive corrective action, these weaknesses threaten Florida's efforts to meet future Recovery Act goals. In response to our review, Florida took corrective action to incorporate the additional award requirements in sub-recipient documents. It also instituted additional controls to correct the internal control weaknesses we identified. More, however, needs to be done with respect to Department oversight. This report details the circumstances surrounding these program issues and outlines actions that, in our opinion, will help Florida achieve its SEP Recovery Act-funded goals.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

2008 Fuel Cell Technologies Market Report

Fuel cells are electrochemical devices that combine hydrogen and oxygen to produce electricity, water, and heat. Unlike batteries, fuel cells continuously generate electricity, as long as a source of fuel is supplied. Moreover, fuel cells do not burn fuel, making the process quiet, pollution-free and two to three times more efficient than combustion. Fuel cell systems can be a truly zero-emissionsource of electricity, if the hydrogen is produced from non-polluting sources. Global concerns about climate change, energy security, and air pollution are driving demand for fuel cell technology. More than 630 companies and laboratories in the United States are investing $1 billion a year in fuel cells or fuel cell component technologies. This report provides an overview of trends in the fuelcell industry and markets, including product shipments, market development, and corporate performance. It also provides snapshots of select fuel cell companies, including general business strategy and market focus, as well as, financial information for select publicly-traded companies.

08 HYDROGEN↗