ISO-STANDARD AND IAEA GUIDANCE MATERIAL FOR PACKAGE LOAD ATTACHMENT POINTS ? Current Approaches and Developments F.
Abstract not provided.
Kalinina, Elena Arkadievna↗
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Leveraging Available Data to Support Extension of Transportation Packages Service Life
Data obtained from testing shipping package materials have been leveraged to support extending the service life of select shipping packages while in nuclear materials transportation. Increasingly, nuclear material inventories are being transferred to an interim storage location where they will reside for extended periods of time. Use of a shipping package to store nuclear materials in an interim storage location has become more attractive for a variety of reasons. Shipping packages are robust and have a qualified pedigree for their performance in normal operation and accident conditions within the approved shipment period and storing nuclear material within a shipping package results in reduced operations for the storage facility. However, the shipping package materials of construction must maintain a level of integrity as specified by the safety basis of the storage facility through the duration of the storage period, which is typically well beyond the one year transportation window. Test programs have been established to obtain aging data on materials of construction that are the most sensitive/susceptible to aging in certain shipping package designs. The collective data are being used to support extending the service life of shipping packages in both transportation and storage.
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Blending Compostable Plastics for Packaging Applications
Non-sustainable packaging materials (polymers) are a large portion of the increasing amount of plastic waste that become environmental pollutants. While many biodegradable or compostable polymers have been developed in recent years, most fail to compete with the non-sustainable polymers dominating the market, due to lack of certain desired properties, such as thermal (high melt temperature) and mechanical (high ductility) performance. For example, the popular compostable polymer polylactic acid (PLLA) has a high melt temperature but is very brittle. Another polymer, poly(d-valerolactone) (PVL) demonstrates great ductility but has a very low melt temperature. By blending PLLA and PVL, there is an opportunity to create a new biodegradable material with synergistic desired properties for packaging applications. In this study, we produce several (9) physical blends of PVL and PLLA with varying compositions of the two polymers while applying three different materials to make them more compatible (compatibilizers). We test the success of compatibilization by scanning electron microscopy (SEM), mechanic testing (strain at break) and differential scanning calorimetry (melting temperature). Overall, we highlight several promising materials with high compatibility and desired thermomechanical properties for sustainable packaging. Ideally, these materials could help mitigate future plastic pollution in Colorado and beyond.
blending↗
SAVY-4000 Surveillance and Life Extension Program Fiscal Year 2013 Annual Report
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the DOE M441.1-1 /sup>1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE, 2008) requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” In order to ensure continuing safe storage of nuclear material and the maximization of risk reduction, TA-55 has established a Surveillance Program to ensure storage container integrity for operations within its specified design life. The LANL SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan 2 defines the near-term field surveillance plan for SAVY-4000 containers as required by the Manual. A long-term surveillance plan will be established based on the results of the first several years of surveillance and the results of the lifetime extension studies as defined in the Accelerated Aging Plan 3 . This report details progress in positioning the Surveillance Program for successful implementation in FY14 and status of the Design Life Extension Program in terms of its implementation and data collection for FY13.
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LANL SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE, 2008) requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” This report defines the near-term field surveillance plan for SAVY-4000 containers as required by the Manual. The long-term surveillance plan will be based on the results of the first several years of surveillance and the results of the lifetime extension studies.
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Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan Update for 2016
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in FY 2013 (Kelly et al. 2013). The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance and other surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies (Blair et al. 2012, Weis et al. 2015a). The LANL SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan Update was issued in 2014 (Kelly et al. 2014). This 2016 update reflects changes to the surveillance plan resulting from restrictions on handling residue materials greater than 500 g, the addition of specific engineering judgment containers, and 2015 surveillance findings. The SAVY-4000 container has a design life of five years, which was chosen as a conservative estimate of the functional properties of the materials used in the construction of the SAVY 4000 when exposed to the potential insults including temperature, corrosive materials and gases, and radiation. The SAVY-4000 container design basis is described in a safety analysis report (Anderson et al. 2013). In the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA’s) approval of the safety analysis report, it was recommended that the design life clock begin on March 2014 (Nez et al. 2014). However, it is expected that a technical basis can be developed to extend the design life of the SAVY-4000 containers to approximately 40 years (Blair et al. 2012, Weis et al. 2015a). This surveillance plan update covers five years (2015–2019) and is developed to ensure SAVY-4000 containers meet their design criteria over the current five-year design life and to gather data that can be used in developing the technical basis for a 40-year design life. The technical basis for the longer design life will be developed based on the results of this surveillance plan and the concurrent lifetime extension studies (Blair et al. 2012, Weis et al. 2015a). A long-term surveillance plan will be developed by the completion of this plan and will be based on the results of the first several years of this five-year surveillance plan and the lifetime extension studies. In addition, the current Hagan container population is so large (approximately 3,500 LANL-wide, approximately 3,000 in PF-4) that it is anticipated Hagan containers will be in use for many years to come. Therefore, this plan includes surveillance activities for the Hagan container system during the time it takes to replace the Hagan containers with manually-compliant containers such as the SAVY 4000. These Hagan examinations not only provide information to determine if additional Hagan surveillance is needed, but also support SAVY lifetime-extension studies because some of the container components are made from similar material (e.g., stainless steel and Viton).
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An Investigation of Catastrophic Failure in Solid-State Lamps Exposed to Harsh Environment Operational Conditions
Today’s lighting technology is steadily becoming more energy efficient and less toxic to the environment since the passing of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) [1]. EISA has mandated a higher energy efficiency standard for lighting products and the phase out of the common incandescent lamp. This has led lighting manufacturers to pursue solid-state lighting (SSL) technologies for consumer lighting applications. However, two major roadblocks are hindering the transition process to SSL lamps: cost and quality. In order to cut cost, manufactures are moving towards cheaper packaging materials and a variety of package architecture construction techniques which may potentially erode the quality of the lamp and reduce its survivability in everyday applications. Typically, SSL lamps are given product lifetimes of over twenty years based off of the IES TM-21-11 lighting standard which does not include moisture effects or large operational temperatures [2]. A group of recently released off-the-shelf lamps have undergone a steady-state temperature humidity bias life test of 85°C/85%RH (85/85) to investigate the reliability in harsh environment applications. The lack of accelerated test methods for lamps to assess reliability prior to introduction into the marketplace does not exist in literature. There is a need for SSL physics based models for the assessment and prediction of a lamp’s lifetime which is being spearheaded by the DOE [3]. In order to be fully accepted in the marketplace, SSL lamps must be able to perform similarly to incandescent lamps in these environments, as well as live up to the lifetime claims of manufacturers. A lamp’s package architecture must be designed with performance factors in mind, as well as address some of the known and published package related failure mechanisms, such as carbonization of the encapsulant material, delamination, encapsulant yellowing, lens cracking, and phosphor thermal quenching [4]. Each failure mechanism produces the similar failure mode of lumen degradation predominately due to two contributing factors: high junction temperature and moisture ingress. The current state-of-the-art has focused on individual areas of the lamp, such as the LED chip, substrate material, electrical driver design and thermal management techniques. [5] – [16] Looking at the lamp as a whole is a novel approach and has not been seen before in literature. This work followed the JEDEC standard JESD22-A101C of 85/85 with a one hour interval of applied voltage followed by a one hour interval of no applied voltage [17]. This test was performed continuously for each SSL lamp until it became nonoperational, i.e. did not turn on. Periodically, photometric measurements were taken following the IES LM-79-08 standard at room temperature using an integrating sphere, a spectrometer, and lighting software. The overall health of the SSL lamps was assed using the relative luminous flux (RLF), correlated color temperature (CCT) and the color difference (Δu'v') using the Euclidean distance of the CIE 1976 color space coordinates. Finally, a Weibull analysis was completed to compare the characteristic lifetime of the SSL lamp to the actual rated lifetime. An important result from this work shows that the rated lifetime does not come close to the actual lifetime when the SSL lamps are used in a harsh humid environment which is fairly common in outdoor applications across the U.S. Also, the photometric results are presented for the entire lifetime of each SSL lamp under test.
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Effects of Laser Etching on the Corrosion Susceptibility of SAVY 4000 and Hagan Containers
Since the late 1990’s, the Hagan container was used as the primary container for packaging of plutonium-bearing materials. The Hagan design consisted of a threaded closure, a Viton® ORing, a carbon-carbon filter, and a 304L stainless steel (SS) body. Over the years, Hagans have shown vulnerability in their design [1]. In 2008, The Department of Energy (DOE) issued DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual, which detailed an approach to obtain highconfidence in containers by including specific design requirements, material contents and an approach to determine life span from said contents, and surveillance techniques [2]. In response to both the vulnerability issues with the Hagan and DOE M 441.1-1, the SAVY 4000 container with its twist style closure, Viton® O-Ring, Fiberfrax-Gortex filter, and annealed 316L SS body, was designed as the replacement for Hagan containers, but only for a short term lifespan of 5 years [1]. However, both the Hagan and SAVY 4000 are being pushed to maintain a lifespan of 40 years. Therefore, proper confidence must be placed on each component of each container to last a minimum of 40 years. So far, the biggest concern found during surveillance of these containers is corrosion and the potential for failure by corrosion. One concern is that the containers fail due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC), especially around the weld between the collar and the body as welds leave residual stresses. One advantage the SAVY 4000 has is that the body is annealed, but its weld is still susceptible as it was welded after annealing [3, 4]. Moreover, 316L SS is known to have a higher pitting resistance (pits are a precursor to SCC and can also lead to extensive failure of the material), than 304L SS [4]. During recent surveillance activities, two SAVY 4000’s containing Solution Assay Instrument (SAI) solutions were opened. The SAI SAVY 4000’s contained plutonium (Pu) in 3M HCl solution in plastic volumetric flasks placed inside of polyethylene bags. Historically, a SAVY 4000 containing an SAI solution is packaged for 3 weeks, however, these particular containers were not reopened until 14 months later. When opened, brown-red corrosion product was found all over the inside of the container as shown in Figure 1.
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Energy Management Information Systems (EMIS) Specification and Procurement Support Materials
This package of materials guides commercial building owners and operators through the specification, procurement, and selection of an Energy Information System (EIS) or related building energy performance monitoring and diagnostic technology.
Energy management information systems, EMIS, energ↗
SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan Update for 2017
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.”This 2017 update reflects changes to the surveillance plan resulting from surveillance findings as documented in Reeves et al. 2016. These findings include observations of corrosion in SAVY and Hagan containers and the indication (in one SAVY container) of possible filter membrane thermal degradation. This surveillance plan update documents the rationale for selecting surveillance containers, specifies the containers for 2017 surveillance, and identifies a minimum set of containers for 2018 surveillance. This update contains important changes to the previous surveillance plans.
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Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan Update for 2019
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013 (Kelly et al. 2013). The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Four surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014 (Kelly et al. 2014), one in 2016 (Kelly et al. 2016), one in 2017 (Kelly et al. 2017) and one in 2018 (Kelly et al. 2018). This 2019 update documents what was actually done in 2018 and what is planned for 2019. Deviations from the 2018 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination.
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Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan Update for 2018
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy ( DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013 (Kelly et al. 2013). The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Three surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014 (Kelly et al. 2014), one in 2016 (Kelly et al. 2016) and one in 2017 ( Kelly et al. 2017). This 2018 update documents what was actually done in 2017 and what is planned for 2018. Deviations from the 2017 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination.
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Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan Update for 2020
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013. The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Five surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014, one in 2016, one in 2017, one in 2018, and one in 2019. This 2020 update documents what was actually done in 2019 and what is planned for 2020. Deviations from the 2019 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination. The goal of the surveillance program is to provide data to: evaluate container component performance over time against the initial baseline qualification; validate the current SAVY container design life; provide data for future design life extensions of components as indicated; identify indications of container degradation early and identify similar containers and/or contents that may need remediation; maintain and continuously improve the surveillance information system that documents the complete life cycle of the containers including the initial production baseline, usage history, surveillance, and disposition; identify container issues related to wear and tear that could indicate the need for a maintenance program for in-service containers prior to the end of the design life.
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Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan (Update for 2021)
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1- 1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013. The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Six surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014, one in 2016, one in 2017, one in 2018 one in 2019 and one in 2020. This 2021 update documents what was actually done in 2020 and what is planned for 2021. Deviations from the 2020 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination.
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THERMAL UPGRADING OF 9977 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (RAM) TYPE B PACKAGE
The 9977 package is a radioactive material package that was originally certified to ship Heat Sources and RTG contents up to 19 watts and it is now being reviewed to significantly expand its contents in support of additional DOE missions. Thermal upgrading will be accomplished by employing stacked 3013 containers, a 3013 aluminum spacer and an external aluminum sleeve for enhanced heat transfer. The 7th Addendum to the original 9977 package Safety Basis Report describing these modifications is under review for the DOE certification. The analyses described in this paper show that this well-designed and conservatively analyzed package can be upgraded to carry contents with decay heat up to 38 watts with some simple design modifications. The Model 9977 package has been designed as a replacement for the Department of Transportation (DOT) Fissile Specification 6M package. The 9977 package is a very versatile Type B package which is certified to transport and store a wide spectrum of radioactive materials. The package was analyzed quite conservatively to increase its usefulness and store different payload configurations. Its versatility is evident from several daughter packages such as the 9978 and H1700, and several addendums where the payloads have been modified to suit the Shipper's needs without additional testing.
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Packaging for Food Service
Most of the key areas of concern in packaging the three principle food forms for the space station were covered. It can be generally concluded that there are no significant voids in packaging materials availability or in current packaging technology. However, it must also be concluded that the process by which packaging decisions are made for the space station feeding program will be very synergistic. Packaging selection will depend heavily on the preparation mechanics, the preferred presentation and the achievable disposal systems. It will be important that packaging be considered as an integral part of each decision as these systems are developed.
Stilwell, E. J.↗
Development and Implementation of a Bag Degradation Predictive Tool at Los Alamos National Laboratory
Nuclear material packaging involves many complex variables derived from the stored material's properties, the storage environment, and the synergistic interaction of said material and its environment on the containment boundary. In the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) the typical containment boundary found, starting from the stored material itself to the outermost containment layer, consists of the material contained within a stainless steel (typically 304) slip-lid (or other equivalent stainless steel packaging layer) wrapped in an sPVC bag-out bag contained within a facility approved outer container stored within the boundaries of an approved facility (i.e., a building designed and approved to store nuclear material). This packaging configuration, though occasionally deviated from in the past, represents the current procedurally enforced, expected containment structure for all interim nuclear material containment outside of an engineered control barrier (e.g., a glovebox). Over the life of containerization research at LANL, packaging engineers have become increasingly concerned with the degradation of the sPVC bag-out bag, which can cause corrosion to the outermost packaging layer as well as possible exposure to alpha contamination if the bag-out bag layer is degraded to the point of containment failure. A bag-out bag degradation predictive tool (BDT) is therefore needed to assess the current and future nuclear material inventory for possible bag degradation in order to continue to ensure safe operations for the facility and its workers to deliver on the vital national security mission of 30 PPY.
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Developments that are making the Versa-Pac Indeed More Versatile (and More Useful to Industry) - 16267
Daher-TLI acquired the assets and employees of Century Industries, a radioactive material packaging manufacturing facility, in 2013. Included in that acquisition was the Versa-Pac Shipping Package. The Versa-Pac is an NRC licensed Type AF packaging (Certificate of Compliance no. USA/9342/AF-96) and was originally designed as a replacement for standard 7A drum-type transportation packaging. It can be used directly or in conjunction with pails, drums or inserts that can be manufactured to accommodate a variety of smaller containers and vessels. The Versa-Pac comes in two sizes, the VP-55 (i.e., 55-gallon drum version) and VP-110 (i.e., 110-gallon drum version). It features a patented design concept in combination with the drum exterior to provide enhanced structural protection to payloads under Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC), per 10CFR71.71 and 10CFR71.73 respectively. Since its introduction in 2010, the Versa-Pac has been utilized mainly as a one-time use package for disposing of radioactive waste. The package is also designed as a reusable package for transporting front-end materials. Discussions with current and prospective clients have resulted in numerous improvements, accomplished and planned, to the package's payload capability through additional engineering analyses and actual design modifications. Revision 10 to the NRC Certificate of Compliance, dated August 6, 2015, introduces an enrichment-loading table that allows shipping larger quantities of U-235 for enrichments less than 100 wt.%. It also authorizes shipment of natural thorium. Other planned and proposed improvements include provisions to transport UF{sub 6} in 1S, 2S, and 5B cylinders, design changes that further increases the amount of U-235 at enrichments less than 100 wt.%, increasing the capacity of the VP-110, developing a lighter 30-gallon version, the VP-30, and introducing content limits specific to uranium-oxides in multiple forms. This paper traces the engineering and design efforts involved in expanding the Versa-Pac's versatility. (authors)
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