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Los Alamos National Laboratory standard nuclear material container

The shut down of United States (U.S.) nuclear-weapons production activities in the early 1990s left large quantities of nuclear materials throughout the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex in forms not intended for long-term storage. In May 1994, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) issued Recommendation 94-1, which called for the stabilization and disposition of 'thousands of containers of plutonium-bearing liquids and solids' in the DOE complex, including LANL in the nuclear-weapons-manufacturing pipeline when manufacturing ended. This resulted in the development of the 3013 standard with container requirements for long term storage (up to 50 years). A follow on was the Criteria For Interim Storage of Plutonium Bearing Materials, Charles B. Curtis, in 1996 to address storage other than the 3013 standard for shorter time frames. In January 2000, the DNFSB issued Recommendation 2000-1, which stated the need for LANL to repackage 'about one ton of plutonium metal and oxide,' declared excess to Defense Program (DP) needs. The DNFSB recommended that LANL 'stabilize and seal within welded containers with an inert atmosphere the plutonium oxides ... which are not yet in states conforming to the long-term storage envisaged by DOE-STD-3013,' and that they '... enclose existing and newly-generated legacy plutonium metal in sealed containers with an inert atmosphere,' and 'remediate and/or safely store the various residues.' Recommendation 2000-1, while adding to the number of items needing remediation, also reiterated the need to address remaining items from 1994-1 in a timely fashion. Since timetables slipped, the DNFSB recommended that the Complex 'prioritize and schedule tasks according to the consideration of risks.' In March 2005, the DNFSB issued Recommendation 2005-1. This recommendation addresses the need for a consistent set of criteria across the DOE complex for the interim storage of nuclear material packaged outside an engineered barrier. The Department of Energy (DOE) approved and issued on March 7, 2008, DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual [hereafter referred to as Manual] to address this recommendation, and a Prioritization Methodology as a complex-wide requirement for the packaging of nuclear material outside an engineered barrier. The Manual establishes 'technically justified criteria' for packages in order to ensure safe interim storage and handling outside an engineered barrier. The Prioritization Methodology establishes a risk-based procedure for identifying the order to repackage that would most efficiently reduce the overall risk. It is a logical extension of the work performed to meet the two earlier DNFSB recommendations to include all materials stored outside of engineered barriers, i.e., not just excess materials. LANL will continue to work all aspects of a comprehensive Implementation Plan to d monstrate all aspects of compliance with the Manual. Assessment of materials in nonstandard containers utilizing a risk based approach, repackaging up to 400 containers/year; activities include reprocessing of items to allow container consolidation and subsequent increase in vault capacity. Continued efforts in establishing and implementing a Surveillance and Maintenance Program for current Hagans and for the NG SNMCSs supported by a database for packaging and surveillance. Elastomer aging studies for the NG SNMCs will continue to justify extending the design life well beyond the currently specified five years. First production with containers available for use anticipated in June 2010. LANL will continue to define schedule and resources to meet these objectives.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Solid cancer incidence other than lung, liver and bone in Mayak workers: 1948–2004

Background: Cancer incidence in the Mayak Production Association (PA) cohort was analysed to investigate for the first time whether external gamma-ray and internal plutonium exposure are associated with raised incidence of solid cancers other than lung, liver and bone (other solid cancers). Methods: The cohort includes 22 366 workers of both sexes who were first employed between 1948 and 1982. A total of 1447 cases of other solid cancers were registered in the follow-up period until 2004. The Poisson regression was used to estimate the excess relative risk (ERR) per unit of cumulative exposure to plutonium and external gamma-ray. Results: A weak association was found between cumulative exposure to external gamma-ray and the incidence of other solid cancers (ERR/Gy = 0.07; 95% confidence intervals (CIs): 0.01–0.15), but this association lost its significance after adjusting for internal plutonium exposure. There was no indication of any association with plutonium exposure for other solid cancers. Among 16 individual cancer sites, there was a statistically significant association with external exposure for lip cancer (ERR/Gy = 1.74; 95% CI: 0.37; 6.71) and with plutonium exposure for pancreatic cancer (ERR/Gy = 1.58; 95% CI; 0.17; 4.77). Conclusion: This study of Mayak workers does not provide evidence of an increased risk of other solid cancers. The observed increase in the risk of cancer of the lip and pancreas should be treated with caution because of the limited amount of relevant data and because the observations may be simply due to chance.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

241 Am Ingrowth and Its Effect on Internal Dose

Generally, plutonium has been manufactured to support commercial and military applications involving heat sources, weapons and reactor fuel. This work focuses on three typical plutonium mixtures, while observing the potential of 241 Am ingrowth and its effect on internal dose. The term “ingrowth” is used to describe 241 Am production due solely from the decay of 241 Pu as part of a plutonium mixture, where it is initially absent or present in a smaller quantity. Dose calculation models do not account for 241 Am ingrowth unless the 241 Pu quantity is specified. This work suggested that 241 Am ingrowth be considered in bioassay analysis when there is a potential of a 10% increase to the individual’s committed effective dose. It was determined that plutonium fuel mixtures, initially absent of 241 Am, would likely exceed 10% for typical reactor grade fuel aged less than 30 years; however, heat source grade and aged weapons grade fuel would normally fall below this threshold. In conclusion, although this work addresses typical plutonium mixtures following separation, it may be extended to irradiated commercial uranium fuel and is expected to be a concern in the recycling of spent fuel.

241Am↗

A Rapid Method for Quantification OF 242Pu in Urine Using Extraction Chromatography and ICP-MS

Occupational exposure to plutonium is generally monitored through analysis of urine samples. Typically, plutonium is separated from the sample and other actinides, and the concentration is determined using alpha spectroscopy. Current methods for separations and analysis are lengthy and require long count times. A new method for monitoring occupational exposure levels of plutonium has been developed, which requires fewer steps and overall less time than the alpha spectroscopy method. In this method, the urine is acidified, and a 239 Pu internal standard is added. The urine is digested in a microwave oven, and plutonium is separated using an Eichrom TRU Resin column. The plutonium is eluted, and the eluant is injected directly into the Inductively Coupled Plasma–Mass Spectrometer (ICP-MS). Compared to a direct “dilute and shoot” method, a 30-fold improvement in sensitivity is achieved. This method was validated by analyzing several batches of spiked samples. Based on these analyses, a combined standard uncertainty plot, which relates uncertainty to concentration, was produced. As a result, the MDA 95 was calculated to be 7.0 × 10 –7 μg L –1 , and the Lc95 was calculated to be 3.5 × 10 –7 μg L –1 for this method.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Radiation Effects on Mortality from Solid Cancers Other than Lung, Liver, and Bone Cancer in the Mayak Worker Cohort: 1948–2008

Radiation effects on mortality from solid cancers other than lung, liver, and bone cancer in the Mayak worker cohort: 1948–2008. The cohort of Mayak Production Association (PA) workers in Russia offers a unique opportunity to study the effects of prolonged low dose rate external gamma exposures and exposure to plutonium in a working age population. We examined radiation effects on the risk of mortality from solid cancers excluding sites of primary plutonium deposition (lung, liver, and bone surface) among 25,757 workers who were first employed in 1948–1982. During the period 1948–2008, there were 1,825 deaths from cancers other than lung, liver and bone. Using colon dose as a representative external dose, a linear dose response model described the data well. The excess relative risk per Gray for external gamma exposure was 0.16 (95% CI: 0.07 – 0.26) when unadjusted for plutonium exposure and 0.12 (95% CI 0.03 – 0.21) when adjusted for plutonium dose and monitoring status. There was no significant effect modification by sex or attained age. Plutonium exposure was not significantly associated with the group of cancers analyzed after adjusting for monitoring status. Site-specific risks were uncertainly estimated but positive for 13 of the 15 sites evaluated with a statistically significant estimate only for esophageal cancer. Comparison with estimates based on the acute exposures in atomic bomb survivors suggests that the excess relative risk per Gray for prolonged external exposure in Mayak workers may be lower than that for acute exposure but, given the uncertainties, the possibility of equal effects cannot be dismissed.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Testing the AVNG

An attribute measurement system (AMS) measures a number of unclassified attributes of potentially classified material. By only displaying these unclassified results as red or green lights, the AMS protects potentially classified information while still generating confidence in the measurement result. The A VNG implementation that we describe is an AMS built by RFNC - VNIIEF in Sarov, Russia. The AVNG detects neutron and gamma radiation signatures and displays the three unclassified attributes of 'plutonium presence,' 'plutonium mass > 2 kg,' and 'plutonium isotopic ratio ({sup 240}Pu to {sup 239}Pu) < 0.1.' Prior to demonstration to a joint US/Russian audience, the overall operation and thresholds of the AVNG were tested using a number of multi-kg plutonium reference material (RM) sources manufactured for this purpose. As the AVNG was designed to incorporate an open mode (where all radiation data was displayed) as well as a secure mode (where only the red/green attribute lights were visible), the AVNG was tested in both modes. We will present data from these tests using unclassified plutonium RM sources as well as detector test results obtained using smaller calibration sources.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Deconvolution of mixed gamma emitters using peak parameters

When evaluating samples containing mixtures of nuclides using gamma spectroscopy the situation sometimes arises where the nuclides present have photon emissions that cannot be resolved by the detector. An example of this is mixtures of {sup 241}Am and plutonium that have L x-ray emissions with slightly different energies which cannot be resolved using a high-purity germanium detector. It is possible to deconvolute the americium L x-rays from those plutonium based on the {sup 241}Am 59.54 keV photon. However, this requires accurate knowledge of the relative emission yields. Also, it often results in high uncertainties in the plutonium activity estimate due to the americium yields being approximately an order of magnitude greater than those for plutonium. In this work, an alternative method of determining the relative fraction of plutonium in mixtures of {sup 241}Am and {sup 239}Pu based on L x-ray peak location and shape parameters is investigated. The sensitivity and accuracy of the peak parameter method is compared to that for conventional peak decovolution.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Nuclear power fleets and uranium resources recovered from phosphates

Current light water reactors (LWR) burn fissile uranium, whereas some future reactors, as Sodium fast reactors (SFR) will be capable of recycling their own plutonium and already-extracted depleted uranium. This makes them a feasible solution for the sustainable development of nuclear energy. Nonetheless, a sufficient quantity of plutonium is needed to start up an SFR, with the plutonium already being produced in light water reactors. The availability of natural uranium therefore has a direct impact on the capacity of the reactors (both LWR and SFR) that we can build. It is therefore important to have an accurate estimate of the available uranium resources in order to plan for the world's future nuclear reactor fleet. This paper discusses the correspondence between the resources (uranium and plutonium) and the nuclear power demand. Sodium fast reactors will be built in line with the availability of plutonium, including fast breeders when necessary. Different assumptions on the global uranium resources are taken into consideration. The largely quoted estimate of 22 Mt of uranium recovered for phosphate rocks can be seriously downscaled. Based on our current knowledge of phosphate resources, 4 Mt of recoverable uranium already seems to be an upper bound value. The impact of the downscaled estimate on the deployment of a nuclear fleet is assessed accordingly. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Model nitride irradiated nuclear fuel: production, reaction with water and dilution in nitric acid

Samples of the model nuclear fuel (MNF) were made from separately synthesized nitride powders uranium-plutonium, zirconium, lanthanum and metal additives of simulators (Mo, Pd, Rh, Ag) fission products. Synthesis of initial nitride components was carried out from individual oxides, using a carbo-thermal restoration method. From MNF samples baked at a temperature of 1750 C. degrees, were made ceramographic specimens which were investigated by a scanning electron microscope. The analysis showed that distribution of the MNF components and structure of the samples corresponds to distribution of these components in the irradiated nitride fuel. The samples of MNF of nitride fuel were used for carrying out researches on dissolution in water and nitric acid. Experiments on studying the interaction of MNF with water have been made at 20, 50 and 80 C. degrees. The speed of leaching has been determined by a way of measuring the activity of water (Bq/l) in time. It is shown that an increase of temperature leads to an increase of the speed of leaching of plutonium. The formation of a precipitation, allegedly polymeric forms of plutonium, has been observed. The estimated speed of leaching of plutonium from MNF in water at 80 C. degrees is -0,0064 μgPu/(mm{sup 2}*h). From elements of FP simulators, molybdenum appears to be the most significantly leached. The dissolution of MNF in nitric acid (7,8 and 9,4 mol/l) has been carried out at boiling temperature (106-109 C. degrees). During the process of dissolution, gases were emitted. The assessment of composition of the emitted gases has been carried out. During the filtering of the solutions a precipitate whose weight makes about 2% from the weight of initial fuel has been found. Precipitate represents small powder of metal with gray color. Precipitate was investigated by a scanning electron microscope. The analysis of ranges of absorption of solution showed that the Pu(VI) share to the general content of plutonium in solution can reach 40%. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Impact of Isotope Fidelity on Fuel Cycle Calculations

The purpose of this study is to examine the importance of the isotopic composition of plutonium on PWR MOX fuel fabrication as part of a multi-tiered fuel cycle, and the effect of its evolution during a transition. Two main effects can modify the isotopic composition of the plutonium used to build the PWR-MOX fuel: decay and depletion. This analysis is based on a transition of the nuclear fuel cycle to a configuration identified as 'Evaluation Group 29' or 'EG29', in the recently-published Evaluation and Screening (E and S) report. The EG29 fuel cycle corresponds to a double strata fleet. The first stratum is composed of sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs) multi-recycling plutonium. Surplus plutonium is sent to the second stratum composed of pressurized water reactors with full mixed oxide (U/Pu)O{sub 2} cores (MOX-PWRs). The PWR stratum is also multi-recycling its plutonium. The target energy generation ratio for the final EG29 system is 70:30 (SFR:PWR), with a 1% annual growth in nuclear energy demand. All the calculation of this study have been performed using the Cyclus fuel cycle simulator framework. The facility models are from the Cycamore package, developed by the Cyclus team, and containing a Pu-equivalent fuel fabrication model as well as a simple fixed mixing ratio fuel fabrication model. A new neural network model has also been contributed to the Cyclus environment using the cyCLASS tool, allowing the use of the fuel fabrication and depletion models from the CLASS tool in Cyclus. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR&PP case study results

The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design should have such features in it if it is seen to have intrinsic proliferation resistance. The technical difficulty in diverting material from the ESFR is at least as strongly impacted by the adversaries overall technical capabilities as it is by the effort required to overcome those barriers intrinsic to the nuclear fuel cycle. The intrinsic proliferation resistance of the ESFR will affect how extrinsic measures in the safeguards approach for the ESFR will provide overall proliferation resistance.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The Association of Inbreeding With Lung Fibrosis Incidence in Beagle Dogs That Inhaled 238PuO2 or 239PuO2.

Studies of health effects in animals after exposure to internally deposited radionuclides were intended to supplement observational studies in humans. Both nuclear workers and Beagle dogs have exhibited plutonium associated lung fibrosis; however, the dogs smaller gene pool may limit the applicability of findings to humans. Data on Beagles that inhaled either plutonium-238 dioxide (238PuO2) or plutonium-239 dioxide (239PuO2) were analyzed. Wright's Coefficient of Inbreeding was used to measure genetic or familial susceptibility and was assessed as an explanatory variable when modeling the association between lung fibrosis incidence and plutonium exposure. Lung fibrosis was diagnosed in approximately 80% of the exposed dogs compared with 23.7% of the control dogs. The maximum degree of inbreeding was 9.4%. Regardless of isotope, the addition of inbreeding significantly improved the model in female dogs but not in males. In female dogs an increased inbreeding coefficient predicted decreased hazard of a lung fibrosis diagnosis. Lung fibrosis was common in these dogs with inbreeding affecting models of lung fibrosis incidence in females but not in males. The apparent protective effect in females predicted by these models of lung fibrosis incidence is likely to be minimal given the small degree of inbreeding in these groups.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Repackaging of High Fissile TRU Waste at the Transuranic Waste Processing Center - 13240

Twenty-six drums of high fissile transuranic (TRU) waste from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) operations were declared waste in the mid-1980's and placed in storage with the legacy TRU waste inventory for future treatment and disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Repackaging and treatment of the waste at the TRU Waste Packaging Center (TWPC) will require the installation of additional equipment and capabilities to address the hazards for handling and repackaging the waste compared to typical Contact Handled (CH) TRU waste that is processed at the TWPC, including potential hydrogen accumulation in legacy 6M/2R packaging configurations, potential presence of reactive plutonium hydrides, and significant low energy gamma radiation dose rates. All of the waste is anticipated to be repackaged at the TWPC and certified for disposal at WIPP. The waste is currently packaged in multiple layers of containers which presents additional challenges for repackaging activities due to the potential for the accumulation of hydrogen gas in the container headspace in quantities than could exceed the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL). The outer container for each waste package is a stainless steel 0.21 m{sup 3} (55-gal) drum which contains either a 0.04 m{sup 3} or 0.06 m{sup 3} (10-gal or 15-gal) 6M drum. The inner 2R container in each 6M drum is ∼12 cm (5 in) outside diameter x 30-36 cm (12-14 in) long and is considered to be a > 4 liter sealed container relative to TRU waste packaging criteria. Inside the 2R containers are multiple configurations of food pack cans, pipe nipples, and welded capsules. The waste contains significant quantities of high burn-up plutonium oxides and metals with a heavy weight percentage of higher atomic mass isotopes and the subsequent in-growth of significant quantities of americium. Significant low energy gamma radiation is expected to be present due to the americium in-growth. Radiation dose rates on inner containers are estimated to be 1-3 mSv/hr (100-300 mrem/hr) with an unshielded dose rate on the waste itself of over 10 mSv/hr (1 rem/hr). Additional equipment to be installed at the TWPC will include a new perma-con enclosure and a shielded/inert glovebox in the process building to repackage and stabilize the waste. All of the waste will be repackaged into Standard Pipe Overpacks. Most of the waste (21 of the 26 drums) is expected to be repackaged at the food-pack can level (i.e. the food-pack cans will not be opened). Five of the incoming waste containers are expected to be repackaged at the primary waste level. Three of the containers exceed the 200 gram Pu-239 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) limit for the Standard Pipe Overpack. These three containers will be repackaged down to the primary waste level and divided into eight Standard Pipe Overpacks for shipment to WIPP. Two containers must be stabilized to eliminate any reactive plutonium hydrides that may be present. These containers will be opened in the inert, shielded glovebox, and the remaining corroded plutonium metal converted to a stable oxide form by using a 600 deg. C tube furnace with controlled oxygen feed in a helium carrier gas. The stabilized waste will then be packaged into two Standard Pipe Overpacks. Design and build out activities for the additional repackaging capabilities at the TWPC are scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2013 with repackaging, stabilization, and certification activities scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2014. Following repackaging and stabilization activities, the Standard Pipe Overpacks will be certified for disposal at WIPP utilizing Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) to verify the absence of prohibited items and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) to verify the isotopic content under the TWPC WIPP certification program implemented by the Central Characterization Project (CCP). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Replacement of lead-loaded glovebox glove with attenuation medium that are not RCRA-hazardous metals

Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA-55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through the use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox, coupled with an adequate negative pressure gradient, provides primary confinement). Radiation shielding is commonly used to protect the glovebox worker from unintentional direct and secondary radiation exposure, while working with plutonium-238 and plutonium-239. In these environments, low-energy photons, i.e., those less than 250 keY, are encountered. Shielding glove box gloves are traditionally composed of lead-based materials, but these are now considered hazardous waste. This has prompted the development of new, nonhazardous- shielding gJovebox gloves. No studies, however, have investigated the effectiveness of these new glovebox gloves. We examined both leaded and nonhazardous- shielding glovebox gloves and compared their attenuation effectiveness over the energy range of interest at TA-55. All measurements are referenced to lead sheets, allowing direct comparisons to the common industry standard of 0.1 mm lead equivalent material. The attenuation properties of both types of glovebox gloves vary with energy, making it difficult for manufacturers to claim lead equivalency across the entire energy range used at TA-55. The positions of materials' photon energy absorption edges, which are particularly important to improved attenuation performance, depending upon the choice of radiation energy range, are discussed. This effort contributes to the Los Alamos National Laboratory Continuous Improvement Program by improving the efficiency, cost effectiveness, and formality of glovebox operations.

57↗

Microprobe Analysis of Pu-Ga Standards

In order to obtain quantitative analysis using an Electron Scanning Microprobe it is essential to have a standard of known composition. Most elemental and multi-elemental standards can be easily obtained from places like Elemental Scientific or other standards organizations that are NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) traceable. It is, however, more challenging to find standards for plutonium. Past work performed in our group has typically involved using the plutonium sample to be analysed as its own standard as long as all other known components of the sample have standards to be compared to [1,2,3]. Finally, this method works well enough, but this experiment was performed in order to develop a more reliable standard for plutonium using five samples of known chemistry of a plutonium gallium mix that could then be used as the main plutonium and gallium standards for future experiments.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Towards an Agent-Based Blackboard System for Reactor Design Optimization

The field of reactor design is rich with opportunities for applications of computational optimization algorithms; these applications can range from preliminary core design to reactor shuffling patterns. Many of these schemes rely on sets of previously generated solutions (sometimes referred to as “generations”) to inform future decisions. While it is important to build upon prior knowledge, this process requires a full generation of solutions to be formed before future solutions can be examined. Rather than relying on a generational scheme to perform an optimization, we propose using an agent-based approach in conjunction with a blackboard framework for performing reactor design optimizations. Utilizing an agent-based approach allows agents to perform tasks independently, while retaining the ability to build off of previous solutions. We develop an agent-based blackboard system (ABBS) for determining the Pareto front (PF) in sodium fast reactor design optimization problems and compared this with the Non-Dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-II). Our goal is to evaluate the viability of the ABBS in producing a PF that is comparable with the NSGA-II algorithm. The design space consists of the fuel height, fuel smear, and plutonium fraction in the core, and we seek to minimize the reactivity swing and plutonium mass, while maximizing the burnup. The diversity, coverage, and spread of the PFs generated by the two methods are examined, and the ABBS is able to converge to the same PF as the NSGA-II algorithm. These results show that the ABBS is able to find optimal designs that are similar to those found by the NSGA-II algorithm. We conclude our study by applying the ABBS to the design of a sodium-cooled fast reactor to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium. The ABBS finds a core design that can burn upwards of 17.5 kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year and degrade an additional 195 kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year into non-weapons-grade material.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Neutron Screening Measurements of 110 gallon drums at T Plant

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) Nondestructive Assay (NDA) Service Center was contracted to develop and demonstrate a simple and inexpensive method of assaying 110 gallon drums at the Hanford Site’s T-Plant. The drums contained pucks of crushed old drums used for storage of transuranic (TRU) waste. The drums were to be assayed to determine if they meet the criteria for TRU or Low Level Waste (LLW). Because of the dense matrix (crushed steel drums) gamma measurement techniques were excluded and a mobile, configurable neutron system, consisting of four sequentially connected slab detectors was chosen to be used for this application. An optimum measurement configuration was determined through multiple test measurements with californium source. Based on these measurements the initial calibration of the system was performed applying the isotopic composition for aged weapon-grade plutonium. A series of background and blank puck drum measurements allowed estimating detection limits for both total (singles) and coincidence (doubles) counting techniques. It was found that even conservative estimates for minimum detection concentration using singles count rate were lower than the essential threshold of 100 nCi/g. Whereas the detection limit of coincidence counting appeared to be about as twice as high of the threshold. A series of measurements intended to verify the technique and revise the initial calibration obtained were performed at the Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) facility with plutonium standards. Standards with a total mass of 0.3 g of plutonium (which is estimated to be equivalent of 100 nCi/g for net waste weight of 300 kg) loaded in the test puck drum were clearly detected. The following measurements of higher plutonium loadings verified the calibration factors obtained in the initial exercise. The revised and established calibration factors were also confirmed within established uncertainties by additional measurements of plutonium standards in various locations in the test drum. Due to necessity to dispense the blank test drum an alternative method of baseline determination was established during field measurements. Count rates of ambient background were corrected by the differences between observed background and blank test drum count rates which were previously determined over a series of measurements. Only 31 drums out of 352 counted during the intensive measurement campaign at T-Plant were determined to be Suspect TRU. 25 of these drums were re-measured at the WRAP facility using the SuperHENC. Of the 25 drums measured, 21 were confirmed to be TRU and the remaining four LLW.

neutron measurements, TRU waste, T-Plant, configur↗

Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, an experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium disposition treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗