A MULTILAYER NETWORK APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS ON SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.
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Distributed wind is unique and fast-growing component of the energy production mix, but cybersecurity for distributed wind is not well developed. In this presentation, we will introduce distributed wind as an example of difficult-to-secure critical infrastructure. We will first provide background on distributed wind architectures, applications, and stakeholder roles. We will explain the need and challenges for cybersecurity for distributed wind, pointing to both academic studies and real-world events. The key component of the presentation will discuss recommendations for different aspects of security, such as risk assessments, communications, and access control, that specifically call out considerations that apply uniquely to distributed wind. We will discuss what sets distributed wind apart from other ICS and energy applications, and how to account for these features in a comprehensive security plan. This process is demonstrative of the type of analysis needed to adapt traditional security guidelines and standards to narrow and focused applications.
This dataset presents an ensemble of streamflow projections covering the conterminous United States (CONUS), developed to support the SECURE Water Act Section 9505 Assessment for the US Department of Energy (DOE) Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO). Multiple Coupled Models Intercomparison Project phase 6 (CMIP6) Global Climate Models (GCMs) were downscaled using either statistical (DBCCA) or dynamical (RegCM) downscaling methods, based on two meteorological reference datasets (Daymet and Livneh). Subsequently, the downscaled precipitation, temperature, and wind speed data were used to drive two calibrated hydrologic models (VIC and PRMS), with total runoff routed through the Routing Application for Parallel computatIon of Discharge (RAPID) routing model, producing an ensemble of streamflow projections across 2.7 million NHDPlusV2 stream reaches across the CONUS. Each ensemble member covers the 1980-2019 baseline and 2020-2059 near-future periods under the high-end (SSP585) emission scenario. Additionally, using only DBCCA and Daymet, the projections extend to the 2060-2099 far-future period and encompass three additional emission scenarios (SSP370, SSP245, and SSP126). This dataset is designed to support the SECURE Water Act Section 9505 Assessment for the US Department of Energy (DOE) Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO). For further details, refer to Kao et al. (2022), Rastogi et al. (2022), and Ghimire et al. (2023).
This dataset presents a suite of downscaled hydro-climate projections over the conterminous United States (CONUS) based on multiple selected Global Climate Models (GCMs) from the Coupled Models Intercomparison Project phase 6 (CMIP6). The CMIP6 GCMs are downscaled dynamically using Regional Climate Model version 4 (RegCM4). Each ensemble member covers the 1980-2019 baseline and 2020-2059 near-future periods under the high-end (SSP585) emission scenario. This dataset is formulated to support the SECURE Water Act Section 9505 Assessment for the US Department of Energy (DOE) Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO). For further details on this dataset, please refer to Kao et al. (2022) and Rastogi et al. (2022).
This study explores the prospective supply of upstream critical materials, providing insights into the U.S.'s capacity to meet its Electric Vehicle (EV) and Energy Storage System (ESS) deployment targets for 2035. It evaluates the proportion of critical materials demand that can be met by domestic upstream sources and the amount that will require non-U.S. sources. The analysis considers geological resources and current international development activities, contributing to the understanding of mineral supply security as the global community strives for net-zero emissions by 2050. The study focuses on five materials assessed in the 2023 DOE Critical Materials Assessment – Lithium, Nickel, Cobalt, Graphite, and Manganese.
This dataset presents a suite of hydropower projections for the conterminous United States (CONUS), derived from multiple downscaled and bias-corrected Global Climate Models (GCMs) from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6). The CMIP6 GCMs are downscaled using either statistical (DBCCA) or dynamical (RegCM) approaches, based on two meteorological reference datasets (Daymet and Livneh). The resulting downscaled precipitation, temperature, and wind speed data are then used to drive two calibrated hydrologic models (VIC and PRMS), enabling simulations of projected future hydrologic responses across the CONUS. Simulated total runoff is subsequently employed to drive two hydropower models (WMP, now implemented as mosartwmpy-power, and WRES) to evaluate how climate change may affect future hydropower production for both federal and non-federal hydropower fleets. This dataset was developed to support the SECURE Water Act Section 9505 Assessment for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO). For further details, see Broman et al. (2024), Thurber et al. (2024), Kao et al. (2022), and Zhou et al. (2023).
Most climate change mitigation scenarios rely on increased use of bioenergy to decarbonize the energy system. Here we use results from the 33rd Energy Modeling Forum study (EMF-33) to investigate projected international bioenergy trade for different integrated assessment models across several climate change mitigation scenarios. Results show that in scenarios with no climate policy, international bioenergy trade is likely to increase over time, and becomes even more important when climate targets are set. More stringent climate targets, however, do not necessarily imply greater bioenergy trade compared to weaker targets, as final energy demand may be reduced. However, the scaling up of bioenergy trade happens sooner and at a faster rate with increasing climate target stringency. Across models, for a scenario likely to achieve a 2 °C target, 10–45 EJ/year out of a total global bioenergy consumption of 72–214 EJ/year are expected to be traded across nine world regions by 2050. While this projection is greater than the present trade volumes of coal or natural gas, it remains below the present trade of crude oil. This growth in bioenergy trade largely replaces the trade in fossil fuels (especially oil) which is projected to decrease significantly over the twenty-first century. As climate change mitigation scenarios often show diversified energy systems, in which numerous world regions can act as bioenergy suppliers, the projections do not necessarily lead to energy security concerns. Nonetheless, rapid growth in the trade of bioenergy is projected in strict climate mitigation scenarios, raising questions about infrastructure, logistics, financing options, and global standards for bioenergy production and trade.
With the advent of new devices and applications, cyber attack surface is continuously evolving due to the emergence of new attack techniques and vulnerabilities. Hence, security management tool must assess the cyber risk of an enterprise at regular interval basis through comprehensively identifying associations among attack techniques, weakness, and vulnerabilities. However, existing repositories providing such associations are incomplete (i.e., missing associations), inducing the likelihood of undermining the risk of particular set of attack techniques. Moreover, such associations still rely on manual interpretation, which is slow compared to attack speed and ineffective for the increasing list of vulnerabilities and attack actions. Therefore, there is an urge to develop methodologies for automatically associating vulnerabilities to all relevant attack techniques. In this paper, we present a framework, named VWC-MAP, that can automatically identify all relevant attack techniques of a vulnerability via weakness based on their text descriptions, applying natural language process (NLP) techniques. To achieve that, we present a novel two-tiered classification approach, where the first tier classifies vulnerabilities to weakness, and the second tier classifies weakness to attack techniques. This research has improved the scalability of the current state-of-the-art tool to make vulnerability to weakness mapping significantly faster. Moreover, this paper presents two novel approaches for weakness to attack technique mapping applying Text-to-Text and link prediction techniques. Our experiment results cross-validated through cyber-security experts show that VWC-MAP can associate vulnerabilities to weakness types with 87% accuracy and to new attack patterns with 80% accuracy.
Cybersecurity for industrial control systems is an important consideration that advance reactor designers will need to consider. How cyber risk is managed is the subject of on-going research and debate in the nuclear industry. This report seeks to identify potential cyber risks for advance reactors. Identified risks are divided into absorbed risk and licensee managed risk to clearly show how cyber risks for advance reactors can potentially be transferred. Absorbed risks are risks that originate external to the licensee but may unknowingly propagate into the plant. Insights include (1) the need for unification of safety, physical security, and cybersecurity risk assessment frameworks to ensure optimal coordination of risk, (2) a quantitative risk assessment methodology in conjunction with qualitative assessments may be useful in efficiently and sufficiently managing cyber risks, and (3) cyber risk management techniques should align with a risked informed regulatory framework for advance reactors.
This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) describes the steps to reconstruct x-ray projection images from Nuctech LS1516BS data captured at facilities operating in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Explosives Threat Assessment Program (ETA). This document also provides the steps for evaluating and approving the quality of the reconstructed images.
This document describes the concept and application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE), a methodology that integrates cyber threat awareness into all stages of the systems engineering life cycle. It delineates how CIE enhances the security posture of critical infrastructure systems, which are increasingly targeted by sophisticated cyber threats. The exposition proceeds to methodically walk through the twelve foundational principles of CIE, each serving as a strategic guidepost for embedding cybersecurity into the fabric of system design, development, operation, and maintenance. The principles highlight the importance of proactive and comprehensive security measures that span from risk assessment to continuous improvement, ensuring that systems are not only designed with security in mind but are also resilient in the face of evolving cyber threats.
The LandScan Myriad World Baseline (MWB) method produces global, residential (nighttime/home-location) gridded geodemographic estimates based on 5-year age/gender cohorts—at 30-arcsecond (≈1 km) resolution. MWB is designed to fill gaps where detailed, georeferenced survey data (e.g., Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)) are missing or outdated, and to provide a baseline that can support human security analysis, including consequence assessment, “patterns of life” modeling, and scenario-based population futures. MWB’s workflow spatializes household-level age/gender characteristics from the GLOPOP-S dataset by conflating household and gridded expected relative wealth adapted from Global Gridded Relative Deprivation Index (GRDI), then adjusts them to a target year of interest. Age/gender estimates are then applied to harmonize lowest-administrative-level statistics with LandScan residential counts, yielding final geodemographic estimates. Two validation case studies are presented: Ghana (2021) and Tokyo/Kanagawa, Japan (2020), illustrating spatial variability in demographic cohorts and comparing MWB outputs to official gridded statistics. Results show close overall alignment relative to validation criteria including population pyramids and age-dependency ratios.
The smart grid is enabling the collection of massive amounts of high-dimensional and multi-type data about the electric power grid operations, by integrating advanced metering infrastructure, control technologies, and communication technologies. However, the traditional modeling, optimization, and control technologies have many limitations in processing the data; thus, the applications of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques in the smart grid are becoming more apparent. This survey presents a structured review of the existing research into some common AI techniques applied to load forecasting, power grid stability assessment, faults detection, and security problems in the smart grid and power systems. It also provides further research challenges for applying AI technologies to realize truly smart grid systems. Finally, this survey presents opportunities of applying AI to smart grid problems. The paper concludes that the applications of AI techniques can enhance and improve the reliability and resilience of smart grid systems.
Risk analysis methods may be qualitative, semi-quantitative, or quantitative; adopt probabilistic and statistical theories; and implement concepts from core disciplines including operations research, reliability engineering, systems engineering, and applied mathematics. These methods continue to develop and evolve and have successfully been applied to address various homeland security mission challenges in recent years. The objective of this book is to: 1) highlight the role of risk analysis for informing homeland security policy decisions, and 2) describe case studies from academia, government, and industry that apply risk analysis methods for addressing challenges within each of the DHS missions.
We examine the state of publicly available information about known exploitable vulnerabilities applicable to operational technology (OT) environments. Specifically, we analyze the Known Exploitable Vulnerabilities Catalog (KEVC) maintained by the US Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to assess whether currently available data is sufficient for effective and reliable remediation in OT settings. Our team analyzed all KEVC entries through July 2025 to determine the extent to which OT environments can rely on existing remediation recommendations. We found that although most entries in the KEVC could affect OT environments, only 13% include vendor workarounds or mitigations as alternatives to patching. This paper also examines the feasibility of developing such alternatives based on vulnerability and exploit characteristics, and we present early evidence of success with this approach.
Gartner, a large research and advisory company, anticipates that by 2024 80% of security operation centers (SOCs) will use machine learning (ML) based solutions to enhance their operations. 1 1 https://www.ciodive.com/news/how-data-science-tools-can-lighten-the-load-for-cybersecurity-teams/572209/ In light of such widespread adoption, it is vital for the research community to identify and address usability concerns. This work presents the results of the first in situ usability assessment of ML-based tools. With the support of the US Navy, we leveraged the national cyber range-a large, air-gapped cyber testbed equipped with state-of-the-art network and user emulation capabilities-to study six US Naval SOC analysts' usage of two tools. Our analysis identified several serious usability issues, including multiple violations of established usability heuristics for user interface design. We also discovered that analysts lacked a clear mental model of how these tools generate scores, resulting in mistrust a and/or misuse of the tools themselves. Surprisingly, we found no correlation between analysts' level of education or years of experience and their performance with either tool, suggesting that other factors such as prior background knowledge or personality play a significant role in ML-based tool usage. Our findings demonstrate that ML-based security tool vendors must put a renewed focus on working with analysts, both experienced and inexperienced, to ensure that their systems are usable and useful in real-world security operations settings.
Security culture plays a critical role in determining the effectiveness of an organization's security performance, making its significance impossible to overemphasize. It encompasses the collective values, shared perceptions, and habitual actions embraced by all individuals within a nuclear organization—from leadership to frontline staff. When the entire workforce recognizes the reality of potential threats, accepts that security is a shared duty, and integrates security-minded behavior into everyday routines, it fosters an environment where strong security practices are the norm. In such a setting, everyone can take pride and feel reassured in being part of an organization where a strong security culture is deeply embedded. Security culture is based on the broader concept of organizational culture. All organizations—whether families, social clubs, religious institutions, businesses, non-governmental organizations, or governments—possess an underlying culture shaped by core values and beliefs. These values and beliefs influence attitudes and drive behavior throughout the organization. While multiple factors contribute to the development of a strong security culture, leadership plays a particularly pivotal role. In organizations where security culture is well-established, leaders go beyond rhetoric; they demonstrate a genuine commitment to security through their actions. They implement policies and procedures that actively engage all employees, foster open dialogue around security concerns, and encourage teamwork in resolving issues. Furthermore, they reward proactive behavior and ensure that corrective actions are taken promptly. Regular assessments of the organization's security culture allow such leaders to gauge its effectiveness and take strategic steps to strengthen it when necessary. This paper leverages practical, real-world experience to guide leadership and senior management within nuclear organizations through the foundational steps of cultivating a robust, organization-wide culture of nuclear security. It emphasizes the critical importance of early leadership engagement in shaping this culture and outlines a comprehensive approach that includes strategic, tactical, and operational measures. Additionally, it explores methods for fostering a unified vision across all levels of the organization to ensure alignment, commitment, and continuous improvement in nuclear security practices.
Marine renewable energy (MRE) is an emerging source of power for marine applications, marine devices, and coastal communities. This energy source relies on industrial control systems and IT to support operations and maintenance activities, which create a pathway for an adversary to gain unauthorized access to systems and data and disrupt operations. Incorporating cybersecurity risk prevention measures and mitigation capabilities from inception, development, operation, to decommissioning of the MRE system and components is paramount to the protection of energy generation and the security of network architecture and infrastructure. To improve the resilience of MRE systems as a predictable, affordable, and reliable source of energy, cybersecurity guidance was developed to enable operators to assess cybersecurity risks and implement security measures commensurate with the risk. This publication is the second of a two-part series, with Part 1 addressing a framework to determine cybersecurity risk by assessing the vulnerability of an MRE system to potential cyber threats and the consequences a cyberattack would have on the end user. This Part 2 publication describes an approach to select appropriate cybersecurity best practices commensurate with the MRE system's cybersecurity risk. The guidance includes 86 cybersecurity best practices, which are associated with 36 cybersecurity domains and grouped into nine categories. The best practices follow the core functions of the National Institute of Science and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (e.g., identify, detect, protect, respond, and and recover) and insights from both maritime and energy industry guidance documents to identify security measures effective in protecting information and operational technology assets prevalent in MRE systems.