Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “STORED”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,279 records · Page 71

New Standards in Liquid Waste Treatment at Fukushima Dai-ichi - 13134

The earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011 severely damaged the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant leading to the most severe nuclear incident since Chernobyl. Ongoing operations to cool the damaged reactors at the site have led to the generation of highly radioactive coolant water. This is currently mainly treated to remove Cs-137 and Cs-134 and passed through a reverse osmosis (RO) unit to reduce the salinity before being cycled back to the reactors. Because only the Cs isotopes are removed, the RO reject water still contains many radioactive isotopes and this has led to the accumulation of over 200,000 cubic meters (52 million gallons) of extremely contaminated water which is currently stored on site in tanks. EnergySolutions, in partnership with Toshiba, were contracted to develop a system to reduce 62 isotopes in this waste down to allowable levels. This was a significant technical challenge given the high background salt content of the wastewater, the variation in aqueous chemistry of the radioactive isotopes and the presence of non-active competing ions (e.g. Ca and Mg) which inhibit the removal of isotopes such as Sr-89 and Sr-90. Extensive testing was performed to design a suitable system that could meet the required decontamination goals. These tests were performed over a 6 month period at facilities available in the nearby Fukushima Dai-ni laboratory using actual waste samples. This data was then utilized to design a Multi Radioactive Nuclides Removal System (MRRS) for Fukushima which is a modified version of EnergySolutions' proprietary Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS)'. The stored tank waste is fed into a preliminary precipitation system where iron flocculation is performed to remove a number of isotopes, including Sb-125, Ru-106, Mn-54 and Co-60. The supernatant is then fed into a second precipitation tank where the pH is adjusted and the bulk of the Mg, Ca and Sr precipitated out as carbonates and hydroxides. After passing through a cross-flow ultrafiltration membrane, the permeate then goes through a total of 14 fixed ion exchange and adsorbent columns followed by a disposable polishing column to polish the residual isotopes down to allowable levels. At the end of the system, the effluent is filtered for a final time to removal any particulates that may have been picked up from the media columns and then stored prior to analysis. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Processing and Disposition of Special Actinide Target Materials - 13138

The Department of Energy (DOE) manages an inventory of materials that contains a range of long-lived radioactive isotopes that were produced from the 1960's through the 1980's by irradiating targets in high-flux reactors at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to produce special heavy isotopes for DOE programmatic use, scientific research, and industrial and medical applications. Among the products were californium-252, heavy curium (including Cm-246 through Cm-248), and plutonium-242 and -244. Many of the isotopes are still in demand today, and they can be recovered from the remaining targets previously irradiated at SRS or produced from the recovered isotopes. Should the existing target materials be discarded, the plutonium (Pu) and curium (Cm) isotopes cannot be replaced readily with existing production sources. Some of these targets are stored at SRS, while other target material is stored at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) at several stages of processing. The materials cannot be stored in their present form indefinitely. Their long-term management involves processing items for beneficial use and/or for disposition, using storage and process facilities at SRS and ORNL. Evaluations are under way for disposition options for these materials, and demonstrations of improved flow sheets to process the materials are being conducted at ORNL and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The disposition options and a management evaluation process have been developed. Processing demonstrations and evaluations for these unique materials are under way. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integrated High-Level Waste System Planning - Utilizing an Integrated Systems Planning Approach to Ensure End-State Definitions are Met and Executed - 13244

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a Department of Energy site which has produced nuclear materials for national defense, research, space, and medical programs since the 1950's. As a by-product of this activity, approximately 37 million gallons of high-level liquid waste containing approximately 292 million curies of radioactivity is stored on an interim basis in 45 underground storage tanks. Originally, 51 tanks were constructed and utilized to support the mission. Four tanks have been closed and taken out of service and two are currently undergoing the closure process. The Liquid Waste System is a highly integrated operation involving safely storing liquid waste in underground storage tanks; removing, treating, and dispositioning the low-level waste fraction in grout; vitrifying the higher activity waste at the Defense Waste Processing Facility; and storing the vitrified waste in stainless steel canisters until permanent disposition. After waste removal and processing, the storage and processing facilities are decontaminated and closed. A Liquid Waste System Plan (hereinafter referred to as the Plan) was developed to integrate and document the activities required to disposition legacy and future High-Level Waste and to remove from service radioactive liquid waste tanks and facilities. It establishes and records a planning basis for waste processing in the liquid waste system through the end of the program mission. The integrated Plan which recognizes the challenges of constrained funding provides a path forward to complete the liquid waste mission within all regulatory and legal requirements. The overarching objective of the Plan is to meet all Federal Facility Agreement and Site Treatment Plan regulatory commitments on or ahead of schedule while preserving as much life cycle acceleration as possible through incorporation of numerous cost savings initiatives, elimination of non-essential scope, and deferral of other scope not on the critical path to compliance. There is currently a premium on processing and storage space in the radioactive liquid waste tank system. To enable continuation of risk reduction initiatives, the Plan establishes a processing strategy that provides tank space required to meet, or minimizes the impacts to meeting, programmatic objectives. The Plan also addresses perturbations in funding and schedule impacts. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Creation of a French Basic Nuclear Installation - Description of the Regulatory Process - 13293

CEA is a French government-funded technological research organization. It has to build a medium-level waste interim storage facility because the geological repository will not be available until 2025. This interim storage facility, called DIADEM, has to be available in 2017. These wastes are coming from the research facilities for spent fuel reprocessing and the dismantling of the most radioactive parts of nuclear facilities. The CEA handles the waste management by inventorying the needs and updating them regularly. The conception of the facility is mainly based on this inventory. It provides quantity and characteristics of wastes and it gives the production schedule until 2035. Beyond mass and volume, main characteristics of these radioactive wastes are chemical nature, radioisotopes, radioactivity, radiation dose, the heat emitted, corrosive or explosive gas production, etc. These characteristics provide information to study the repository safety. DIADEM mainly consists of a concrete cell, isolated from the outside, wherein stainless steel welded containers are stored, stacked in a vertical position in the racks. DIADEM is scheduled to store three types of 8 mm-thick, stainless steel cylindrical containers with an outside diameter 498 mm and height from 620 to 2120 mm. DIADEM will be a basic nuclear installation (INB in French) because of overall activity of radioactive substances stored. The creation of a French basic nuclear installation is subject to authorization according to the French law No. 2006-686 of 13 June 2006 on Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Field. The authorization takes into account the technical and financial capacities of the licensee which must allow him to conduct his project in compliance with these interests, especially to cover the costs of decommissioning the installation and conduct remediation work, and to monitor and maintain its location site or, for radioactive waste disposal installations, to cover the definitive shut-down, maintenance and surveillance expenditure. The authorization is issued by a decree adopted upon advice of the French Nuclear Safety Authority and after a public enquiry. In accordance with Decree No. 2007-1557 of November 2, 2007, the application is filed with the ministries responsible for nuclear safety and the Nuclear Safety Authority. It consists of twelve files and four records information. The favorable opinion of the Nuclear Safety Authority on the folder is required to start the public inquiry. Once the public inquiry is completed, the building permit is issued by the prefect. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Decommissioning and Dismantling of the Floating Maintenance Base 'Lepse' - 13316

The Lepse was built in Russia in 1934 and commissioned as a dry cargo ship. In 1961 she was re-equipped for use as a nuclear service ship (NSS), specifically a floating maintenance base (FMB), to support the operation of the civilian nuclear fleet (ice-breakers) of the USSR. In 1988 Lepse was taken out of service and in 1990 she was re-classified as a 'berth connected ship', located at a berth near the port of Murmansk under the ownership of Federal State Unitary Enterprise (FSUE) Atomflot. Lepse has special storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel assemblies (SFA) that have been used to store several hundred SFAs for nearly 40 years. High and intermediate-level liquid radioactive waste (LRW) is also present in the spent nuclear fuel assembly storage channels, in special tanks and also in the SFA cooling circuit. Many of the SFAs stored in Lepse are classified as damaged and cannot be removed using standard procedures. The removal of the SFA and LRW from the Lepse storage facilities is a hazardous task and requires specially designed tools, equipment and an infrastructure in which these can be deployed safely. Lepse is a significant environmental hazard in the North West of Russia. Storing spent nuclear fuel and high-level liquid radioactive waste on board Lepse in the current conditions is not acceptable with respect to Russian Federation health, safety and environmental standards and with international best practice. The approved concept design for the removal of the SFA and LRW and dismantling of Lepse requires that the ship be transported to Nerpa shipyard where specialist infrastructure will be constructed and equipment installed. One of the main complexities of the Project lies within the number of interested stakeholders involved in the Project. The Lepse project has been high focus on the international stage for many years with previous international efforts failing to make significant progress towards the objective of decommissioning Lepse. The Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) approved an internationally funded project to identify and prioritise nuclear and environmental hazards in NW Russia. Within this project the Lepse was recognised as being one of the highest nuclear hazards in NW Russia. Removal of SNF, SRW and LRW from Lepse requires innovative design and development of bespoke equipment. The main drivers of the NDEP Donors are first to safely transport Lepse in 2012 from her current berth close to the local population in Murmansk to the nominated dismantling shipyard, and secondly to raise Lepse from the water in 2013 onto the slip-way at the dismantling shipyard. A description is provided of the approach and progress towards preparing the Lepse for the removal of SFAs and other radioactive waste, to decontaminate and then dismantle the vessel under international donor funding. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Recovering Americium and Curium from Mark-42 Target Materials- New Processing Approaches to Enhance Separations and Integrate Waste Stream Disposition - 12228

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is investigating flowsheets to enhance processing efficiencies and to address waste streams associated with recovery of americium (Am) and curium (Cm) from Mark-42 (Mk-42) target materials stored at ORNL. The objective of this work was to identify the most effective flowsheet with which to process the 104 Mk-42 oxide capsules holding a total of 80 g of plutonium (Pu), 190 g of Cm, 480 g of Am, and 5 kg of lanthanide (Ln) oxides for the recovery and purification of the Am/Cm for future use as feedstock for heavy actinide production. Studies were also conducted to solidify the process flowsheet waste streams for disposal. ORNL is investigating flowsheets to enhance processing efficiencies and address waste streams associated with recovery of Am and Cm from Mk-42 target materials stored at ORNL. A series of small-scale runs are being performed to demonstrate an improved process to recover Am/Cm and to optimize the separations of Ln fission products from the Am/Cm constituents. The first of these runs has been completed using one of the Am/Cm/Ln oxide capsules stored at ORNL. The demonstration run showed promising results with a Ln DF of 40 for the Am/Cm product and an Am/Cm DF of 75 for the Ln product. In addition, the total losses of Am, Cm, and Ln to the waste solvents and raffinates were very low at <0.2%, 0.02%, and 0.04%, respectively. However, the Ln-actinide separation was less than desired. For future Reverse TALSPEAK demonstration runs, several parameters will be adjusted (flow rates, the ratio of scrub to strip stages, etc.) to improve the removal of Ln from the actinides. The next step will also include scale-up of the processing flowsheet to use more concentrated solutions (15 g/L Ln versus 5 g/L) and larger volumes and to recycle the HDEHP solvent. This should improve the overall processing efficiency and further reduce losses to waste streams. Studies have been performed with simulated wastes to develop solidification processes for disposal of the secondary waste streams generated by this flowsheet. Formulations were successfully developed for all the waste simulants. Additional tests with actual waste will be the next step in this effort. Future plans are to process all of the remaining 103 capsules in storage at ORNL. A nine-capsule test is now under way to provide additional information to scale-up the process to a target 20-capsule batch size for future processing runs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Tools Developed to Prepare and Stabilize Reactor Spent Fuel for Retrieval from Tile Holes - 12251

Spent fuel from the Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) nuclear reactors is stored in the waste management areas on site. This fuel is contained within carbon steel spent fuel cans that are stored inside vertical carbon steel lined concrete pipes in the ground known as tile holes. The fuel cans have been stored in the tile holes for greater than 30 years. Some of the fuel cans have experienced corrosion which may have affected their structural integrity as well as the potential to form hydrogen gas. In addition to these potential hazards, there was a need to clean contaminated surfaces inside of and around the exposed upper surface of the tile holes. As part of the site waste management remediation plan spent fuel will be retrieved from degraded tile holes, dried, and relocated to a new purpose built above ground storage facility. There have been a number of tools that are required to be developed to ensure spent fuel cans are in a safe condition prior to retrieval and re-location. A series of special purpose tools have been designed and constructed to stabilize the contents of the tile holes, to determine the integrity of the fuel containers and to decontaminate inside and around the tile holes. Described herein are the methods and types of tools used. Tools that have been presented here have been used, or will be used in the near future, in the waste management areas of the CRL Site in preparation for storage of spent fuel in a new above ground facility. The stabilization tools have been demonstrated on mock-up facilities prior to successful use in the field to remove hydrogen gas and uranium hydrides from the fuel cans. A lifting tool has been developed and used successfully in the field to confirm the integrity of the fuel cans for future relocation. A tool using a commercial dry ice blaster has been developed and is ready to start mock-up trials and is scheduled to be used in the field during the summer of 2012. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

US Spent (Used) Fuel Status, Management and Likely Directions- 12522

As of 2010, the US has accumulated 65,200 MTU (42,300 MTU of PWR's; 23,000 MTU of BWR's) of spent (irradiated or used) fuel from 104 operating commercial nuclear power plants situated at 65 sites in 31 States and from previously shutdown commercial nuclear power plants. Further, the Department of Energy (DOE) has responsibility for an additional 2458 MTU of DOE-owned defense and non defense spent fuel from naval nuclear power reactors, various non-commercial test reactors and reactor demonstrations. The US has no centralized large spent fuel storage facility for either commercial spent fuel or DOE-owned spent fuel. The 65,200 MTU of US spent fuel is being safely stored by US utilities at numerous reactor sites in (wet) pools or (dry) metal or concrete casks. As of November 2010, the US had 63 'independent spent fuel storage installations' (or ISFSI's) licensed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission located at 57 sites in 33 states. Over 1400 casks loaded with spent fuel for dry storage are at these licensed ISFSI's; 47 sites are located at commercial reactor sites and 10 are located 'away' from a reactor (AFR's) site. DOE's small fraction of a 2458 MTU spent fuel inventory, which is not commercial spent fuel, is with the exception of 2 MTU, being stored at 4 sites in 4 States. The decades old US policy of a 'once through' fuel cycle with no recycle of spent fuel was set into a state of 'mass confusion or disruption' when the new US President Obama's administration started in early 2010 stopping the only US geologic disposal repository at the Yucca Mountain site in the State of Nevada from being developed and licensed. The practical result is that US nuclear power plant operators will have to continue to be responsible for managing and storing their own spent fuel for an indefinite period of time at many different sites in order to continue to generate electricity because there is no current US government plan, schedule or policy for taking possession of accumulated spent fuel from the utilities. There are technical solutions for continuing the safe storage of spent fuel for 100 years or more and these solutions will be implemented by the US utilities that need to keep their nuclear power plants operating while the unknown political events are played out to establish future US policy decisions that can remain in place long enough regarding accumulated spent fuel inventories to implement any new US spent fuel centralized storage or disposition policy by the US government. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Compact System for Operating and Decommissioned Reactor Used Fuel Management - 17243

Most nuclear power plants in operation today were designed with limited wet storage for their discharged used nuclear fuel (UNF), predicated on the assumption that either recycling or geologic storage would be available within the reactor's lifetime. While that has proven to be the case in some countries such as France with its recycling, it has not for most. In the USA, dry storage of UNF at the plant site at an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) has since the mid-1980s been the primary mode of interim storage so that the plant can off-load its UNF from the pools at the power plants. Initially the space reserved for the ISFSI at a reactor site was based on the assumption that the Department of Energy (DOE) would be transporting that UNF to a geological repository site, such as Yucca Mountain, by 1998. However, due to the delay in the opening of any geological repository the utilities are running out of space on their existing ISFSIs for additional UNF dry storage systems. Since plants prefer to keep their ISFSIs inside the protected area of the plant, options for expanding the ISFSI are becoming limited. At the same time, increasing the capacity of the dry storage systems is also not an option in most cases as the dry storage systems have almost reached their capacity limits with the 37 PWR or 89 BWR fuel assembly canister designs. For plants that have announced plans to shut down, their main priority is to off-load the UNF from the pool to dry storage at an ISFSI so that they can proceed to 'Safe store' or other storage options, and start their decommissioning process as soon as possible. Thus, keeping the size of the ISFSI compact is very important for safety, security and economics. This paper will describe the details of a reduced footprint version of AREVA TN's NUHOMS{sup R} System that addresses the need for maximizing ISFSI capacity. This system not only offers a compact design that stores nearly double the number of UNF assemblies in the same space, it also offers superior radiation protection to the workers and public. In addition, it offers unmatched protection against beyond design basis (BDB) events like the tsunami at Fukushima in Japan, the earthquake at North Anna site, tornadoes and manmade attacks such as the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York. It also includes significant enhancement for a robust Canister Evolved Safety Program for Aging Management. The utilities in the USA are currently using dry storage systems with canisters of different diameter, different length, and different weights. The fuel assemblies that are stored in these canisters are also different in their fuel types (PWR or BWR),different fuel parameters like burnups, enrichments, and cooling times and different storage orientations in the storage overpacks like horizontal or vertical. The compact version of AREVA TN's NUHOMS{sup R} System offers a 'Universal' Storage Overpack which is designed to accept all these different design dry storage canister available in the industry. As UNF storage continues to drives the industry towards innovations that address the need for consolidated storage, compact ISFSIs and aging management, this new evolution of the AREVA TN NUHOMS{sup R} system offers a significant leap forward in addressing all of these challenges. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Thermal Analysis of a Pipe Over-pack Container with a Combustible Waste Matrix for Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17307

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Technical Area 55 (TA 55) utilizes several different container types to store and transfer special nuclear material and waste for numerous programs. The Nuclear Process Infrastructure - Infrastructure Operations Group (NPI-2) analyzes and certifies containers to meet the specifications for distinct processes and storage. Engineering analysis performed on these containers include but are not limited to: leak testing, filter efficiency testing, pressure drop test, drop testing, water penetration testing, polymer (o-ring) hardness testing, and thermal steady state testing. Of all of these tests, thermal steady-state testing is most crucial to ensure critical components for specific containers do not fail under an internal heat payload. This testing provides data for setting heat payload limits for different containers. The Pipe Over-pack Container (POC) is a vented carbon steel container with a removable lid designed for storing or transferring nuclear waste. Additionally, TA 55 has been tasked to manage and store all of its Transuranic (TRU) waste for the foreseeable future. Being able to place more material into a single container conserves the physical storage space available at TA 55. The Pipe Over pack Handling and Operations Manual requires each user to ensure that the maximum temperature of each component in the POC is not exceeded. Conducting a thermal steady-state test with a combustible waste matrix on the POC can benefit stakeholders on increasing the material limits of the container. The results of these measurements will establish new wattage limits to meet LANL's transportation requirements. The current LANL Transportation Safety Document (TSD) limits the amount of heat source plutonium to 10 grams per POC, corresponding to approximately 5 Watts of heat. The result of this test was provided to the Packaging and Transportation (OS-PT) group to evaluate new wattage limits that can satisfy the needs of TA 55, while maintaining a safe packaging configuration. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Challenges to Collection of High Quality Samples of Saltstone - 17468

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) is used to dispose of low-level radioactive liquid waste in the form of grout. The SDF is comprised of a series of concrete saltstone disposal units (SDUs) that receive the grout. The grout solidifies into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. Properties of saltstone that influence contaminant release have been measured on simulant material but not on samples of emplaced saltstone because samples of emplaced radioactive saltstone are difficult to obtain, transport, and store in a manner that protects the properties of interest. Savannah River Remediation (SRR) initiated a project to obtain samples of emplaced saltstone such that the two critical properties, hydraulic conductivity and reduction capacity, are negligibly impacted by the sample collection effort. The sample collection project was established to manage sample collection efforts beginning with sample collection mock-up activities through field execution. The project focused on three phases: mock-up in a clean environment, development of equipment needed to maintain an inert environment during sample transport and laboratory storage, and coordination of Facility operations and support resources and schedules to support sample collection. A mock-up facility was constructed at SRS to mimic the SDU. Core drill equipment was tested, procedures developed, and operator training conducted using the mockup facility. Concurrent with mock-up activities, inert transportation and storage equipment was designed, manufactured, tested, and specific operating instruction included in the sample collection procedure. Inerting equipment minimized oxidation from the atmosphere as the samples were removed from the disposal unit, transported, and stored in the laboratory awaiting analysis. Coordination with the Saltstone Facility began during construction of the mock-up platform to collect current as-built information for platform construction. Baseline data was collected from the disposal unit vapor space to assess the potential for personnel exposure from chemical hazards associated with trapped vapors. Based on this data, mitigating actions were incorporated into the project scope. Finally, project and facility schedules were integrated to assure that facility non-processing windows, support personnel, equipment fabrication, and field preparation activities were in alignment and supportive of the overall sample collection objectives. During May 2014, 485 linear cm of approximately 5 cm diameter radioactive core material was successfully collected from three access ports in SDU Cell 2A, inerted, transported to the laboratory, and stored in an inert environment for analysis. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Leaning the tank closure process at the Savannah River Site - 15515

The Savannah River Site liquid waste system consists of multiple facilities that safely receive and store legacy radioactive waste prior to treatment and disposition. The liquid radioactive waste is stored in large underground tanks. The waste inventory currently stored in these tanks is a complex mixture of insoluble metal hydroxide solids and soluble salt supernate. The high-level (radioactive) portion of the waste is vitrified into a glass waste form, while the low-level waste is immobilized into a cementitious grout waste form called salt-stone. Once the waste is retrieved and processed, the tanks are closed. The closure process includes; waste removal, characterizing residuals, isolating the tank systems, and stabilizing the tank with tailored grout formulations. The core of Lean is to eliminate waste or non-value added steps from processes to maximize customer value. From the perspective of the customer, 'value' is defined as any action or process for which a customer would willingly pay. In this case our product is to safely and efficiently remove waste from the underground storage tanks and demonstrate operational closure to the State of South Carolina. Savannah River Remediation (SRR) initiated the use of the Lean process in late 2013 and identified the Tank Closure process as one of the targeted areas to improve. The first step in the Lean process is to 'map' out the value stream and identify areas where non-value added steps are present and then prioritize Rapid Improvement Events (RIE). Based on this mapping process, there were a number of areas that SRR determined warranted further evaluation for improvements, including; standard equipment design, characterization, standard work packages, regulatory documentation, tank characterization, structural evaluations, engineering documentation and equipment re-use. This paper focuses on the application of the Lean process at SRR and more specifically, effective application to the Tank Closure Process. This paper discusses the value stream mapping process for Tank Closures, as well as, summarizes the RIEs and demonstrate the realized benefits. Benefits can come in a variety of forms, from schedule compression to decreased costs. Through the Lean process we have been able to identify close to $10 M in savings over the life cycle of the tank closure process and a 4 year schedule compression. Cost and schedule savings are used to accomplish further risk reduction efforts. In addition to hard benefits, there are also soft benefits. These soft benefits are a result of the process itself and help drive improved efficiencies through better communication with key stakeholders, such as regulators and customers. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Twenty years of dry interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Germany- History and developments - 15575

According to article 6 of the German Atomic Energy Act, storage of nuclear fuel requires a license granted by the competent authority in this field, which is the Federal Office of Radiation Protection. In 1983 a license to store spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and later expanded for vitrified high level waste (HAW) for the interim storage facility in Gorleben was granted. Dry Interim storage at the NPP sites in its actual form started in 2002 in the interim storage facility next to the NPP Lingen. Since this time each NPP erected its own storage facility and three central storage facilities have been built. All of these facilities use dry storage in metallic casks. The actual storage licenses for SNF and the HAW (which is stored in Gorleben and Rubenow) are limited to 40 years starting with the first cask emplacement. As no opening of the cask is intended during the storage period the condition of the inventory and the cask before loading has to be known in detail. This requires for instance detailed knowledge of the history of the SNF loaded as well as supervision of the manufacturing process of the cask. Within the last twenty years several mishaps influenced the regulatory point of view. During a loading campaign in a boiling water reactor traces of pool water remained in the gasket slot and during the drying procedure crystalline boron salts prevented the required tightness. After that event a long-term experiment was started and is still going on which studies the effects of water and minor damages to the gasket. As well changes in the loading procedure have been introduced. The pressure switch used to monitor the pressure in the space between primary and secondary lid has a self surveillance function. This indicated a malfunction 23 times in the last twenty years. Examinations of all events indicated no systematic failure, but a weak point seems to be the plug-in connection. The manufacturer introduced some modifications to improve the system. Introduction of FEM methods in safety analysis to amend the existing methods of testing allowed a new view on and in the cask safety analysis. Progress in this field is closely connected to the available computing capacity and stipulates experts to ongoing improvement. After expiring of the storage license which will be the case for the first cask loaded in 1992 and stored in Ahaus 2032 an extension or a new license can only be granted if the at this time relevant requirements are met. This will require detailed knowledge about the happenings and accidents during the previous storage period. All experience of the periodic safety assessment (PSA) which started in 2013 and accompanying experiments conducted till now and during the licensed storage time will be needed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Innovative Waste Packaging and Associated Venting/Hydrogen Management - 16594

The original strategy for managing intermediate level waste (ILW) was developed in the 1980s by the UK Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive (NIREX), which is now the Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM), a wholly owned subsidiary of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). The strategy involved retrieving ILW, sorting and encapsulating it in cement based grout within thin walled stainless steel containers. The containers would then be transferred to a large purpose-built shielded ILW store on site, where they would be stored until the planned final deep geological disposal facility becomes available. In recognition of the high up-front costs of such a strategy, which requires remote facilities for the encapsulation and storage, and coupled with the long programme duration for the design, construction and commissioning of these facilities, waste management organisations responsible for managing the clean-up of legacy facilities within the UK have, in recent years, sought innovative solutions which could potentially both accelerate clean-up and hazard reduction on sites, and with a lower overall programme lifecycle cost. Many of the recent innovative solutions are focused around a new family of packaging designs known as robust shielded containers (RSCs). These are self-shielded containers manufactured from materials such as ductile cast iron or fabricated steel. These containers offer the potential to package wastes for disposal without encapsulation and avoid the need for a highly engineered remote handled shielded store for interim storage. The paper provides a high level overview of the generic concepts of RSCs developed by Croft and focuses on the specific challenges of wasteform evolution on waste package integrity and performance. In particular, the integrity and performance of the filtered vent system required to manage internal pressurisation and to ensure sufficient venting capacity of hydrogen and other evolved gases. The paper summarises the analysis by ARUP undertaken to substantiate the RSC integrity under detonation/deflagration explosion loadings arising from hydrogen accumulation. Analyses of the structural response of the filter assembly were undertaken for both detonation and deflagration explosion scenarios, with the loadings applied to the filter housing rim and to the filter vent cover. The paper also presents evidence of the mechanical performance of the filter medium in terms of pressure transients during deflagration events and the degree to which filtration efficiency is maintained. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Cameco Corporation's Approach to Legacy and Ongoing Waste Management Within the Fuel Services Division - 19124

Since 2011, a Fuel Services Division (FSD) employee has been dedicated to oversee divisional waste management with the goal of accelerating the recycle/disposal of accumulated legacy radioactive wastes stored at its Ontario operations in Blind River and Port Hope. The Blind River Refinery (BRR) and Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) were previously owned by the federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear, becoming part of Cameco in 1988 and Cameco Fuel Manufacturing (CFM), previously known as Zircatec Precision Industries, becoming part of Cameco in 2006. Accumulated legacy radioactive waste is stored at each of the facilities. This radioactive waste has accumulated from operations beginning in the 1930's in Port Hope and the 1980's in Blind River. Due to minimal commercially available outlets for the disposal and/or treatment of these wastes, the waste was managed onsite by storage in underutilized space in buildings, trailers and/or in the secured yard. This relatively low-cost practice meant that over decades, the inventory increased at an unsustainable rate until available space became a limiting factor. During this time, the labelling, inventory records, characterization details and other history of many of the waste materials was not maintained adequately. Due to the volume of waste that had accumulated, campaigns to address these deficiencies in information were not considered feasible, sustaining the issue of accumulation of low-level radioactive waste. Since 2011, FSD has completed annual campaigns to address the accumulated legacy waste, which has included processing of material for decontamination to meet the unrestricted release criteria under the Canadian Nuclear Substance and Radiation Devices Regulations (NSRDR), disposal of marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) at a permitted landfill in the United States, processing of contaminated materials to reduce the volume of low-level radioactive waste and disposal at a designated facility in Port Hope. In addition FSD has undertaken significant changes to radioactive waste management practices at each of the facilities. Multiple characterization techniques, including visual observation, review of process and other historical records, laboratory analysis and radiation scanning have been utilized in campaign planning to identify the scope and appropriate waste management technique(s) to reduce the inventory of stored material. This divisional waste management program has resulted in a significant change to how radioactive waste is generated, inventoried, characterized and managed within FSD and has increased the visibility within the leadership team of the opportunities and challenges of waste management, such as alignment with decommissioning planning, project planning and budgeting. The heightened awareness has led to better financial and physical resource planning to execute waste projects with a current projected elimination of the legacy waste within FSD by 2025. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Use of Automation in Low Level Waste Storage and Management - 19227

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) generates Low Level Waste (LLW) and Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) from various site operations such as the operation of a research Reactor and the manufacture of Molybdenum 99. The Low Level Solid Waste (LLSW) generated is stored at ANSTO before and after conditioning. The current process flow involves the storage of LLSW waste before conditioning on racks, handled using forklifts. When the unconditioned waste is ready for conditioning, it is transferred to another facility, where volume reduction and packaging is carried out. Once conditioned, the waste is placed in further storage, pending dispatch to the proposed Australian National Radioactive Waste Management Facility (NRWMF). A new purpose built facility has been constructed, adjacent to the LLSW processing facility, for the storage and management of LLSW in both unconditioned and conditioned forms. This new facility will streamline the waste management process and significantly enhance the safety and efficiency of the process. In line with international best practises, the new facility utilises automation solutions to minimise the build footprint, and minimise the use of forklifts and other mobile plant. Most importantly, it applies the principle of ALARA (As Low as Reasonably Achievable) to minimise operator activities in areas where radioactive material is stored and eliminates double handling of the waste. The automation for unconditioned waste utilises an Automated Storage and Retrieval System (ASRS), a vertical stacker crane within high density racking, to provide easy storage and retrieval for processing and/or routine inspections. This system allows operators to control it from outside of the storage area whilst utilising integrated software that allows for the required tracking of the unconditioned waste. From the ASRS storage area, unconditioned waste will have a smooth transition to the processing facility which is located adjacent to the ASRS system. Once conditioned, the waste is catalogued and returned to a designated storage area within the new facility using an automated building gantry crane with a target delivery system to eliminate the need for operators in the main storage bay. The waste will be held here in preparation for dispatch to the future repository. The utilisation of the ASRS for the purpose of storing LLSW is an innovative use of automation that will eliminate operators from active areas, reduce dose rates received and integrate with the waste tracking software. Furthermore, the system has significant advantages with operational efficiencies increased, reduced double handling of nuclear waste and maximum use of building footprint. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

OCTOKV: An Agile Network-Based Key-Value Storage System with Robust Load Orchestration

In this paper, we propose OctoKV, an innovative network-based key-value storage system. OctoKV addresses the repetitive address translation overhead associated with traditional key-value stores running on file systems on the client side. To mitigate this overhead, we implemented the key-value store on the server side using NVMe-oF and a user-level NVMe driver. In particular, we employed fine-grained resource monitoring and load balancing based on heuristics to optimize I/O performance. OctoKV is deployed on a Linux cluster with Intel SPDK. The extensive evaluation shows that OctoKV achieves lower I/O response times in comparison to traditional approaches where key-value stores run on the client side. Also, the proposed load balancing strategies efficiently enhance I/O response times by equally distributing the workload from overloaded cores to other cores.

Khan, Awais↗

Modeling Efforts to Gain Insight into Historical Leak Events from the Single-Shell Tank A-105 in the Hanford 241-A Tank Farm - 20113

The 241-A Tank Farm is a single-shell tank (SST) farm constructed to store process waste from Hanford nuclear operations. Millions of gallons of nuclear waste were stored in the 241-A Tank Farm SSTs and some of the SSTs leaked in the past. In addition, spills and pipeline leaks during transfers and storage and intentional discharges to cribs and trenches resulted in releasing waste to the ground. Tank liner leaks are referred to as 'leaks' and all other discharges to the soil are referred to as 'releases.' Liquid waste that could be removed by pumping has been removed from all of the SSTs to reduce the potential for future leaks. The most significant historical leak event in 241-A Tank Farm occurred in 1965 when tank A-105 experienced a pressurized steam event. This event resulted in damage to the inner steel liner flooring of A-105, which was separated from the sidewalls over part of its circumference and buckled up to 2.5 m, vertically. During this event up to 7,570 L of contaminated liquid may have leaked to the adjacent soil. This leak occurred under extreme temperature and pressure conditions. Modeling efforts to better understand the nature and extent of historical leaks from subsurface SSTs that were used to store highly radioactive, self-boiling liquid wastes at 241-A Tank Farm have recently been undertaken. These efforts have compiled the available historical information to support a preliminary non-isothermal, multiphase flow and chemical transport modeling effort to re-create the conditions under which the leaks occurred and to formulate a conceptual model as to the extent and distribution of leaked radioactive contaminants in the adjacent soil material. The focus of this work was on developing an understanding of the key features, processes and bounding conditions related to tank A-105 leak events that occurred in the 1960's. The activities include estimation of leak composition, non-isothermal multiphase flow and transport modeling, and geochemical modeling. The STOMP{sup C} Water-Air-Energy modeling code was utilized to implement the three-dimensional representation of the subsurface tank and the surrounding flow field. Once constructed, the model was used to evaluate the conceptual understanding of leaks originating from different parts of the tank under the elevated temperature boundary conditions that were imposed by surrounding tanks at the time of the historical leaks. The chemical evolution of the liquid waste was also evaluated as it leaked from the tank under transient pressure and temperature gradients. The results of the preliminary evaluation suggested the presence of a heat-pipe effect beneath tank A-105 in which water vapor at an elevated temperature is driven away from the base of the tank to a position where water vapor cools, condenses and is then drawn back toward the tank by the strong capillary attraction of the dry soil. A non-sorbing contaminant (Tc-99) was introduced into this flow field to better understand the potential distribution patterns of leaked contaminants that may have occurred during the historical leak events. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗