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At least 127 records · Page 7

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NASA NTRS2010

Operational Lessons Learned from the Ares I-X Flight Test

The Ares I-X flight test, launched in 2009, is the first test of the Ares I crew launch vehicle. This development flight test evaluated the flight dynamics, roll control, and separation events, but also provided early insights into logistical, stacking, launch, and recovery operations for Ares I. Operational lessons will be especially important for NASA as the agency makes the transition from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation Program, which is designed to be less labor-intensive. The mission team itself comprised only 700 individuals over the life of the project compared to the thousands involved in Shuttle and Apollo missions; while missions to and beyond low-Earth orbit obviously will require additional personnel, this lean approach will serve as a model for future Constellation missions. To prepare for Ares I-X, vehicle stacking and launch infrastructure had to be modified at Kennedy Space Center's Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) as well as Launch Complex (LC) 39B. In the VAB, several platforms and other structures designed for the Shuttle s configuration had to be removed to accommodate the in-line, much taller Ares I-X. Vehicle preparation activities resulted in delays, but also in lessons learned for ground operations personnel, including hardware deliveries, cable routing, transferred work and custodial paperwork. Ares I-X also proved to be a resource challenge, as individuals and ground service equipment (GSE) supporting the mission also were required for Shuttle or Atlas V operations at LC 40/41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. At LC 39B, several Shuttle-specific access arms were removed and others were added to accommodate the in-line Ares vehicle. Ground command, control, and communication (GC3) hardware was incorporated into the Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP). The lightning protection system at LC 39B was replaced by a trio of 600-foot-tall towers connected by a catenary wire to account for the much greater height of the vehicle. Like Shuttle, Ares I-X will be stacked on a MLP and rolled out to the pad on a Saturn-era crawler-transporter. While Ares I-X was only held in place by the four hold-down posts on its aft skirt during rollout, a new vehicle stabilization system (VSS) attached to the vertical service structure kept the vehicle from undue swaying prior to launch at the pad, LC 39B. Following the launch, the flight test vehicle first stage was recovered with the aid of new parachutes resized to accommodate the five-segment-long first stage, which had a much greater length and mass than the Shuttle s reusable solid rocket boosters. After splashdown, recovery divers exercised extra care when handling the first stage to ensure that the flight data recorders in the fifth segment simulator were not damaged by exposure to sea water. The data recovered from the Ares I-X flight test will be very valuable in verifying the predicted environments and models used to design the vehicle. Lessons learned from Ares I-X will be shared with the Ares Projects through written and verbal reports and through integration of mission team members into the Project workforce.

Davis, Stephan R.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Lessons Learned from the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage and Water Recovery and Management Subsystem Design

Node 1 flew to the International Space Station (ISS) on Flight 2A during December 1998. To date the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has learned a lot of lessons from this module based on its history of approximately two years of acceptance testing on the ground and currently its twelve years on-orbit. This paper will provide an overview of the ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) design of the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage (ACS) and Water Recovery and Management (WRM) subsystems and it will document some of the lessons that have been learned to date for these subsystems based on problems prelaunch, problems encountered on-orbit, and operational problems/concerns. It is hoped that documenting these lessons learned from ISS will help in preventing them in future Programs.

Williams, David E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Engine Cutoff System (ECO) Anomalies

The Space Shuttle Orbiter's main engine cutoff (ECO) system first failed ground checkout in April, 2005 during a first tanking test prior to Return-to-Flight. Despite significant troubleshooting and investigative efforts that followed, the root cause could not be found and intermittent anomalies continued to plague the Program. By implementing hardware upgrades, enhancing monitoring capability, and relaxing the launch rules, the Shuttle fleet was allowed to continue flying in spite of these unexplained failures. Root cause was finally determined following the launch attempts of STS-122 in December, 2007 when the anomalies repeated, which allowed drag-on instrumentation to pinpoint the fault (the ET feedthrough connector). The suspect hardware was removed and provided additional evidence towards root cause determination. Corrective action was implemented and the system has performed successfully since then. This white paper presents the lessons learned from the entire experience, beginning with the anomalies since Return-to-Flight through discovery and correction of the problem. To put these lessons in better perspective for the reader, an overview of the ECO system is presented first. Next, a chronological account of the failures and associated investigation activities is discussed. Root cause and corrective action are summarized, followed by the lessons learned.

Martinez, Hugo E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

International Space Station Passive Thermal Control System Analysis, Top Ten Lessons-Learned

The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for over 10 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The analysis lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.

Iovine, John↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage and Water Recovery and Management Subsystem Design

Williams, David E.↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew Launch Vehicle Approach Builds on Lessons from Past and Present Missions

The United States Vision for Space Exploration, announced in January 2004, outlines the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives, including retiring the Space Shuttle and replacing it with a new human-rated system suitable for missions to the Moon and Mars. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) that the new Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) lofts into space early next decade will initially ferry astronauts to the International Space Station and be capable of carrying crews back to lunar orbit and of supporting missions to Mars orbit. NASA is using its extensive experience gained from past and ongoing launch vehicle programs to maximize the CLV system design approach, with the objective of reducing total lifecycle costs through operational efficiencies. To provide in-depth data for selecting this follow-on launch vehicle, the Exploration Systems Architecture Study was conducted during the summer of 2005, following the confirmation of the new NASA Administrator. A team of aerospace subject matter experts used technical, budget, and schedule objectives to analyze a number of potential launch systems, with a focus on human rating for exploration missions. The results showed that a variant of the Space Shuttle, utilizing the reusable Solid Rocket Booster as the first stage, along with a new upper stage that uses a derivative of the RS-25 Space Shuttle Main Engine to deliver 25 metric tons to low-Earth orbit, was the best choice to reduce the risks associated with fielding a new system in a timely manner. The CLV Project, managed by the Exploration Launch Office located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, is leading the design, development, testing, and operation of this new human-rated system. The CLV Project works closely with the Space Shuttle Program to transition hardware, infrastructure, and workforce assets to the new launch system . leveraging a wealth of lessons learned from Shuttle operations. The CL V is being designed to reduce costs through a number of methods, ranging from validating requirements to conducting trades studies against the concept design. Innovations such as automated processing will build on lessons learned from the Shuttle, other launch systems, Department of Defense operations experience, and subscale flight tests such as the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced (DCXA) vehicle operations that utilized minimal touch labor, automated cryogen ic propellant loading , and an 8-hour turnaround for a cryogenic propulsion system. For the CLV, the results of hazard analyses are contributing to an integrated vehicle health monitoring system that will troubleshoot anomalies and determine which ones can be solved without human intervention. Such advances will help streamline the mission operations process for pilots and ground controllers alike. In fiscal year 2005, NASA invested approximately $4.5 billion of its $16 bill ion budget on the Space Shuttle. The ultimate goal of the CLV Project is to deliver a safe, reliable system designed to minimize lifecycle costs so that NASA's budget can be invested in missions of scientific discovery. Lessons learned from developing the CLV will be applied to the growth path for future systems, including a heavy lift launch vehicle.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗

NASA NTRS2012

MODIS On-Orbit Calibration and Lessons Learned

The Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) is a key instrument for NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS) Terra and Aqua missions. Since launch, Terra and Aqua MODIS have successfully operated for more than 12 and 10 years, respectively, and generated an unprecedented amount of data products for the science and user community over a wide range of applications. MODIS was developed with improved design and stringent calibration requirements over its heritage sensors in order . to extend and enhance their long-term data records. Its follow-on instrument, the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), was launched on-board the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (NPP) spacecraft October 28, 2011. MODIS collects data in 36 spectral bands, covering wavelengths from 0.41 to 14.S!Jlll, and at 250m, SOOm, and lkm spatial resolutions (nadir). MODIS on-orbit calibration is provided by a set of onboard calibrators (OBC), including a solar diffuser (SO), a solar diffuser stability monitor (SDSM), a blackbody (BB), and a spectroradiometric calibration assembly (SRCA). In addition to the onboard calibrators, regular lunar observations are made by both Terra and Aqua MODIS to track their calibration stability in the reflective solar region. This tutorial session provides an overview of MODIS on-orbit calibration and characterization methodologies. It discusses challenging issues and lessons learned from sensor design, operation, calibration, and inter-comparisons. Examples of instrument on-orbit performance are illustrated with a focus on the improvements made based on various lessons learned. It is expected that MODIS experience and lessons will continue to provide valuable information for future earth observing missions/sensors.

Xiong, Jack↗

NASA NTRS2012

Lessons Learned for Improving Spacecraft Ground Operations

NASA has a unique history in processing the Space Shuttle fleet for launches. Some of this experience has been captured in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS). This tool provides a convenient way for design engineers to review lessons from the past to prevent problems from reoccurring and incorporate positive lessons in new designs. At the Kennedy Space Center, the LLIS is being used to design ground support equipment for the next generation of launch and crewed vehicles. This paper describes the LLIS process and offers some examples.

Bell, Michael A.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Strategic Options for International Participation in Space Exploration: Lessons from U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation

The President's Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy suggests that after NASA establishes the Space Exploration vision architecture, it should pursue international partnerships. Two possible approaches were suggested: multiple independently operated missions and an integrated mission with carefully selected international components. The U.S.-Japan defense sectors have learned key lessons from experience with both of these approaches. U.S.-Japan defense cooperation has evolved over forty years from simple military assistance programs to more complex joint development efforts. With the evolution of the political-military alliance and the complexity of defense programs, these cooperative efforts have engaged increasingly industrial resources and capabilities as well as more sophisticated forms of planning, technology transfers and program management. Some periods of this evolution have been marked by significant frictions. The U.S.Japan FS-X program, for example, provides a poor example for management of international cooperation. In November 1988, the United States and Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to co-develop an aircraft, named FS-X and later renamed F -2, as a replacement to the aging Japan support fighter F-l. The program was marked by numerous political disputes. After over a decade of joint development and testing, F -2 production deliveries finally began in 1999. The production run was curtailed due to much higher than anticipated costs and less than desired aircraft performance. One universally agreed "lesson" from the FSX/F-2 case was that it did not represent the ideal approach to bilateral cooperation. More recent cooperative programs have involved targeted joint research and development, including component development for ballistic missile defense systems. These programs could lay the basis for more ambitious cooperative efforts. This study examines both less-than-stellar international cooperation efforts as well as more successful initiatives to identify lessons from military programs that can help NASA encourage global investment in its Space Exploration Vision. The paper establishes a basis for examining related policy and industrial concerns such as effective utilization of dual-use technologies and trans-Pacific program management of large, complex cooperative programs.

Hudiburg, John J.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Lessons from 30 Years of Flight Software

This presentation takes a brief historical look at flight software over the past 30 years, extracts lessons learned and shows how many of the lessons learned are embodied in the Flight Software product line called the core Flight System (cFS). It also captures the lessons learned from developing and applying the cFS.

Flight Software↗

NASA NTRS2018

Laser Tracker Utilization Methodology in Measuring Truth Trajectories for INS Testing on 6 Degree of Freedom Table at the Marshall Space Flight Center's Contact Dynamics Simulation Laboratory with Lessons Learned

When performing Inertial Navigation System (INS) testing at the Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC) Contact Dynamics Simulation Laboratory (CDSL) early in 2017, a Leica Geosystems AT901 Laser Tracker system (LLT) measured the twist & sway trajectories as generated by the 6 Degree Of Freedom (6DOF) Table in the CDSL. These LLT measured trajectories were used in the INS software model validation effort. Several challenges were identified and overcome during the preparation for the INS testing, as well as numerous lessons learned. These challenges included determining the position and attitude of the LLT with respect to an INS-shared coordinate frame using surveyed monument locations in the CDSL and the accompanying mathematical transformation, accurately measuring the spatial relationship between the INS and a 6DOF tracking probe due to lack of INS visibility from the LLT location, obtaining the data from the LLT during a test, determining how to process the results for comparison with INS data in time and frequency domains, and using a sensitivity analysis of the results to verify the quality of the results. While many of these challenges were identified and overcome before or during testing, a significant lesson on test set-up was not learned until later in the data analysis process. It was found that a combination of trajectory-dependent gimbal locking and environmental noise introduced non-negligible noise in the angular measurements of the LLT that spanned the evaluated frequency spectrum. The lessons learned in this experiment may be useful for others performing INS testing in similar testing facilities.

Leggett, Jared O.↗

NASA NTRS2018

International Space Station Passive Thermal Control System Top Ten Lessons-Learned

Final document not an Abstract attached. The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for nearly 20 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The PTCS lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.

Iovine, John V.↗

NASA NTRS2018

International Space Station Passive Thermal Control System Top Ten Lessons-Learned

Iovine, John V.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Lessons Learned from Sonic Boom Flight Research Projects conducted by NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center

Over the course of four years, a team of aerospace engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Armstrong Flight Research Center completed four projects, each with the objective to research sonic boom signatures from a ground and building level perspective. The relatively compressed timeline of these projects resulted in the team amassing a large number of lessons learned. With each successive project, these lessons have been more relied upon and referenced. This report serves as a written record of the teams tribal knowledge capturing the relevant lessons learned and their importance for future projects.

Erin R Waggoner↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned in Space Life Support System Testing

The earlier problems can be found and corrected, the easier and cheaper it is to fix them. Doing less testing saves cost and time but doing too little testing increases the risk of operational failures causing large costs and delays. Integrated test is necessary to determine if the subsystems work together and the overall architecture performs as intended. This report reviews the testing lessons learned from the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, a National Research Council report, and five reviews of International Space Station (ISS) lessons learned. The five reviews all mention two important points. First, that testing should be performed on the final integrated system, one as close as possible to the intended flight system. Second, “test as you fly,” while operating as planned in an environment as close as possible to the expected flight environment. Other lessons are the need for extensive preflight ground testing, the need to establish and defend an adequate budget, the problems using protoflight hardware on ISS, and the benefit of having ISS as a zero gravity test bed. The major ISS life support systems, carbon dioxide, water recycling, and oxygen recovery, were protoflight systems with little testing before launch to ISS. The failure rates these systems have been much greater than predicted and this has caused dissatisfaction with the protoflight approach. The more costly traditional approach is building qualification and test units in addition to flight units. The test units are used to test, analyze, and fix failure modes. Other work shows that there is an optimum cost-effective intuitive appeal of a human ecosystem in space.

Life support↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned in Space Life Support System Testing

The earlier problems can be found and corrected, the easier and cheaper it is to fix them. Doing less testing saves cost and time but doing too little testing increases the risk of operational failures causing large costs and delays. Integrated test is necessary to determine if the subsystems work together and the overall architecture performs as intended. This report reviews the testing lessons learned from the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, a National Research Council report, and five reviews of International Space Station (ISS) lessons learned. The five reviews all mention two important points. First, that testing should be performed on the final integrated system, one as close as possible to the intended flight system. Second, “test as you fly,” while operating as planned in an environment as close as possible to the expected flight environment. Other lessons are the need for extensive preflight ground testing, the need to establish and defend an adequate budget, the problems using protoflight hardware on ISS, and the benefit of having ISS as a zero gravity test bed. The major ISS life support systems, carbon dioxide removal, water recycling, and oxygen recovery, were protoflight systems with little testing before launch to ISS. The failure rates of these systems have been much greater than predicted and this has caused dissatisfaction with the protoflight approach. The more costly traditional approach builds qualification and test units in addition to flight units. The test units are used to find, analyze, and fix failure modes. Other work shows that there is an optimum cost-effective amount of testing when redundant systems must have a specified reliability and confidence.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assimilating Lessons Learned – From URGE to NASA's Student Airborne Science Activation (SaSa) Project

In the first half of 2021, formal and informal pods at several universities and NASA Center affiliates participated in the Unlearning Racism in Geosciences (URGE) curriculum and deliverables. As a result, several members from different URGE pods are propagating and applying the URGE lessons learned to the new 5-year NASA Student Airborne Science Activation project (SaSa). Starting in the Summer of 2022, SaSa will provide an 8-week summer Earth Science research experience focused on attracting and retaining early undergraduate students from historically underrepresented groups from minority-serving institutions (MSIs). The multicenter and field-based research experience will provide the students access to and experience with NASA airborne resources. Additionally, integrating NASA material into the MSI curricula and providing student mentorship at both MSIs and NASA Centers will enhance students' exposure to Earth Science research. The objectives of URGE and SaSa are highly compatible with one another, and the project timing allows for the integration of URGE lessons early in the SaSa curriculum design phase. As of December 2021, the first SaSa summer program application will be open and the first SaSa semester at the host MSIs will be completed. This presentation will discuss the assimilation of URGE lessons learned from our respective pods into the first SaSa academic semester and into the preparations for the first SaSa summer cohort. We will welcome additional feedback from the broader URGE community in advance of SaSa's first summer session.

Kristina Pistone↗

NASA NTRS2021

Lessons Learned in Remote Participant Concurrent Engineering Concept Development Studies

Team-X was born from a need to perform rapid space mission design for principal investigator-led competed proposals in the mid-1990s. Throughout the last 25 years, Team-X at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has expanded its application of the collaborative, concurrent study approach into every facet necessary to win competed proposals. The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 created an immediate and new constraint on these studies – the need to conduct them with remote participants, both on the client side requesting the study, but also on the provider side producing the study. This paper provides lessons learned from dozens of design studies run by Team-X at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory during the COVID-19 pandemic. These lessons span all aspects of the information infrastructure: the people, processes, procedures, methods, tools, and “facilities”. These lessons learned will have applicability post-pandemic, as they have shown how best to incorporate participants, both on the provider side, and on the client side, who cannot travel or otherwise be co-located during collaborative, concurrent study sessions.

Nash, Alfred↗