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At least 127 records · Page 7

URBAN-NET: A Network-based Infrastructure Monitoring and Analysis System for Emergency Management and Public Safety

Abstract Critical Infrastructures (CIs) such as energy, water, and transportation are complex networks that are crucial for sustaining day-to-day commodity flows vital to national security, economic stability, and public safety. The nature of these CIs is such that failures caused by an extreme weather event or a man-made incident can trigger widespread cascading failures, sending ripple effects at regional or even national scales. To minimize such effects, it is critical for emergency responders to identify existing or potential vulnerabilities within CIs during such stressor events in a systematic and quantifiable manner and take appropriate mitigating actions. We present here a novel critical infrastructure monitoring and analysis system named URBAN-NET. The system includes a software stack and tools for monitoring CIs, pre-processing data, interconnecting multiple CI datasets as a heterogeneous network, identifying vulnerabilities through graph-based topological analysis, and predicting consequences based on what-if simulations along with visualization. As a proof-of-concept, we present several case studies to show the capabilities of our system. We also discuss remaining challenges and future work.

Lee, Sangkeun↗

A software framework for assessing the resilience of drinking water systems to disasters with an example earthquake case study

Water utilities are vulnerable to a wide variety of human-caused and natural disasters. The Water Network Tool for Resilience (WNTR) is a new open source PythonTM package designed to help water utilities investigate resilience of water distribution systems to hazards and evaluate resilience-enhancing actions. In this paper, the WNTR modeling framework is presented and a case study is described that uses WNTR to simulate the effects of an earthquake on a water distribution system. The case study illustrates that the severity of damage is not only a function of system integrity and earthquake magnitude, but also of the available resources and repair strategies used to return the system to normal operating conditions. While earthquakes are particularly concerning since buried water distribution pipelines are highly susceptible to damage, the software framework can be applied to other types of hazards, including power outages and contamination incidents.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity and Digital Components: Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment

The report “America’s Strategy to Secure the Supply Chain for a Robust Clean Energy Transition” lays out the challenges and opportunities faced by the United States in the energy supply chain as well as the federal government plans to address these challenges and opportunities. It is accompanied by several issue-specific deep dive assessments, including this one, in response to Executive Order 14017 “America’s Supply Chains,” which directs the Secretary of Energy to submit a report on supply chains for the energy sector industrial base. The Executive Order is helping the federal government to build more secure and diverse U.S. supply chains, including energy supply chains. As the energy sector has become more globalized and increasingly complex, digitized, and even virtualized, its supply chain risk for digital components – the software, virtual platforms and services, and data – in energy systems has evolved and expanded. All digital components in U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable and may be subject to cyber supply cha in risks stemming from a variety of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts. This includes digital components in all systems within the ESIB, namely those systems operated by asset owners across different energy subsectors (e.g., electricity, oil and natural gas, and renewables) and the systems operated by a worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and development and design, produce, operate, and maintain energy sector systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet U.S. energy requirements. Supply chain risks for digital components including software, virtual platforms and services, and data have grown in recent years as increasingly sophisticated cyber adversaries have targeted exploiting vulnerabilities in these digital assets. Supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Project Boeing SGS (Final Report)

Boeing and its partner, PJM Interconnection, teamed to bring advanced “defense-grade” technologies for cyber security to the US regional power grid through demonstration in PJM’s energy management environment. Under this cooperative project with the Department of Energy, Boeing and PJM have developed and demonstrated a host of technologies specifically tailored to the needs of PJM and the electric sector as a whole. The team has demonstrated to the energy industry a combination of processes, techniques and technologies that have been successfully implemented in the commercial, defense, and intelligence communities to identify, mitigate and continuously monitor the cyber security of critical systems. Guided by the results of a Cyber Security Risk-Based Assessment completed in Phase I, the Boeing-PJM team has completed multiple iterations through the Phase II Development and Phase III Deployment phases. Multiple cyber security solutions have been completed across a variety of controls including: Application Security, Enhanced Malware Detection, Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) Optimization, Continuous Vulnerability Monitoring, SCADA Monitoring/Intrusion Detection, Operational Resiliency, Cyber Range simulations and hands on cyber security personnel training. All of the developed and demonstrated solutions are suitable for replication across the electric sector and/or the energy sector as a whole. Benefits identified include; Improved malware and intrusion detection capability on critical SCADA networks including behavioral-based alerts resulting in improved zero-day threat protection; Improved Security Incident and Event Management system resulting in better threat visibility, thus increasing the likelihood of detecting a serious event; Improved malware detection and zero-day threat response capability; Improved ability to systematically evaluate and secure in house and vendor sourced software applications; Improved ability to continuously monitor and maintain secure configuration of network devices resulting in reduced vulnerabilities for potential exploitation; Improved overall cyber security situational awareness through the integration of multiple discrete security technologies into a single cyber security reporting console; Improved ability to maintain the resiliency of critical systems in the face of a targeted cyber attack of other significant event; Improved ability to model complex networks for penetration testing and advanced training of cyber security personnel

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Assessment and Coordination of EVSE Cybersecurity Standards

Cybersecurity certification programs for Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) are fragmented due to no single certification covering all aspects of the device and additionally the existence of multiple programs and under different levels of regulation. These devices are also confronted by the intricate assembly of product software, firmware, and hardware. Devices contain both logical and physical interfaces. These multifaceted devices have vulnerabilities at many levels and interconnect with other potentially vulnerable systems including the electric vehicle, the cloud where data and payment information are stored, and the electric grid and electric grid equipment including utilities. Of the EVSE certification programs that are found, none are directly for the cybersecurity of EVSE. Many standards are for safety, specifically battery safety, some are cybersecurity standards for other types of equipment and can be modeled for EVSE. In specific, ISA/IEC 62443 is found to be significantly in line with EVSE security needs and will be used in future testing to certify EVSE and help guide the project to demonstrate where gaps exist, where strengths lie in the standard and how this can be used to lead the certification efforts in harmonizing EVSE cybersecurity standards. In addition, there are multiple efforts that are currently seeking to build EVSE standards or revise existing standards to address gaps. This effort is seeking to establish a cybersecurity program for EVSE that will inform customers and help increase the level of security across products and state EVSE procurements to achieve consistency across different jurisdictions.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

The theory of diversity and redundancy in information system security : LDRD final report.

The goal of this research was to explore first principles associated with mixing of diverse implementations in a redundant fashion to increase the security and/or reliability of information systems. Inspired by basic results in computer science on the undecidable behavior of programs and by previous work on fault tolerance in hardware and software, we have investigated the problem and solution space for addressing potentially unknown and unknowable vulnerabilities via ensembles of implementations. We have obtained theoretical results on the degree of security and reliability benefits from particular diverse system designs, and mapped promising approaches for generating and measuring diversity. We have also empirically studied some vulnerabilities in common implementations of the Linux operating system and demonstrated the potential for diversity to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Our results provide foundational insights for further research on diversity and redundancy approaches for information systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DER Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis

Solar photovoltaic (PV) cybersecurity is a growing field of research. As deployments of solar PV have increased, cyber risk has also increased. Utility solar PV installations, however, are not required to comply with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) plan unless they meet a minimum generation threshold of 75 MW. Individual residential-scale solar PV deployments will not meet that generation threshold and are therefore excluded from the NERC CIP requirements. With most solar installations less than 75 MW, solar PV has been deployed with minimal oversight and highly variable cybersecurity maturity. The resources that comprise the digital supply chain can include software, code, data, and other digital components. But as clean energy technologies advance, cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities continue to evolve and grow in sophistication. Supply chain cybersecurity represents a critical area for ensuring safe operations as the U.S. moves toward a clean energy future.

cybersecurity↗

WildFire Ignition Resistance Estimator (WildFIRE) Wizard Software Development Report

This report describes the development of a software tool, entitled “WildFire Ignition Resistance Estimator Wizard” (WildFIRE Wizard, Version 2.10). This software was developed within the Wildfire Ignition Resistant Home Design (WIRHD) program, sponsored by the U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Infrastructure Protection & Disaster Management Division. WildFIRE Wizard is a tool that enables homeowners to take preventive actions that will reduce their home’s vulnerability to wildfire ignition sources (i.e., embers, radiant heat, and direct flame impingement) well in advance of a wildfire event. This report describes the development of the software, its operation, its technical basis and calculations, and steps taken to verify its performance.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Assessing the Vulnerability of Large Critical Infrastructure Using Fully-Coupled Blast Effects Modeling

Structural failures, such as the MacArthur Maze I-880 overpass in Oakland, California and the I-35 bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, are recent examples of our national infrastructure's fragility and serve as an important reminder of such infrastructure in our everyday lives. These two failures, as well as the World Trade Center's collapse and the levee failures in New Orleans, highlight the national importance of protecting our infrastructure as much as possible against acts of terrorism and natural hazards. This paper describes a process for evaluating the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to large blast loads using a fully-coupled finite element approach. A description of the finite element software and modeling technique is discussed along with the experimental validation of the numerical tools. We discuss how such an approach can be used for specific problems such as modeling the progressive collapse of a building.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Supply Chain Cybersecurity Recommendations for Solar Photovoltaics

Solar photovoltaic (PV) cybersecurity is a growing field of research. As deployments of solar PV has increased, cyber risk has also increased. However, utility solar PV installations are not required to comply with North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) unless they meet a minimum generation threshold of 75 Megawatts (MW). Individual residential scale solar PV deployments will not meet that generation threshold and are therefore excluded from NERC CIP requirements. With most solar installations below 75MW, solar PV has been deployed with minimal oversight and highly variable cybersecurity maturity. The resources that make up the digital supply chain can include software, code, data, as well as other digital components. However as clean energy technology advances, cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities continue to evolve and grow in sophistication. Solar PV faces a unique challenge in which it can be deployed in residential buildings and purchased by a consumer directly. This makes the supply chain of PV a unique challenge, where responsible parties for cybersecurity vary widely depending on the type of solar PV being deployed. Supply chain cybersecurity for solar PV represents a critical area for ensuring safe operations as the U.S. moves towards a clean energy future.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Recommended Practice for Patch Management of Control Systems

A key component in protecting a nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources is the security of control systems. The term industrial control system refers to supervisory control and data acquisition, process control, distributed control, and any other systems that control, monitor, and manage the nation’s critical infrastructure. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) consists of electric power generators, transmission systems, transportation systems, dam and water systems, communication systems, chemical and petroleum systems, and other critical systems that cannot tolerate sudden interruptions in service. Simply stated, a control system gathers information and then performs a function based on its established parameters and the information it receives. The patch management of industrial control systems software used in CIKR is inconsistent at best and nonexistent at worst. Patches are important to resolve security vulnerabilities and functional issues. This report recommends patch management practices for consideration and deployment by industrial control systems owners.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Review of Cyber-Physical Security for Photovoltaic Systems

In this paper, the challenges and a future vision of the cyber-physical security of photovoltaic (PV) systems are discussed from a firmware, network, PV converter controls, and grid security perspective. The vulnerabilities of PV systems are investigated under a variety of cyber-attacks, ranging from data integrity attacks to software-based attacks. A success rate metric is designed to evaluate the impact and facilitate decision making. Model-based and data-driven methods for threat detection and mitigation are summarized. In addition, the blockchain technology that addresses cyber-attacks in software and cyber networks is described. Simulation and experimental results that show the impact of cyber-attacks at the converter (device) and grid (system) levels are presented. Finally, potential research opportunities are discussed for next-generation, cyber-secure power electronics systems. These opportunities include multi-scale controllability, self-/event-triggering control, artificial intelligence/machine learning, hot patching, and online security. As of today, this study will be one of the few comprehensive studies in this emerging and fast-growing area.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Reinforcement Learning Approach to Cybersecurity in Space (RELACSS)

Securing satellite groundstations against cyber-attacks is vital to national security missions. However, these cyber threats are constantly evolving. As vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, new vulnerabilities are discovered and exploited. In order to automate the process of discovering existing vulnerabilities and the means to exploit them, a reinforcement learning framework is presented in this report. We demonstrate that this framework can learn to successfully navigate an unknown network and detect nodes of interest despite the presence of a moving target defense. The agent then exfiltrates a file of interest from the node as quickly as possible. This framework also incorporates a defensive software agent that learns to impede the attacking agents progress. This setup allows for the agents to work against each other and improve their abilities. We anticipate that this capability will help uncover unforeseen vulnerabilities and the means to mitigate them. The modular nature of the framework enables users to swap out learning algorithms and modify the reward functions in order to adapt the learning tasks to various use cases and environments. Several algorithms, viz., tabular Q learning, deep Q networks, proximal policy optimization, advantage actor-critic, generative adversarial imitation learning, are explored for the agents and the results highlighted. The agent learns to solve the tasks in a light-weight abstract environment. Once the agent learns to perform sufficiently well, it can be deployed in a minimega virtual machine environment (or a real network) with wrappers that map abstract actions to software commands. The agent also uses a local representation of the actions called a ‘slot-mechanism’. This allows the agent to learn in a certain network and generalize it to different networks. The defensive agent learns to predict the actions taken by an offensive agent and uses that information to anticipate the threat. This information can then either be used to raise an alarm or to take actions to thwart the attack. We believe that with the appropriate reward design, a representative environment, and action set, this framework can be generalized to tackle other cybersecurity tasks. By sufficiently training these agents, we can anticipate vulnerabilities leading to robust future designs. We can also deploy automated defensive agents that can help secure satellite groundstation and their vital national security missions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

SDN-Based Smart Cyber Switching (SCS) for Cyber Restoration of a Digital Substation

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have increasingly been targets of cyber-attacks, causing widespread and extended blackouts. Digital substations are particularly vulnerable to such cyber incursions, jeopardizing grid stability. This paper addresses these risks by proposing a cybersecurity framework that leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to bolster the resilience of substations based on the IEC- 61850 standard. The research introduces a strategy involving smart cyber switching (SCS) for mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for restoration, ensuring ongoing operational integrity and cybersecurity within a substation. The SCS framework improves the physical network’s behavior (i.e., leveraging commercial SDN capabilities) by incorporating an adaptive port controller (APC) module for dynamic port management and an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect and counteract malicious IEC-61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. The framework’s effectiveness is validated through comprehensive simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, demonstrating its ability to sustain substation operations during cyber-attacks and significantly improve the overall resilience of the power grid.

Liu, Chen-Ching (ORCID:0000000289417958)↗

SU-E-J-114: A Practical Hybrid Method for Improving the Quality of CT-CBCT Deformable Image Registration for Head and Neck Radiotherapy

Purpose: Accurate deformable image registration (DIR) between CT and CBCT in H&N is challenging. In this study, we propose a practical hybrid method that uses not only the pixel intensities but also organ physical properties, structure volume of interest (VOI), and interactive local registrations. Methods: Five oropharyngeal cancer patients were selected retrospectively. For each patient, the planning CT was registered to the last fraction CBCT, where the anatomy difference was largest. A three step registration strategy was tested; Step1) DIR using pixel intensity only, Step2) DIR with additional use of structure VOI and rigidity penalty, and Step3) interactive local correction. For Step1, a public-domain open-source DIR algorithm was used (cubic B-spline, mutual information, steepest gradient optimization, and 4-level multi-resolution). For Step2, rigidity penalty was applied on bony anatomies and brain, and a structure VOI was used to handle the body truncation such as the shoulder cut-off on CBCT. Finally, in Step3, the registrations were reviewed on our in-house developed software and the erroneous areas were corrected via a local registration using level-set motion algorithm. Results: After Step1, there were considerable amount of registration errors in soft tissues and unrealistic stretching in the posterior to the neck and near the shoulder due to body truncation. The brain was also found deformed to a measurable extent near the superior border of CBCT. Such errors could be effectively removed by using a structure VOI and rigidity penalty. The rest of the local soft tissue error could be corrected using the interactive software tool. The estimated interactive correction time was approximately 5 minutes. Conclusion: The DIR using only the image pixel intensity was vulnerable to noise and body truncation. A corrective action was inevitable to achieve good quality of registrations. We found the proposed three-step hybrid method efficient and practical for CT/CBCT registrations in H&N. My department receives grant support from Industrial partners: (a) Varian Medical Systems, Palo Alto, CA, and (b) Philips HealthCare, Best, Netherlands.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Achieving American Leadership in Cybersecurity and Digital Components Factsheet

The Biden Administration’s efforts to meet 100% clean electricity by 2035 and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 has created opportunities to rebuild American supply chains create new jobs, strengthen community engagement, and spur U.S. economic growth. DOE’s strategy for success in the transition to a clean energy economy hinges on building and maintaining technology supply chains that are advanced, secure, and resilient to cyber threats. As the energy sector grows increasingly globalized, complex, and digitized, the supply chain for digital components of energy systems – including software, virtual platforms and services, and data – is facing greater threats. Nearly all digital components of U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable to cyber supply chain instability, stemming from a variety of causes and shared among a broad set of interdependent stakeholders. Overall, supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.

CCE↗

Exe-Guard Project

The exe-Guard Project is an alliance between Dominion Virginia Power (DVP), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Dartmouth University, and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL). SEL is primary recipient on this project. The exe-Guard project was selected for award under DE-FOA-0000359 with CFDA number 81.122 to address Topic Area of Interest 4: Hardened platforms and Systems. The exe-Guard project developed an antivirus solution for control system embedded devices to prevent the execution of unauthorized code and maintain settings and configuration integrity. This project created a white list antivirus solution for control systems capable of running on embedded Linux® operating systems. White list antivirus methods allow only credible programs to run through the use of digital signatures and hash functions. Once a system’s secure state is baselined, white list antivirus software denies deviations from that state because of the installation of malicious code as this changes hash results. Black list antivirus software has been effective in traditional IT environments but has negative implications for control systems. Black list antivirus uses pattern matching and behavioral analysis to identify system threats while relying on regular updates to the signature file and recurrent system scanning. Black list antivirus is vulnerable to zero day exploits which have not yet been incorporated into a signature file update. System scans hamper the performance of high availability applications, as revealed in NIST special publication 1058 which summarizes the impact of blacklist antivirus on control systems: Manual or “on-demand” scanning has a major effect on control processes in that they take CPU time needed by the control process (Sometimes close to 100% of CPU time). Minimizing the antivirus software throttle setting will reduce but not eliminate this effect. Signature updates can also take up to 100% of CPU time, but for a much shorter period than a typical manual scanning process. Control systems are vulnerable to performance losses if off-the-shelf blacklist antivirus solutions aren’t implemented with care. This investment in configuration in addition to constant decommissioning to perform manual signature file updates is unprecedented and impractical. Additionally, control systems are often disconnected or islanded from the network making the delivery of signature updates difficult. Exe-Guard project developed a white list antivirus solution that mitigated the above drawbacks and allows control systems to cost-effectively apply malware protection while maintaining high reliability. The application of security patches can also be minimized since white listing maintains constant defense against unauthorized code execution. Security patches can instead be applied in less frequent intervals where system decommissioning can be scheduled and planned for. Since control systems are less dynamic than IT environments, the feasibility of maintaining a secure baselined state is more practical. Because upgrades are performed in infrequent, calculated intervals, it allows a new security baseline to be established before the system is returned to service. Exe-Guard built on the efforts of SNL under the Code Seal project. SNL demonstrated prototype Trust Anchors on the project which are independent monitoring and control devices that can be integrated into untrustworthy components. The exe-Guard team started with the lessons learned under this project then designed commercial solution for white list malware protection. Malware is a real threat, even on islanded or un-networked installations, since operators can unintentionally install infected files, plug in infected mass storage devices, or infect a piece of equipment on the islanded local area network that can then spread to other connected equipment. Protection at the device level is one of the last layers of defense in a security-in-depth defense model before an asset becomes compromised. This project provided non-destructive intrusion, isolation and automated response solution, achieving a goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) Roadmap to Secure Control Systems. It also addressed CIP-007-R4 which requires asset owners to employ malicious software prevention tools on assets within the electronic security perimeter. In addition, the CIP-007-R3 requirement for security patch management is minimized because white listing narrows the impact of vulnerabilities and patch releases. The exe-Guard Project completed all tasks identified in the statement of project objective and identified additional tasks within scope that were performed and completed within the original budget. The cost share was met and all deliverables were successfully completed and submitted on time. Most importantly the technology developed and commercialized under this project has been adopted by the Energy sector and thousands of devices with exe-Guard technology integrated in them have now been deployed and are protecting our power systems today

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Considerations regarding the Use of Computer Vision Machine Learning in Safety-Related or Risk-Significant Applications in Nuclear Power Plants

With the advancements made to date in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), significant potential exists to utilize AI capabilities for nuclear power plant (NPP) applications. AI can replicate human decision making and it is usually faster and more accurate than humans. For implementations that impact critical NPP applications (e.g., safety-related or non-safety systems that potentially affect overall plant risk), a deeper safety analysis of the AI methods is necessary. AI applied to NPP operations could resemble the use of digital I&C (DI&C) because such applications involve digital computer hardware and custom-designed software that input plant data, execute complex software algorithms, and output the results to a system or licensed human operator to potentially provoke an action. For AI methods to be compliant with current safety requirements for DI&C, AI compatibility must be evaluated, and AI-related gaps may exist that prevent the prompt deployment of AI in NPPs. This effort aims to evaluate how example AI technologies align with the DI&C safety framework, and discusses how they could be analyzed, modeled, tested, and validated in a manner similar to typical DI&C technologies. Because AI is a broad field that encompasses areas such as machine learning (ML), natural language processing, and computer vision, this research focused on a subset of methods categorized as the computer vision ML (CVML) methods. This report explores two CVML use cases, gauge reading and fire watch, considered relevant to the DI&C standards, as they could play a safety-critical role. For the gauge reading use case, a CVML-enabled technology that can read gauges at oblique angles is utilized. For the fire watch use case, a CVML-enabled technology is utilized that migrates fire watch from a manual (human) approach to automated fire detection. These use cases are mainly intended to give context to the CVML system discussion. This effort assumes the worst-case scenario, with the CVML system being used to replace a safety-related or risk-significant system, thus requiring evaluation. Evaluating CVML against most of the relevant safety requirements for DI&C yielded several CVML-specific considerations due to the uniqueness of its characteristics in comparison with typical DI&C systems. For example, CVML models often employ commonly used (open-source) datasets, and it is not always possible to determine the level of overlap among open-source datasets. Therefore, the independence of the developed CVML models when demonstrating diversity is questionable, therefore creating vulnerability to common cause failure (CCF). The design verification process is also impacted since the data overlap could result in overestimation of the software validation and verification (V&V) performance results. Section 2 of this report evaluates a list of the identified CVML-specific characteristics and discusses the resulting considerations and potential solutions in the context of each referenced requirement. A summation is provided in Section 3. This report is not to be used as a guideline. It was developed to identify and consider issues in the implementation of ML technologies used to augment activities that may have a bearing on plant operation. The report draws parallels to the use of DI&C technologies, for which many standards are available to guide their use in nuclear plant operation. It considers the technologies and some of the potential implications of their use in safety-related applications but is not intended to address regulatory or licensing related issues.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗