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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1992

An international program to protect the earth from impact catastrophe - Initial steps

Risks posed by impacting objects of various sizes are analyzed using the Spaceguard Survey, the 1992 NASA report of International Near-Earth-Object (NEO) Detection workshop. The state-of-the-art technology makes it possible to discover and track nearly all earth-crossing asteroids and short-period comets large enough to threaten global catastrophe. To deal with this hazard a long-term telescopic search is required that reaches stellar magnitude 22 in order to achieve a nearly complete census of objects 1 km or larger. A program can be performed on the basis of an international network of six telescopes of 2-3 m aperture equipped with modern CCD detectors and automatic signal processing capability.

Morrison, David↗
NASA NTRS2011

N plus 3 Advanced Concept Studies for Supersonic Commercial Transport Aircraft Entering Service in the 2030-2035 Period

Boeing, with Pratt & Whitney, General Electric, Rolls-Royce, M4 Engineering, Wyle Laboratories and Georgia Institute of Technology, conducted a study of supersonic commercial aircraft concepts and enabling technologies for the year 2030-2035 timeframe. The work defined the market and environmental/regulatory conditions that could evolve by the 2030/35 time period, from which vehicle performance goals were derived. Relevant vehicle concepts and technologies are identified that are anticipated to meet these performance and environmental goals. A series of multidisciplinary analyses trade studies considering vehicle sizing, mission performance and environmental conformity determined the appropriate concepts. Combinations of enabling technologies and the required technology performance levels needed to meet the desired goals were identified. Several high priority technologies are described in detail, including roadmaps with risk assessments that outline objectives, key technology challenges, detailed tasks and schedules and demonstrations that need to be performed. A representative configuration is provided for reference purposes, along with associated performance estimates based on these key technologies.

Welge, H. Robert↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) Re-Entry Prediction and Analysis

No NASA or USG human casualty reentry risk limits existed when UARS was designed, built, and launched. Time of reentry estimates were within normal limits NASA, the USG, and some foreign space agencies now seek to limit human casualty risks from reentering space objects to less than 1 in 10,000. UARS was a moderate-sized space object. Uncontrolled reentries of objects more massive than UARS are not frequent, but neither are they unusual. Since the beginning of the space age, there has been no confirmed report of an injury resulting from reentering space objects.

Stansbery, Eugene↗
NASA NTRS2013

NASA Earned Value Management (EVM) Update

Earned Value Management (EVM) is an integrated management control system for assessing, understanding and qualifying what a project is achieving with the resoures. EVM integrates technical cost and schedules with risk management. It allows objective assessment and quantification of current project performance, and helps predict future performance-based trents.

Kerby, Jerald↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shooting the Moon

This story is about an unlikely NASA mission to the Moon. It was unlikely because it was started with far too little time and too-little money to complete. It was unlikely because it was able to take chances to accept risk of failure. It was unlikely because it was searching for the unthinkable: water-ice on the moon... Figure 1-1: LCROSS Mission. The mission of the Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) was to investigate the possibility of water ice in craters on the Moon s poles. This is certainly an interesting scientific topic in itself, but I intend to focus on the compelling experience of managing the LCROSS Project in the context of this storied Agency. Perhaps most interesting are the implications this story has for managing any development effort, lunar or not, and working a balance to achieve success. NASA is by design a risk-taking agency within the US Government. It could be argued that NASA s purpose in the aerospace community is to take on the really big challenges that either the corporate world can t afford, are not yet profitable endeavors, or are just too risky for private corporations to entertain. However, expectations of the Agency have evolved. A combination of grim human tragedies and some very public cost and schedule overruns have challenged the public s and Congress s tolerance for risk-taking within the Agency. NASA, which is supposed to be in the business of taking risks to do bold, difficult things, has become less and less able to do so within its cost framework. Yet effectively replacing prudent risk management with attempts to "risk-eliminate" is completely unaffordable. So where does risk-taking fit within the Agency, or within private/corporate organizations for that matter? Where astronauts play there is clearly concern about risk. When an organization puts humans in harm s way, it is understandably going to take extra effort to assure nobody gets hurt. Doing so, of course, costs money - a lot of money to pay for labor and hardware which is attempting to assure nothing will go wrong. Sophisticated designs, with doubly- or triply-redundant systems, extensive testing to verify those systems, and numerous engineering test units built to learn and evolve a hardware design, all drive the cost and time required to implement. Human spaceflight is an expensive business because of the exceptional system complexity and levels of assurance required for human space travel. What about missions that do not involve human spaceflight? What about missions whose potential failure will not take a human life, whose costs are small and whose urgency and importance are limited by design? A portfolio consisting of this type of mission can be designed to be risk tolerant, not requiring large expenditures to guarantee against failure. With the money saved, the number of missions that can be executed within the portfolio grows, or the total cost of the portfolio can be reduced. The NASA LCROSS mission is a pathfinder example of a low-cost, quick turn-around mission which struck a balance on mission risk, while accomplishing big objectives, like defining how we understand the Moon.

Andrews, Daniel R.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Space Mission Concept Development Using Concept Maturity Levels

Over the past five years, pre-project formulation experts at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) has developed and implemented a method for measuring and communicating the maturity of space mission concepts. Mission concept development teams use this method, and associated tools, prior to concepts entering their Formulation Phases (Phase A/B). The organizing structure is Concept Maturity Level (CML), which is a classification system for characterizing the various levels of a concept's maturity. The key strength of CMLs is the ability to evolve mission concepts guided by an incremental set of assessment needs. The CML definitions have been expanded into a matrix form to identify the breadth and depth of analysis needed for a concept to reach a specific level of maturity. This matrix enables improved assessment and communication by addressing the fundamental dimensions (e.g., science objectives, mission design, technical risk, project organization, cost, export compliance, etc.) associated with mission concept evolution. JPL's collaborative engineering, dedicated concept development, and proposal teams all use these and other CML-appropriate design tools to advance their mission concept designs. This paper focuses on mission concept's early Pre-Phase A represented by CMLs 1- 4. The scope was limited due to the fact that CMLs 5 and 6 are already well defined based on the requirements documented in specific Announcement of Opportunities (AO) and Concept Study Report (CSR) guidelines, respectively, for competitive missions; and by NASA's Procedural Requirements NPR 7120.5E document for Projects in their Formulation Phase.

Concept Maturity Levels (CMLs)↗
NASA NTRS2017

EVA Systems Technology Gaps and Priorities 2017

Performance of Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA) has been and will continue to be a critical capability for human space flight. Human exploration missions beyond LEO will require EVA capability for either contingency or nominal activities to support mission objectives and reduce mission risk. EVA systems encompass a wide array of products across pressure suits, life support systems, EVA tools and unique spacecraft interface hardware (i.e. EVA Translation Paths and EVA Worksites). In a fiscally limited environment with evolving transportation and habitation options, it is paramount that the EVA community's strategic planning and architecture integration products be reviewed and vetted for traceability between the mission needs far into the future to the known technology and knowledge gaps to the current investments across EVA systems. To ascertain EVA technology and knowledge gaps many things need to be brought together, assessed and analyzed. This includes an understanding of the destination environments, various mission concept of operations, current state of the art of EVA systems, EVA operational lessons learned, and reference advanced capabilities. A combined assessment of these inputs should result in well-defined list of gaps. This list can then be prioritized depending on the mission need dates and time scale of the technology or knowledge gap closure plan. This paper will summarize the current state of EVA related technology and knowledge gaps derived from NASA's Exploration EVA Reference Architecture and Operations Concept products. By linking these products and articulating NASA's approach to strategic development for EVA across all credible destinations an EVA could be done in, the identification of these gaps is then used to illustrate the tactical and strategic planning for the EVA technology development portfolio. Finally, this paper illustrates the various "touch points" with other human exploration risk identification areas including human health and performance.

Johnson, Brian J.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Development of Structural Energy Storage for Aeronautics Applications

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has identified Multifunctional Structures for High Efficiency Lightweight Load-bearing Storage (M-SHELLS) as critical to development of hybrid gas-electric propulsion for commercial aeronautical transport in the N+3 timeframe. The established goals include reducing emissions by 80 and fuel consumption by 60 from todays state of the art. The advancement will enable technology for NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Strategic Thrust 3 to pioneer big leaps in efficiency and environmental performance for ultra-efficient commercial transports, as well as Strategic Thrust 4 to pioneer low-carbon propulsion technology in the transition to that scheme. The M-SHELLS concept addresses the hybrid gas-electric highest risk with its primary objective: to save structures energy storage system weight for future commercial hybrid electric propulsion aircraft by melding the load-carrying structure with energy storage in a single material. NASA's multifunctional approach also combines supercapacitor and battery chemistries in a synergistic energy storage arrangement in tandem with supporting good mechanical properties. The arrangement provides an advantageous combination of specific power, energy, and strength.

Santiago-Dejesus, Diana↗
NASA NTRS2017

Future Exploration Missions' Tasks Associated with the Risk of Inadequate Design of Human and Automation/Robotic Integration

NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) funds research efforts aimed at mitigating various human health and performance risks, including the Risk of Inadequate Design of Human and Automation/Robotic Integration (HARI). As such, within HRP, the Human Factors and Behavioral Performance (HFBP) Element tasked an evaluation of future HARI needs in order to scope and focus the HARI risk research plan. The objective was to provide a systematic understanding of the critical factors associated with effective HARI that will be necessary to achieve the future mission goals for near- and deep-space exploration. Future mission goals are specified by NASA Design Reference Missions (DRMs) that are pertinent to the HRP. The outcome of this evaluation is a set of NASA-relevant HARI tasks, factors, and interactions required for exploration-class missions.

space operations↗
NASA NTRS2019

Urban Area Unmanned Aerial Systems Sensor Capabilities for Ensuring Ground Hazards Safety

Unmanned aerial systems (UASs) in urban areas can pose significant safety risks to dynamic ground objects (DGOs) such as people, pets, and bikes; especially for off-nominal emergency traverses and landings. This paper will examine a framework for evaluating the UAS safety benefits which can be achieved by classifying DGO hazards, modeling their behavior, and assigning collision costs. DGOs are assumed to be any ground objects which are either moving or capable of moving. Safety benefits will be assessed by analyzing metrics computed from UAS and DGO trajectories which take into account intent and uncertainties. This paper will establish the theoretical relationships mapping these trajectories and DGO classifications to safety levels. Sensor capabilities will be mapped to DGO trajectory uncertainties, so that safety can be directly estimated from the sensor specifications for a given UAS trajectory.

Bouyssounouse, Xavier↗
NASA NTRS2018

Status Report on Aeroelasticity in the Vehicle Development for X-57 Maxwell

Risk reduction is the objective of the X-57 Maxwell aeroelasticity team. The X-57, NASA’s experimental electric propulsion aircraft, has a long thin wing with primary propulsion systems located at the wing tips and high lift motors distributed along the span. Many of the classical aeroelastic concerns associated with such a configuration were addressed through early design decisions. The as-designed intermediate flight vehicle configurations show flutter mechanisms associated with flexible models of control surface systems –the stabilator, flaps and ailerons. Improvements to the analytical models, based on ground test data and project decisions about flight operations, show improved prospects of the vehicle being aeroelastically stable throughout the flight envelope. On-going ground testing and further analyses will lend credibility to the flutter predictions and vehicle safety.

Heeg, Jennifer↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Near-Earth Object Observations Program: Abbreviated History and Update

In the wake of Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9’s (D/1993 F2) collision with Jupiter, NASA’s Near-Earth Object (NEO) Observations Program was established more than two decades ago. The NEO Observations Program is responsible for finding, tracking, and characterizing NEOs. Since the Program’s inception in 1998, NASA-funded efforts have discovered more than 98% of the more than 30,000 NEOs currently known. This unique NASA Program supports several NEO surveys that contribute to a sustained and productive campaign to find and track NEOs; collecting data of sufficient precision to allow accurate predictions of the future trajectories of discovered objects. It is a key element of the Planetary Defense Coordination Office (PDCO). The Program also sponsors applied planetary science research conducted at NASA field centers, astronomical observatories, and other locations around the United States. The PDCO relies on data from projects supported by the NEO Observations Program which, in turn, also coordinates NEO observation efforts conducted at ground-based observatories sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the space domain awareness facilities of the United States Space Force (USSF). PDCO’s current priority is the NEO Surveyor Mission (NEOSM) , launched away from the vicinity of Earth to SEL1 and working in coordination with large ground-based surveys could complete the NEO survey within a decade following launch. NEOSM’s has three primary mission objectives: - assess the current risk to the Earth of asteroid impact(s); - examine the origin and ultimate fate of the asteroid population (within our solar system); - to find suitable, low-Δv targets for future robotic and piloted missions of exploration Operating at SEL1, NEOSM will also find NEOs with long synodic periods (i.e., several decades or longer) and unfavorable orbital viewing geometries. NEOSM will obviate the inherent Earth-based geometric observing handicap.

NEO↗
NASA NTRS2021

Modernizing NASA’s Space Flight Safety and Mission Success (S&MS) Assurance Framework In Line With Evolving Acquisition Strategies and Systems Engineering Practices

This paper presents the objectives-driven, case-based safety and mission success (S&MS) assurance framework being developed by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), including its motivations and its implementation via a S&MS Assurance Standard that is under development, supplemented by supporting standards including an S&MS Analysis Management Standard that is also under development. A need to evolve NASA’s S&MS assurance framework has emerged in recent years, resulting from the need to accommodate new acquisition models; the need to accommodate evolving systems engineering (SE) practices; the need to stipulate acceptable levels of S&MS risk; the need for improved integration of S&MS into SE; and the need for clearer risk acceptance accountability. The objectives-driven, case-based S&MS assurance framework proposed here is responsive to that need. Its key features include: • The establishment, by NASA Acquirers, of fundamental S&MS performance objectives that define limits of acceptability for the likelihoods that mission technical objectives will be accomplished and that people, assets, and environments put at risk by the mission will not be adversely affected; • The development and approval of Providers’ S&MS plans for meeting Acquirers’ S&MS performance objectives, including commitments to support Acquirer audit, investigation, and reporting needs; • The development, by Providers, of S&MS assurance cases that argue, supported by evidence, that the Provider has met, or is on track to meeting, the fundamental S&MS objectives; • The evaluation, throughout the program/project life cycle, of Provider S&MS assurance cases as the primary S&MS-related technical basis for Acquirer risk acceptance and the granting to the Provider of authority to proceed through the program/project life cycle. This proposed S&MS assurance framework is notable for its lack of prescription of traditional S&MS requirements and strategies such as defined failure tolerances, margins, or analysis requirements. Instead, Providers are given latitude to propose their own strategies for meeting the fundamental S&MS performance objectives, subject to independent review and Acquirer approval. The result is a framework for S&MS assurance that is at once both rigorous and flexible.

Assurance Case↗
NASA NTRS2012

Hazard Analysis for Pneumatic Flipper Suitport/Z-1 Manned Evaluation, Chamber B, Building 32

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to protect our personnel from injury and our equipment from damage. The purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Z1 Suit Port Test in Chamber B located in building 32, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments, and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment, and hardware. The goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel and/or damage facility equipment, flight hardware, property, or harm the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, JSC Safety and Health Handbook.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2014

Hazard Analysis for Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to prevent injury to personnel, and to prevent damage to facilities and equipment. The primary purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment and hardware. In fulfillment of the stated purposes, the goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel, damage the facility or its test systems or equipment, test articles, Government or personal property, or the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in Appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, "JSC Safety and Health Handbook" and JSC 17773 Rev D "Instructions for Preparation of Hazard Analysis for JSC Ground Operations".

Meginnis, Ian↗
NASA NTRS2009

Human Research Program (HRP) Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Standing Review Panel (SRP)

The SRP believes strongly that regularly performed in-flight crew assessments are needed in order to identify a change in health status before a medical condition becomes clinically apparent. It is this early recognition in change that constitutes the foundation of the "occupational health model" expounded in the HRP Requirements Document as a key component of the HRP risk mitigation strategy that will enable its objective of "prevention and mitigation of human health and performance risks". A regular crew status examination of physiological and clinical performance is needed. This can be accomplished through instrumented monitoring of routine embedded tasks. The SRP recommends addition of a new gap to address this action under Category 3.0 Mitigate the Risk. This new gap is closely associated with Task 4.19 which addresses the lack of adequate biomedical monitoring capabilities for performing periodic clinical status evaluations and contingency medical monitoring. A corollary to these gaps is the critical emphasis on preventive medicine, not only during pre- and post-flight phases of a mission as is the current practice, but continued into the in-flight phases of exploration class missions.

Cintron, Nitza↗
NASA NTRS2006

Intertwining Risk Insights and Design Decisions

The state of systems engineering is such that a form of early and continued use of risk assessments is conducted (as evidenced by NASA's adoption and use of the 'Continuous Risk Management' paradigm developed by SEI). ... However, these practices fall short of theideal: (1) Integration between risk assessment techniques and other systems engineering tools is weak. (2) Risk assessment techniques and the insights they yield are only informally coupled to design decisions. (3) Individual riskassessment techniques lack the mix of breadth, fidelity and agility required to span the gamut of the design space. In this paper we present an approach that addresses these shortcomings. The hallmark of our approach is a simple representation comprising objectives (what the system is to do), risks (whose occurrence would detract from attainment of objectives) and activities (a.k.a. 'mitigations') that, if performed, will decrease those risks. These are linked to indicate by how much a risk would detract from attainment of an objective, and by how much an activity would reduce a risk. The simplicity of our representational framework gives it the breadth to encompass the gamut of the design space concerns, the agility to be utilized in even the earliest phases of designs, and the capability to connect to system engineering models and higher-fidelity risk tools. It is through this integration that we address the shortcomings listed above, and so achieve the intertwining between risk insights and design decisions needed to guide systems engineering towards superior final designs while avoiding costly rework to achieve them. The paper will use an example, constructed to be representative of space mission design, to illustrate our approach.

systems engineering↗