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At least 127 records · Page 7

ISS External Microorganisms: A Planetary Protection Experiment to Inform Requirements for Crewed Missions to Mars

We have developed, tested, and flown a caddy capable of collecting aseptic samples from external surfaces of the ISS (International Space Station). The sampling caddy is certified for use during US EVA (extra vehicular activity) and was launched to ISS in the summer of 2023. We are scheduled to collect samples from 6 locations outside ISS during an EVA in May of 2024. We will freeze these samples at -80°C on orbit and return them to Earth. We will then extract and sequence any DNA collected during the EVA using next generation sequencing technologies to characterize the community composition and function of each sample. Measuring the type and quantity of microbes present on the exterior of ISS will allow us to address knowledge gap 2B, “Acceptable levels of microbial/organic releases from humans and support systems” described in a 2019 COSPAR report. Collecting data about microbial release from current crewed vehicles will inform requirements for acceptable leak rates for future crewed missions to Mars. The sampling kit consists of eight commercially available, sterile, DNA free, macrofoam swabs ( 23 mm. diameter ) installed in custom aluminum end effectors. Each end effector is housed in and individual aluminum canister. Each canister contains a 0.2 μm Teflon filter to allow the interior volume to accommodate pressure changes without permitting microbial contaminants to enter the sterile interior volume. A handle repurposed from the space shuttle tile repair kit is used to remove the end effector from the sample canister, collect a sample by swabbing a surface and then replace the end effector in its canister. The canisters and end effectors were cleaned and assembled on Earth. Prior to installing the sterile swab the canisters and end effectors were sterilized in an autoclave at 134°C, 215 kPA, for 7 min.. The final assembly occurred in a sterilized class II biosafety cabinet. We will collect six samples from the 1) airlock vestibule, 2) airlock thermal cover, 3) a gap in the micrometeorite shielding near the airlock, 4) a handrail near the airlock, 5) the CDRA (Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly) vent, and 6) the VES (Vacuum Exhaust System) vent. The remaining two swabs will be reserved as controls. One swab will be exposed during the EVA without touching any surfaces to act as a blank. The final swab will remain sealed until the entire sampling kit is returned to earth. Based on previously published results from the Russian segment, we hypothesize that there will be detectable microbes at some or all of these locations. Ground-based testing of this sampling caddy confirms that the swabs remain sterile as the canisters transition in and out of vacuum. We were able to retrieve, viable bacterial and fungal cells as well as DNA from samples collected from US space suits during vacuum chamber tests lasting as long as seven hours. Based on these results and feedback from the test subjects the sampling caddy was modified to improve ergonomics and meet US EVA safety requirements. Bayonet probes were added to the sides of the sample kit as alternate mounting points. Additional locking features were added to the end effector and the filter stack to prevent inadvertent release during use. The opening mechanism was changed from one where the end effector was rocked laterally to defeat a ball detent to a twist-to-open threaded closure for similar reasons. Demonstrating, this sampling caddy’s effectiveness during a US EVA will allow us to address knowledge gaps identified in COSPAR reports and begin to define planetary protection requirements for life support systems on crewed missions to mars. This kit could also be used to collect contamination control samples during Artemis missions to verify requirements and could be easily modified for robotic sample collection.

Planetary Protection↗

ISS External Microorganisms: Collecting Planetary Protection Samples During Extravehicular Activity

We have developed, tested, and flown a caddy capable of collecting aseptic samples from external surfaces of the ISS (International Space Station). The sampling caddy is certified for use during US EVA (extra vehicular activity) and was launched to ISS in the summer of 2023. We are scheduled to collect samples from 6 locations outside ISS during an EVA in May of 2024. We will freeze these samples at -80°C on orbit and return them to Earth. We will then extract and sequence any DNA collected during the EVA using next generation sequencing technologies to characterize the community composition and function of each sample. Measuring the type and quantity of microbes present on the exterior of ISS will allow us to address knowledge gap 2B, “Acceptable levels of microbial/organic releases from humans and support systems” described in a 2019 COSPAR report. Collecting data about microbial release from current crewed vehicles will inform requirements for acceptable leak rates for future crewed missions to Mars. The sampling kit consists of eight commercially available, sterile, DNA free, macrofoam swabs ( 23 mm. diameter ) installed in custom aluminum end effectors. Each end effector is housed in and individual aluminum canister. Each canister contains a 0.2 μm Teflon filter to allow the interior volume to accommodate pressure changes without permitting microbial contaminants to enter the sterile interior volume. A handle repurposed from the space shuttle tile repair kit is used to remove the end effector from the sample canister, collect a sample by swabbing a surface and then replace the end effector in its canister. The canisters and end effectors were cleaned and assembled on Earth. Prior to installing the sterile swab the canisters and end effectors were sterilized in an autoclave at 134°C, 215 kPA, for 7 min.. The final assembly occurred in a sterilized class II biosafety cabinet. We will collect six samples from the 1) airlock vestibule, 2) airlock thermal cover, 3) a gap in the micrometeorite shielding near the airlock, 4) a handrail near the airlock, 5) the CDRA (Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly) vent, and 6) the VES (Vacuum Exhaust System) vent. The remaining two swabs will be reserved as controls. One swab will be exposed during the EVA without touching any surfaces to act as a blank. The final swab will remain sealed until the entire sampling kit is returned to earth. Based on previously published results from the Russian segment, we hypothesize that there will be detectable microbes at some or all of these locations. Ground-based testing of this sampling caddy confirms that the swabs remain sterile as the canisters transition in and out of vacuum. We were able to retrieve, viable bacterial and fungal cells as well as DNA from samples collected from US space suits during vacuum chamber tests lasting as long as seven hours. Based on these results and feedback from the test subjects the sampling caddy was modified to improve ergonomics and meet US EVA safety requirements. Bayonet probes were added to the sides of the sample kit as alternate mounting points. Additional locking features were added to the end effector and the filter stack to prevent inadvertent release during use. The opening mechanism was changed from one where the end effector was rocked laterally to defeat a ball detent to a twist-to-open threaded closure for similar reasons. Demonstrating, this sampling caddy’s effectiveness during a US EVA will allow us to address knowledge gaps identified in COSPAR reports and begin to define planetary protection requirements for life support systems on crewed missions to mars. This kit could also be used to collect contamination control samples during Artemis missions to verify requirements and could be easily modified for robotic sample collection.

Planetary Protection↗

Planetary protection issues and future Mars missions

A primary scientific theme for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) is the search for life, extant or extinct, on Mars. Because of this, concerns have arisen about Planetary Protection (PP), the prevention of biological cross-contamination between Earth and other planets during solar system exploration missions. A recent workshop assessed the necessity for, and impact of, PP requirements on the unmanned and human missions to Mars comprising the SEI. The following ground-rules were adopted: (1) Information needed for assessing PP issues must be obtained during the unmanned precursor mission phase prior to human landings. (2) Returned Mars samples will be considered biologically hazardous until proven otherwise. (3) Deposition of microbes on Mars and exposure of the crew to martian materials are inevitable when humans land. And (4) Human landings are unlikely until it is demonstrated that there is no harmful effect of martian materials on terrestrial life forms. These ground-rules dictated the development of a conservative PP strategy for precursor missions. Key features of the proposed strategy include: to prevent forward-contamination, all orbiters will follow Mars Observer PP procedures for assembly, trajectory, and lifetime. All landers will follow Viking PP procedures for assembly, microbial load reduction, and bio-shield. And, to prevent back-contamination, all sample return missions will have PP requirements which include fail-safe sample sealing, breaking contact chain with the martian surface, and containment and quarantine analysis in Earth-based laboratory. In addition to deliberating on scientific and technical issues, the workshop made several recommendations for dealing with forward and back-contamination concerns from non-scicntific perspectives.

Devincenzi, D. L.↗

Planetary Protection, Sample Return Missions and Mars Exploration: History, Status, and Future Needs

As the prospect grows for a Mars sample return mission early in the next millennium, it will be important to ensure that appropriate planetary protection (PP) controls are incorporated into the mission design and implementation from the start. The need for these PP controls is firmly based on scientific considerations and backed by a number of national and international agreements and guidelines aimed at preventing harmful cross contamination of planets and extraterrestrial bodies. The historical precedent for the use of PP measures on both unmanned and manned missions traces from post-Sputnik missions to the present, with periodic modifications as new information was obtained. In consideration of the anticipated attention to PP questions by both the scientific/technical community and the public, this paper presents a comprehensive review of the major issues and problems surrounding PP for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission, including an analysis of arguments that have been raised for and against the imposition of PP measures. Also discussed are the history and foundations for PP policies and requirements; important research areas needing attention prior to defining detailed PP requirements for a MSR mission; and legal and public awareness issues that must be considered with mission planning.

DeVincenzi, Donald L.↗

Planetary Protection, Sample Return Missions and Mars Exploration: History, Status, and Future Needs

As the prospect grows for a Mars sample return mission early in the next millennium, it will be important to ensure that appropriate planetary protection (PP) controls are incorporated into the mission design and implementation from the start. The need for these PP controls is firmly based on scientific considerations and backed by a number of national and international agreements and guidelines aimed at preventing harmful cross contamination of planets and extraterrestrial bodies. The historical precedent for the use of PP measures on both unmanned and manned missions traces from post-Sputnik missions to the present, with periodic modifications as new information was obtained. In consideration of the anticipated attention to PP questions by both the scientific/technical community and the public, this paper presents a comprehensive review of the major issues and problems surrounding PP for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission, including an analysis of arguments that have been raised for and against the imposition of PP measures. Also discussed are the history and foundations for PP policies and requirements; important research areas needing attention prior to defining detailed PP requirements for a MSR mission; and legal and public awareness issues that must be considered with mission planning.

DeVincenzi, Donald L.↗

EVA Swab Tool to Support Planetary Protection and Astrobiology Evaluations

When we send humans to search for life on other planets, we'll need to know what we brought with us versus what may already be there. To ensure our crewed systems meet planetary protection requirements-and to protect our science from human contamination-we'll need to assess whether microorganisms may be leaking or venting from our spacecraft. Microbial sample collection outside of a pressurized spacecraft is complicated by temperature extremes, low pressures that preclude the use of laboratory standard (wetted) swabs, and operation either in bulky spacesuits or with robotic assistance. Engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recently developed a swab kit for use in collecting microbial samples from the external surfaces of crewed spacecraft, including spacesuits. The Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Swab Kit consists of a single swab tool handle and an eight-canister sample caddy. The design team minimized development cost by re-purposing a heritage Space Shuttle tile repair handle that was designed to quickly snap into different tool attachments by engaging a mating device in each attachment. This allowed the tool handle to snap onto a fresh swab attachment much like popular shaving razor handles can snap onto a disposable blade cartridge. To disengage the handle from a swab, the user performs two independent functions, which can be done with a single hand. This dual operation mitigates the risk that a swab will be inadvertently released and lost in microgravity. Each swab attachment is fitted with commercially available foam swab tips, vendor-certified to be sterile for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA). A microbial filter installed in the bottom of each sample container allows the container to outgas and repressurize without introducing microbial contaminants to internal void spaces. Extensive ground testing, post-test handling, and sample analysis confirmed the design is able to maintain sterile conditions as the canister moves between various pressure environments. To further minimize cost, the design team acquired extensive ground test experience in a relevant flight environment by piggy-backing onto suited crew training runs. These training runs allowed the project to validate tool interfaces with pressurized EVA gloves and collect user feedback on the tool design and function, as well as characterize baseline microbial data for different types of spacesuits. In general, test subjects found the EVA Swab Kit relatively straightforward to operate, but identified a number of design improvements that will be incorporated into the final design. Although originally intended to help characterize human forward contaminants, this tool has other potential applications, such as for collecting and preserving space-exposed materials to support astrobiology experiments.

Rucker, Michelle A.↗

EVA Swab Tool to Support Planetary Protection and Astrobiology Evaluations

When we send humans to search for life on other planets, we'll need to know what we brought with us versus what may already be there. To ensure our crewed systems meet planetary protection requirements-and to protect our science from human contamination-we'll need to assess whether microorganisms may be leaking or venting from our spacecraft. Microbial sample collection outside of a pressurized spacecraft is complicated by temperature extremes, low pressures that preclude the use of laboratory standard (wetted) swabs, and operation either in bulky spacesuits or with robotic assistance. A team at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recently developed a swab kit for use in collecting microbial samples from the external surfaces of crewed spacecraft, including spacesuits. The Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Swab Kit consists of a single swab tool handle and an eight-canister sample caddy. The design team minimized development cost by re-purposing a heritage Space Shuttle tile repair handle that was designed to quickly snap into different tool attachments by engaging a mating device in each end effector. This allowed the tool handle to snap onto a fresh swab end effector much like popular shaving razor handles can snap onto a disposable blade cartridge. To disengage the handle from a swab, the user performs two independent functions, which can be done with a single hand. This dual operation mitigates the risk that a swab will be inadvertently released and lost in microgravity. Each swab end effector is fitted with commercially available foam swab tips, vendor-certified to be sterile for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA). A microbial filter installed in the bottom of each sample container allows the container to outgas and re-pressurize without introducing microbial contaminants to internal void spaces. Extensive ground testing, post-test handling, and sample analysis confirmed the design is able to maintain sterile conditions as the canister moves between various pressure environments. To further minimize cost, the design team acquired extensive ground test experience in a relevant flight environment by piggy-backing onto suited crew training runs. These training runs allowed the project to validate tool interfaces with pressurized EVA gloves and collect user feedback on the tool design and function, as well as characterize baseline microbial data for different types of spacesuits. In general, test subjects found the EVA Swab Kit relatively straightforward to operate, but identified a number of design improvements that will be incorporated into the final design. Although originally intended to help characterize human forward contaminants, this tool has other potential applications, such as for collecting and preserving space-exposed materials to support astrobiology experiments.

Rucker, Michelle A.↗

Planetary Protection at Marshall Space Flight Center

Introduction: NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is historically known for its role in propulsion. While this is still the mainstay of MSFC’s expertise, many unique capabilities exist at MSFC which pertain to Planetary Protection (PP), including 1) identifying PP threats, and 2) developing novel methods to neutralize those threats. Furthermore, because these capabilities exist among diverse groups at MSFC, this work promotes collaboration both within and outside MSFC to expand and develop PP studies related to a full spectrum of NASA research, design, manufacture, and test interests. This abstract describes the PP research ongoing at MSFC and describes how it contributes to NASA’s overall PP objectives. Microbial Identification in Cleanrooms: One of the greatest threats to successful implementation of PP requirements is recontamination post bioburden reduction. One method to prevent recontamination is to keep the spacecraft in clean environments (i.e. cleanrooms) as much as possible during assembly and integration. However, cleanrooms are not without their own sources of contamination, which is why NASA is interested in monitoring the cleanliness of cleanrooms and characterizing the microbial species present. Such information allows a greater understanding of the resistance of these microbes to cleaning methods, as well as the risk of their contaminating the targeted planetary body of a given mission. MSFC has multiple cleanrooms of various ISO cleanliness levels onsite. We sampled the air and surfaces of three of these rooms, isolated microbes, and then sequenced the 16S rRNA gene or ITS region of the 18S rRNA gene for bacterial and fungal isolates, respectively. This has resulted in a microbial library which currently includes nearly 100 isolates. Microbial Enumeration of Spacecraft Materials: Currently, there are only a couple bioburden reduction methods approved by NASA, and often the harshness of these methods presents additional concerns or risks related to material properties. The goal of this research is to assess the microbial content of solid rocket motor (SRM) materials potentially used for lander missions. This work aims to more accurately define the risk of planetary contamination by providing empirical data associated with commonly used SRM raw materials. In this study, we pulverized nonmetallic SRM materials using a cryogenic grinder, then analyzed the resulting substrate for microbial colony forming units (CFU). We found that many SRM nonmetallic materials do not harbor detectable bioburden, though a range existed depending on the material. The results from this work provide quantitative data to potentially reduce concerns of contamination, while also providing a foundation for follow up studies into additional sterilization methods and molecular identification of contaminating microbes. Space Environmental Effects on Microbial Survival: One potential area of microbial reduction is the space environment. Understanding the survivability of hardy microbes in space-like conditions is a crucial first step in answering how space may reduce bioburden and if it can be relied upon for adherence to PP requirements. This work studied the effects of ultraviolet (UV) and ionizing radiation on survival of Bacillus atrophaeus spores. Microbes were dried on relevant polymeric materials then exposed to space environmental stressors. Coupons were submerged in water, diluted, and plated to determine survival compared with controls. We found that both UV and ionizing radiation were capable of reducing viability by nearly 99%, but there were still survivors, some with changed morphology indicating resistance mechanisms within certain cells. Manufacturing credit: Finally, given the above-mentioned limitations of the NASA-approved bioburden reduction methods, there is interest in understanding if manufacturing processes may provide enough bioburden reduction without additional PP-specific bakeouts. For instance, some material additives may be antimicrobial. Given this, we investigated the effects of several commonly used rubber additives on the growth of B. atrophaeus spores. We found that some of the materials inhibited growth of the spores, possibly supporting the use of these additives on missions with PP constraints. Future work into manufacturing credit for bioburden reduction includes inoculation of green insulation with B. atrophaeus spores, followed by a typical cure. Thermal profiles will be verified for appropriate temperature and durations to meet PP requirements, and cured samples will be analyzed using a cryogenic grinder to determine survivability of spores.

Chelsi D. Cassilly↗

A proposed new policy for planetary protection

A policy on the protection of extraterrestrial bodies from contamination by terrestrial microorganisms and organic constituents that might interfere with studies of chemical and biological evolution on those bodies is proposed which is based on new information gained in planetary exploration over the past decade. The proposed policy overcomes the difficulties associated with the uncertainties in parameters and the rigid requirements of the current probabilistic approach by eliminating the general quantitative guideline and by calling for the implementation of planetary protection procedures for space projects by exception, depending on target planet and type of encounter. The impact of the proposed policy on the implementation of future space missions is illustrated for the Galileo Jupiter mission, a cometary mission, the Saturn Orbiter with Twin Probes, and a Mars Surface Sample Return Mission, and procedures which may lead to the eventual adoption of the policy are noted.

Devincenzi, D. L.↗

Planetary protection issues and human exploration of Mars

A key feature of the Space Exploration Initiative involves human missions to Mars. The report describing the initiative cites the search for life on Mars, extant or extinct, as one of the five science themes for such an endeavor. Because of this, concerns for planetary protection (PP) have arisen of two fronts: (1) forward contamination of Mars by spacecraft-borne terrestrial microbes which could interfere with exobiological analyses; and (2) back contamination of Earth by species that may be present in returned Mars samples. The United States is also signatory to an international treaty designed to protect Earth and planets from harmful cross-contamination during exploration. Therefore, it is timely to assess the necessity for, and impact of, PP procedures on the mission set comprising the human exploration of Mars. The ground-rules adopted at a recent workshop which addressed PP questions of this type are presented. In addition, the workshop produced several recommendations for dealing with forward and back contamination concerns for non-scientific perspectives, including public relations, legal, regulatory, international, and environmental.

Devincenzi, D. L.↗

Planetary Protection Requirements and Aimpoint Biasing for Mars 2020 Mission

The Mars 2020 mission was launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida on July 30, 2020, and landed at Mars Jezero Crater on February 18, 2021. Throughout the 7-month interplanetary trajectory, there were various requirements and constraints the navigation team had to observe. Particularly pertinent to trajectory control and maneuver design were the planetary protection requirements for preventing microbial contamination of Mars. Consequently, the aimpoints for injection and early TCMs were biased away to reduce the probability of unintended Mars impact, thus satisfying these requirements. In addition, extensive pre-launch analyses were done to ensure other requirements could be met with high probabilities.

Kruizinga, Gerhard↗

Exposing Microorganisms in the Stratosphere for Planetary Protection Project

Earths stratosphere is similar to the surface of Mars: rarified air which is dry, cold, and irradiated. E-MIST is a balloon payload that has 4 independently rotating skewers that hold known quantities of spore-forming bacteria isolated from spacecraft assembly facilities at NASA. Knowing the survival profile of microbes in the stratosphere can uniquely contribute to NASA Planetary Protection for Mars.Objectives 1. Collect environmental data in the stratosphere to understand factors impacting microbial survival. 2. Determine of surviving microbes (compared to starting quantities). 3. Examine microbial DNA mutations induced by stratosphere exposure.

Technology Portfolio System↗

Using Artificial Life to Assess the Typicality of Terrestrial Life: Implications for Human Mission Planetary Protection

The extent to which extraterrestrial life questions can be addressed, in the absence of an actual example, rests in some measure on the extent to which terrestrial life is representative of life in general since we will likely have to draw heavily, if not completely, from terrestrial life research. One example of a practical question involving extraterrestrial life that arises in preparing for a human mission to another planet such as Mars, is trying to assess and minimize the possible adverse effects of the presence of humans on possible indigenous extraterrestrial life-forms. This paper will present some key planetary protection challenges for a human Mars mission and then focus on one possible approach for assessing the extent to which terrestrial life is representative of biological phenomena in general, informing perhaps, the level of confidence we might have in applying terrestrial research - to extraterrestrial life issues. The approach involves appealing to the relatively new field of Artificial Life (A-Life) to: (1) use what might be the most basic minimal set of life-defining characteristics in (2) a large number of open-ended Artificial Life simulations to generate a "life possibility space" (3) the products of which can be examined for their plausibility within the context of relevant constraining knowledge, so that (4) the remaining possibility space can be examined for its variability relative to terrestrial life, where low variability might suggest that terrestrial life is representative of life in general, and high variability would indicate otherwise.

Lupisella, Mark↗