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CBRN Situational Awareness Tools for the Modern Age

CBRN Situational awareness (SA) should be a key operational requirement in the CNI area of discussion, not only for the “boots-on-the-ground” warfighter, but at a strategic level. For example, maneuver plans will need to be developed for contamination avoidance and battlefield survivability. Large datasets from instruments dispersed across the battlefield will thus need to be collected and processed into a holistic assessment of the radiological hazard. From there, hazard maps then must be distributed at the tactical level, all while continuing to effectively engage a peer adversary. This vision represents a network of sensors, software tools, data processing algorithms, communications suites, and common operational picture (COP) platforms working in concert to inform warfighters and command echelons alike of evolving nuclear and radiological hazards. This complex system-of-systems and the ultimate goal of effective engagement in a nuclear or radiological-hazard battlefield can be achieved through pursuit of improvement in collaborative SA tools.

Becker, Eric M.↗

Wash Penalty Factors: Insight into the Effects of Water Wash Down of Building Materials for Radionuclide/Nuclear (Rn) Decontamination - 20153

The release of radiological material to the urban environment can have a devastating socio-economic impact. In an urban release scenario, areas around the dispersal epicenter and any areas contaminated via atmospheric deposition may require extensive decontamination. Most recently, our group reported the decontamination efficacy of pressurized water washing of common porous building materials, and compared the penetration depth of the contaminations before and after exposure to pressurized tap water. Here, we continue evaluation of the decontamination efficacy of wash solutions based on potassium (K{sup +}) salt for cesium (Cs), strontium (Sr), and europium (Eu) contaminations on common building surfaces. The surfaces included: the cement used in concrete, the aggregate used in concrete, intact concrete, roadway asphalt, asphalt shingles, and latex paint. We deposited solutions of {sup 137}Cs, {sup 85}Sr, and {sup 152}Eu onto numerous common building materials and exposed these materials to a static bath or low-pressure flow of tap water, 0.1 M potassium chloride (KCl), and 0.5 M KCl. The decontamination efficacy and the depth profile for residual contamination were measured to determine the conditions under which applying a wash solution has benefit compared to physically removing the surface material. To aid in these analyses, we introduced a 'wash penalty factor' to quantify the degree to which contamination migrated into the bulk material by the action of the wash method. On asphalt, 70-80% of the radionuclides were found to be within 0.02 mm of the surface. Cs{sup +} bonded to negative charge sites on the surface of the mineral aggregate (used in concrete) so decontamination was improved by ion exchange with K{sup +}. Sr{sup 2+} is soluble and removed by water, while not bonding to aggregate or demonstrating solubility in the liquid asphalt. Eu{sup 3+} is precipitated and not removed in gentle wash but displays mobility within the pore space that suggests its presence as a colloid. Concrete is more porous than asphalt, and 80% of the radionuclides were within 0.2 mm of the surface for {sup 137}Cs and {sup 152}Eu and 50- 80% for {sup 85}Sr. On concrete, Cs{sup +} bonds similarly to asphalt. Sr{sup 2+} bonds to the cement or precipitates from the alkaline pore water. Eu{sup 3+} sorbs to the cement and then precipitates. In brick, the results for Cs{sup +} and Sr{sup 2+} suggested that diffusion of ions from deeper in the coupon was important. Eu{sup 3+} is removed poorly due to precipitation. We will explain and report example wash penalty factors that vary from 0 to > 1 for the various methods and the implications for deciding when to implement wash down methods. (authors)

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The Evaluation of Chemical Decontamination for Contaminated Carbon Steel Scrap by Multiphase Treatment Process - 20249

There is a significant growth in the field of decommissioning of nuclear facilities due the fact that for a lot of them their end of life is nearing. In Taiwan, the government plans to steadily reduce the dependence on nuclear power and moves gradually towards a nuclear-free homeland. Therefore, the development of decommissioning technology becomes the significant issue for the next coming years. The decommissioning of a nuclear power plant is a long process and practical work including radiological surveys, decontamination, dismantling, and the subsequent waste management. Chemical decontamination is an important task in the decommissioning of nuclear power plants and is usually performed by circulating the chemical solution in selected systems or full systems in order to reduce dose levels. However, the decontamination of segmented metal parts is also considered to reduce the contamination to such levels that they may be disposed of at a lower classification or be unconditionally released, and it helps to achieve the goal of waste minimization and provide a more economical cost for disposal management. Chemical decontamination technology is used to remove the contaminated oxides deposited on the surface of metals by dissolving them with chemical mechanisms, such as chelation, acidic or alkaline dissolution, redox reaction and so on. Carbon steel is the major material used in systems and pipelines in the nuclear power plant, thus it is also commonly selected as the target to be decontaminated in the decommissioning process. In this study, the effectiveness of chemical decontamination is evaluated by using multiphase treatment process including the reduction and the oxidation steps. In the step of redox reaction, the oxidation state of the substance is very important. Especially metals of some oxidation states show solubility in water, which has a decisive influence on the chemical decontamination. The experiment of decontamination of metal scraps is carried out by the immersion method within a chemical solution. The relative operation parameters such as temperature, pH, and concentration of the chemical solution are recorded to demonstrate the effect of the decontamination process. (authors)

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Distribution of Infiltration in the 216-U-10 and 216-B-3 Pond Systems 1944-1997

A modeling system to simulate fate and transport of contaminant plumes in groundwater beneath the Central Plateau to support the Cumulative Impact Evaluation (CIE) and Composite Analysis (CA) is being developed. The CIE will evaluate the cumulative effect of multiple Central Plateau radiological and chemical sources on groundwater quality (DOE/RL-2018-69, Cumulative Impact Evaluation Technical Approach Document ). This will enable cleanup decisions to be evaluated in the context of all Central Plateau waste sites and existing groundwater conditions. The CA evaluates the cumulative effect of all sources of radioactive materials on radiological dose to future members of the public (DOE/RL-2018-60, Annual Status Report (FY 2018): Composite Analysis of Low Level Waste Disposal in the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site ). Fate and transport modeling will be used to forecast future groundwater concentrations for both the CIE and CA. The CIE/CA subsurface modeling system is divided into source (inventory), vadose zone, and saturated zone facets. Source inventory is a necessary input to the vadose zone facet, and releases from the vadose zone to groundwater are inputs to the saturated zone facet. The vadose zone facet simulates historical and future releases from the vadose zone to groundwater for both liquid waste and solid waste disposal sites. Effluent release volumes and radionuclide inventory estimates for liquid waste sites are contained in ECFHANFORD- 17-0079, Hanford Soil Inventory Model (SIM-v2) Calculated Radionuclide Inventory of Direct Liquid Discharges to Soil in the Hanford Site’s 200 Areas , herein referred to as SIM-v2. The liquid waste sites in SIM-v2 include the 216-B-3 Pond near 200 East Area and the 216-U-10 Pond in 200 West Area. The 216-B-3 Pond system consisted of a main pond and 3 expansion lobes that were operational during overlapping time periods. It also included influent ditches, but these are not listed as liquid waste sources in SIM-v2 and are not included in the CIE/CA modeling. The total effluent volume released to the pond system was measured, but the partitioning of this volume to the various expansion lobes was not determined and is not accounted for in SIM-v2. Regarding the 216-U-10 Pond, it received water from several influent ditches. The pond and the influent ditches are listed as liquid waste sites in SIM-v2 and are included as sources in the CIE/CA modeling. Because water in the ditches flowed into the pond, only a portion of the effluent volumes and contaminant inventories assigned to the ditches in SIM-v2 infiltrated from the ditches. Thus, partitioning of infiltration and contaminant inventories between the ditches and the pond is not fully accounted for in SIM-v2. Further, some of the water in the 216-U-10 Pond entered overflow ditches and the amount of this overflow was not recorded and is not accounted for in SIM-v2. Thus, the purpose of this Environmental Calculation File (ECF) is to partition the infiltration of wastewater and contaminant inventory between the main pond and each expansion lobe of the 216-B-3 Pond system, and to partition the infiltration of wastewater and contaminant inventory between the ditches and pond of the 216-U-10 Pond system.

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Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL Radiological Response Training Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radiological Response Training Range (RRTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for a period of 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Intelligent Consequence Control by Aerial Reconnoiter Using Unmanned Systems

In a nuclear accident, or in the aftermath of an improvised nuclear device or radiological dispersal device detonation, radioactive materials may pose a severe health threat to individuals near the site of the incident. The Intelligent Consequence Control by Aerial Reconnoiter Using Unmanned Systems (ICARUS) does the dull, dirty, and dangerous (and, sometimes, deep) work of mapping and characterizing valuable information to enable a safe and appropriate response. ICARUS provides timely answers to the questions, “What is it?” “Where is it?”, and “How far does it extend?” Using commercial, off-the-shelf proven components, the integrated chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives detection architecture for our drones provides a solution for collecting radiological, chemical, and optical information on developing complex situations, returning actionable data for determining if it is safe for further response efforts. ICARUS can determine and transmit the location, identity, and intensity of radionuclide contamination to a remote base station. It can deliver on the unexpected.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Review of particle deposition to and removal from clothing, skin, and hair after a radioactive airborne dispersal event

Explosive Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) – aka dirty bombs – are seen as a credible method to carry out a radiological terror attack. After exploding a radioactive source, the radionuclide-laden plume will be blown downwind of ground zero, with particles falling out and potentially depositing on people caught in and under the cloud. Some of these people may not show any sign of radiation sickness and therefore not realize they have been contaminated and may take the radioactive particulate with them on their daily activities, thus spreading the radioactive particulate outside the initially contaminated area. This paper reviews the scientific literature to better understand the rate at which particulate deposits on and is removed from the different “surfaces” of a person, i.e., hair, skin, and clothing. Prior research indicates that: 1) particle deposition is usually higher on skin than on hair and clothing; 2) particle deposition is greater for a person with higher skin moisture, 3) stronger wind increases the deposition flux onto a person, and 4) the fraction of particulate deposited on the hair, skin, and clothing respectively depends on the length of the hair, assuming all the hair surface is available for deposition. The studies taken into consideration show that the largest uncertainty in particulate deposition onto a person is due to clothing type because of the different possible weave arrangements and tightness which translate into differences in actual surface area and surface roughness. A factor of 2-to-20 variation in deposition rate was found. Removal of the particulate from the contaminated person may be due to wind, a person's movement, and/or contact transfer, i.e., by touching a different clean surface. Experiments show that the majority of the particulate is resuspended within 2–6 h mostly depending on the intensity of physical activity. The largest uncertainty in particulate removal from skin depends on the skin moisture, transfer rate of single-contact, and how many objects/people a person touches per hour. No data for hair were found for particle removal and resuspension. The studies considered did not utilize radionuclides directly; however, data on adhesion of radioactive vs. their non-radioactive counterpart have shown that the uncertainty due to the radioactivity of the particles is lower than that due to other factors. In conclusion, an idealized scenario involving a single building in the path of the cloud showed the impact of building-influenced flow on the cloud transport path and mixing, which affects the radiological dose the downwind population is exposed to and consequently the health effects.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Challenges and Practical Solutions for Conducting Structural MARSSIM Surveys in Elevated Radon Environments - 20413

The Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) [1] provides comprehensive guidance for the development and implementation of radiological surveys conducted to demonstrate compliance with a dose- or risk-based cleanup goal during final status survey. The MARSSIM methodology follows an integrated strategy combining direct measurements and sampling to assess uniform residual contamination, and scanning surveys to identify localized areas of elevated activity. Building surveys assessing residual surface contamination present unique challenges from reliance on field measurements that may be subject to less than ideal environmental conditions. Additionally, limited characterization and excessive conservatism incorporated into the conceptual site model may result in derived concentration guideline levels (DCGL) and, as a consequence of relatively inefficient field instrumentation, corresponding attributable count rates generally comparable to background. The presence of elevated ambient radon concentrations and associated progeny deposition both exacerbate these intrinsic survey challenges and introduce a series of technical, logistic, and administrative obstacles that can wreak havoc on the statistical legitimacy of each component of the MARSSIM process. Short-lived radon progeny including polonium-218, lead-214, bismuth-214, and polonium-214 produce excessive alpha and beta radiation that may decrease instrument sensitivity through an increase in background count rates, and, at worst, may result in incorrect survey unit failure through the simulation of residual surface activity. Aside from the obvious solution of exhaustive radon mitigation, the primary objectives are to distinguish between radon progeny deposition and actual surface activity, and collect sufficient defensible data. The following is a technical discussion of the consequences of performing building MARSSIM surveys in the presence of elevated ambient radon atmospheres, conceptual examples, and an overview of practical strategies to minimize the effects of radon interference while collecting sufficient defensible data to complete the survey. (authors)

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Radiological Considerations Supporting the American Medical Isotope Producer Niowave

This report provides a summary of work performed by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) during FY22 in support of Niowave, an American Medical Isotope Production (AMIP) facility. SRNL served in a technical support role, funded by NA-231, supporting Niowave in the beginning of non radiological functional testing of their airport facility in FY22. Through this agreement, SRNL provides Niowave access to subject matter experts (SMEs) for questions that may arise during the drafting of engineering plans, facility policies, and/or response procedures. This report summarizes discussions between SRNL and Niowave about guidance concerning issues with the floor of the hot cells, dispersible removable contamination (beta emitting fission product), hot cell operation specifically utilization of cameras or mirrors, and the process for removing contaminated waste from the hot cell. Lessons learned and other various resources provided to Niowave by SRNL during FY22 are referenced in this report. This work was funded through NNSA’s Office of Material Management and Minimization, Conversion Office (NA-231).

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Dosimetry and cancer risk estimations for different radiation protection solutions at decommissioning a contaminated nuclear power plant site

Contaminated sediments originating from dredging activities in a nuclear power plant site were placed in a pond, which has to be taken into consideration during the future decommissioning process. The sediments have to be handled to free release the site. The radionuclides Co-60 and Cs-137 were identified and the activity concentrations (Bq/kg) were quantified in the range of 10–6000 and 5–50 Bq kg -1 , respectively. The absorbed dose rate to individuals of various ages and sex present at the site of the dry pond area was estimated. The radiological impact in terms of lifetime attributable risk (LAR) and effective dose were calculated. For a 30-year-old male exposed during one year without any action regarding the sediments in the dried out pond, the LAR was predicted to be 0.0027, which recalculated to effective dose corresponds to 7.6 mSv year -1 . The calculations show that countermeasures will be needed for the contaminated site.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Decommissioning R and D at NNL - Characterisation, Decontamination and Deployment - 20091

Nuclear facilities frequently contain a wide range of different physical, chemical and radiological hazards post-operation which are regularly poorly characterised, difficult to access and in turn hard to decontaminate. NNL's Decontamination Science theme is striving to help facilitate faster, safer and cheaper decommissioning operations through the study contaminated materials and the development of innovative decommissioning technologies. Projects within the theme are developing a deeper understanding of the mechanisms in which materials (metal, concrete, plastics etc.) become contaminated. Methodologies of deploying novel characterisation and decontamination devices in-situ are also being produced and are being designed for deployment within existing plant infrastructure. (authors)

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Certifying the Performance of Fixative Technologies under Open Air Demolition Activities for D and D - 20096

Department of Energy (DOE) facilities undergoing deactivation and decommissioning (D and D) activities struggle with safety concerns of residual radioactive contamination leftover after gross decontamination efforts have concluded. The positive effects of implementing fixative technologies for decommissioning and maintenance is known across the DOE complex. However, there is no standardized metric in place that quantifies the performance of these technologies such as incombustible fixative platforms that immobilize the contamination in a solid polymer material under normal operating conditions or when exposed to stressors. The primary focus of this research is to provide the empirical data necessary to properly characterize the effects of implementing fixative technologies on mitigating the release of contamination. In addition, this effort has been used to identify and establish uniform testing protocols to quantify operational parameters of fixating platforms and properly credit such systems under a variety of operational conditions and stressors that can arise during open air demolition efforts (e.g. impact, water, thermal, etc.). The established protocols will be provided to the ASTM International E10.03 Subcommittee on Radiological Protection for Decontamination and Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities and Components for the potential of formal standardization. Attributes to be addressed during testing are material compromise from impact stress, thermal stress for incombustible fixative materials, and immobilization factors (how well an immobilizing platform is capable of retaining fixated material during thermal and impact stressors). In developing these test methods, a greater understanding of the material's behavior under anticipated and unanticipated events, such as decommissioning activities and contingency events as outlined in the Basis of Interim Operations (BIO), can be successfully characterized. There are several key components of the experimental methodology that is essential in empirically certifying fixative technologies. A surrogate contaminant with a unique signature has been utilized with the implementation of a uniform contamination process of test coupons that is quantifiable and replicable for direct fixative comparisons. A modular test chamber has also been used to apply the various stressors of interest. Collection of released contamination that includes airborne and resettled contaminant particles and analyzed using mass spectrometry. This research directly supports DOE complex-wide concerns in terms of final disposition of nuclear facilities and the considerations made during their time between ceasing facility operation and final disposition. The results of this effort aims to provide a standardized road map and logical decision flow to better facilitate fixative technologies into D and D activities required to achieve the desired facility end state. (authors)

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Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Annual Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 2024

This report provides the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the public with information on the level of radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants (if any) that are added to the environment as a result of Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory’s (PPPL) operations. This report fulfills the annual public reporting requirements of DOE Order 231.1B. The results of PPPL’s 2024 environmental surveillance and monitoring program are presented and discussed. The report also summarizes environmental initiatives, assessments, and community involvement programs that were undertaken in 2024. PPPL has engaged in fusion energy research since 1951 and at its current locations since 1958. The Laboratory’s mission is to develop the scientific knowledge and advanced engineering to enable fusion to power the US and the world, and to develop the understanding of plasmas from the nano- to the astrophysical scale. PPPL’s primary experiment, the National Spherical Torus Experiment-Upgrade (NSTX-U) is a collaboration among national laboratories, universities, and national and international research institutions and is a major element in the US Fusion Energy Sciences Program. Its design tests the physics principles of spherical torus (ST) plasmas, playing an important role in the development of smaller, more economical fusion reactors. Due to previous operational issues, NSTX-U did not operate in 2024. PPPL is engaged in a project to replace key NSTX-U components and systems to enable the operation of this international magnetic fusion user facility. In 2024, PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program measured tritium in the air at onsite sampling stations. Using highly sensitive air monitors, PPPL is capable of detecting small changes in the ambient levels of tritium. The operation of monitors located on D-site is used to demonstrate compliance with the National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) regulations. Also included in PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program, are water monitoring – ground, surface, and waste waters. PPPL’s radiological monitoring program characterized the background levels of tritium in the environment and those data are presented in this report. Ground water monitoring continued under New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s (NJDEP) Site Remediation Program regulations. PPPL monitored for nonradiological contaminants, mainly volatile organic compounds (components of common degreasing solvents). In 2024, PPPL complied with permit limits for surface water and sanitary wastewater discharges. PPPL was honored with an award for EPEAT-certified electronics purchasing from the Global Electronics Council on July 25, 2024.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Perspectives on Response to an Abnormal Radiological Event [Slides]

On May 2, 2019, a sealed radioactive source containing cesium-137 was breached at the University of Washington Harborview Research and Training (HRT) Building in downtown Seattle while attempting to recover the source for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Off-site Source Recovery Program (OSRP). The breach of the source resulted in the contamination of personnel, large sections of the building, and a release of material to the local environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

An Assessment of Potential Dose Impacts from External Contamination on Naval Reactors Facility Waste Canisters (Special Analysis)

This Special Analysis (SA) was performed to address a request by Naval Reactors Facility (NRF) Waste Programs for a permanent exception to limits of removable surface contamination on the exterior of waste canisters shipped to the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility as specified in the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) (PLN-5446). The purpose of this SA is to determine if the NRF-requested levels for removable surface contamination on the exterior of all NRF waste canisters is within the bounds of the current performance assessment (PA). This was done by calculating the groundwater all-pathways dose contribution from surface contamination on the exterior of NRF canisters for the following cases: (1) the exteriors of all NRF waste canisters are contaminated to the 10 CFR 835 Appendix D allowable limits in the current WAC, and (2) the exteriors of all NRF waste canisters are contaminated to the limits requested by NRF Waste Programs. Dose impacts for each case were compared to each other and to the all pathways dose for the PA base case. Dose impacts were also compared to the all pathways dose limit specified in DOE O 435.1. A simple assessment of the potential impacts of the increase in surface contamination using the NRF-requested limits on the biotic, air, and inadvertent intruder pathways was also performed. Based on the results of this SA, the increase in canister exterior contamination limits requested by NRF are well within the bounds of the current PA and will not result in a violation of performance objectives. The results also show the increased limits do not reflect or necessitate a fundamental change to the PA conceptual model, nor a change to the way exterior contamination is not included in PA dose calculations. Therefore, it is recommended the NRF request for an exception to the current limits for external surface contamination be accepted and the revised limits for NRF-generated waste canisters be added to the WAC. The monitoring plan will also be revised to identify external canister contamination as a potential mobile source term that may be detected by monitoring earlier than potential releases from waste. The PA, composite analysis (CA), closure plan, and PA/CA maintenance plan do not require revision. Recommendations are also included for inclusion of NRF procedures used to limit water pool radionuclide variability (and thus canister surface contamination variability) to the waste generator certification process.

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Dirty bomb source term characterization and downwind dispersion: Review of experimental evidence

Dirty bombs are considered one of the easiest forms of radiological terrorism, a form of terrorism based on the deliberate use of radiological material to cause adverse effects in a target population. One U.S. Government official has even described a dirty bomb attack as “all but inevitable”. While people in the vicinity of the blast may experience acute radiation effects, people downwind may unknowingly be contaminated by the radioactive airborne particulate and face increased long-term cancer risk. The likelihood of increased cancer risk depends on the radionuclide used and its specific activity, its aerosolization potential, the particle sizes generated in the blast, and where a person is with respect to the detonation. Different studies have reported that plausible radionuclides for dirty bomb include 60 Co, 90 Sr, 137 Cs, 192 Ir, 241 Am based on their availability in commercial sources as well as safeguards, the amount needed for adverse health effects, previous mishandling of radionuclides and malicious uses. In order to have increased long-term cancer risk, the radionuclide would have to deposit inside the body by entering the respiratory tract and then possibly migrate to other organs or bones (ground shine is not considered in this paper because areas affected by the event will likely become inaccessible). This implies that the particles will have to be smaller than 10 μm to be inhaled. Experiments involving the detonation of dirty bombs have shown that particles or droplets smaller than 10 μm are generated, independently from the initial radionuclide or its state (e.g., powder, solution). Atmospheric tests have shown that in unobstructed terrain, the radionuclide laden cloud can travel kilometers downwind even for relatively small amounts of explosives. Furthermore, buildings in the path of the cloud can change the dose rate. For instance, in one experiment with a single building, the dose rate was 1–2 orders of magnitude lower behind the obstacle compared to its front face. For people walking around, the amount of particulate deposited on them and inhaled will depend on their path relative to the cloud, resulting in the counterintuitive result that the closer people may actually not be the ones more at risk because they could simply miss the bulk of the cloud in their wandering. In summary, the long-term cancer risk for people caught in a dirty bomb cloud away from the detonation requires considering where and when the people are, which radionuclide was used, and the layout of the obstacles (e.g., buildings, vegetation) in the path of the cloud.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Alpha Spectrometry Results for Groundwater Samples Collected in Northern Iraq and a Summary of the Environmental Setting of the Adaya Burial Site

The Radiation Protection Center (RPC) of the Iraqi Ministry of Environment continues to evaluate the potential health impacts associated with the Adaya Burial Site, which is located 33 kilometers (20.5 miles) southwest of Mosul. This report documents the radiological analyses of 16 groundwater samples collected from wells located in the vicinity of the Adaya Burial Site and at other sites in northern Iraq. The Adaya Burial Site is a high-risk dump site because a large volume of radioactive material and contaminated soil is located on an unsecure hillside above the village of Tall ar Ragrag. The uranium activities for the 16 water samples in northern Iraq are considered to be naturally occurring and do not indicate artificial (man-made) contamination. With one exception, the alpha spectrometry results for the 16 wells that were sampled in 2019 indicate that the water quality concerning the three uranium isotopes (Uranium-233/234, Uranium-235/236, and Uranium-238) was acceptable for potable purposes (drinking and cooking). However, Well 7 in Mosul had a Uranium-233/234 activity concentration that slightly exceeded the World Health Organization guidance level. Eight of the 16 wells are located in the villages of Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya and had naturally occurring uranium concentrations. Wells in the villages of Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya are located near the Adaya Burial Site and should be sampled on an annual schedule. The list of groundwater analytes should include metals, total uranium, isotopic uranium, gross alpha/beta, gamma spectroscopy, organic compounds, and standard water quality parameters. Our current understanding of the hydrogeologic setting in the vicinity of the Adaya Burial Site is solely based on villager's domestic wells, topographic maps, and satellite imagery. To better understand the hydrogeologic setting, a Groundwater Monitoring Program needs to be developed and should include the installation of twelve groundwater monitoring wells in the vicinity of Tall ar Ragrag and the Adaya Burial Site. Characterization of the limestone aquifer and overlying alluvium is needed. RPC should continue to support health assessments for the villagers in Tall ar Ragrag and Adaya. Collecting samples for surface water (storm water), airborne dust, vegetation, and washway sediment should be conducted on a routine basis. Human access to the Adaya Burial Site needs to be strictly limited. Livestock access on or near the burial site needs to be eliminated. The surface-water exposure pathway is likely a greater threat than the groundwater exposure pathway. Installation of a surface-water diversion or collection system is recommended in order to reduce the potential for humans and livestock to come in contact with contaminated water and sediment. To reduce exposure to villagers, groundwater treatment should be considered if elevated uranium or other contaminants are detected in drinking water. Installing water-treatment systems would likely be quicker to accomplish than remediation and excavation of the Adaya Burial Site. The known potential for human exposure to uranium and metals (such as arsenic, chromium, selenium, and strontium) at the Adaya Burial Site is serious. Additional characterization , mitigation, and remediation efforts should be given a high priority.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Characterization of C-Reactor (105-C) Moderator Tanks 204 and 205

Area Completion Project (ACP)/Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) has requested Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to perform chemical and radiological analyses on moderator heavy water samples from C-Reactor (105-C) in Moderator Tanks 204 and 205. The heavy water samples have been characterized using SRNL analytical methods. Information generated from the characterization of these heavy water samples provide a basis for determining the residual contamination remaining in the tanks. These analyses are needed in order to update the C-Reactor Contaminant migration groundwater model and report, to help determine a disposition pathway for the moderator water, and to ship samples off-site to the Southwest Research Institute (SWRI). This report presents characterization results for the March 2024 C-Reactor Moderator Tank 204 and 205 heavy water samples. SRNL results are critical to allow ACP to complete this Performance Based Incentive project on time. Based on the characterization data provided in this report, results of these samples meet customer expectations and satisfy the Technical Assistance Request (TAR).

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