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At least 1,261 records · Page 70

Integrating Resilience Planning in Distribution System Planning

Electric utilities, regulators, and stakeholders face increasing risks of severe storms, freezes, floods, and heat waves damaging grid infrastructure and causing power outages—and increasing risks of utility equipment igniting wildfires. At the same time, customer electricity rates have risen substantially in recent years, due in part to replacing aging infrastructure and improving resilience to natural hazards and physical threats. To address these challenges, utilities are beginning to move beyond traditional, siloed planning processes to balance resilience with other fundamental grid objectives such as affordability, reliability, safety, and serving new loads. This study presents a framework for states and utilities that want to advance integration of resilience and distribution planning processes to improve planning efficiency, better prioritize cost-effective grid expenditures, and balance planning objectives. The framework includes 7 key integration points between these planning processes: -Strategy process -Data -Threat assessments -Solution identification and prioritization -Optimization opportunities -Consideration of other grid needs -Metrics Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory reviewed utility distribution system plans and interviewed subject matter experts to identify emerging practices for each of the 7 integration points. This report presents these practices, which can be used as a guide toward more holistic planning and cohesive investment strategies. It also includes 3 case studies to provide practical examples of how utilities apply such integrated planning processes: two pole hardening programs and one microgrid planning effort. The report concludes by identifying opportunities for future research.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

FIC Consequence Profile - Hypothetical Cybercrime Syndicate Adversary Dossier

The FIC team has engaged PNNL’s Shamrock Cyber team to produce this Consequence Profile. This Consequence Profile is an Adversary Dossier, which provides the foundation for a thorough understanding of unacceptable mission outcomes, and the threats and vulnerabilities that make these outcomes plausible. The dossier helps stakeholders and development teams understand each other’s viewpoints. It also provides a means for reducing overall risk by prioritizing threats and vulnerabilities based on unacceptable outcomes. The Consequence Profile can be used as is, or as content to inform other reports tailored to a specific audience. It is intended to enable decision makers at all levels to improve the security posture of the system.

Beaman, Jacob E.↗

Requirements Definition for ORNL Trusted Corridors Project

The ORNL Trusted Corridors Project has several other names: SensorNet Transportation Pilot; Identification and Monitoring of Radiation (in commerce) Shipments (IMR(ic)S); and Southeastern Transportation Corridor Pilot (SETCP). The project involves acquisition and analysis of transportation data at two mobile and three fixed inspection stations in five states (Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington DC). Collaborators include the State Police organizations that are responsible for highway safety, law enforcement, and incident response. The three states with fixed weigh-station deployments (KY, SC, TN) are interested in coordination of this effort for highway safety, law enforcement, and sorting/targeting/interdiction of potentially non-compliant vehicles/persons/cargo. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is interested in these deployments, as a Pilot test (SETCP) to identify Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs) in highway transport. However, the level of DNDO integration among these state deployments is presently uncertain. Moreover, DHS issues are considered secondary by the states, which perceive this work as an opportunity to leverage these (new) dual-use technologies for state needs. In addition, present experience shows that radiation detectors alone cannot detect DHS-identified IND threats. Continued SETCP success depends on the level of integration of current state/local police operations with the new DHS task of detecting IND threats, in addition to emergency preparedness and homeland security. This document describes the enabling components for continued SETCP development and success, including: sensors and their use at existing deployments (Section 1); personnel training (Section 2); concept of operations (Section 3); knowledge discovery from the copious data (Section 4); smart data collection, integration and database development, advanced algorithms for multiple sensors, and network communications (Section 5); and harmonization of local, state, and Federal procedures and protocols (Section 6).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Climate-derived tensions in Arctic security.

Globally, there is no lack of security threats. Many of them demand priority engagement and there can never be adequate resources to address all threats. In this context, climate is just another aspect of global security and the Arctic just another region. In light of physical and budgetary constraints, new security needs must be integrated and prioritized with existing ones. This discussion approaches the security impacts of climate from that perspective, starting with the broad security picture and establishing how climate may affect it. This method provides a different view from one that starts with climate and projects it, in isolation, as the source of a hypothetical security burden. That said, the Arctic does appear to present high-priority security challenges. Uncertainty in the timing of an ice-free Arctic affects how quickly it will become a security priority. Uncertainty in the emergent extreme and variable weather conditions will determine the difficulty (cost) of maintaining adequate security (order) in the area. The resolution of sovereignty boundaries affects the ability to enforce security measures, and the U.S. will most probably need a military presence to back-up negotiated sovereignty agreements. Without additional global warming, technology already allows the Arctic to become a strategic link in the global supply chain, possibly with northern Russia as its main hub. Additionally, the multinational corporations reaping the economic bounty may affect security tensions more than nation-states themselves. Countries will depend ever more heavily on the global supply chains. China has particular needs to protect its trade flows. In matters of security, nation-state and multinational-corporate interests will become heavily intertwined.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

PINS Measurements of Explosive Simulants for Cargo Screening

As part of its efforts to prevent the introduction of explosive threats on commercial flights, the Transportation Security Administration (TSL) is evaluating new explosives detection systems (EDSs) for use in air cargo inspection. The TSL has contracted Battelle to develop a new type of explosives simulant to assist in this development. These are designed to mimic the elemental profile (C, H, N, O, etc.) of explosives as well as their densities. Several “neutron in—gamma out” (n,?) techniques have been considered to quantify the elemental profile in these new simulants and the respective explosives. The method chosen by Battelle is Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS), developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Battelle wishes to validate that the simulants behave like the explosive threats with this technology. The results of the validation measurements are presented in this report.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Audit Report on "Management Controls over the Department's Excess Weapons Inventories and Selected Sensitive Equipment used by Protective Forces"

Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Energy has, on several occasions, revised its security posture based on identified threats and adversaries. These revisions in security posture have driven Departmental sites to upgrade their defensive and tactical equipment. Subsequent changes in the perceived threats have, in some cases, led to a reduction in the need for certain types of weapons, thus creating a pool of surplus equipment. These surplus weapons could potentially be used by other Department sites and Federal law enforcement agencies. Recent Office of Inspector General reports have raised concerns with the adequacy of controls related to defensive and tactical equipment. For example, our report on Management Controls Over Defense Related High Risk Property (OAS-M-08-06, April 2008) found that administrative controls over certain defense related high risk property were not sufficient for providing accountability over these items. Because of prior reported weaknesses in controls over defensive and tactical equipment, we initiated this audit to determine whether the Department and its contractors were properly managing excess weapons inventories and selected sensitive equipment used by protective forces. Our review disclosed that the Department was not always properly managing its inventories of excess weapons and selected sensitive equipment. We identified issues with the retention of unneeded weapons at many locations and with the identification and tracking of sensitive items. More specifically: Sites maintained large inventories of weapons that were no longer needed but had not been made available for use by either other Departmental sites or other Federal law enforcement agencies. For instance, at six of the locations included in our review we identified a total of 2,635 unneeded weapons with a total acquisition value of over $2.8 million that had not been officially declared as excess - an action that would have made them available for others to use. In addition; Sites were not always identifying, tracking and properly disposing of potentially high risk and sensitive equipment. In particular, we identified control weaknesses in this area related to weapons sights and scopes. These issues occurred because the Department did not have processes in place to properly manage excess inventories of weapons. In particular, the Department does not have requirements for ensuring timely declaration of excess weapons. Additionally, certain sites indicated that they were unwilling to give up excess weapons because of the possibility that they may be needed in the future. However, other sites had a need for some of these weapons and could have avoided purchasing them had they been made available through the excess screening process. Also, we found that the Department lacks clear guidance on the identification of high risk/sensitive equipment. Except for immaterial differences, we were able to locate and verify accountability over the items of defensive and tactical equipment we selected for review. Specifically, we took statistical samples of weapons, ammunition, and other related equipment and were able to verify their existence. While these accountability measures were noteworthy, additional action is necessary to strengthen controls over weapon and sensitive equipment management. Untimely declaration of excess weapons may result in an inefficient use of scarce Government resources. Similarly, if selected high risk/sensitive equipment is not properly categorized and tracked, accountability issues may occur. To address these issues, we made recommendations aimed at improving the management of these categories of defensive and tactical equipment.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Constructing vulnerabilty and protective measures indices for the enhanced critical infrastructure protection program.

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has directed its Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) to form partnerships with the owners and operators of assets most essential to the Nation's well being - a subclass of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) - and to conduct site visits for these and other high-risk assets as part of the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) Program. During each such visit, the PSA documents information about the facility's current CIKR protection posture and overall security awareness. The primary goals for ECIP site visits (DHS 2009) are to: (1) inform facility owners and operators of the importance of their facilities as an identified high-priority CIKR and the need to be vigilant in light of the ever-present threat of terrorism; (2) identify protective measures currently in place at these facilities, provide comparisons of CIKR protection postures across like assets, and track the implementation of new protective measures; and (3) enhance existing relationships among facility owners and operators; DHS; and various Federal, State, local tribal, and territorial partners. PSAs conduct ECIP visits to assess overall site security; educate facility owners and operators about security; help owners and operators identify gaps and potential improvements; and promote communication and information sharing among facility owners and operators, DHS, State governments, and other security partners. Information collected during ECIP visits is used to develop metrics; conduct sector-by-sector and cross-sector vulnerability comparisons; identify security gaps and trends across CIKR sectors and subsectors; establish sector baseline security survey results; and track progress toward improving CIKR security through activities, programs, outreach, and training (Snyder 2009). The data being collected are used in a framework consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) risk criteria (DHS 2009). The NIPP framework incorporates consequence, threat, and vulnerability components and addresses all hazards. The analysis of the vulnerability data needs to be reproducible, support risk analysis, and go beyond protection. It also needs to address important security/vulnerability topics, such as physical security, cyber security, systems analysis, and dependencies and interdependencies. This report provides an overview of the approach being developed to estimate vulnerability and provide vulnerability comparisons for sectors and subsectors. the information will be used to assist DHS in analyzing existing protective measures and vulnerability at facilities, to identify potential ways to reduce vulnerabilities, and to assist in preparing sector risk estimates. The owner/operator receives an analysis of the data collected for a specific asset, showing a comparison between the facility's protection posture/vulnerability index and those of DHS sector/subsector sites visited. This comparison gives the owner/operator an indication of the asset's security strengths and weaknesses that may be contributing factors to its vulnerability and protection posture. The information provided to the owner/operator shows how the asset compares to other similar assets within the asset's sector or subsector. A 'dashboard' display is used to illustrate the results in a convenient format. The dashboard allows the owner/operator to analyze the implementation of additional protective measures and to illustrate how such actions would impact the asset's Protective Measures Index (PMI) or Vulnerability Index (VI).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuisance Source Population Modeling for Radiation Detection System Analysis

A major challenge facing the prospective deployment of radiation detection systems for homeland security applications is the discrimination of radiological or nuclear 'threat sources' from radioactive, but benign, 'nuisance sources'. Common examples of such nuisance sources include naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM), medical patients who have received radioactive drugs for either diagnostics or treatment, and industrial sources. A sensitive detector that cannot distinguish between 'threat' and 'benign' classes will generate false positives which, if sufficiently frequent, will preclude it from being operationally deployed. In this report, we describe a first-principles physics-based modeling approach that is used to approximate the physical properties and corresponding gamma ray spectral signatures of real nuisance sources. Specific models are proposed for the three nuisance source classes - NORM, medical and industrial. The models can be validated against measured data - that is, energy spectra generated with the model can be compared to actual nuisance source data. We show by example how this is done for NORM and medical sources, using data sets obtained from spectroscopic detector deployments for cargo container screening and urban area traffic screening, respectively. In addition to capturing the range of radioactive signatures of individual nuisance sources, a nuisance source population model must generate sources with a frequency of occurrence consistent with that found in actual movement of goods and people. Measured radiation detection data can indicate these frequencies, but, at present, such data are available only for a very limited set of locations and time periods. In this report, we make more general estimates of frequencies for NORM and medical sources using a range of data sources such as shipping manifests and medical treatment statistics. We also identify potential data sources for industrial source frequencies, but leave the task of estimating these frequencies for future work. Modeling of nuisance source populations is only useful if it helps in understanding detector system performance in real operational environments. Examples of previous studies in which nuisance source models played a key role are briefly discussed. These include screening of in-bound urban traffic and monitoring of shipping containers in transit to U.S. ports.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Simulated, Emulated, and Physical Investigative Analysis (SEPIA) of networked systems.

This report describes recent progress made in developing and utilizing hybrid Simulated, Emulated, and Physical Investigative Analysis (SEPIA) environments. Many organizations require advanced tools to analyze their information system's security, reliability, and resilience against cyber attack. Today's security analysis utilize real systems such as computers, network routers and other network equipment, computer emulations (e.g., virtual machines) and simulation models separately to analyze interplay between threats and safeguards. In contrast, this work developed new methods to combine these three approaches to provide integrated hybrid SEPIA environments. Our SEPIA environments enable an analyst to rapidly configure hybrid environments to pass network traffic and perform, from the outside, like real networks. This provides higher fidelity representations of key network nodes while still leveraging the scalability and cost advantages of simulation tools. The result is to rapidly produce large yet relatively low-cost multi-fidelity SEPIA networks of computers and routers that let analysts quickly investigate threats and test protection approaches.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Cybersecurity through Real-Time Distributed Control Systems

Critical infrastructure sites and facilities are becoming increasingly dependent on interconnected physical and cyber-based real-time distributed control systems (RTDCSs). A mounting cybersecurity threat results from the nature of these ubiquitous and sometimes unrestrained communications interconnections. Much work is under way in numerous organizations to characterize the cyber threat, determine means to minimize risk, and develop mitigation strategies to address potential consequences. While it seems natural that a simple application of cyber-protection methods derived from corporate business information technology (IT) domain would lead to an acceptable solution, the reality is that the characteristics of RTDCSs make many of those methods inadequate and unsatisfactory or even harmful. A solution lies in developing a defense-in-depth approach that ranges from protection at communications interconnect levels ultimately to the control system s functional characteristics that are designed to maintain control in the face of malicious intrusion. This paper summarizes the nature of RTDCSs from a cybersecurity perspec tive and discusses issues, vulnerabilities, candidate mitigation approaches, and metrics.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NW-MILO Acoustic Data Collection

There is an enduring requirement to improve our ability to detect potential threats and discriminate these from the legitimate commercial and recreational activity ongoing in the nearshore/littoral portion of the maritime domain. The Northwest Maritime Information and Littoral Operations (NW-MILO) Program at PNNL’s Coastal Security Institute in Sequim, Washington is establishing a methodology to detect and classify these threats - in part through developing a better understanding of acoustic signatures in a near-shore environment. The purpose of the acoustic data collection described here is to investigate the acoustic signatures of small vessels. The data is being recorded continuously, 24 hours a day, along with radar track data and imagery. The recording began in August 2008, and to date the data contains tens of thousands of signals from small vessels recorded in a variety of environmental conditions. The quantity and variety of this data collection, with the supporting imagery and radar track data, makes it particularly useful for the development of robust acoustic signature models and advanced algorithms for signal classification and information extraction. The underwater acoustic sensing system is part of a multi-modal sensing system that is operating near the mouth of Sequim Bay. Sequim Bay opens onto the Straight of Juan de Fuca, which contains part of the border between the U.S. and Canada. Table 1 lists the specific components used for the NW-MILO system. The acoustic sensor is a hydrophone permanently deployed at a mean depth of about 3 meters. In addition to a hydrophone, the other sensors in the system are a marine radar, an electro-optical (EO) camera and an infra-red (IR) camera. The radar is integrated with a vessel tracking system (VTS) that provides position, speed and heading information. The data from all the sensors is recorded and saved to a central server. The data has been validated in terms of its usability for characterizing the signatures of small vessels. The sampling rate of 8 kHz and low pass filtering to 2 kHz results in an alias-free signal in the frequency band that is appropriate for small vessels. Calibration was performed using a Lubell underwater speaker so that the raw data signal levels can be converted to sound pressure. Background noise is present due to a nearby pump and as a result of tidal currents. More study is needed to fully characterize the noise, but it does not pose an obstacle to using the acoustic data for the purposes of vessel detection and signature analysis. The detection range for a small vessel was estimated using the calibrated voltage response of the system and a cylindrical spreading model for transmission loss. The sound pressure of a typical vessel with an outboard motor was found to be around 140 dB mPa, and could theoretically be detected from 10 km away. In practical terms, a small vessel could reliably be detected from 3 - 5 km away. The data is archived in netCDF files, a standard scientific file format that is "self describing". This means that each data file contains the metadata - timestamps, units, origin, etc. - needed to make the data meaningful and portable. Other file formats, such as XML, are also supported. A visualization tool has been developed to view the acoustic data in the form of spectrograms, along with the coincident radar track data and camera images.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Final Report for LDRD Project 02-FS-009 Gigapixel Surveillance Camera

The threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction add urgency to the development of new techniques for surveillance and intelligence collection. For example, the United States faces a serious and growing threat from adversaries who locate key facilities underground, hide them within other facilities, or otherwise conceal their location and function. Reconnaissance photographs are one of the most important tools for uncovering the capabilities of adversaries. However, current imaging technology provides only infrequent static images of a large area, or occasional video of a small area. We are attempting to add a new dimension to reconnaissance by introducing a capability for large area video surveillance. This capability would enable tracking of all vehicle movements within a very large area. The goal of our project is the development of a gigapixel video surveillance camera for high altitude aircraft or balloon platforms. From very high altitude platforms (20-40 km altitude) it would be possible to track every moving vehicle within an area of roughly 100 km x 100 km, about the size of the San Francisco Bay region, with a gigapixel camera. Reliable tracking of vehicles requires a ground sampling distance (GSD) of 0.5 to 1 m and a framing rate of approximately two frames per second (fps). For a 100 km x 100 km area the corresponding pixel count is 10 gigapixels for a 1-m GSD and 40 gigapixels for a 0.5-m GSD. This is an order of magnitude beyond the 1 gigapixel camera envisioned in our LDRD proposal. We have determined that an instrument of this capacity is feasible.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Computational Enzymology and Organophosphorus Degrading Enzymes: Promising Approaches Toward Remediation Technologies of Warfare Agents and Pesticides

The re-emergence of chemical weapons as a global threat in hands of terrorist groups, together with an increasing number of pesticides intoxications and environmental contaminations worldwide, has called the attention of the scientific community for the need of improvement in the technologies for detoxification of organophosphorus (OP) compounds. A compelling strategy is the use of bioremediation by enzymes that are able to hydrolyze these molecules to harmless chemical species. Several enzymes have been studied and engineered for this purpose. However, their mechanisms of action are not well understood. Theoretical investigations may help elucidate important aspects of these mechanisms and help in the development of more efficient bio-remediators. In this review, we point out the major contributions of computational methodologies applied to enzyme based detoxification of OPs. Furthermore, we highlight the use of PTE, PON, DFP, and BuChE as enzymes used in OP detoxification process and how computational tools such as molecular docking, molecular dynamics simulations and combined quantum mechanical/molecular mechanics have and will continue to contribute to this very important area of research.The re-emergence of chemical weapons as a global threat in hands of terrorist groups, together with an increasing number of pesticides intoxications and environmental contaminations worldwide, has called the attention of the scientific community for the need of improvement in the technologies for detoxification of organophosphorus (OP) compounds. A compelling strategy is the use of bioremediation by enzymes that are able to hydrolyze these molecules to harmless chemical species. Several enzymes have been studied and engineered for this purpose. However, their mechanisms of action are not well understood. Theoretical investigations may help elucidate important aspects of these mechanisms and help in the development of more efficient bio-remediators. In this review, we point out the major contributions of computational methodologies applied to enzyme based detoxification of OPs. Furthermore, we highlight the use of PTE, PON, DFP, and BuChE as enzymes used in OP detoxification process and how computational tools such as molecular docking, molecular dynamics simulations and combined quantum mechanical/molecular mechanics have and will continue to contribute to this very important area of research.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

HydroFish: freshwater fish co-occurrence with hydropower plants and non-powered dams in conterminous United States sub-basins

The HydroFish dataset lists all existing hydropower plants (EHAs) and non-powered dams (NPDs; ≥ 0.001 MW potential nominal capacity), delineates the hydrologic sub-basins in which they are situated, and then lists all freshwater fish species reported to occur in those sub-basins. This dataset was compiled using the HydroBio dataset (https://hydrosource.ornl.gov/data/datasets/hydrobio/) and contains 24 total variables that describe hydrologic sub-basins, each unique EHA (plant ID and name, geographic coordinates, permit type, capacity, etc.) and NPD (ID value, known names, geographic coordinates, and estimated potential nominal capacity), and freshwater fish species in the sub-basin (common and scientific name, origin, and migratory and threat status). The HydroBio dataset was built using Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Existing Hydropower Assets Dataset (2024 version) and Non-powered Dam Technical Potential Dataset (2024 version), and NatureServe’s fish species distribution dataset (2023 version). The dataset also contains summary variables that report the unique number of EHAs, NPDs, and freshwater fish species per sub-basin. The HydroFish dataset contains two unique data files: 1) a .csv metadata file describing the dataset variables, and 2) a .csv data file containing the actual dataset. Note that there may be many rows per unique existing hydropower plant or non-powered dam given that distinct species are listed per existing plant or NPD per sub-basin. The dataset is downloadable as a zip file containing the metadata and dataset files.

Bozeman, Bryan [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORN↗

SMART Cables for Observing the Global Ocean: Science and Implementation

The ocean is key to understanding societal threats including climate change, sea level rise, ocean warming, tsunamis, and earthquakes. Because the ocean is difficult and costly to monitor, we lack fundamental data needed to adequately model, understand, and address these threats. One solution is to integrate sensors into future undersea telecommunications cables. This is the mission of the SMART subsea cables initiative (Science Monitoring And Reliable Telecommunications). SMART sensors would “piggyback” on the power and communications infrastructure of a million kilometers of undersea fiber optic cable and thousands of repeaters, creating the potential for seafloor-based global ocean observing at a modest incremental cost. Initial sensors would measure temperature, pressure, and seismic acceleration. The resulting data would address two critical scientific and societal issues: the long-term need for sustained climate-quality data from the under-sampled ocean (e.g., deep ocean temperature, sea level, and circulation), and the near-term need for improvements to global tsunami warning networks. A Joint Task Force (JTF) led by three UN agencies (ITU/WMO/UNESCO-IOC) is working to bring this initiative to fruition. This paper explores the ocean science and early warning improvements available from SMART cable data, and the societal, technological, and financial elements of realizing such a global network. Simulations show that deep ocean temperature and pressure measurements can improve estimates of ocean circulation and heat content, and cable-based pressure and seismic-acceleration sensors can improve tsunami warning times and earthquake parameters. The technology of integrating these sensors into fiber optic cables is discussed, addressing sea and land-based elements plus delivery of real-time open data products to end users. The science and business case for SMART cables is evaluated. SMART cables have been endorsed by major ocean science organizations, and JTF is working with cable suppliers and sponsors, multilateral development banks and end users to incorporate SMART capabilities into future cable projects. By investing now, we can build up a global ocean network of long-lived SMART cable sensors, creating a transformative addition to the Global Ocean Observing System.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

ARM-IRL: Adaptive Resilience Metric Quantification Using Inverse Reinforcement Learning

The resilience of safety-critical systems is gaining importance due to the rise in cyber and physical threats, especially within critical infrastructure. Traditional static resilience metrics may not capture dynamic system states, leading to inaccurate assessments and ineffective responses to cyber threats. This work aims to develop a data-driven, adaptive method for resilience metric learning. We propose a data-driven approach using inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) to learn a single, adaptive resilience metric. The method infers a reward function from expert control actions. Unlike previous approaches using static weights or fuzzy logic, this work applies adversarial inverse reinforcement learning (AIRL), training a generator and discriminator in parallel to learn the reward structure and derive an optimal policy. The proposed approach is evaluated on multiple scenarios: optimal communication network rerouting, power distribution network reconfiguration, and cyber–physical restoration of critical loads using the IEEE 123-bus system. The adaptive, learned resilience metric enables faster critical load restoration in comparison to conventional RL approaches.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Implementation Aspects of Smart Grids Cyber-Security Cross-Layered Framework for Critical Infrastructure Operation

Communication networks in power systems are a major part of the smart grid paradigm. It enables and facilitates the automation of power grid operation as well as self-healing in contingencies. Such dependencies on communication networks, though, create a roam for cyber-threats. An adversary can launch an attack on the communication network, which in turn reflects on power grid operation. Attacks could be in the form of false data injection into system measurements, flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data, or intercepting messages. Using machine learning-based processing on data gathered from communication networks and the power grid is a promising solution for detecting cyber threats. In this paper, a co-simulation of cyber-security for cross-layer strategy is presented. The advantage of such a framework is the augmentation of valuable data that enhances the detection as well as identification of anomalies in the operation of the power grid. The framework is implemented on the IEEE 118-bus system. The system is constructed in Mininet to simulate a communication network and obtain data for analysis. A distributed three controller software-defined networking (SDN) framework is proposed that utilizes the Open Network Operating System (ONOS) cluster. According to the findings of our suggested architecture, it outperforms a single SDN controller framework by a factor of more than ten times the throughput. This provides for a higher flow of data throughout the network while decreasing congestion caused by a single controller’s processing restrictions. Furthermore, our CECD-AS approach outperforms state-of-the-art physics and machine learning-based techniques in terms of attack classification. The performance of the framework is investigated under various types of communication attacks.

cross-layered↗

A Survey on Cybersecurity Challenges, Detection, and Mitigation Techniques for the Smart Grid

The world is transitioning from the conventional grid to the smart grid at a rapid pace. Innovation always comes with some flaws; such is the case with a smart grid. One of the major challenges in the smart grid is to protect it from potential cyberattacks. There are millions of sensors continuously sending and receiving data packets over the network, so managing such a gigantic network is the biggest challenge. Any cyberattack can damage the key elements, confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the smart grid. The overall smart grid network is comprised of customers accessing the network, communication network of the smart devices and sensors, and the people managing the network (decision makers); all three of these levels are vulnerable to cyberattacks. In this survey, we explore various threats and vulnerabilities that can affect the key elements of cybersecurity in the smart grid network and then present the security measures to avert those threats and vulnerabilities at three different levels. In addition to that, we suggest techniques to minimize the chances of cyberattack at all three levels.

Tufail, Shahid↗