Results for “Cyber security” — Page 71

DOE OSTI2019

Power Sector Resilience Planning: To Ensure Reliable, Secure, Safe and Affordable Electricity Supplies (Lab Translation)

Decision makers around the globe are exploring strategies to ensure the reliable, secure, safe, and affordable supply of electricity to power economic growth and achieve development goals. Vulnerabilities of the power sector to natural hazards (e.g., acts of nature, severe weather, and climate variabilities), technological hazards (e.g., accidents and system or structure failures), and threats or human-caused incidents (e.g., intentional cyber-attacks or acts of terror) can impede the provision of the energy services necessary to achieve these goals. Although decision makers cannot prevent an act of nature such as an earthquake, they can anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to potential vulnerabilities through planning. The purpose of power sector resilience planning is to identify vulnerabilities and devise strategies to mitigate them. This document reviews some of the hazards that power sectors face and how decision makers can plan to increase resilience.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2019

Planning a Resilient Power Sector: Ensuring Reliable, Secure, Safe, and Affordable Electricity

Decision makers around the globe are exploring strategies to ensure the reliable, secure, safe, and affordable supply of electricity to power economic growth and achieve development goals. Vulnerabilities of the power sector to natural hazards (e.g., acts of nature, severe weather, and climate variabilities), technological hazards (e.g., accidents and system or structure failures), and threats or human-caused incidents (e.g., intentional cyber-attacks or acts of terror) can impede the provision of the energy services necessary to achieve these goals. Although decision makers cannot prevent an act of nature such as an earthquake, they can anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to potential vulnerabilities through planning. The purpose of power sector resilience planning is to identify vulnerabilities and devise strategies to mitigate them. This document reviews some of the hazards that power sectors face and how decision makers can plan to increase resilience.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Technical Assistance Capabilities Overview [Slides]

Electric grids around the world are undergoing rapid structural and operational change, making it more important than ever to understand evolving risks and improve grid resilience and security against natural and human disruptions. Through tailored technical assistance, NREL is working with partners to support the secure and resilient deployment of energy systems and address grid integration challenges.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2016

A Systems Approach to Analyzing Cyber-Physical Threats in the Smart Grid

This paper presents a systems analysis approach to characterizing the risk of a Smart Grid to a load-drop attack. A characterization of the risk is necessary for the design of detection and remediation strategies to address the consequences of such attacks. Using concepts from systems health management and system engineering, this work (a) first identifies metrics that can be used to generate constraints for security features, and (b) lays out an end-to-end integrated methodology using separate network and power simulations to assess system risk. We demonstrate our approach by performing a systems-style analysis of a load-drop attack implemented over the AMI subsystem and targeted at destabilizing the underlying power grid.

Almajali, Anas↗

DOE OSTI2014

GridOPTICS Software System

GridOPTICS Software System (GOSS) is a middleware that facilitates creation of new, modular and flexible operational and planning platforms that can meet the challenges of the next generation power grid. GOSS enables Department of Energy, power system utilities, and vendors to build better tools faster. GOSS makes it possible to integrate Future Power Grid Initiative software products/prototypes into existing power grid software systems, including the PNNL PowerNet and EIOC environments. GOSS is designed to allow power grid applications developed for different underlying software platforms installed in different utilities to communicate with ease. This can be done in compliance with existing security and data sharing policies between the utilities. GOSS not only supports one-to-one data transfer between applications, but also publisher/subscriber scheme. To support interoperability requirements of future EMS, GOSS is designed for CIM compliance. In addition to this, it supports authentication and authorization capabilities to protect the system from cyber threats. In summary, the contributions of the GOSS middleware are as follows: A platform to support future EMS development. A middleware that promotes interoperability between power grid applications. A distributed architecture that separates data sources from power grid applications. Support for data exchange with either one-to-one or publisher/subscriber interfaces. An authentication and authorization scheme for limiting the access to data between utilities.

Akyol, BoraA↗

DOE OSTI2014

GridOPTICS Software System

GridOPTICS Software System (GOSS) is a middleware that facilitates creation of new, modular and flexible operational and planning platforms that can meet the challenges of the next generation power grid. GOSS enables Department of Energy, power system utilities, and vendors to build better tools faster. GOSS makes it possible to integrate Future Power Grid Initiative software products/prototypes into existing power grid software systems, including the PNNL PowerNet and EIOC environments. GOSS is designed to allow power grid applications developed for different underlying software platforms installed in different utilities to communicate with ease. This can be done in compliance with existing security and data sharing policies between the utilities. GOSS not only supports one-to-one data transfer between applications, but also publisher/subscriber scheme. To support interoperability requirements of future EMS, GOSS is designed for CIM compliance. In addition to this, it supports authentication and authorization capabilities to protect the system from cyber threats. In summary, the contributions of the GOSS middleware are as follows: A platform to support future EMS development. A middleware that promotes interoperability between power grid applications. A distributed architecture that separates data sources from power grid applications. Support for data exchange with either one-to-one or publisher/subscriber interfaces. An authentication and authorization scheme for limiting the access to data between utilities.

Akyol, Bora A↗

DOE OSTI2021

Impact Analysis of Data Integrity Attacks on FACTS-based Wide-Area Voltage Control System

Energy management system (EMS) consists of several wide-area control applications that serve as a backbone for security, stability, and reliability of the power system. Wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), one of the critical wide-area applications, operates in coordination with local Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices to provide voltage security and optimal management of active and reactive power resources. Since the WAVCS relies on wide-area communication and data sharing devices, possible cybersecurity vulnerabilities have to be addressed to ensure the closed-loop operation of WAVCS. In this paper, we present a methodology for performing an impact analysis of cyber-attacks in WAVCS cybersecurity. In particular, different types of data integrity attacks, such as malicious tripping, fault replay, and signal altering attacks, are considered, and detailed impact analysis is conducted in a testbed environment using the Kundur's four machine two-area system. For performing an impact analysis, the transient voltage stability of the sensitive bus voltage is studied, followed by the quantitative assessment and severity ranking using the voltage profile index. Our experimental evaluation reveals that the data integrity attacks on control signals exhibit a higher attack severity than on the measurement signals. Further, the severity of these attacks varies with nature (static or dynamic), location, and types of attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Security of DERs and Grid Edge Technologies [Slides]

Distributed energy resources (DERs) offer significant value for incorporating diverse generation technologies and improving reliability. They also present a new set of cybersecurity challenges. The move of generation to the grid edge can also mean more distributed control systems and expanded communication networks, resulting in an increase in attack surface. This presentation will discuss definitions and essential terms related to DERs; developments and deployment trends for DERs; recent cyber attacks on operational technology and industrial systems; cyber risk arising from distributed grid resources; and ways in which standards may help mitigate some of these risks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

International Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Overview [Slides]

Innovations in clean energy technology are beginning to transform electric grids around the world. It is more important than ever to understand and improve the resiliency and security of the grid against natural and human disruptions as our energy systems become more distributed, intelligent, and interconnected. Through its advanced cybersecurity technical assistance portfolio, experts at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) work with international governments to support secure and resilient deployment of renewable energy assets and address grid interconnection challenges. Cybersecurity technical assistance is tailored to the needs of our international partners.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2018

Advanced Data Structures for Improved Cyber Resilience and Awareness in Untrusted Environments: LDRD Report

This report summarizes the work performed under the project "Advanced Data Structures for Improved Cyber Resilience and Awareness in Untrusted Environments." The goal of the project was to design, analyze, and test new data structures for cybersecurity applications. We had two major thrusts: 1) using new/improved write-optimized data structures and/or algorithms to better man- age and analyze high-speed massive-volume cyberstreams, and 2) adding security features to data structures at minimum cost. Write optimization allows data structures to better use secondary memory to store and search a larger amount of useful information. Secondary memory is large compared to main memory, but data movement to and from secondary memory must be carefully managed to run quickly enough to keep up with fast streams. The first thrust included managing cyberstreams in parallel, both multi-threaded and distributed, and improving the benchmarking infrastructure for testing new streaming data structures. We considered both (near) real-time discovery of particular patterns, and improved logging for improved forensics. We considered two kinds of security-feature problem. The first was high-performance history- independent external-memory data structures. These provide certain protections to data if a disk is stolen. We also prove some trade-offs between speed and security in this setting. The second data-security problem is more secure data look-up in secret-shared data bases. This report summarizes the project's major accomplishments, with the background to under- stand these accomplishments. It gathers the abstracts and references for the six refereed publications that have appeared as part of this work. We summarize several accomplishments that will be submitted for publication. We then archive one piece of partial work that is not likely to be published in the near future: validation of history-independent data structure implementations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Essence2.0 Development and Deployment (Final Report)

The objective of the project was to take two core technologies that have been developed under the Recipient’s solid laboratory products and integrate them into a single CyberPhysical awareness platform and complete development on current field-tested prototypes that will extend the integrated capability of the platform. During the final development phase, the Recipient development team and its selected industry partners tested and hardened the platform to ensure resilient and secure operation of the integrated platform. The team also executed substantial field testing and established the framework for defining the organization and/or commercial infrastructure needed to sustain operations and provide readiness for a national scale deployment. The focus of the project was (1) the improvement, refinement, and deployment of technology for the detection of cyber-attacks on utility operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) networks and assets, including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) systems; and (2) support for containment and remediation of adversarial threats and actions against those systems and environments.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2024

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because they can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

alfalfa↗

DOE OSTI2013

Towards a Multiscale Approach to Cybersecurity Modeling

We propose a multiscale approach to modeling cyber networks, with the goal of capturing a view of the network and overall situational awareness with respect to a few key properties--- connectivity, distance, and centrality--- for a system under an active attack. We focus on theoretical and algorithmic foundations of multiscale graphs, coming from an algorithmic perspective, with the goal of modeling cyber system defense as a specific use case scenario. We first define a notion of \emph{multiscale} graphs, in contrast with their well-studied single-scale counterparts. We develop multiscale analogs of paths and distance metrics. As a simple, motivating example of a common metric, we present a multiscale analog of the all-pairs shortest-path problem, along with a multiscale analog of a well-known algorithm which solves it. From a cyber defense perspective, this metric might be used to model the distance from an attacker's position in the network to a sensitive machine. In addition, we investigate probabilistic models of connectivity. These models exploit the hierarchy to quantify the likelihood that sensitive targets might be reachable from compromised nodes. We believe that our novel multiscale approach to modeling cyber-physical systems will advance several aspects of cyber defense, specifically allowing for a more efficient and agile approach to defending these systems.

Cybersecurity↗

DOE OSTI2022

Signal-Based Fast Tripping Protection Schemes for Electric Power Distribution System Resilience

This report is a summary of a 3-year LDRD project that developed novel methods to detect faults in the electric power grid dramatically faster than today’s protection systems. Accurately detecting and quickly removing electrical faults is imperative for power system resilience and national security to minimize impacts to defense critical infrastructure. The new protection schemes will improve grid stability during disturbances and allow additional integration of renewable energy technologies with low inertia and low fault currents. Signal-based fast tripping schemes were developed that use the physics of the grid and do not rely on communication to reduce cyber risks for safely removing faults.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE)

The Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response Office (CESER) has partnered with Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and energy companies to develop CyOTE. This research initiative addresses cybersecurity threats against operational technology (OT) networks by sharing intelligence about adversarial tactics and techniques with the energy sector. CyOTE improves the sector’s ability to detect anomalous behavior that indicates potential malicious cyber activity in OT networks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Data Center Cybersecurity, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Cohort Summary: Takeaways and Action Plans

This report summarizes the outcomes of the Data Center Cohort under the Department of Energy’s Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, aimed at enhancing grid resilience through cybersecurity, supply chain risk management (SCRM), and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). The cohort engaged 17 organizations across utilities, data center operators, vendors, and technology providers in three sessions combining presentations, discussions, and exercises. Key topics included AI-driven load behavior, cybersecurity vulnerabilities in UPS/BESS and cooling systems, governance gaps at utility–data center boundaries, and supply chain integrity. Five cross-cutting themes emerged: interconnection architecture vulnerabilities, fragmented governance, AI-driven stability risks, lack of regulatory frameworks, and long-term supply chain concerns. Actionable recommendations were developed, including implementing DMZ segmentation, formalizing vendor access agreements, designing AI workload limits, and advancing standards through NERC and state-level programs. These strategies aim to strengthen resilience, clarify responsibilities, and ensure secure integration of data centers into the grid.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

Quantifying Graph Uncertainty from Communication Data

Graphs are a widely used abstraction for representing a variety of important real-world problems including emulating cyber networks for situational awareness, or studying social networks to understand human interactions or pandemic spread. Communication data is often converted into graphs to help understand social and technical patterns in the underlying communication data. However, prior to this project, little work had been performed analyzing how best to develop graphs from such data. Thus, many critical, national security problems were being performed against graph representations of questionable quality. Herein, we describe our analyses that were precursors to our final statistically grounded technique for creating static graph snapshots from a stream of communication events. The first analyzes the statistical distribution properties of a variety of real-world communication datasets generally fit best by Pareto, log normal, and extreme value distributions. The second derives graph properties that can be estimated given the expected statistical distribution for communication events and the communication interval to be viewed node observability, edge observability, and expected accuracy of node degree. Unfortunately, as that final process is under review for publication, we can't publish it here at this time.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the U.S. electrifies the transportation sector, cyberattacks targeting vehicle charging could impact several critical infrastructure sectors including power systems, manufacturing, medical services, and agriculture. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery capabilities and must communicate to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid operator communication systems could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks — or public perception of such — would ripple across the industry and produce lasting effects. Unfortunately, there is currently no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured inter faces. Comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project provided the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team created a cybersecurity threat model and performed a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets across multiple manufacturers and vendors, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders could better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗