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At least 127 records · Page 7

Mapping the Temperature-dependent and network site-specific onset of spectral diffusion at the surface of a water cluster cage

We explore the kinetic processes that sustain equilibrium in a microscopic, finite system. This is accomplished by monitoring the spontaneous, time-dependent frequency evolution (the frequency autocorrelation) of a single OH oscillator, embedded in a water cluster held in a temperature-controlled ion trap. The measurements are carried out by applying two-color, IR-IR photodissociation mass spectrometry to the D3O+?(HDO)(D2O)19 isotopologue of the “magic number” protonated water cluster, H+?(H2O)21. The OH group can occupy any one of the five spectroscopically distinct sites in the distorted pentagonal dodecahedron cage structure. The OH frequency is observed to evolve over tens of milliseconds in the temperature range (90-120 K). Starting at 100 K, large “jumps” are observed between two OH frequencies separated by ~300 cm-1 indicating migration of the OH group from the bound OH site at 3350 cm-1 to the free position at 3686 cm-1. Increasing the temperature to 110 K leads to partial interconversion among many sites. All sites are observed to interconvert at 120 K such that the distribution of the unique OH group among them adopts the form one would expect for a canonical ensemble. The spectral dynamics displayed by the clusters thus offer an unprecedented view into the molecular-level processes that drive spectral diffusion in an extended network of water molecules.

Yang, Nan↗

Computational Tools and Workflows for Quantitative Risk Assessment and Decision Support for Geologic Carbon Storage Sites: Progress and Insights from the U.S. DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership

The 2005 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on CCS raised the profile of CO2 capture and storage (CCS) as an important technology for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. CCS is now recognized as a key component of most climate change mitigation scenarios. Since publication of that report the international research, development, and deployment (RD&D) community has advanced key technical aspects, clarified regulatory requirements, explored value chain and infrastructure solutions, and developed incentive paradigms to enable and promote large-scale deployment of CCS. These efforts have included research to better characterize geologic storage resources, to improve injection performance and storage efficiency, to assess and manage subsurface environmental risks, and to advance monitoring technologies to assure system conformance. These efforts have helped to build confidence in the viability of geologic carbon storage (GCS), but stakeholder concerns about long-term risks and liability associated with GCS remain a hurdle to broad acceptance and large-scale deployment of CCS. Since 2010, the U.S. DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) – a research collaboration between five contributing national laboratories – has worked to establish and demonstrate methods and tools to quantify and manage the subsurface environmental risks associated with GCS, amidst uncertainty. This work supports the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management Carbon Transport and Storage Program’s goal of advancing safe and secure commercial-scale GCS deployment. To address the technical challenge of simulating the physical response of the GCS site to large-scale CO2 injection, NRAP has adopted an approach that relies on coupling computationally efficient reduced-order and/or data-driven proxy models of important system components (i.e., storage reservoir, sealing caprock, leakage pathways, intermediate formations, overlying groundwater aquifers, and the atmosphere) in integrated assessment framework. That integrated model of the physical system is complemented with fit-for purpose functionality to support site characterization and risk-related decisions. The recently released NRAP Phase II toolset includes the Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) for evaluation of trends in leakage risk and potential impact, tools to support monitoring design optimization (Designs for Risk Evaluation and Management – DREAM v3.0 and Passive Seismic Monitoring Tool - PSMT), and tools for state of stress evaluation (State-of-Stress Analysis Tool - SOSAT) and forecasting induced seismicity risk. The NRAP team has also released a pair of reports describing conceptual workflows to incorporate physics-based, quantitative risk assessment into many of the design, planning, operation, and closure decisions for GCS projects. An online catalogue highlights published studies where these tools and methods are demonstrated. In this presentation, the utility of these products to assess risks and address key stakeholder questions will be highlighted through examples, and related insights about the safety and security of geologic carbon storage in qualified storage sites will be discussed. The prospect of rapid, large-scale deployment of GCS technology to aggressively reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions requires careful consideration of interference between multiple commercial-scale storage projects within a basin. Going forward, NRAP is expanding and adapting site-scale risk quantification tools and methods to enable assessment of risks and inform management decisions for basin-scale deployment. Increasingly, this work will leverage next-generation approaches for surrogate modelling, fast prediction, and advanced visualization enabled by machine learning and artificial intelligence to promote virtual learning, scenario evaluation, and augment risk-based decision making.

quantitative risk assessment, geologic carbon stor↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2017-Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2017 . Included are subsections that This volume of the three-part report summarizes the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the Nevada National Security Site. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The EGS Collab Hydroshear Experiment at the Sanford Underground Research Facility – Siting Criteria and Evaluation of Candidate Sites

The objective of the EGS Collab project is to establish a suite of intermediate-scale (~10-20 m) field test beds coupled with stimulation and interwell flow tests to provide a basis to better understand fracture stimulation methods, resulting fracture geometries, and processes that control heat transfer between rock and stimulated fractures. Experiment 1 of the project is being conducted at a depth of ~1.5 km in the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) on the 4850 Level (ft. below the ground surface). The stimulation method planned for Experiment 2 of this project is hydroshearing of an existing natural fracture. In siting this experiment, there are several key geologic criteria that need to be met. These include: 1) the fracture should be least 10 m in length so that it could be intersected by two boreholes that are spaced that far apart; 2) it should be optimally oriented relevant to the stress field so that it is critically stressed; 3) the site should have appropriate stress conditions (not too shallow a depth); 4) the fracture should have sufficient permeability to allow for prestimulation flow testing, but not too high a permeability that would preclude permeability enhancement via shear stimulation; 5) the fracture should not intersect other features (permeable fractures, boreholes, adjacent drifts) that could serve as major leak-off zones; 6) the site should not be complicated by geology (a single lithology would be preferred). In addition, there are logistical criteria that will also influence site selection, including: 1) site availability/access, 2) logistical support, e.g., power, internet, water, operating rail system; 3) drift size and orientation compatible with drilling and site operations; 4) appropriate ground support. There are only two deep levels at SURF that can be accessed by the Yates Shaft: the 4100 and the 4850, so we limited our search to these two levels. Currently, three candidate sites are being evaluated: the existing Experiment 1 site and its surroundings on the West Drift on the 4850 level, and two locations on the 4100 level. This paper will evaluate advantages, disadvantages, and risks associated with these three options at SURF.

EGS Collab, Sanford Underground Research Facility↗

Preliminary Safety Analysis of the Gorleben Site: Safety Concept and Application to Scenario Development Based on a Site-Specific Features, Events and Processes (FEP) Database - 13304

Based upon the German safety criteria, released in 2010 by the Federal Ministry of the Environment (BMU), a safety concept and a safety assessment concept for the disposal of heat-generating high-level waste have both been developed in the framework of the preliminary safety case for the Gorleben site (Project VSG). The main objective of the disposal is to contain the radioactive waste inside a defined rock zone, which is called containment-providing rock zone. The radionuclides shall remain essentially at the emplacement site, and at the most, a small defined quantity of material shall be able to leave this rock zone. This shall be accomplished by the geological barrier and a technical barrier system, which is required to seal the inevitable penetration of the geological barrier by the construction of the mine. The safe containment has to be demonstrated for probable and less probable evolutions of the site, while evolutions with very low probability (less than 1 % over the demonstration period of 1 million years) need not to be considered. Owing to the uncertainty in predicting the real evolution of the site, plausible scenarios have been derived in a systematic manner. Therefore, a comprehensive site-specific features, events and processes (FEP) data base for the Gorleben site has been developed. The safety concept was directly taken into account, e.g. by identification of FEP with direct influence on the barriers that provide the containment. No effort was spared to identify the interactions of the FEP, their probabilities of occurrence, and their characteristics (values). The information stored in the data base provided the basis for the development of scenarios. The scenario development methodology is based on FEP related to an impairment of the functionality of a subset of barriers, called initial barriers. By taking these FEP into account in their probable characteristics the reference scenario is derived. Thus, the reference scenario describes a comprehensive set of probable future evolutions of the repository site. By stepwise consideration of less probable FEP or less probable characteristics of FEP within this process, alternative scenarios are also developed, which are characterized by a lower probability of occurrence. An important methodological aspect is that some assumptions had to be made for the scenario development. They allow, on the one hand, to deal systematically with incomplete knowledge regarding the geological situation below ground owing to restricted site investigations, and, on the other hand, to structure the scenario development process. The consideration of alternative assumptions may result in additional alternative scenarios. (authors)

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Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Spent Nuclear Fuel From Shutdown Sites - Fort Calhoun Site Visit - 18048

This is a technical paper that does not take into account contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. An updated evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 14 shutdown nuclear power plant sites was conducted during 2017. The major update since 2016 was the addition of the recently shutdown Fort Calhoun site to the evaluation. The Fort Calhoun site is located on the western shore of the Missouri River in Washington County in eastern Nebraska, about 31 km north of Omaha, Nebraska. Fort Calhoun has been shut down since October 24, 2016 and final removal of SNF from the reactor vessel was completed on November 13, 2016. The site visit to Fort Calhoun occurred in May 2017 and involved meetings with the Fort Calhoun staff and the Union Pacific Railroad. Participants in the site visit included the Federal Railroad Administration, Pahrump Paiute Tribe, Prairie Island Indian Community, Nebraska State Patrol, Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Rail Transportation, Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Motor Vehicle Enforcement, and the Council of State Governments-Midwest. The Fort Calhoun site was found to have two transportation mode options for the removal of SNF, rail and barge. In the case of rail, an onsite rail spur could be reinstalled from the existing Cargill industrial spur that runs through the Fort Calhoun site, or an onsite trans-load onto the Cargill industrial spur could be performed. In 2006, a barge was used to ship steam generators, a pressurizer, and a reactor vessel head to the Fort Calhoun site; consequently, barge transport of SNF offsite is potentially an option. (authors)

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Depth of the Biologically Active Zone in Terrestrial Habitats at the Chalk River Laboratories Site: Implications for Contaminated Site Assessment and Ecological Risk Assessment - 19272

Plants, soil invertebrates and burrowing mammals penetrate the soil layer to varying depths. As Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) assesses risks and remediates soils contaminated with radioactive and other hazardous wastes at the Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) site, a site-specific characterization of the biologically active zone is required to help to identify the relevant depth in soil for exposure assessment of ecological receptors. A defined biologically active zone is also required to determine the depth to which remedial actions should be taken to protect the environment, help prioritize locations for remediation efforts based on ecological risk and avoid unnecessary cleanup efforts. By taking advantage of the abundance of information on contaminant locations and depths, biodiversity, and hydrogeology available for the well-studied CRL site, it is possible to produce a site-specific estimation of the biologically active zone in CRL upland soils. A literature review was conducted to determine rooting and burrowing depths for vascular plants, soil invertebrates and burrowing mammals documented to be present (or potentially present) on the CRL site. This literature review was supplemented with field surveys to fill data gaps in our understanding of species composition (e.g., soil invertebrates and plant understory). Overall, we found that there was significant variability in maximum rooting/burrowing depths among plant, mammal and invertebrate species present on the CRL site. The majority of biological activity occurs in the top 0.5 m of soil. However, about 19% of burrowing or rooting receptors present at CRL may be in contact with soils up to 1 m depth, 9% of receptors present may be in contact with soils up to 2 m depth, and only about 2% of receptors may be in contact with soils up to 3 m depth. It is highly unlikely that any ecological receptor present at CRL is in direct contact with soils deeper than about 3.6 m. Further site-specific results pertaining to burrowing and rooting depths estimated for the CRL site will be presented, and these results will be compared to generic/default 'depth of biologically-active layer' guidelines recommended by various agencies. (authors)

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Preliminary Evaluation of Removing SNF from Nuclear Power Plant Sites - Pilgrim Site Visit - 20048

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management (DOE-IWM)a conducted an evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Pilgrim site on November 4-8, 2019. The Pilgrim site is located on the western shore of Cape Cod Bay in the Town of Plymouth, Massachusetts, about 61 km southeast of Boston and 71 km east of Providence, Rhode Island. Participants in the site visit included the U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the state of Massachusetts, the Federal Railroad Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, the Consolidated Group of Tribes and Organizations, the Council of State Governments-Eastern Regional Conference, the Pilgrim Nuclear Decommissioning Citizens Advisory Panel, and the Massachusetts Coastal Railroad. The Pilgrim site was found to have two transportation mode options for the removal of SNF, offsite rail access and onsite barge access. Two offsite heavy haul truck to rail transload locations were evaluated, one in Middleborough, Massachusetts, about 35-47 km from the Pilgrim site, and a second location in Middleborough about 36-43 km from the Pilgrim site. A passenger railroad terminates in Plymouth, Massachusetts, about 11 km from the Pilgrim site; however, this location is not suitable for freight rail involving large SNF transportation casks. There is also an onsite barge facility located on the Pilgrim site that was used during construction and would require refurbishment to be used. (authors)

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Using Multiple Geophysical Methods to Refine a Stratigraphic Conceptual Site Model at a Nuclear Waste Site

At contaminated sites, there is a critical reliance on conceptual site models of which a key component is the geologic framework model (GFM), which is used to build predictive fate and transport modeling in support of remediation goals. Here, we detail an ongoing study at a nuclear waste site (Hanford Site, Washington, USA) where surface geophysical methods were used to complement existing borehole information and to help site new boreholes to update and refine the GFM. Ground-based electrical resistivity tomography (ERT), time-domain electromagnetics (TEM), and seismic data was acquired on the Hanford Site’s Central Plateau, where the presence of a hydraulically transmissive subsurface feature, or paleochannel, was suspected but uncertain based on contaminant concentrations at sparsely located boreholes. To assess and compare ERT, TEM, and seismic geophysical datasets, co-located data was acquired in an area where the existing GFM was more certain. Surrounding the suspected paleochannel, ERT and seismic refraction tomography showed similar subsurface structures consistent with a channelized feature. While TEM interpretation was limited in the suspected paleochannel area due to a thick resistive top layer and high electromagnetic noise, TEM showed greater utility in a different area where these factors were less prevalent. Based on the results of quasi-3D ERT inversions, we propose updates to the GFM, including identifying a paleochannel. Further, we evaluate the utility of geophysical methods and examine lessons learned that will be used as a basis for continued characterization efforts to support site management decisions and implementation efforts.

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Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 366: Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit 366 comprises the six corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 11-08-01, Contaminated Waste Dump No.1; (2) 11-08-02, Contaminated Waste Dump No.2; (3) 11-23-01, Radioactively Contaminated Area A; (4) 11-23-02, Radioactively Contaminated Area B; (5) 11-23-03, Radioactively Contaminated Area C; and (6) 11-23-04, Radioactively Contaminated Area D. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed July 6, 2011, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 366. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 366 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose (TED) at sample locations to the dose-based final action level (FAL). The TED will be calculated by summing the estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples collected from sample plots will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. Based on historical documentation of the releases associated with the nuclear tests, it was determined that CASs 11-23-02, 11-23-03, and 11-23-04 will be investigated as one release site. The three test areas associated with these CASs are in close proximity; the devices tested were all composed of plutonium and enriched uranium; and the ground zeroes are all posted high contamination areas (HCAs). Because the device tested at CAS 11-23-01 was composed primarily of enriched uranium and the ground zero is not a posted HCA, the CAS will be investigated as a separate release. The DQO process also resulted in an assumption that TED within the HCAs and contaminated waste dumps exceeds the FAL and requires corrective action. A field investigation will be performed to define where TED exceeds the FAL and to determine whether other contaminants of concern are present at the site associated with other activities that took place at the site or from spills or waste discovered during the investigation. The presence and nature of contamination from other types of releases (such as migration and any potential releases discovered during the investigation) will be evaluated using soil samples collected from the locations most likely containing contamination, if present. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS.

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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011 Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011. Included are subsections that summarize the site's geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological setting and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site's environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2013 Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2012 (National Security Technologies, LLC [NSTec], 2013). Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological setting and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016, Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016 (prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC [NSTec], 2017). Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

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2016 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs), with the results submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan.The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PAs and CAs for federal fiscal year (FY) 2016. This annual summary report presents results and conclusions of the FY 2016 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs. Important developments in FY 2016 include the following: Development of a new Area 5 RWMS closure inventory estimate based on disposals through FY 2016, Evaluation of new or revised waste streams by special analysis, and Development and acceptance of version 4.200 of the Area 5 RWMS GoldSim PA/CA model. The Area 3 RWMS has been in inactive status since July 1, 2006, with the last shipment received in April 2006. The FY 2016 review of operations, facility design, closure plans, monitoring results, and R&D results for the Area 3 RWMS indicates no changes that would impact PA validity. The conclusion of the annual review is that all performance objectives can be met and the Area 3 RWMS PA remains valid. There is no need to revise the Area 3 RWMS PA. Review of Area 5 RWMS operations, design, closure plans, monitoring results, and R&D activities indicates that no significant changes have occurred. The FY 2016 PA results, generated with the Area 5 RWMS v4.200 GoldSim PA model, indicate that there continues to be a reasonable expectation of meeting all performance objectives. All results remain less than 50% of their performance objectives. The results and conclusions of the Area 5 RWMS PA are judged valid, and there is no need to the revise the PA. A review of changes potentially impacting the CAs indicates that no significant changes occurred in FY 2016. A new Corrective Action Unit (CAU), CAU 576, with corrective action sites near the Area 3 RWMS and Area 5 RWMS was identified in FY 2016. The sites are currently under investigation and not expected to be important sources for the CA. The continuing adequacy of the CAs was evaluated with the new models, and no significant changes that would alter the CAs’ results or conclusions were found. The revision of the Area 3 RWMS CA, which will include the Yucca Flat Underground Test Area (CAU 97) source, is scheduled for FY 2024, following the completion of the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan. Inclusion of the Frenchman Flat Underground Test Area (CAU 98) source in the Area 5 RWMS CA is planned pending the completion of the CAU 98 Closure Report in FY 2017. Near-term R&D efforts will focus on continuing development of the PA, CA, and inventory models for the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs.

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Unraveling Site Selective Magnetic Properties of Cobalt Sites in Critical Elements Lean RE(TM)5 Magnet Materials

We report here our discovery of crystallographic and interstitial sites and onsite electron correlation propelled intrinsic and derived permanent magnetic properties of critical elements lean RE(TM) 5 (RE = La, Ce and TM = Fe, Co) magnet materials. A full potential linearized augmented plane wave (FP-LAPW) method within the local density approximation (LDA) is used to investigate and analyze the electronic structure and magnetism of these RE(TM) 5 type structures. To better correlate the experimental results, the effective Coulomb (U) and exchange (J) interactions (Hubbard parameters) are crucial at the transition metal sites. Results show that the main propeller of magnetic anisotropy in these compounds is the cobalt atoms at the 2c sites not the 3g sites. This site-specific property and site preference energetics are used to replace 3g sites with non-critical elements such as iron that exhibits a larger magnetic moment. Based on this strategic replacement, we predict two new compounds that have a larger hardness parameter with a relatively large energy product due to the atomic dilution caused by interstitial addition of nitrogen in the compounds: CeCo 2 Fe 3 N 2 and LaCo 2 Fe 3 N 2 .

Rare-earths↗

Multi-site Milling Strategy Reveals Significant Variation in Biomass Composition of Switchgrass ( Panicum virgatum ) Grown at Ten Locations

Cell wall composition influences biomass use as a forage and as a feedstock for biofuel and chemical conversion. To examine the influence of environment on composition of switchgrass (Panicum virgatum L.), we utilized a multi-environment experiment consisting of clones of switchgrass genotypes grown at up to ten locations in the continental US. We tested the influence of different milling treatments on biomass composition trait predictions via near-infrared reflectance spectroscopy (NIRS). We found that most compositional trait predictions (29/34) were significantly different (P < 0.05) when a single lot of biomass was subjected to disparate milling treatments, i.e., knife milling vs. knife milling with an additional cyclone milling. Further, depending on the plant material tested, three to eight compositional trait predictions vary (P < 0.05) when identical biomass was knife milled at different sites followed by cyclone milling at a single site, including for traits such as Klason lignin, nitrogen, and carbon. In some cases, variation due to milling site exceeded environmentally induced compositional variation of a single switchgrass genotype grown at different sites. From these observations, we recommend a protocol with two sequential millings that decouples growth environment from a particular mill. Utilizing this approach, we found that 46/46 biomass composition traits from the warm season herbaceous forage and switchgrass bioethanol NIRS equations vary significantly (P < 0.001) in clones of a switchgrass genotype (WBC) grown at ten sites, with the growth site representing the largest average source of variation (41%). This multi-site milling approach can be used to examine environmental and gene-by-environment influences on composition with the goal of optimizing cell wall composition in different environments for biomass utilization.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗