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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 1,279 records · Page 71
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NASA NTRS2009

Development and Testing of the Orion CEV Parachute Assembly System (CPAS)

The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is an element of the Constellation Program that includes launch vehicles, spacecraft, and ground systems needed to embark on a robust space exploration program. As an anchoring capability of the Constellation Program, the CEV shall be human-rated and will carry human crews and cargo from Earth into space and back again. Coupled with transfer stages, landing vehicles, and surface exploration systems, the CEV will serve as an essential component of the architecture that supports human voyages to the Moon and beyond. In addition, the CEV will be modified, as required, to support International Space Station (ISS) mission requirements for crewed and pressurized cargo configurations. Headed by Johnson Space Center (JSC), NASA selected Jacobs Engineering as the support contractor to manage the overall CEV Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) program development. Airborne Systems was chosen to develop the parachute system components. General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GD-OTS) was subcontracted to Airborne Systems to provide the mortar systems. Thus the CPAS development team of JSC, Jacobs, Airborne Systems and GD-OTS was formed. The CPAS team has completed the first phase, or Generation I, of the design, fabrication, and test plan. This paper presents an overview of the CPAS program including system requirements and the development of the second phase, known as the Engineering Development Unit (EDU) architecture. We also present top level results of the tests completed to date. A significant number of ground and flight tests have been completed since the last CPAS presentation at the 2007 AIAA ADS Conference.

Lichodziejewski, David↗
NASA NTRS2006

Joint Non-kinetic Effects Model (JNEM)

This slide presentation reviews the development of the Joint Non-kinetic Effects Model (JNEM), which is tool to support Battle Command Training that links simulation-generated non-kinetic events and outcomes to Training Audience Command and Staff decisions. JNEM helps create the operating environment for the following population groups (P-groups): (1) Local Civilians on the Battlefield, (2) Inter-Governmental Organizations (3) Non-Governmental Organizations (4) Contractors on the battlefield.

wargaming↗
NASA NTRS2008

Launch and Landing Effects Ground Operations (LLEGO) Model

LLEGO is a model for understanding recurring launch and landing operations costs at Kennedy Space Center for human space flight. Launch and landing operations are often referred to as ground processing, or ground operations. Currently, this function is specific to the ground operations for the Space Shuttle Space Transportation System within the Space Shuttle Program. The Constellation system to follow the Space Shuttle consists of the crewed Orion spacecraft atop an Ares I launch vehicle and the uncrewed Ares V cargo launch vehicle. The Constellation flight and ground systems build upon many elements of the existing Shuttle flight and ground hardware, as well as upon existing organizations and processes. In turn, the LLEGO model builds upon past ground operations research, modeling, data, and experience in estimating for future programs. Rather than to simply provide estimates, the LLEGO model s main purpose is to improve expenses by relating complex relationships among functions (ground operations contractor, subcontractors, civil service technical, center management, operations, etc.) to tangible drivers. Drivers include flight system complexity and reliability, as well as operations and supply chain management processes and technology. Together these factors define the operability and potential improvements for any future system, from the most direct to the least direct expenses.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2009

Infusing Training into the Documentation and Culture of Ares I Upper Stage Design and Manufacturing

In roughly two years time, Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC) Mission Operations Laboratory (MOL) has incubated a personnel training and certification program for about 1000 learners and multiple phases of the Ares I Upper Stage (US) project. Previous MOL-developed training programs focused on about 100 learners with a focus on operations, and had enough full-time training staff to develop courseware and provide training administration. This paper discusses 1) how creation of a broad, structured training program unfolded as feedback from more narrowly defined tasks, 2) how training philosophy, development methods, and administration are being simplified and tailored so that many Upper Stage organizations can grow their own training yet maintain consistency, accountability, and traceability across the project, and 3) possibilities for interfacing with the production contractor's training system and staff.

Scott, David W.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Growing a Training System and Culture for the Ares I Upper Stage Project

In roughly two years time, Marshall Space Flight Center s (MSFC) Mission Operations Laboratory (MOL) has incubated a personnel training and certification program for about 1000 learners and multiple phases of the Ares I Upper Stage (US) project. Previous MOL-developed training programs focused on about 100 learners with a focus on operations, and had enough full-time training staff to develop courseware and provide training administration. This paper discusses 1) the basics of MOL's training philosophy, 2) how creation of a broad, structured training program unfolded as feedback from more narrowly defined tasks, 3) how training philosophy, development methods, and administration are being simplified and tailored so that many Upper Stage organizations can "grow their own" training yet maintain consistency, accountability, and traceability across the project, 4) interfacing with the production contractor's training system and staff, and 5) reaping training value from existing materials and events.

Scott, David W.↗
NASA NTRS2009

TurboTech Technical Evaluation Automated System

TurboTech software is a Web-based process that simplifies and semiautomates technical evaluation of NASA proposals for Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives (COTRs). At the time of this reporting, there have been no set standards or systems for training new COTRs in technical evaluations. This new process provides boilerplate text in response to interview style questions. This text is collected into a Microsoft Word document that can then be further edited to conform to specific cases. By providing technical language and a structured format, TurboTech allows the COTRs to concentrate more on the actual evaluation, and less on deciding what language would be most appropriate. Since the actual word choice is one of the more time-consuming parts of a COTRs job, this process should allow for an increase in quantity of proposals evaluated. TurboTech is applicable to composing technical evaluations of contractor proposals, task and delivery orders, change order modifications, requests for proposals, new work modifications, task assignments, as well as any changes to existing contracts.

Tiffany, Dorothy J.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Engine Gimbal Requirements for Ground Testing of J-2X

Based on the Apollo-era J-2 that powered the second and third stages of the Saturn V, the current J-2X is the liquid hydrogen and oxygen high-altitude rocket engine in development for both the Ares I Upper Stage and Ares V Earth Departure Stage. During my summer 2009 internship, J-2X was at a stage in its design maturity where verification testing needed to be considered for the benefit of adequate test facility preparation. My task was to focus on gimbal requirements and gimbal related hot-fire test plans. Facility capabilities were also of interest, specifically for hot-fire testing slated to occur at test stands A-1, A-2, and A-3 at Stennis Space Center(SSC) in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. Gimbal requirements and stage interface conditions were investigated by applying a top-to-bottom systems engineering approach, which involved system level requirements, engine level requirements from both government and engine contractor perspectives, component level requirements, and the J-2X to Upper Stage and Earth Departure Stage interface control documents. Previous hydrogen and oxygen liquid rocket engine gimbal verification methods were researched for a glimpse at lessons learned. Discussion among the J-2X community affected by gimballing was organized to obtain input relative to proper verification of their respective component. Implementing suggestions such as gimbal pattern, angulated dwell time, altitude testing options, power level, and feed line orientation, I was able to match tests to test stands in the A Complex at SSC. Potential test capability gaps and risks were identified and pursued. The culmination of all these efforts was to coordinate with SSC to define additional facility requirements for both the A-3 altitude test stand that is currently under construction and the A-1 sea level test stand which is being renovated

Kovalcik, Julia↗
NASA NTRS2009

Tensile Fabrics Enhance Architecture Around the World

Using a remarkable fabric originally developed to protect Apollo astronauts, Birdair Inc. of Amherst, New York, has crafted highly durable, safe, environmentally friendly, and architecturally stunning tensile membrane roofs for over 900 landmark structures around the world. Travelers in airports, sports fans at stadiums, and shoppers in malls have all experienced the benefits of the Teflon-coated fiberglass fabric that has enabled Birdair to grow from a small company established in its founder?s kitchen in 1955 to a multimillion-dollar specialty contractor today.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2008

Increasing the Cost-efficiency of the DSN

JPL has operated the Deep Space Network (DSN) on behalf of NASA since the 1960's. Over the last two decades, the DSN budget has generally declined in real-year dollars while the aging assets required more attention, and the missions became more complex. As a result, the budget has been increasingly consumed by Operations and Maintenance (O and M), significantly reducing the funding wedge available for technology investment and for enhancing the DSN capability and capacity. Responding to this budget squeeze, the DSN launched an effort to improve the cost-efficiency of the O and M. In this paper we: Analyze the components of O&M. We note for example that, for the DSN, less than 20% of the staff engage in the traditional human-in-front-a-console role, so any effort to increase the cost efficiency must go beyond reducing the number of "Real-time operators." Explain the underlying organizational and cultural structures. Any cost-efficiency activities changes either accept, or carefully modify these structures. For example, the DSN O&M is based on the concept that there are three nearly identical antenna complexes separated by approximately 1200 in latitude and that each antenna complex is operated by a different contractor (driven by international agreements). Explore planned changes in the customer interface, e.g. web-based automated scheduling, and the processes required for a transition. Changes have to be evaluated in the larger end-to-end context, e.g. do the changes provide a net cost-efficiency for the DSN and the missions, or do they merely shift cost from the DSN to the missions. Consider possible significant changes in real-time pass management, e.g. full-remoting of operations, and lights-dim operations, while maintaining (or improving) the performance metrics of the DSN. Investigate how procedural and administrative changes could increase cost-efficiency, in conjunction with changes in the customer interfaces and real-time pass management. Examples would be handling of inter-governmental agreements, improved sharing of resources with other agencies, and better use of commercial (rather than government) resources

Deep Space Network (DSN)↗
NASA NTRS2009

2008 NASA Seal/Secondary Air System Workshop

The 2008 NASA Seal/Secondary Air System Workshop covered the following topics: (i) Overview of NASA s new Orion project aimed at developing a new spacecraft that will fare astronauts to the International Space Station, the Moon, Mars, and beyond; (ii) Overview of NASA s fundamental aeronautics technology project; (iii) Overview of NASA Glenn s seal project aimed at developing advanced seals for NASA s turbomachinery, space, and reentry vehicle needs; (iv) Reviews of NASA prime contractor, vendor, and university advanced sealing concepts, test results, experimental facilities, and numerical predictions; and (v) Reviews of material development programs relevant to advanced seals development. Turbine engine studies have shown that reducing seal leakage as well as high-pressure turbine (HPT) blade tip clearances will reduce fuel burn, lower emissions, retain exhaust gas temperature margin, and increase range. Turbine seal development topics covered include a method for fast-acting HPT blade tip clearance control, noncontacting low-leakage seals, intershaft seals, and a review of engine seal performance requirements for current and future Army engine platforms.

Steinetz, Bruce M.↗
NASA NTRS2010

EVA 2010: Preparing for International Space Station EVA Operations Post-Space Shuttle Retirement

The expected retirement of the NASA Space Transportation System (also known as the Space Shuttle ) by 2011 will pose a significant challenge to Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA) on-board the International Space Station (ISS). The EVA hardware currently used to assemble and maintain the ISS was designed assuming that it would be returned to Earth on the Space Shuttle for refurbishment, or if necessary for failure investigation. With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, a new concept of operations was developed to enable EVA hardware (Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), Airlock Systems, EVA tools, and associated support hardware and consumables) to perform ISS EVAs until 2015, and possibly beyond to 2020. Shortly after the decision to retire the Space Shuttle was announced, the EVA 2010 Project was jointly initiated by NASA and the OneEVA contractor team. The challenges addressed were to extend the operating life and certification of EVA hardware, to secure the capability to launch EVA hardware safely on alternate launch vehicles, to protect for EMU hardware operability on-orbit, and to determine the source of high water purity to support recharge of PLSSs (no longer available via Shuttle). EVA 2010 Project includes the following tasks: the development of a launch fixture that would allow the EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS) to be launched on-board alternate vehicles; extension of the EMU hardware maintenance interval from 3 years (current certification) to a minimum of 6 years (to extend to 2015); testing of recycled ISS Water Processor Assembly (WPA) water for use in the EMU cooling system in lieu of water resupplied by International Partner (IP) vehicles; development of techniques to remove & replace critical components in the PLSS on-orbit (not routine); extension of on-orbit certification of EVA tools; and development of an EVA hardware logistical plan to support the ISS without the Space Shuttle. Assumptions for the EVA 2010 Project included no more than 8 EVAs per year for ISS EVA operations in the Post-Shuttle environment and limited availability of cargo upmass on IP launch vehicles. From 2010 forward, EVA operations on-board the ISS without the Space Shuttle will be a paradigm shift in safely operating EVA hardware on orbit and the EVA 2010 effort was initiated to accommodate this significant change in EVA evolutionary history.

Chullen, Cinda↗
NASA NTRS2010

Validating Human Performance Models of the Future Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle

NASA's Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) will provide transportation for crew and cargo to and from destinations in support of the Constellation Architecture Design Reference Missions. Discrete Event Simulation (DES) is one of the design methods NASA employs for crew performance of the CEV. During the early development of the CEV, NASA and its prime Orion contractor Lockheed Martin (LM) strived to seek an effective low-cost method for developing and validating human performance DES models. This paper focuses on the method developed while creating a DES model for the CEV Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, and Docking (RPOD) task to the International Space Station. Our approach to validation was to attack the problem from several fronts. First, we began the development of the model early in the CEV design stage. Second, we adhered strictly to M&S development standards. Third, we involved the stakeholders, NASA astronauts, subject matter experts, and NASA's modeling and simulation development community throughout. Fourth, we applied standard and easy-to-conduct methods to ensure the model's accuracy. Lastly, we reviewed the data from an earlier human-in-the-loop RPOD simulation that had different objectives, which provided us an additional means to estimate the model's confidence level. The results revealed that a majority of the DES model was a reasonable representation of the current CEV design.

Wong, Douglas T.↗
NASA NTRS2010

4D Dynamic RNP Annual Interim Report-Year 1

This Annual Interim Report summarizes the activities led by Raytheon, in collaboration with GE Aviation and SAIC, and presents the results obtained during the first year of this research effort to expand the RNP concept to 4 dimensions relative to a dynamic frame of reference. Joint Program Development Office (JPDO)Concepts of Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) considers 4 Dimension Trajectory (4DT) procedures a key enabler to Trajectory Based Operations (TBO). The JPDO defines 4DT as a precise description of an aircraft path in space and time . While NextGen assumes that this path is defined within an Earth-reference frame, many 4DT procedure implementations will require an aircraft to precisely navigate relative to a moving reference such as another aircraft to form aggregate flows or a weather cell to allow for flows to shift. Current methods of implementing routes and flight paths rely on aircraft meeting a Required Navigation Performance (RNP) specification and being equipped with a monitoring and alerting capability to annunciate when the aircraft system is unable to meet the performance specification required for the operation. Since all aircraft today operate within the NAS relative to fixed reference points, the current RNP definition is deemed satisfactory. However, it is not well understood how the current RNP construct will support NextGen 4DT procedures where aircraft operate relative to each other or to other dynamic frames of reference. The objective of this research effort is to analyze candidate 4DT procedures from both an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and aircraft perspective, to identify their specific navigational requirements, assess the shortcomings of the current RNP construct to meet these requirements, to propose an extended 4 Dimensional Dynamic RNP (4D Dynamic RNP) construct that accounts for the dynamic spatial and temporal nature of the selected 4DT procedures, and finally, to design an experiment using the Airspace and Traffic Operations Simulation (ATOS) system to validate the 4D Dynamic RNP construct. This Annual Interim Report summarizes the activities led by Raytheon, in collaboration with GE Aviation and SAIC, and presents the results obtained during the first year of this research effort to expand the RNP concept to 4 dimensions relative to a dynamic frame of reference. A comprehensive assessment of the state-of-the-art international implementation of current RNP was completed and presented in the Contractor Report RNP State-of-the-Art Assessment, Version 4, 17 December 2008 . The team defined in detail two 4DT operations, Airborne Precision Spacing and Self-Separation, that are ideally suited to be supported by 4D Dynamic RNP and developed their respective conceptual frameworks, Required Interval Management Performance (RIMP) Version 1.1, 13 April 2009 and Required Self Separation Performance (RSSP) Version 1.1, 13 April 2009 . Finally, the team started the development of a mathematical model and simulation tool for RIMP and RSSP scheduled to be delivered during the second year of this research effort.

Finkelsztein, Daniel M.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Ares I-X Roll Control System Development

Project Managers often face challenging technical, schedule and budget issues. This presentation will explore how the Ares I-X Roll Control System Integrated Product Team (IPT) mitigated challenges such as concurrent engineering requirements and environments and evolving program processes, while successfully managing an aggressive project schedule and tight budget. IPT challenges also included communications and negotiations among inter- and intra-government agencies, including the US Air Force, NASA/MSFC Propulsion Engineering, LaRC, GRC, KSC, WSTF, and the Constellation Program. In order to successfully meet these challenges it was essential that the IPT define those items that most affected the schedule critical path, define early mitigation strategies to reduce technical, schedule, and budget risks, and maintain the end-product focus of an "unmanned test flight" context for the flight hardware. The makeup of the IPT and how it would function were also important considerations. The IPT consisted of NASA/MSFC (project management, engineering, and safety/quality) and contractors (Teledyne Brown Engineering and Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne, who supplied heritage hardware experience). The early decision to have a small focused IPT working "badgelessly" across functional lines to eliminate functional stove-piping allowed for many more tasks to be done by fewer people. It also enhanced a sense of ownership of the products, while still being able to revert back to traditional roles in order to provide the required technical independence in design reviews and verification closures. This presentation will highlight several prominent issues and discuss how they were mitigated and the resulting Lessons Learned that might benefit other projects.

Unger, Ronald J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Improving Life-Cycle Cost Management of Spacecraft Missions

This presentation will explore the results of a recent NASA Life-Cycle Cost study and how project managers can use the findings and recommendations to improve planning and coordination early in the formulation cycle and avoid common pitfalls resulting in cost overruns. The typical NASA space science mission will exceed both the initial estimated and the confirmed life-cycle costs by the end of the mission. In a fixed-budget environment, these overruns translate to delays in starting or launching future missions, or in the worst case can lead to cancelled missions. Some of these overruns are due to issues outside the control of the project; others are due to the unpredictable problems (unknown unknowns) that can affect any development project. However, a recent study of life-cycle cost growth by the Discovery and New Frontiers Program Office identified a number of areas that are within the scope of project management to address. The study also found that the majority of the underlying causes for cost overruns are embedded in the project approach during the formulation and early design phases, but the actual impacts typically are not experienced until late in the project life cycle. Thus, project management focus in key areas such as integrated schedule development, management structure and contractor communications processes, heritage and technology assumptions, and operations planning, can be used to validate initial cost assumptions and set in place management processes to avoid the common pitfalls resulting in cost overruns.

Clardy, Dennon↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk Mitigation Approach to Commercial Resupply to the International Space Station

In August 2006, NASA awarded Space Act Agreements (SAAs) for Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) under the Commercial Crew and Cargo Project Office at Johnson Space Center. One of the goals of the SAAs is to facilitate U.S. private industry demonstration of cargo transportation capabilities, ultimately achieving reliable, cost effective access to low-Earth orbit (LEO). Each COTS provider is required to complete International Space Stations (ISS) Integration activities, which includes meeting the physical and functional interfaces and interface requirements between the ISS and COTS vehicles. These requirements focus on the areas of risk to the ISS during rendezvous and proximity operations, as well as the integration operations while the COTS vehicle is berthed to the ISS. On December 23, 2008, NASA awarded Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) contracts to provide resupply services to the ISS, following the Shuttle retirement. In addition to performing any ISS Integration activities, NASA will be performing independent assessments of the launch vehicle and orbital vehicle to evaluate the readiness of the contractor to deliver NASA cargo safely to the ISS. This paper will address the activities NASA Centers, both JSC and KSC, in the oversight and insight function over commercial visiting vehicles to the ISS.

Koons, Diane S.↗
NASA NTRS2009

A Comparison of the Capability of Sensitivity Level 3 and Sensitivity Level 4 Fluorescent Penetrants to Detect Fatigue Cracks in Aluminum

Historically both sensitivity level 3 and sensitivity level 4 fluorescent penetrants have been used to perform NASA Standard Level inspections of aerospace hardware. In April 2008, NASA-STD-5009 established a requirement that only sensitivity level 4 penetrants were acceptable for inspections of NASA hardware. Having NASA contractors change existing processes or perform demonstration tests to certify sensitivity level 3 penetrants posed a potentially huge cost to the Agency. This study was conducted to directly compare the probability of detection sensitivity level 3 and level 4 penetrants using both Method A and Method D inspection processes. The study results strongly support the conclusion that sensitivity level 3 penetrants are acceptable for NASA Standard Level inspections

Parker, Bradford, H.↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA's Participation in Joint SatOPS Compatibility Efforts 2009-2010

Many U.S. government organizations build or fly space systems: a) NASA, NOAA, Navy, Air Force, NRO, ORS. Others? b) Through the Joint SatOps Compatibility Committee (JSCC) we have increased the grass-roots interaction between many of these organizations. c) We all deal with many of the same challenges: More rapid deployments, lower budgets; Advancing technologies - frameworks, clouds, virtualization; Evolving concepts - automation, situational awareness, enterprise mngt. Standardization - formal or by common use. There is an inherently governmental role in creating the business case for contractors and commercial product vendors to move in directions beneficial to multiple government space organizations.

Smith, Danford↗