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At least 127 records · Page 7

Thermal Response Testing Takes a Step Forward

Oak Ridge National Labs has independently confirmed the accuracy of a new breakthrough Advanced Thermal Response Test (TRT) method that it claims “uses less than half of the test time, allows for a fluctuating or interruptible heat flux, performs quality validation of a GHEX installation, and yields new insights into ground thermal conductivity that warrant further research.” The new Advanced TRT approach will reduce costs and, for the first time, also determine the actual thermal conductivity of grout as it is installed. As everyone in the ground source heat pump (GSHP) industry knows, assuring the quality of the grout job of a ground heat exchanger (GHEX) is an especially vexing problem. Unless one is standing at the borehole head the entire time grouting is underway, they basically have no idea how good or bad the grouting job is or even if the loop pipe itself is installed correctly. This problem has been further brought to light with formal third party grout reports confirming that grout had been poured from the surface and that many loops were shorter than the specified depth in several projects

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PREPARATION OF U-PLANT FOR FINAL DEMOLITION AND DISPOSAL - 12109E

The U-Plant is one of the five major nuclear materials processing facilities at Hanford and was chosen as a pilot project to develop the modalities for closure of the other four facilities at Hanford and the rest of the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The remedy for this facility was determined by a Record of Decision (ROD) pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). That remedy was to 'Close in Place - Partially Demolished Structure'. The U-Plant facility is identified as the 221-U Building and is a large, concrete structure nominally 247m (810 ft) long, 20 M (66 ft) wide and 24 m (77 ft) high with approximately 9 m (30 ft) being below grade level. It is a robust facility with walls ranging from 0.9 m to 2.7 m (3 ft to 9 ft) thick. One large room extends the entire length of the building that provides access to 40 sub-grade processing cells containing tanks, piping and other components. The work breakdown was divided into three major deliverables: (1) Tank D-10 Removal: removal of Tank D-10, which contained TRU waste; (2) Equipment Disposition: placement of contaminated equipment in the sub-grade cells; and (3) Canyon Grouting: grouting canyon void spaces to the maximum extent practical. A large number of pieces of contaminated equipment (pumps, piping, centrifuges, tanks, etc) from other facilities that had been stored on the canyon operating floor were placed inside of the sub-grade cells as final disposition, grouted and the cell shield plug reinstalled. This action precluded a large volume of waste being transported to another burial site. Finally, {approx}19,000 m3 ({approx}25,000 yd3) of grout was placed inside of the cells (in and around the contaminated equipment), in the major galleries. the ventilation tunnel, the external ventilation duct, and the hot pipe trench to minimize the potential for void spaces and to reduce the mobility, solubility, and/or toxicity of the grouted waste. The interim condition of the facility is 'cold and dark'. Upon availability of funding the structure will have contamination fixative applied to all contaminated surfaces and may be explosively demolished, with the remaining structure buried under an engineered barrier.

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A Dual Regime Reactive Transport Model for Simulation of High Level Waste Tank Closure Scenarios - 13375

A numerical simulation framework is presented in this paper for estimating evolution of pH and release of major species from grout within high-level waste tanks after closure. This model was developed as part of the Cementitious Barriers Partnership. The reactive transport model consists of two parts - (1) transport of species, and (2) chemical reactions. The closure grout can be assumed to have varying extents of cracking and composition for performance assessment purposes. The partially or completely degraded grouted tank is idealized as a dual regime system comprising of a mobile region having solid materials with cracks and macro-pores, and an immobile/stagnant region having solid matrix with micropores. The transport profiles of the species are calculated by incorporating advection of species through the mobile region, diffusion of species through the immobile/stagnant region, and exchange of species between the mobile and immobile regions. A geochemical speciation code in conjunction with the pH dependent test data for a grout material is used to obtain a mineral set that best describes the trends in the test data of the major species. The dual regime reactive transport model predictions are compared with the release data from an up-flow column percolation test. The coupled model is then used to assess effects of crack state of the structure, rate and composition of the infiltrating water on the pH evolution at the grout-waste interface. The coupled reactive transport model developed in this work can be used as part of the performance assessment process for evaluating potential risks from leaching of a cracked tank containing elements of human health and environmental concern. (authors)

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Decommissioning an Active Historical Reactor Facility at the Savannah River Site - 13453

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is an 802 square-kilometer United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina, where Management and Operations are performed by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). In 2004, DOE recognized SRS as structure within the Cold War Historic District of national, state and local significance composed of the first generation of facilities constructed and operated from 1950 through 1989 to produce plutonium and tritium for our nation's defense. DOE agreed to manage the SRS 105-C Reactor Facility as a potentially historic property due to its significance in supporting the U.S. Cold War Mission and for potential for future interpretation. This reactor has five primary areas within it, including a Disassembly Basin (DB) that received irradiated materials from the reactor, cooled them and prepared the components for loading and transport to a Separation Canyon for processing. The 6,317 square meter area was divided into numerous work/storage areas. The walls between the individual basin compartments have narrow vertical openings called 'slots' that permit the transfer of material from one section to another. Data indicated there was over 830 curies of radioactivity associated with the basin sediments and approximately 9.1 M liters of contaminated water, not including a large quantity of activated reactor equipment, scrap metal, and debris on the basin floor. The need for an action was identified in 2010 to reduce risks to personnel in the facility and to eliminate the possible release of contaminants into the environment. The release of DB water could potentially migrate to the aquifer and contaminate groundwater. DOE, its regulators [U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)-Region 4 and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC)] and the SC Historical Preservation Office (SHPO) agreed/concurred to perform a non-time critical removal action for the In Situ Decommissioning (ISD) of the 105-C Disassembly Basin. ISD consisted of stabilization/isolation of remaining contaminated water, sediment, activated reactor equipment, and scrap metal by filling the DB with underwater non-structural grout to the appropriate (-4.877 meter) grade-level, thence with dry area non-structural grout to the final -10 centimeter level. The roof over the DB was preserved due to its potential historical significance and to prevent the infiltration of precipitation. Forced evaporation was the form of treatment implemented to remove the approximately 9.1 M liters of contaminated basin water. Using specially formulated grouts, irradiated materials and sediment were treated by solidification/isolation thus reducing their mobility, reducing radiation exposure and creating an engineered barrier thereby preventing access to the contaminants. Grouting provided a low permeability barrier to minimize any potential transport of contaminants to the aquifer. Efforts were made to preserve the historical significance of the Reactor in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act. ISD provides a cost effective means to isolate and contain residual radioactivity from past nuclear operations allowing natural radioactive decay to reduce hazards to manageable levels. This method limits release of radiological contamination to the environment, minimizes radiation exposure to workers, prevents human/animal access to the hazardous substances, and allows for ongoing monitoring of the decommissioned facility. Field construction was initiated in August 2011; evaporator operations commenced January 2012 and ended July 2012 with over 9 M liters of water treated/removed. Over 8,525 cubic meters of grout were placed, completing in August 2012. The project completed with an excellent safety record, on schedule and under budget. (authors)

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Solid Secondary Waste Immobilization in Cementitious Waste Forms at the Hanford Site - 19081

During operations of the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, solid secondary wastes (SSW) will be generated. These materials include HEPA filters, granular activated carbon (GAC), and silver mordenite (AgM). The planned disposal pathway for SSW is through solidification (blending) or encapsulation in a cementitious waste form and then disposal on site at the Hanford Site's Integrated Disposal Facility. Performance assessment evaluations of SSW forms have been performed; however, limited experimental data on simulated SSW is available as input. This paper will cover efforts to fill this gap in experimental data through testing of simulated SSW materials. Two grout formulations were used in the tests: 1) Hanford grout mix 5, a mix of 25 wt% ordinary Portland cement (OPC) and 75 wt% fly ash (FA); and 2) the Cast Stone dry blend of 47 wt% blast furnace slag, 45 wt% FA, and 8 wt% OPC. The sorption (Kd) of potential contaminants (iodide, iodate, technetium) to the grouts and SSW materials was investigated in simulated grout pore water. Waste forms containing GAC and AgM were prepared using the two grout formulations and characterized using scanning electron microscopy energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy and X-ray diffraction. Acquiring this information will further support the candidacy of cementitious waste forms to be used for disposal of SSW at Hanford. (authors)

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How do Early Age Geopolymers Respond to Gamma Irradiation Exposure? - 19515

Geopolymers have been proposed by the UK nuclear industry as a potential replacement for the currently accepted blend of Portland cement and supplementary cementitious materials, such as fly ash and blast furnace slag. This preferred grouting system is not ideal for the encapsulation of some problematic waste streams, such as oils and reactive metals. Metakaolin based geopolymers have been selected as the alternative grouting system, as this mitigates the supply risk which is currently associated with the supplementary cementitious materials described above. To allow these systems to be used as an alternative nuclear grouting system, the effect of irradiation on the 'neat' grout needs to be understood. The majority of the literature appears to present studies of the irradiation of aged grouts (3 - 7 days). This study will assess samples that have been irradiated at early age curing (20 hours). The effects of clay type and total dose will also be studied, and a comparison between the effects of rotary and flash calcined clays, irradiated to doses up to 1 MGy will be presented. The thermogravimetry data indicates that irradiation promotes the liberation of water and also the formation of carbonate species. The rotary calcined metakaolin liberates more water than the flash calcined metakaolin. Therefore, it is expected that the flash calcined system is more stable to irradiation. (authors)

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Thermal Analysis for SRS Saltstone Disposal Unit Facility

Saltstone Disposal Units (SDU) are long term disposal units for low activity grout produced from the solidification of decontaminated non-hazardous salt waste at SRS. The unit is a cylindrical disposal vault of 150 ft. in diameter and 23 ft. in height. The total volume the SDU can hold is 3 million gallons of grout. The hydration process of the grout material produces heat from an exothermic chemical reaction. If the grout reaches temperatures higher than the maximum safety temperature of 95 deg. C, cracks can start forming leading to contamination of the environment. The purpose of this study is to develop the optimal baseline domain boundary conditions and to perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the baseline modeling conditions. The following assumptions were made for the modeling calculations: - The system geometry is axisymmetric; - The system was at steady state; - Ambient temperature was set to 100 deg. F; - Air was assumed to be an incompressible ideal gas; - Radiation was neglected for a conservative estimation; - Natural convection for the SDU vapor space is assumed to be turbulent because Rayleigh number based on typical operating conditions is higher than 10{sup 8}; - Water tables were not taken into consideration. The following sensitivity analyses were performed to find the optimal domain boundary: - Mesh size sensitivity; - Soil depth sensitivity - Soil depth varied from 30 ft to 250 ft with a soil thickness of 90 ft; - Soil thickness sensitivity - Soil thickness varied from 30 ft to 270 ft with a soil depth of 180 ft; - Soil conductivity sensitivity - Soil thermal conductivity varied from 0.25 W/m-K to 1 W/m-K; - Ambient Temperature Sensitivity - Ambient temperature varied from 70 deg. F to 110 deg. F. For the thermal calculations, the temperature of the bottom of the soil was set to 17.4 deg. C. The heat flux on the roof of the building and surface of the earth is 163.2 W/m{sup 2}. The soil sides are set to be adiabatic. The sensitivity analysis shows that the mesh size has no effect on the numerical results. This is mainly due to a small convection zone and large conduction zones in the modeling domain. The optimal domain boundary was found to be a soil thickness of 90 ft and a soil depth of 150 ft. The different sensitivity analysis performed here shows the optimal boundary domain to be used for thermal calculations is a soil depth of 150 ft beneath the SDU and a soil thickness of 90 ft. Anything larger would produce similar solutions but at a longer computational time to solve. The maximum temperature was more sensitive to soil properties as shown here. While the ambient temperature affected the max temperature linearly. Most of the heat transfer takes place downward vertically between the SDU and the soil beneath it. Using the optimal domain boundary determined by the sensitivity analyses, the maximum thermal loading to keep the maximum grout temperature below 95 deg. C is 1.646 W/m{sup 3}.

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Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

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Numerical modeling study of a man-made low-permeability barrier for the compressed air energy storage in high-permeability aquifers

Compressed air energy storage (CAES) is a grid-scale energy storage technology for intermittent energy, as proven by the decades-long successful operation of two existing compressed air energy storage in cavern (CAESC) power plants. Because of the limited availability of salt domes appropriate for CAESC, the more widely available aquifers (compressed air energy storage in aquifers, CAESA) have recently attracted considerable attention as candidates for CAES. An ideal aquifer for CAESA is highly permeable around the well to facilitate easy injection and withdrawal of air, but the high-permeability region is surrounded by low-permeability zones to minimize the loss of injected air and decrease in energy efficiency. However, such ideal geological structures are not always available in nature. Therefore, the potential of creating man-made low-permeability barrier in high-permeability aquifers is very interesting. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of man-made low-permeability barriers in high-permeability aquifers using the numerical simulator TOUGH2/Gel to calculate the three-component flow (including a miscible gelling liquid). The simulation results show that an expected low-permeability barrier can be created by injecting grout with certain properties, and the altered aquifer performs well for CAESA. Additional sensitivity studies are also performed to reveal the effects of the various factors on the success of the low-permeability barrier creation, including the critical solidification concentration, the scale factor of the time dependence of the grout viscosity, the relative density of the grout, and the volume of the follow-up water injection. The results indicate that, in a horizontal aquifer, low critical solidification concentrations, and small scale factors are generally preferred and the density of grout should be close to that of the in situ water. For the given volume of the injected grout, there is an optimal follow-up water injection that will create the largest storage space without damaging the barrier. Furthermore, these results may help to extend the candidate sites for CAESA and the prospect of large scale energy storage.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Decommissioning of a facility in a historical reactor at SRS: achieving both historical significance preservation and effective in-situ decommissioning - 15275

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is an 802 square-kilometer United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina, where Management and Operations are performed by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS). In 2004, US DOE recognized SRS as a structure within the Cold War Historic District of national, state and local significance because it is composed of the first generation of facilities constructed and operated from 1950 through 1989 to produce plutonium and tritium for our nation's defense. US DOE agreed to manage the SRS 105-C Reactor Facility as a potentially historic property due to its significance in supporting the U.S. Cold War Mission and for potential for future interpretation. The Disassembly Basin (DB) in C Reactor was evaluated for action under CERCLA. Data indicated there were over 830 curies of radioactivity associated with the basin sediments and approximately 9.1 million (M) liters (L) of contaminated water, not including a large quantity of activated reactor equipment, scrap metal, and debris on the basin floor. The release of DB water could potentially migrate to the aquifer and contaminate groundwater. The need for an action was identified to reduce risks to personnel in the facility and to eliminate the possible release of contaminants into the environment. In-situ decommissioning was selected as the remedy. The remedial action proceeded in stages: -Above-grade modifications to the interior of DB building -Relocation of irradiated scrap and reactor components to the deepest segments of the DB - Construction of a metal building to house evaporators - Forced evaporation of the DB's radiologically contaminated water - Grouting with special hybrid grouts - Removal of the evaporators and temporary building. Since the building itself was not demolished and will remain unchanged in appearance with the exception of filling the DB with grout, this ISD removal action/methodology did not adversely impact the historical significance of the 105-C Reactor Building, in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act, nor did it adversely affect the ability to determine the full extent and details of preservation at some later date. Both special hybrid grout materials met all requirements. Overall average 7-day compressive strength for the dry area mix was 1.54 MPa (223 psi) and for the underwater mix 2.94 MPa (427 psi).Overall 28-day compressive strength for the dry area mix was 2.88 MPa (417 psi) and for the underwater mix 4.99 MPa (724 psi). A limited amount of testing was also performed at 91 days, where the overall compressive strength for the dry area mix was found to be 9.40 MPa (1363 psi) and for the underwater mix 13.98 MPa (2028 psi). All compressive strength values far exceeded the 0.34 MPa (50 psi) minimum requirements. The special, flowable-fill grouts designed and used for P- and R-Reactor ISD and used again for this 105-C ISD removal action resulted in considerable labor, cost, and schedule savings versus conventional materials. As an added bonus/benefit, the CO{sub 2} footprint of the SRS C-Reactor DB ISD was minimized by using a small amount of cement and byproduct material to produce the structural fill materials. (authors)

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Waste Management 2016 300-296 Soil Remediation Project. Developing Innovative Solutions to Overcome Design Challenges - 16229

The 324 Building is a non-reactor, Hazard Category 2, Nuclear Facility located in the 300 Area of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site, located near Richland, Washington. The building is undergoing deactivation, decommissioning, decontamination, and demolition by Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) under the River Corridor Closure Contract. During the Cold War Era, the facility was used for chemical and radionuclide processing associated with nuclear weapons production. Historical records indicate that in October 1986, approximately 516 L of a concentrated liquid waste stream containing cesium-137 and strontium-90 was spilled onto the floor of B-Cell. B-Cell is located in the Radiochemical Engineering Complex (REC) of the 324 Building. It is estimated that this spill contained approximately 1.3 million curies of radioactivity. Some fraction of the spill was recovered; however, an unknown quantity was released into the soil beneath the 324 Building through an undetected breach in the B-Cell floor sump. Unknown quantities of water were used after the spill to wash items contained in B-Cell. When B-Cell was taken out of service, wastes being removed from B-Cell were placed in Grout Containers (GCs) and stabilized using a particulate grout. In the course of grouting activities, grout was spilled on the floor of B-Cell, eventually filling the sump. The primary scope of this project is to design, test, and implement a process capable of removing and isolating contaminated soil below B-Cell. This remediation effort has been divided into two removal zones identified as the primary and secondary removal zones. Based on current assumptions and estimates, the primary phase of this cleanup effort will remove roughly 156.45 m{sup 3} of highly contaminated materials. B-Cell debris, particulate grout, and the floor slab and liner comprise about 21.24 m{sup 3} of the total. The remaining 135.21 m3 will be contaminated soil. All of this material must be disposed of within the existing 324 Facility or packaged for disposal at the Hanford site. The objective of this project is to remove the B-Cell floor and highly contaminated underlying soils from beneath B-Cell using remote equipment to reduce the radiation levels and allow open-air excavation for the remaining contaminated soil. The challenges and subsequent technological solutions encountered from the Conceptual Design phase to the 100% Design Issued For Fabrication/Issued For Construction (IFF/IFC) consisted in part of the following: Design an efficient remote cleanup strategy for highly contaminated Low Level Waste (LLW) given the unknowns. Maintain contamination control down to 18 feet below B-Cell in a highly radioactive environment (12,870 R/Hr Cs-137 and Sr-90). Perform facility upgrades to enable remediation process implementation while maintaining integrity of pre-existing facility structure and license. Designing first-of-a-kind remote equipment for use in high radiation areas. Developing first-of-a-kind operations sequences for remote equipment while minimizing usage of original facility equipment (i.e. cranes, manipulators, etc.). Conducting time-motion studies of operations sequences to maximize efficiency while keeping dose As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) in a high dose environment. Construction of a full scale mockup to conduct performance testing in a clean environment and train the work force to operate the equipment. Overcoming scope, budget and schedule constraints associated with a fast-track DOE project. (authors)

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SALTSTONE 2QCY11 TCLP RESULTS

The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) receives waste from Tank 50H for treatment. In the second quarter of the 2011 calendar year (2QCY11), Tank 50H accepted transfers of approximately 15 kgal from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), approximately 2 kgal from Tank 710 - the H-Canyon General Purpose Evaporator, approximately 63 kgal from the HCanyon Super Kukla campaign, approximately 370 kgal from the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (ARP/MCU) Decontaminated Salt Solution Hold Tank (DSS-HT), and approximately 10 kgal from other sources. The Saltstone Grout Sampling plan provides the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution which is to be disposed of in the Z-Area Solid Waste Landfill (SWLF). During operation, samples were collected from Tank 50H and grout samples prepared to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24(b) and R.61-79.268.48(a). Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was asked to prepare saltstone from samples of Tank 50H obtained April 5, 2011 during 2QCY11 to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout. The samples were cured and shipped to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group-Radioisotope and Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (B&W TSG-RACL) to perform the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) and subsequent extract analysis on saltstone samples for the analytes required for the quarterly analysis saltstone sample. In addition to the eight toxic metals - arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury, lead, selenium and silver - analytes included the underlying hazardous constituents (UHC) antimony, beryllium, nickel, and thallium which could not be eliminated from analysis by process knowledge. B&W TSGRACL provided subsamples to GEL Laboratories, LLC for analysis for the UHCs benzene, phenols and total and amenable cyanide.

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Saltstone 3QCY11 TCLP Results

A Saltstone waste form was prepared in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) from a Tank 50H sample and Z-Area premix material for the third quarter of calendar year 2011 (3QCY11). After the prescribed 32 day cure, samples of the saltstone were collected, and the waste form was shown to meet the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24 and R.61-79.268.48(a) requirements for a nonhazardous waste form with respect to RCRA metals and underlying hazardous constituents. These analyses met all quality assurance specifications of USEPA SW-846. The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) receives waste from Tank 50H for treatment. In the third quarter of the 2011 calendar year (3QCY11), Tank 50H accepted transfers of approximately 20 kgal from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), approximately 236 kgal from the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (ARP/MCU) Decontaminated Salt Solution Hold Tank (DSS-HT), and approximately 25 kgal from other sources. The Saltstone Grout Sampling plan provides the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution which is to be disposed of in the Z-Area Solid Waste Landfill (SWLF). During operation, samples were collected from Tank 50H and grout samples prepared to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24(b) and R.61-79.268.48(a). Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was asked to prepare saltstone from samples of Tank 50H obtained July 7, 2011 during 3QCY11 to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout. The samples were cured and shipped to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group-Radioisotope and Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (B&W TSG-RACL) to perform the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) and subsequent extract analysis on saltstone samples for the analytes required for the quarterly analysis saltstone sample. In addition to the eight toxic metals - arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury, lead, selenium and silver - analytes included the underlying hazardous constituents (UHC) antimony, beryllium, nickel, and thallium which could not be eliminated from analysis by process knowledge. B&W TSG-RACL provided subsamples to GEL Laboratories, LLC for analysis for the UHCs benzene, phenols and total and amenable cyanide.

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Variability of K d Values in Cementitious Materials and Sediments

Measured distribution coefficients (K d values) for environmental contaminants provide input data for performance assessments (PA) that evaluate physical and chemical phenomena for release of radionuclides from wasteforms, degradation of engineered components and subsequent transport of radionuclides through environmental media. Research efforts at SRNL to study the effects of formulation and curing variability on the physiochemical properties of the saltstone wasteform produced at the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) are ongoing and provide information for the PA and Saltstone Operations. Furthermore, the range and distribution of plutonium K d values in soils is not known. Knowledge of these parameters is needed to provide guidance for stochastic modeling in the PA. Under the current SRS liquid waste processing system, supernate from F & H Tank Farm tanks is processed to remove actinides and fission products, resulting in a low-curie Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS). At the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF), DSS is mixed with premix, comprised of blast furnace slag (BFS), Class F fly ash (FA), and portland cement (OPC) to form a grout mixture. The fresh grout is subsequently placed in SDF vaults where it cures through hydration reactions to produce saltstone, a hardened monolithic waste form. Variation in saltstone composition and cure conditions of grout can affect the saltstone's physiochemical properties. Variations in properties may originate from variables in DSS, premix, and water to premix ratio, grout mixing, placing, and curing conditions including time and temperature (Harbour et al. 2007; Harbour et al. 2009). There are no previous studies reported in the literature regarding the range and distribution of K d values in cementitious materials. Presently, the Savannah River Site (SRS) estimate ranges and distributions of K d values based on measurements of K d values made in sandy SRS sediments (Kaplan 2010). The actual cementitious material K d values and solubility values differ from the sandy sediments. The K d value range and distribution currently used in the PA are estimated to range between 0.25*K d and 1.75*K d , where the minimum and maximum values of the ranges reflect the 95% confidence level for the mean K d value (Kaplan 2010). The objective of the research with cementitious materials was to measure the range and distribution of a monovalent (Cs) and I - (anion), divalent (Sr), and trivalent (Eu) ions for a variety of laboratory-prepared saltstone surrogate samples to establish a K d range other than that which is presently used in the PA. It has been observed in laboratory samples that cure temperature profiles can affect properties such as heat of hydration, permeability, porosity, compressive strength, and set time (Harbour et al. 2009). The intent was to identify a range and distribution that could be used by stochastic modelers for the PA. Furthermore, the intent was to replace the arbitrarily selected distributions based on geological sandy sediments and to base it on actual cementitious materials. The scope of this study did not include understanding saltstone sorption mechanisms responsible for increasing or decreasing sorption. Similar to the work with cementitious materials, the purpose of the Pu sediment K d dataset was not to attempt to understand through statistics how to better understand Pu sorption to sediments or to lower Pu K d variance. The sediment Pu K d data is included in this study because it is a key risk driver for the PAs on the SRS, and there is presently no direct studies of Pu variability in SRS soils. Instead the distribution of Pu sediment K d values was assumed to be similar to other cations, as presented by Kaplan (2010).

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Effects of SRPPF ARS Effluent Variations on Magnesium Oxysulfate Solidification

A magnesium oxysulfate (MOS) grout formulation has been identified to solidify the liquid effluent from the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) Aqueous Recovery System (ARS). The formulation uses reactive, light burnt MgO (28 wt%), anhydrous MgSO 4 (10 wt%), and dead burnt MgO (62 wt%), resulting in a grout with good mixability, acceptable density, acceptable setting times, and a leachate pH around 9.4, within the assumed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) brine pH range. A series of tests were then designed to observe how this formula reacted to variations in the liquid effluent. Liquid effluent temperature, the caustic pH level, concentration of NaNO 3 , and the presence of neutralization products, trace metals, and/or sodium sulfate (all potential residuals found in the effluent from upstream processing), were evaluated to see how each impacts the grout mixing time, peak temperature, setting time, presence of bleed water, leachate pH, and density. The standard mix has an average mixing time of 18 minutes, peak temperature of 100.5 °C, and set time of 60 minutes. Increasing the temperature of the liquid effluent increased the reaction rate of the mix and reduced mixing and setting times. Between 30 and 40°C the change was relatively small, raising no more than 6 °C compared to the standard mix maximum temperature. Increasing the pH of the liquid effluent had no significant impact on the mix. The addition of neutralization products and trace metals had an overall impact of decreasing the reactivity of the mix. The addition of more ions in the liquid effluent, such as an increase in the concentration of NaNO 3 and the addition of Na 2 SO 4 , generally decreased the reactivity of the mix. None of the variations to the liquid effluent hindered solidification as indicated by the lack of bleed water found on all the samples. The leachate pH values for all mixes tested did not significantly vary from the expected pH of 9.4 and none of the density values fell below 1.8 g/cm 3 . Overall, changes to the liquid effluent were found to have a minimal impact on the formulation suggesting the grout's ability to properly form despite increased temperatures and the presence of residuals typically found in the liquid effluent from the ARS.

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SALTSTONE 3QCY09 TCLP RESULTS

A Saltstone waste form was prepared in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) from a Tank 50H sample and Z-Area premix material for the third quarter of calendar year 2009 (3QCY09). After the prescribed 28 day cure, samples of the saltstone were collected, and the waste form was shown to meet the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24 and R.61-79.268.48(a) requirements for a nonhazardous waste form with respect to RCRA metals and underlying hazardous constituents. These analyses met all quality assurance specifications of USEPA SW-846. The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) receives waste from Tank 50H for treatment. In the third quarter of the 2009 calendar year (3QCY09), Tank 50H accepted transfers of approximately 37 kgal from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP) waste, approximately 5 kgal from Tank 710 - the H-Canyon General Purpose Evaporator, approximately 26 kgal from Tank 221H, approximately 319 kgal from the Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) Decontaminated Salt Solution Hold Tank (DSS-HT), and approximately 358 kgal from Tank 23H. The Saltstone Grout Sampling plan provides the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution which is to be disposed of in the Z-Area Solid Waste Landfill (ISWLF). During operation, samples were collected from Tank 50H and grout samples prepared to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24(b) and R.61-79.268.48(a). Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was asked to prepare saltstone from a sample of Tank 50H obtained August 5, 2009 during 3QCY09 to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout. The samples were cured and shipped to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group-Radioisotope and Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (B&WTSG-RACL) to perform the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) and subsequent extract analysis on saltstone samples for the analytes required for the quarterly analysis saltstone sample. In addition to the eight toxic metals-arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury, lead, selenium and silver-analytes included the underlying hazardous constituents (UHC) antimony, beryllium, nickel, and thallium which could not be eliminated from analysis by process knowledge. B&WTSG-RACL provided subsamples to GEL Laboratories, LLC for analysis for the UHCs benzene, phenols and total and amenable cyanide.

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PERFORMANCE PROPERTIES OF SALTSTONE PRODUCED USING SWPF SIMULANTS

The overwhelming majority of waste to be immobilized at the Saltstone Production Facility will come from the waste stream exiting the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). These SWPF batches are salt solutions that result from pretreatment of the High Level Waste (HLW) supernate by an Actinide Removal Process followed by Caustic Side Solvent Extraction. The concentration of aluminate within these streams will vary and be determined by (1) the concentration in the incoming salt waste stream, (2) the degree of aluminum leaching from the HLW, (3) the method for introducing the aluminate into the waste stream (continuous or batch) and (4) and any operational or regulatory limitations. The overall Performance Assessment outcome for the Saltstone Disposal Facility will depend significantly on the performance properties of the SWPF Saltstone grouts. This report identifies and quantifies, when possible, those factors that drive the performance properties of the projected SWPF grouts. Previous work has identified aluminate concentration in the salt waste stream as a key factor in determining performance. Consequently, significant variation in the aluminate concentration to a maximum level of 0.65 M was investigated in this report. The SWPF baseline grout is a mix with a 0.60 water to cementitious ratio and a premix composition of 45 wt % slag, 45 wt % fly ash and 10 wt % portland cement. The key factors that drive performance of the SWPF mixes were determined to be (1) the time/temperature profile for curing, (2) water to cementitious materials ratio, (3) aluminate concentration in the waste stream, and (4) wt % slag in the premix. An increase in the curing temperature for mixes with 45 wt % slag resulted in a 2.5 times decrease in Young's modulus. The reduction of Young's modulus measured at 60 C versus 22 C was mitigated by an increase in the aluminate concentration but was still significant. For mixes containing 60 wt % slag, the reduction in Young's modulus between these two curing temperatures was significantly lessened. The importance of curing conditions can not be overemphasized. The gain realized in performance by, e.g., a higher level of aluminate or wt % slag or a reduction in w/cm ratio, can be offset by the effects of a higher curing temperature. In fact, the final performance properties of a mix cured at 60 C can be lower than the initial values before any of the performance enhancing changes are introduced. Control of the time/temperature curing profile can be managed by pour schedules and other temperature control measures. The reduction in performance at higher curing temperatures is consistent with results obtained in a separate study. Although preliminary, results from this task on the measurement of hydraulic conductivity at MACTEC showed that curing of a Saltstone mix at 60 C increased the hydraulic conductivity by several orders of magnitude. The permeability data are based on only one mix but, were consistent with a measured reduction in Young's modulus for these same samples. Therefore, it is recommended that impact of curing temperature on performance properties be further investigated. An increase in dynamic Young's modulus (indicator of performance) is observed as the water to cementitious materials (w/cm) ratio decreases. The w/cm ratio is a process parameter which can be adjusted to improve performance as long as the processing properties of the grout are still within an operational window that will lead to successful placement. The same conclusions apply to wt % slag in the premix. That is, an increase in the wt % slag at the expense of fly ash in the premix increases Young's modulus and performance. An increase in wt % slag (as with a decrease in w/cm ratio) increases viscosity and yield stress and a final mix design must be balanced such that acceptable processing properties are obtained. The performance properties of SWPF mixes show a non-linear dependence on aluminate concentration. As the aluminate concentration is increased from 0.1 M to 0.25 M, the Young's modulus and compressive strength increase and the porosity is reduced. Consistent with this improvement in performance is an increase in the heat of hydration, reflective of an increase in the degree of hydration. Higher degrees of hydration in mixes generally lead to better performance. In the region of 0.25 to 0.45 M aluminate, very little additional change is observed in any of the properties. A further increase in the aluminate concentration from 0.45 M to 0.65 M leads to a slight reduction in Young's modulus. It was observed however, that the values of Young's modulus for samples cured at 22 C decreased after approximately 50 days. This was the first time a reduction in Young's modulus was observed as a function of time and is most likely correlated with the high levels of aluminate present in these mixes. This reduction can be accounted for by cracking of the Saltstone samples with time.

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SALTSTONE 1QCY10 TCLP RESULTS

The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) receives waste from Tank 50H for treatment. In the first quarter of the 2010 calendar year (1QCY10), Tank 50H accepted transfers of approximately 32 kgal from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), approximately 10 kgal from Tank 710 - the H-Canyon General Purpose Evaporator, approximately 32 kgal from the H-Canyon Super Kukla campaign, and approximately 26 kgal from the Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) Decontaminated Salt Solution Hold Tank (DSS-HT). The Saltstone Grout Sampling plan provides the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution which is to be disposed of in the Z-Area Solid Waste Landfill (ISWLF). During operation, samples were collected from Tank 50H and grout samples prepared to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-79.261.24(b) and R.61-79.268.48(a). Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was asked to prepare saltstone from samples of Tank 50H obtained January 8, 2010 during 1QCY10 to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout. The samples were cured and shipped to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group-Radioisotope and Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (B&W TSG-RACL) to perform the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) and subsequent extract analysis on saltstone samples for the analytes required for the quarterly analysis saltstone sample. In addition to the eight toxic metals - arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury, lead, selenium and silver - analytes included the underlying hazardous constituents (UHC) antimony, beryllium, nickel, and thallium which could not be eliminated from analysis by process knowledge. B&W TSG-RACL provided subsamples to GEL Laboratories, LLC for analysis for the UHCs benzene, phenols and total and amenable cyanide.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗