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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Hanford Immobilized Low-Activity Waste Transportation System Testing Results - 20043

The immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW) transportation system is a first-of-a-kind system that is being designed and tested to transport ILAW glass-filled containers from Hanford's Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility to the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) burial trench for permanent disposal. A prototype design and fabrication of one transport trailer and four engineered ILAW pallets was completed in mid-2018. Prototype qualification testing to verify adequacy of the design was completed in 2019 by Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) and affiliate ATKINS SNC-Lavalin Group. Prototype testing was completed to advance design maturation across all operational and facility interfaces, and under adverse environmental and operating conditions, including thermal assessment of the system at peak projected temperatures. Test design, observation, and feedback was well represented and supported by all ILAW Transportation System interfacing organizations: WTP constructor Bechtel National, Inc.; IDF operator CH2M (CHPRC); transportation contractor Mission Support Alliance (MSA); the U. S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (DOE/RL) and Office of River Protection (DOE/ORP); and Washington State Department of Ecology. This paper presents the results of prototype qualification testing and opportunities for design improvements based on testing. Changes to the final design as a result of prototype testing include improvements in safety, ergonomics, operational flexibility, and As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) applications. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 129: Perspectives (US and Non-US) on the Use of Risk and Dose Assessment Tools (R9.3)

This panel focused on various dose and risk assessment tools for assessments, Deactivation and Decommissioning, remediation, and closure of sites of chemical and radioactive wastes. Representatives from the US government agencies, non-US countries and their representative regulatory bodies or authorities, as well as performance/risk assessment practitioners compared and contrasted the various guidance from regulatory agencies and authorities on how tools such as the Preliminary Remediation Goals (PRG) calculator, the Dose Compliance Concentrations (DCC) calculator, and Residual Radioactivity (RESRAD) should be used in support of analyses and decisions for environmental cleanup activities. Panelists with presentations: Cumulative Impact Evaluation: Innovative Tools for Evaluation of Groundwater Protection (Alaa Aly); Superfund Evaluation Process for Alternative Risk and Dose Models (with Focus on EPA and DOE Tools) (Stuart Walker); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid)

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NASA NTRS2024

NASA Spaceflight Medical Selection, Recertification and Mission Evaluation Standards

This NASA Technical Standard provides medical requirements and clinical procedures designed to ensure crew health and safety and occupational longevity of NASA career astronauts. This NASA Technical Standard used for selection and annual recertification of astronauts reflects the medical requirements to successfully complete specific mission tasks and the multifaceted training and performance required of a NASA astronaut. These include, but are not limited to, flying in high performance aircraft, exposure to hypobaric and hyperbaric conditions, exposure to unique environments (e.g., microgravity), and conducting specialized operations (e.g., extra-vehicular activities, robotic arm operations). NASA policy for establishing standards to protect the health and safety of crew and for providing health and medical programs for astronauts during all phases of space flight is authorized by NPD 1000.3 - The NASA Organization, and by NPD 8900.5B - NASA Health and Medical Policy for Human Space Exploration. This document includes medical evaluations for private astronauts and NASA Suborbital Research Specialist (NSRS). Private astronauts are defined as a crew member who is not a NASA career (U.S. government) astronaut or international partner astronaut. NASA Suborbital Research Specialist is an individual who is employed by NASA or funded by NASA to conduct research, technology testing, training, or other activities onboard a sub-orbital vehicle. This excludes those individuals who are the commercially employed crew of the suborbital vehicle. This NASA Technical Standard also provides mission specific medical evaluations which include both clinical and occupational requirements that may be tailored for future missions.

Standards↗
NASA NTRS2023

Human Systems Integration: Managing Risk in Anesthesia

The practice of anesthesia relies on clinicians’ ability to safely manage increasingly complex equipment. Devices such as ventilators, drug infusion pumps, and physiologic monitors use sophisticated algorithms to deliver care, but most clinicians are only trained to manage automated systems during normal operation. Few if any receive training on how to manage system failures. Although manufacturers are required to consult with human factors engineers as part of the equipment design process, most pieces of equipment are ultimately brought to market without extensive input from clinicians. Systems in the operating room can be as simple as an oxygen tank, or as complex as a multi-institutional healthcare organization. Humans are also a complex system, and play a critical role in the domains of operations, design, fabrication, maintenance, repair, and ultimately, dismantling and closeout. HSI seeks to provide a means for advocating the human side of the system. Human Systems Integration (HSI) is the cross disciplinary process used as part of the Systems Engineering process to reduce risk in systems. HSI professionals consider the human, hardware, and software elements of system design to optimize system performance and improve safety. HSI professionals work in domains of study that include training, management, human factors engineering, safety, and occupational health, among others. This article discusses the role of systems in the practice of anesthesia, and how consideration of the human during all phases of the system life cycle helps manage risks and promote a better patient outcome.

Human Factors↗
DOE OSTI2021

Optimizing Ventilation Using Low-Cost Sensors to Improve Health, Safety, and Energy Efficiency

Air is the primary carrier of hazards within a space, whether it be hazardous byproducts of laboratory research activities or airborne pathogens. As a result, building ventilation is a primary defense against unseen airborne hazards. Critical laboratory facilities require effective mitigation of exposure to research-related, airborne hazards, providing a proving ground for effective ventilation strategies that optimize safety of occupants and reduce energy use. The heart of smart laboratory building operation is dynamic, analytics-based ventilation, which requires an in-depth intimate knowledge of building environmental conditions achieved through contaminant-detection systems. Unfortunately, currently many contaminant-detection solutions are expensive, elaborate systems that raise barriers for building managers. Through the successful deployment of a novel low-cost, modular sensor technology, we have developed a demand-control ventilation protocol effective in improving safety and reducing energy in critical laboratory environments. In this article, we will highlight best practices and lessons learned through this deployment that can be applied beyond laboratories. This article describes a low-cost sensor to support providing a safe, healthy building environment and reduce energy use through effective and efficient ventilation.

dynamic management of indoor air quality↗
DOE OSTI2021

Optimizing Ventilation Using Low-Cost Sensors to Improve Health, Safety, and Energy Efficiency

Air is the primary carrier of hazards within a space, whether it be hazardous bi-products of research activities or airborne pathogens. As a result, building ventilation is the primary defense against unseen airborne hazards. Critical laboratory facilities already demand the need for effective mitigation of exposure to research-related, airborne hazards, providing a proving ground for effective ventilation strategies that optimize safety of occupants and reduce energy use. The heart of smart laboratory building operation is dynamic, analytics-based ventilation, which requires an intimate knowledge of building environmental conditions achieved through contaminant-detection systems. Unfortunately, currently available contaminant-detection solutions are expensive, elaborate systems that raise barriers for building managers on a limited budget. Through the successful deployment of a novel low-cost, modular sensor technology, we have developed a demand-control ventilation protocol effective in improving safety and reducing energy in the critical laboratory environment. In this session, we will highlight best practices and lessons learned through this deployment that can be applied beyond laboratories without breaking the bank. This paper describes a low-cost solution for providing a safe, healthy building environment and reducing energy use through effective, efficient ventilation.

ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 132: Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management: Reasonable Assurance for Safety

Mr. Larry Camper organized a panel of experts to discuss approaches to better make risk-informed decisions in waste management, decommissioning, and the management of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The audience heard the perspectives from four panelists that addressed issues ranging from the technical basis used to make risk-informed decisions to for developing cleanup criteria and promulgating regulations and safety standards both domestically and abroad. A summary of each of the presentations given by the panelists is provided herein. This WMS BOD featured panel focused on the Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management and the Reasonable Assurance for Safety. The panelists addressed and discussed with the audience different approaches used for decision-making, summarizing ongoing probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches, including IAEA graded approach, and discussed policies/approaches to achieve reasonable assurance for safety rather than using absolute assurance. Panelists with presentations: Risk-Informed Decision Making - More than a Motto? (Paul Black); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid); Risk-Informed Decision-Making and Illustrative National Academies Studies (Charles Ferguson); IAEA's Revised Safety Guidance on Remediation (Michelle Roberts); NDA Radioactive Waste Strategy - A Risk Informed Approach (James McKinney)

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DOE OSTI2020

Robotic Assisted Non-Destructive Testing (NDT)

Mission Statement: Concrete wall characterization for structural integrity evaluation of H-Canyon exhaust tunnel using a remote controlled robotic arm with a NDT Concrete Instrument. Challenges: Rough and Curved Surfaces, Remote location. The UR5 is a collaborative robotic arm capable of: Payload: 11 lbs (5 kg), Reach: 33.5 in (850 mm), Footprint: 5.87 in (149 mm) diameter, Weight: 45.4 Ibs (20.6 kg). The force torque sensor reacts to a set value inputted by the user that can be utilized for sensitive products. This allows the UR5 to react to surfaces using the built-in function to search for a wall and orient itself normal to that plane. The Proceq Pundit 250 array is a nondestructive device that the user applies against a concrete wall and scans using ultrasonic transducers. The back wall and other defects can be show through the touchscreen. A fixture to hold the Proceq Pundit 250 array onto the UR5 robotic arm was designed and 3D printed. It includes openings for easy access to the buttons from the Pundit array as well as a reinforced structural design. The scan from the Pundit array can show the back-wall, rebars, and other defects to assist in determining the structural integrity. In order to scan, a program was made to search for the wall first. 1. The UR5 robotic arm will go to the desired location away from the wall. 2. It will then search for the wall by moving towards it slowly. 3. After contact, the force applied will slowly but steadily increase to a preset value inputted by the user. 4. The force torque sensor will use those values and communicate with the UR5 by adjusting the arm to become normal to the wall. 5. The arm will then apply force to push back the transducers on the Pundit array to avoid gaps. 6. It will then prompt the user to collect data and wait until finished. The UR5 teach pendant allows the user to program the robot to perform automated and repeatable tasks. It includes a free drive mode which allows the user to move the arm to a desired position by hand. The user can also apply restricted planes which include either stopped or slower motion to ensure safety. The concrete sample being tested includes rebars and different grades of surface roughness to understand the readings from the Proceq Pundit 250 array. Desired concrete samples are currently being fabricated that will simulate the terrain being tested.

3D PRINTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Spent Nuclear Fuel Exploratory Roadmaps - 20054

The U.S. Department of Energy manages nearly 2,500 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from several decades of research, testing, and production reactors [DOE 1995]. This SNF is managed at the DOE Hanford Site in Washington State (Hanford), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Savannah River Site in South Carolina (SRS). From 1995 to 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) made several key programmatic decisions, supported by appropriate documentation in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for the management of SNF [DOE 1995]. These decisions have provided an overarching framework for SNF management, as well as site-specific and SNF-related management decisions for the past two decades. In the years since these decisions were made, with the notable exception of the successful drying and packaging of the production reactor fuel at Hanford, a majority of the decisions have been largely unimplemented. Also, since these decisions were made, a number of changes that bear on considerations relative to the path forward have occurred. A SNF Exploratory Road map activity, identified reasonable alternate pathways for DoE's inventory of SNF. Three fundamental pathways were identified in this activity for the long-term management and disposition of DOE SNF: Direct Disposal Pathway, Existing Processing Pathway and Alternate Processing Pathway. Further actions would be required (e.g., evaluation of NEPA analysis, technology maturity evaluations, refinement of cost and risks, benefits and advantages relative to other alternate paths) to define and inform many key decisions that will result in the selection of the disposition pathways that are most beneficial to the US Government in dispositioning DoE's SNF inventory. DOE is currently managing all SNF safely; however, the age of DOE-owned SNF and facilities for storing and processing SNF, coupled with the uncertainty of the storage duration, necessitates decisions and actions to ensure that the infrastructure will be in place to ensure continued safe and effective long-term management and eventual disposal. The identification of reasonable alternate pathways took these considerations into account in an effort to proactively manage conditions that could challenge the safety of storing and managing DOE SNF over the time periods now contemplated and also to ensure that flexibility is preserved to ensure that the DOE SNF remains compatible with final disposition pathways when they become available. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

CSA, the French LILW Disposal Facility: Taking Stock of the 30 years' Operating Experience - 20009

French Andra's currently operational LILW repository, Aube disposal facility, is almost 30 years old. From the beginning, the repository has benefited from the lessons learned from the first disposal facility, the CSM. It has nevertheless continued to evolve, to improve and to adapt, seeking to gain in efficiency, safety and cost optimization. This is a look at what has changed at the CSA since 1992 - and the effect these changes had on its operating practices, construction principles and the entire management organization. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Origins and Contents of the Waste Specifications: the Example of the French LLW-SL Disposal Facility - 20016

The waste specifications published by Andra for its surface disposal facilities for Low and Intermediate, Short-Lived waste (CSA) are primarily defined to ensure the safe disposal of waste, both in the short and long term, spanning from disposal operations to hundreds of years after closure, when the man-made safety barriers have long disappeared into dust. The paper presents the methodology used at Andra to derive the CSA waste specifications, also known as Waste Acceptance Criteria, their contents, and the process in place to verify compliance of the waste with the specifications. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Using FLAC{sup R} Modeling Software to Analyze the Stability of a LLRW Disposal Facility - 20031

Waste Control Specialists (WCS) wished to amend its existing LLRW disposal license such that it might use gravel aggregate instead of concrete as backfill around large component (LC) parts from decommissioned nuclear reactors. A classical mechanics evaluation of the strength of the LCs was presented to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), demonstrating that the LCs had adequate capacity to withstand the loads within the facilities, and that concrete was unnecessary for structural support. TCEQ requested that additional analyses of the LCs within the facilities be performed using FLAC{sup R} finite difference modeling software. Because FLAC{sup R} has the capability of modeling the support provided by the lateral earth pressures, the factors of safety against failure for the LCs increased. TCEQ found the FLAC{sup R} analyses presented in this report to be satisfactory, and granted WCS' license amendment request. This work demonstrates that FLAC{sup R} may be used advantageously to more accurately represent the complexities of the physical situation being modeled. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Sludge Removal: Success and Partnership with T Plant - 20510

U.S. DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) has safely and efficiently managed the removal of highly radioactive sludge from the 105-K West Reactor fuel storage basin (105- KW Basin) near the Columbia River. In mid-September 2019, sludge retrieval was completed after 21 storage containers were safely loaded with highly radioactive sludge and transported approximately 13 miles from the 105-KW Basin to T Plant, located in the 200 West Area on the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site. Sludge removal represents the last major source term reduction necessary before the K West Reactor and fuel storage basin can transition to closure activities in preparation for final deactivation and demolition. The technical complexity of the sludge retrieval process, coupled with the challenging physical and radiological characteristics of the waste, necessitated a methodical and deliberate approach using unique design and operational solutions to safely conduct the work. This challenge was further complicated by the need to plan and conduct the work in two separate facilities, each subject to the controls and requirements of its own nuclear facility safety basis. The project overcame these challenges through creating an integrated team that actively engaged, communicated and coordinated each phase of the project to ensure successful completion. This paper will cover how these key elements of the Sludge Removal Project led to its success: - Integrating project planning and management; - Lessons learned from design and construction; - Preparing for a successful campaign (lessons learned from testing and start-up); - Lessons learned from operating in two separate facilities, transporting sludge containers on the Hanford Site and ensuring compliance with a range of regulatory and safety basis requirements. The establishment of an integrated group spanning two facilities and multiple organizations created a team capable of overcoming the challenges necessary to successfully plan and execute the sludge retrieval mission. Sharing lessons learned from this successful project can enhance the ability of teams across the DOE complex to successfully plan and execute complex projects. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Integrated Environmental Management System Communication at Large Sites - 20480

At a large Department of Energy-owned (DOE) site, there are challenges to communicating Environmental Management System (EMS) topics effectively. With multiple contractors and Environmental Management System scopes, as well as a large number of employees, communication preferences and possibilities vary, providing both the benefit and the challenge of differing pathways for sharing information. Additionally, data collection for site-wide environmental reporting involves numerous points of contact spread across contractors and requires organization and integrated communication. Focusing on the value of communication to enhance EMS education and awareness to drive environmental performance, we discuss the communication methods used both at a site-wide level and by individual organizations. Example methods include site-wide working group meetings, internal Share Point, site-wide surveys, collaborative reporting, weekly newsletters, and combined communication efforts with the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS). Using external audit results to gauge employee environmental awareness and culture, we analyze the effectiveness of EMS communications. In conclusion, integration of EMS communication in alignment with the ISMS has assisted in meeting International Organization of Standardization 14001 (ISO 14001) requirements and strengthened the concept that environmental protection is part of safety for workers and the site. Increased environmental enthusiasm and awareness supports the effectiveness of EMS communication methods and positive external audit results. These results benefit other sites with EMS to gain knowledge of integrated communication efforts that increase the effectiveness of the EMS, environmental performance, and conformance with ISO 14001. By assessing the effectiveness of actual EMS communication methods, contractors will be able to take away tools to enhance environmental communication in their workplace. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Deep Isolation-Development of the Safety Case for Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in Horizontal Boreholes - 20028

Deep Isolation has developed a safe, secure, and permanent geological disposal method for high-level waste, including spent nuclear fuel as well as sealed sources and other highly radioactive materials. The method leverages well established directional drilling technology to create horizontal repositories deep underground. The combination of great depth (1-3 km) and the ability to precisely position repositories in a horizontal orientation provides access to geologic strata that are inaccessible for typical mined and deep vertical borehole repositories. A number of potential direct and indirect safety benefits accrue including:1) greater depth below regional freshwater aquifers; 2) increased flexibility and more geologic options for siting; 3) access to deep formations with persistent and sustained reducing conditions. In addition there are a number of safety elements related specifically to the horizontal repository geometry including: 1) passive direction of thermally driven fluid and radionuclide movement away from the vertical access hole and toward the 'dead end' portion of the repository; 2) mitigation of seismic hazards by orienting repositories parallel to local and regional fault structures. In this paper we explore and discuss some of the key technologic, geologic and hydrologic elements that support the deep horizontal borehole safety case. The stalemate seen across the globe on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste can be broken. Deep Isolation offers a novel option for safe, secure, and permanent deep geological disposal of nuclear waste that can be developed as centralized repositories or adapted to smaller regional or site-specific repositories located near waste sources. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Quest for Continuous Design and Safety Optimization: A Look at Cires, the French Very Low Level Waste Disposal - 20010

Cires, the French repository for very low-level waste (VLLW) managed by Andra, has a fifteen-year history of enhancing design and disposal operations, responding to producers' needs by optimizing existing facilities and providing new facilities as needed. Its flexibility allows the facility to adapt to changes in waste delivery flows, to dispose of larger waste volumes without using more space, to integrate new concepts and even envisage disposal capacity extension. The article traces the ever evolving history of technical and operational optimization of this unique disposal facility situated in Eastern France. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Technical Evaluation of the Department of Energy Research and Development Activities in Underground Research Laboratories - 20287

Congress created the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) in the 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (Public Law 100-203) to evaluate the technical and scientific validity of activities undertaken by the Secretary of Energy to implement the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Since 2012, DOE has collaborated in research conducted in several underground research laboratories (URLs) located in Europe and Asia. According to DOE, these international collaborations have been beneficial to its spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste radioactive (HLW) disposal research program, particularly after the termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program when DOE began generic research on alternative host rocks (crystalline, clay, and salt) and repository environments very different from those at Yucca Mountain. In accordance with its mandate, the NWTRB is reviewing the DOE research and development (R and D) activities related to URLs. The NWTRB's review is documented in a report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy that will be released in January 2020, and this paper summarizes the NWTRB review and findings. The NWTRB held a fact-finding meeting with DOE and subsequently held a workshop on international URL collaborations in April of 2019. Based on the presentations and discussions at the workshop and at the fact-finding meeting, as well as information from reports published by DOE and others, there are four principal findings related to DoE's URL-related R and D activities. First, DOE participation in URL-related international research greatly benefits the U.S. geologic disposal R and D program by furthering its understanding of generic and site-specific disposal issues relevant to alternative repository host rocks and environments. DOE-funded R and D activities also are benefiting the URL-related research of other countries, especially in the area of complex analytical and numerical model/software development. Second, the more developed repository programs in other countries have focused on creating and strengthening their safety cases and making them transparent to the public. Repository programs in other countries use URLs to explain the technical bases underlying their safety cases, periodically reassess knowledge gaps and define new activities to strengthen the technical bases, and demonstrate the technology that will allow implementation of the proposed safety concept. Third, countries with more developed geologic disposal programs have found domestic URLs essential to their repository programs. DOE needs domestic URLs to advance geologic disposal efforts over the next decades and further its ability to train the next generation of scientists, engineers, and skilled technical workers. Fourth, DoE's international URL collaborations have advanced its generic disposal R and D program, including development of modeling capabilities recognized internationally as state-of-the-art, but further work on its coupled thermal-hydrological-mechanical-chemical models and URL- and laboratory-based research can strengthen its program. (authors)

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