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At least 127 records · Page 7
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Psychophysiological Methods to Assess Pilot Productive Safety Behaviors

The NASA System-Wide Safety (SWS) Project is focused on developing new technologies and operational concepts for the aviation industry to meet the increasing global demand while maintaining the current ultra-safe system safety levels. To achieve this, the SWS Project is developing research priorities, including In-time System-wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) and In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS; Ellis et al., 2019). A critical component of the IASMS is the human as pilot and in other roles in aviation operations as demonstrated by SWS human factors research on rare occurrences of human error and the far more prevalent human safety producing behaviors (e.g., Hollnagel, 2016). The talk presented by Chad Stephens of NASA Langley Research Center and NASA SWS Project will describe the history of human factors research involving psychophysiological and biocybernetics methods supporting aviation safety conducted at NASA. Specific examples of recent NASA crew state monitoring research focused on a psychophysiological assessment method and system to enable Training for Attention Management will be demonstrated. Current SWS research including the SWS Operations and Technologies for Enabling Resilient In-Time Assurance (SOTERIA) flight simulation study and a data testbed created to enable study of Human Contributions to Safety (HC2S) will be presented. Ongoing collaborative research efforts with Boeing researchers will be highlighted and opportunities for further collaboration will be discussed.

psychophysiology↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Contribution of Pilots to Resilience in Normal Operations: A Survey Approach

Much of our knowledge about human performance in flight safety has come from the analysis of undesired events, whether accidents, incidents, or crew behaviors identified via flight exceedance monitoring or observational techniques. In recent years, there has been an acknowledgement that operational personnel are not merely sources of “human error”, but also make a unique human contribution to safe outcomes. In a few celebrated cases, this takes the form of “heroic saves”, but on many more occasions, operational personnel contribute to safety through everyday, often-unnoticed actions that turn potentially hazardous situations into non-events. An emerging approach to safety, frequently referred to as “Safety II,” proposes that the positive human contribution is an important and largely untapped source of safety information. Some airlines have successfully trained observers to identify and record the positive behaviors exhibited by the crew over the course of a flight. In other cases, flight crew are interviewed about good practices or positive behaviors. However, each of these methods are relatively limited in scale and resource intensive. A survey could provide a relatively low-cost approach to systematically gather this information on a larger scale. The primary purpose of the research was to develop and assess a surveys methodology for assessing crews' activities in normal flights and the operational perturbations encountered during normal operations. We hope that such a survey could be both a research tool as well as a safety management aid for the aviation industry. We collected responses concerning revenue flights from two groups of airline pilots (N = 25 & N= 65). The results indicated that relatively few flights proceeded exactly as in the original flight plan. Pilots routinely anticipated and adapted to changing circumstances. We will review the challenges encountered in developing the survey and summarize preliminary findings from two administrations of the survey to airline pilots.

human contribution safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Contribution of Pilots to Resilience in Normal Operations. Part II: A closer look at briefings: Anticipation and Monitoring Also Known as Planning and Coordination

Much of our knowledge about human performance in flight safety has come from the analysis of undesired events, whether accidents, incidents, or crew behaviors identified via flight exceedance monitoring or observational techniques. In recent years, there has been an acknowledgement that operational personnel are not merely sources of “human error”, but also make a unique human contribution to safe outcomes. In a few celebrated cases, this takes the form of “heroic saves”, but on many more occasions, operational personnel contribute to safety through everyday, often-unnoticed actions that turn potentially hazardous situations into non-events. An emerging approach to safety, frequently referred to as “Safety II,” proposes that the positive human contribution is an important and largely untapped source of safety information. Some airlines have successfully trained observers to identify and record the positive behaviors exhibited by the crew over the course of a flight. In other cases, flight crew are interviewed about good practices or positive behaviors. However, each of these methods are relatively limited in scale and resource intensive. A survey could provide a relatively low-cost approach to systematically gather this information on a larger scale. The primary purpose of the research was to develop and assess a surveys methodology for assessing crews' activities in normal flights and the operational perturbations encountered during normal operations. We hope that such a survey could be both a research tool as well as a safety management aid for the aviation industry. We collected responses concerning revenue flights from two groups of airline pilots (N = 25 & N= 65). The results indicated that relatively few flights proceeded exactly as in the original flight plan. Pilots routinely anticipated and adapted to changing circumstances. We will review the challenges encountered in developing the survey and summarize preliminary findings from two administrations of the survey to airline pilots.

human contribution safety↗
NASA NTRS2004

Performance Effects of Display Incogruity in a Digital and Analog Clock Reading Task

In an era of increasing automation, it is important to design displays and input devices that minimize human error. In this context, information concerning the human response to the detection of incongruous information is important. Such incongruous information can be operationalized as unexpected (perhaps erroneous) information on which a decision by the human or operation by an automated system is based. In the aviation environment, decision making when faced with inadequate, incomplete, or incongruous information may occur in a failure scenario. An additional challenge facing the human operator in automated environments is maintaining alertness or vigilance. The vigilance issue is of particular concern as a factor that may interact with performance when faced with inadequate, incomplete, or incongruous information. From the literature on eye-scan behavior we know that the time spent looking at a particular display or indicator is a function of the type of information one is trying to discern from the display. For example, quick glances are all it takes for confirming that an indicator is in a normal position or range, whereas a continuous look of several seconds may be required for confirmation that a complex control input is having the desired effect. Important to consider is that while an extended look takes place, visual input from other sources may be missed. Much like an extended look, the interpretation of incongruous information may require extra time. The present experiment was designed to explore the performance consequences of a decision making task when incongruous information was presented. For this experiment a display incongruity was created on a subset of trials of a clock reading laboratory task. Display incongruity was made possible through presentation of 'impossible' times (e.g. 1:65 or 11:90). Subjects made 'same' 'different' decisions and keyboard responses to pairings of Analog-Analog (AA), Digital-Digital (DD), and Analog- Digital (AD), display combinations. For trials during which display incongruities were not presented, based on prior research comparing digital and analog clock displays, it would be expected that the Digital-Digital condition would result in the shortest response times and the Analog-Analog and Analog-Digital conditions would have longer response times. The performance consequence expected on trials with incongruous times would be very long response times.

J. Raymond Comstock, Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2006

An Efficient Approach for the Reliability Analysis of Phased-Mission Systems with Dependent Failures

We consider the reliability analysis of phased-mission systems with common-cause failures in this paper. Phased-mission systems (PMS) are systems supporting missions characterized by multiple, consecutive, and nonoverlapping phases of operation. System components may be subject to different stresses as well as different reliability requirements throughout the course of the mission. As a result, component behavior and relationships may need to be modeled differently from phase to phase when performing a system-level reliability analysis. This consideration poses unique challenges to existing analysis methods. The challenges increase when common-cause failures (CCF) are incorporated in the model. CCF are multiple dependent component failures within a system that are a direct result of a shared root cause, such as sabotage, flood, earthquake, power outage, or human errors. It has been shown by many reliability studies that CCF tend to increase a system's joint failure probabilities and thus contribute significantly to the overall unreliability of systems subject to CCF.We propose a separable phase-modular approach to the reliability analysis of phased-mission systems with dependent common-cause failures as one way to meet the above challenges in an efficient and elegant manner. Our methodology is twofold: first, we separate the effects of CCF from the PMS analysis using the total probability theorem and the common-cause event space developed based on the elementary common-causes; next, we apply an efficient phase-modular approach to analyze the reliability of the PMS. The phase-modular approach employs both combinatorial binary decision diagram and Markov-chain solution methods as appropriate. We provide an example of a reliability analysis of a PMS with both static and dynamic phases as well as CCF as an illustration of our proposed approach. The example is based on information extracted from a Mars orbiter project. The reliability model for this orbiter considers the various phases of Launch, Cruise, Mars Orbit Insertion, and Orbit. Some of the CCF for the orbiter in this mission include environmental effects, such as micrometeoroids, human operator errors, and software errors.

reliability analysis↗
NASA NTRS1984

Preparing for the unexpected - A psychologist's case for improved training

In the procedures designed to minimize human errors that lead to aircraft incidents, the improved human factor engineering and automation approaches must be supplemented by new training methods. Changes are suggested in the preprogrammed training principles which are currently based almost exclusively on the procedures-oriented environment, with insufficient training for cognitive processing and awareness. Use of the Line-Oriented Flight Training procedure, in which a training simulator is supplemented by a highly structured script or scenario to simulate the total line operational environment for the purpose of simultaneously training the entire flight crew, offers one way of providing pilots and other crewmembers with the experience of dealing with unexpected or stressful events. Of primary importance is maximal coordination between the aircraft captain and other crewmembers during the flight, which puts emphasis on the importance of teamwork and personal relations among all other crewmembers. The current FARs governing training and proficiency will have to be modified to accommodate new training appoaches.

Foushee, H. C.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Helicopter human factors

The state-of-the-art helicopter and its pilot are examined using the tools of human-factors analysis. The significant role of human error in helicopter accidents is discussed; the history of human-factors research on helicopters is briefly traced; the typical flight tasks are described; and the noise, vibration, and temperature conditions typical of modern military helicopters are characterized. Also considered are helicopter controls, cockpit instruments and displays, and the impact of cockpit design on pilot workload. Particular attention is given to possible advanced-technology improvements, such as control stabilization and augmentation, FBW and fly-by-light systems, multifunction displays, night-vision goggles, pilot night-vision systems, night-vision displays with superimposed symbols, target acquisition and designation systems, and aural displays. Diagrams, drawings, and photographs are provided.

Hart, Sandra G.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Psychophysiology of Spaceflight and Aviation

In space, the absence of gravity alone causes unique physiological stress. Significant biomedical changes, across multiple organ systems, such as body fluid redistribution, diminished musculoskeletal strength, changes in cardiac function and sensorimotor control have been reported. The time course of development of these disorders and severity of symptoms experienced by individuals varies widely. Space motion sickness (SMS) is an example of maladaptation to microgravity, which occurs early in the mission and can have profound effects on physical health and crew performance. Disturbances in sleep quality, perception, emotional equilibrium and mood have also been reported, with impact to health and performance varying widely across individuals. And lastly, post-flight orthostatic intolerance, low blood pressure experienced after returning to Earth, is also of serious concern. Both the Russian and American space programs have a varied list of human errors and mistakes, which adversely impacted mission goals. Continued probability of human exposure to microgravity for extended time periods provides a rationale for the study of the effects of stress. The primary focus of this research group is directed toward examining individual differences in: (a) prediction of susceptibility to these disorders, (b) assessment of symptom severity, (c) evaluation of the effectiveness of countermeasures, and (d) developing and testing a physiological training method, Autogenic-Feedback Training Exercise (AFTE) as a countermeasure with multiple applications. The present paper reports on the results of a series of human flight experiments with AFTE aboard the Space Shuttle and Mir Space Station, and during emergency flight scenarios on Earth.

Cowings, Patricia↗
NASA NTRS1986

At least some errors are randomly generated (Freud was wrong)

An experiment was carried out to expose something about human error generating mechanisms. In the context of the experiment, an error was made when a subject pressed the wrong key on a computer keyboard or pressed no key at all in the time allotted. These might be considered, respectively, errors of substitution and errors of omission. Each of seven subjects saw a sequence of three digital numbers, made an easily learned binary judgement about each, and was to press the appropriate one of two keys. Each session consisted of 1,000 presentations of randomly permuted, fixed numbers broken into 10 blocks of 100. One of two keys should have been pressed within one second of the onset of each stimulus. These data were subjected to statistical analyses in order to probe the nature of the error generating mechanisms. Goodness of fit tests for a Poisson distribution for the number of errors per 50 trial interval and for an exponential distribution of the length of the intervals between errors were carried out. There is evidence for an endogenous mechanism that may best be described as a random error generator. Furthermore, an item analysis of the number of errors produced per stimulus suggests the existence of a second mechanism operating on task driven factors producing exogenous errors. Some errors, at least, are the result of constant probability generating mechanisms with error rate idiosyncratically determined for each subject.

Sellen, A. J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategies for Quantifying Human Space Flight Performance in the Crew Health and Performance System

The Crew Health and Performance-Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) team at NASA Glenn Research Center is planning a customized approach to quantify human spaceflight performance changes with respect to changes to the CHP system functions and capabilities. Using the Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) initiated by NASA’s Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB) [1], the team is surveying potential candidate models and novel strategies that generate metrics suitable for supporting decision making related to how the CHP system may influence human system performance risk. One such investigation includes classic Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) models. Traditionally, HRA methods estimate the occurrence of human errors and their impact on the success of an activity when designing and operating a system. While humans perceive, interpret, decide on, and carry out a course of action, the factors affecting performance and error likelihood are commonly referred to as performance shaping factors (PSFs). Originally developed to alleviate safety concerns related to nuclear power plant operations, HRA methods such as THERP [2] and CREAM [3] dismantle an activity into tasks, requiring elemental steps to be executed, and assess their failure due to predefined PSFs. In this study, we compare generic HRA methods and those that incorporate some human spaceflight aspects, such as sleep conditions (SCREAM [4]), with respect to how they may be adopted to capture performance with an intention to mitigate detrimental outcomes elucidated by the HSRB DAGs. We suggest strategies to quantify astronaut performance specific to spaceflight activities and illustrate how such concepts may help in optimizing the CHP system capabilities with respect to Artemis missions.

dag↗
NASA NTRS1974

An analysis of pilot error-related aircraft accidents

A multidisciplinary team approach to pilot error-related U.S. air carrier jet aircraft accident investigation records successfully reclaimed hidden human error information not shown in statistical studies. New analytic techniques were developed and applied to the data to discover and identify multiple elements of commonality and shared characteristics within this group of accidents. Three techniques of analysis were used: Critical element analysis, which demonstrated the importance of a subjective qualitative approach to raw accident data and surfaced information heretofore unavailable. Cluster analysis, which was an exploratory research tool that will lead to increased understanding and improved organization of facts, the discovery of new meaning in large data sets, and the generation of explanatory hypotheses. Pattern recognition, by which accidents can be categorized by pattern conformity after critical element identification by cluster analysis.

Kowalsky, N. B.↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Psychology of Safety

Many studies of mishaps show that human error is a factor in a significant majority of accidents. Trying to decide how to change human behavior to be safer is generally the biggest challenge of any safety program. However, understanding the human psyche is the first step to changing behavior. Many studies focus on the before and after of an accident, but what about the thoughts of a person in the commission of an unsafe act? This is a less understood area. Examining it reveals why it is not well comprehended. This paper attempts to examine a part of the thought process, with an eye to helping influence people to less hurtful actions.

Anderson, Brenda Lindley↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Manual Crew Override of Vehicle Landings Following G-Transitions

BACKGROUND Manual control during exploration spaceflight consists of both planned automated supervisory control and unplanned crew override. This crew override capability is critical to enable overall mission success during landing contingencies. However, the introduction of manual override capabilities must be implemented to enable crews to mitigate risks introduced by human error. Adaptive changes in the sensorimotor system can manifest during g-transitions as spatial disorientation. While training and landing aids enable successful landing through disorientation, these adaptive changes may increase cognitive demand that needs to be accounted for in the manual control strategy. It is important to characterize these effects as soon as possible following the G-transition to develop appropriate countermeasures. METHODS In this study, we will examine operational piloting tasks following International Space Station (ISS) missions in a simulated lunar landing using a six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) motion base. The motion-based simulation will be implemented in our laboratory at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and will be available within hours following the return from commercial crew landings. The primary goals of this study are (1) to understand the impact of spaceflight on crew ability to perform manual crew override tasks, (2) to examine how adaptive changes in vestibular and cognitive function relate to changes in manual crew override proficiency, and (3) compare performance during late “just-in-time” on-board training with early post-flight crew performance. The impact of spaceflight on piloting capability will be assessed from pre- versus post-flight changes in crewmembers assigned to either short duration (< 30 day) or long duration (~6- month) missions to the International Space Station (ISS). Individual differences in post-flight vestibular and cognitive changes include motion sickness reports, measures of tilt motion perception accuracy and precision, and dual-task tracking. During the 6DOF lunar simulation, the crew will manually takeover attitude and rate-of-descent to the nominal or re-designated landing aim point during the approach phase. The outcome measures for the lunar crew override tasks will be the percent time maintaining actual vehicle states, e.g., attitude and rate-of-descent, within recommended guidance during the landing approach, number and maximum deviation outside limits, and root mean square error (RMSE). Given that “just-in-time” (JIT) training is an operational expectation for the Human Landing System (HLS) program, all participants will perform late inflight JIT training for each manual crew override task in which they will participate. Crew proficiency will be captured inflight during JIT training that will be implemented on a laptop with hand controllers to allow the crewmember to practice the landing task procedures like the approach implemented for JIT training with Shuttle landing and ISS telerobotic tasks. COUNTERMEASURE UPDATES The lunar lander simulation has been implemented onto a two-laptop display system where subjects select from alternative landing points, based upon avoiding hazards that the on-board system identifies during the landing. The subject makes inputs using a rotational hand controller (i.e., joystick) and a translational hand controller, which are processed by simulated vehicle dynamics to update the vehicle attitude and rate of descent. Subjects will utilize a combination of flight, situation, and status displays to monitor the state of the simulated vehicle. The simulation exports tilt and translation movements to a 6DOF motion base synced to visual movements and provides representative vestibular cues to the subject while performing the task inside an enclosed cabin featuring a simulated lunar out-the-window view and a heads-down lander cockpit view. RELEVANCE This project will deliver an operational demonstration of crew override capability following spaceflight and identify potential deficits that may require remediation. Comparison of individual vestibular and cognitive changes with crew override performance will help better characterize the manual control risks associated with sensorimotor alterations. The inclusion of “just-in-time” on-board training will ensure we are characterizing changes in override proficiency with this expected countermeasure in place. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The authors acknowledge contributions from Draper, HLS Joint Test Panel, Crew HLS Interfaces for Piloting Working Group, and Dynamic Skills Trainer (DST) Lab toward the development of the lunar landing simulation. This project is funded by the Human Health Countermeasures Element.

Austin M Bollinger↗
NASA NTRS2002

Skills, rules and knowledge in aircraft maintenance: errors in context

Automatic or skill-based behaviour is generally considered to be less prone to error than behaviour directed by conscious control. However, researchers who have applied Rasmussen's skill-rule-knowledge human error framework to accidents and incidents have sometimes found that skill-based errors appear in significant numbers. It is proposed that this is largely a reflection of the opportunities for error which workplaces present and does not indicate that skill-based behaviour is intrinsically unreliable. In the current study, 99 errors reported by 72 aircraft mechanics were examined in the light of a task analysis based on observations of the work of 25 aircraft mechanics. The task analysis identified the opportunities for error presented at various stages of maintenance work packages and by the job as a whole. Once the frequency of each error type was normalized in terms of the opportunities for error, it became apparent that skill-based performance is more reliable than rule-based performance, which is in turn more reliable than knowledge-based performance. The results reinforce the belief that industrial safety interventions designed to reduce errors would best be directed at those aspects of jobs that involve rule- and knowledge-based performance.

Aircraft↗
NASA NTRS1988

Human operator response to error-likely situations in complex engineering systems

The causes of human error in complex systems are examined. First, a conceptual framework is provided in which two broad categories of error are discussed: errors of action, or slips, and errors of intention, or mistakes. Conditions in which slips and mistakes might be expected to occur are identified, based on existing theories of human error. Regarding the role of workload, it is hypothesized that workload may act as a catalyst for error. Two experiments are presented in which humans' response to error-likely situations were examined. Subjects controlled PLANT under a variety of conditions and periodically provided subjective ratings of mental effort. A complex pattern of results was obtained, which was not consistent with predictions. Generally, the results of this research indicate that: (1) humans respond to conditions in which errors might be expected by attempting to reduce the possibility of error, and (2) adaptation to conditions is a potent influence on human behavior in discretionary situations. Subjects' explanations for changes in effort ratings are also explored.

Morris, Nancy M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Man-Machine Integration Design and Analysis System (MIDAS) v5: Augmentations, Motivations, and Directions for Aeronautics Applications

As automation and advanced technologies are introduced into transport systems ranging from the Next Generation Air Transportation System termed NextGen, to the advanced surface transportation systems as exemplified by the Intelligent Transportations Systems, to future systems designed for space exploration, there is an increased need to validly predict how the future systems will be vulnerable to error given the demands imposed by the assistive technologies. One formalized approach to study the impact of assistive technologies on the human operator in a safe and non-obtrusive manner is through the use of human performance models (HPMs). HPMs play an integral role when complex human-system designs are proposed, developed, and tested. One HPM tool termed the Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis System (MIDAS) is a NASA Ames Research Center HPM software tool that has been applied to predict human-system performance in various domains since 1986. MIDAS is a dynamic, integrated HPM and simulation environment that facilitates the design, visualization, and computational evaluation of complex man-machine system concepts in simulated operational environments. The paper will discuss a range of aviation specific applications including an approach used to model human error for NASA s Aviation Safety Program, and what-if analyses to evaluate flight deck technologies for NextGen operations. This chapter will culminate by raising two challenges for the field of predictive HPMs for complex human-system designs that evaluate assistive technologies: that of (1) model transparency and (2) model validation.

Gore, Brian F.↗